

JOHANN GUSTAV DROYSEN

HISTORY OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT



Translated from the German by Flora Kimmich

Preface by G. W. Bowersock

Foreword by A. B. Bosworth

American Philosophical Society • 2012

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BY

FLORA KIMMICH

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

Johann Gustav Droysen, master stylist that he was, wrote and did not re-read. Only so can one account for the inadvertent repetitions of entire words or word stems that swarm through his paragraphs, undisturbed by an editor's blue pencil. My translation extends to light editing that removes these lapses. It also trims sparingly, but sternly, what to my ear are pronouncements of common knowledge and statements of the obvious. More rarely, and still sparingly, I have removed unnecessary and debilitating reformulations of a point that has been adequately made and felicitously expressed.

In three instances, I have transposed short passages in the interest of narrative continuity: Parmenion taking booty after Gaugamela, Perdikkas dispatched to a neighboring town before Agalassa, and final gifts from the princes of the upper Indus and arrival of ships built by the Xathras.

Where Droysen gives modern place names (usually in the notes) I have adopted the orthography found on current British or American tourist maps of Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, and of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India and adjacent corners of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, sometimes with Droysen's spelling of the name in parentheses. The orthography of ancient names, by contrast, I have kept as Greek as I dared.

My translation of the notes retains references to Droysen's many and voluminous appendices, which I have not translated. Measures of distance appear as in the original; Droysen's "one mile" is equivalent to about five English miles.

The notes as they appear in the 1877 edition of *Alexander* may fairly be described as chaotic. I have edited them thoroughly and redivided, rearranged, and redistributed them so as to attach them properly to the main text. The French translation, executed in Droysen's lifetime by a team under the supervision of Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, aided my efforts (though it did not determine the result), and I have adopted Bouché's

emendations of Droysen's Latin and Greek citations and of all numerals. In matters of translation, however, especially of not a few passages of opaque or ambiguous German in the notes, my rendering into English often differs significantly from the French.

Droysen wrote a sonorous prose that has been called Latinate, but is in fact characteristically German. I have endeavored to turn this retardative style into a limpid, readily intelligible English that preserves something of the elevated tone and amplitude of the original, but is above all fluent, accessible, and easy to read. To that end, I have habitually resolved Droysen's great hypotaxes, often sustained over entire long paragraphs, into unadorned Anglo-Saxon parataxes that nonetheless accumulate and culminate, after the fashion of the original.

My usage is conservative, in keeping with an original written in the nineteenth century and a subject that belongs to ancient times. When a state appears as an actor in a political or military drama of some complexity, I use the pronoun "she" to complete the personification and to help clarify antecedents; I use "men" and the indefinite "he" to signify persons male and female, as the context warrants.

To help orient the reader in a forest of proper names no longer taught in school, I have appended "People, Places, Battles," a set of identifications specific to Droysen's *Alexander*.

PREFACE

Finally, well over a century after the last edition to appear in the author's lifetime, the monumental history of Alexander the Great by Johann Gustav Droysen is accessible in an English translation. Readers are fortunate that this is a rendering that catches all the complexity, subtlety, and literary panache of the original. The book was never easy to read, because of its philosophical density, historical detail, and hypotactic style, but it was, from the beginning, an unambiguous paean to the power of a single great man to change the course of history. Alexander not only conquered realms that Greeks before him knew only from legend and literature, such as Aeschylus's play *The Persians*, but he also, in Droysen's perspective, hellenized the Middle East in a way that prepared for the coming of Christianity through the medium of the Greek New Testament.

The career of Alexander had four great expositors after Droysen, and all worked in the shadow of turbulent events that occurred in the twentieth century. The first was another German, Helmut Berve, whose great work *Das Alexanderreich* of 1926 dissected the administrative and prosopographical structure of Alexander's empire. Berve was a meticulous scholar, but his subsequent espousal of National Socialism inevitably appeared to reflect enthusiasm for Hitler as a potential conqueror in Alexander's mold. This has left a lasting, though unwarranted stain on a scholarly achievement that was undoubtedly the most substantial contribution to Alexander scholarship between Droysen's death and the end of the Second World War.

Berve's authority in the field then passed to a British scholar, William Woodthorpe Tarn, who had written an influential work in 1933, *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind*, which famously resuscitated the visionary conqueror that Droysen had imagined. But Tarn's most enduring work came after the Second World War in an immense volume of critical analyses of the ancient Alexander sources. This was designed to provide the fullest possible documentation for a slim companion volume of

unadorned narrative. Both volumes appeared in 1948. In them Tarn developed further what he believed to be Alexander's policy of fusion, to unite peoples of differing ethnic and religious backgrounds. The reprise of his prewar case for a grand ambition to join together different cultures and nations spoke to a world still reeling from the horrors of Dunkirk, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.

In the second half of the twentieth century Ernst Badian reopened the entire Alexander dossier with a cool analytical and prosopographical revisionism that he had learned from his teacher Ronald Syme. In *The Roman Revolution*, published in 1939 with an eye to events unfolding in Europe, Syme had depicted the rise of Augustus as the consequence of a cynical manipulation of the traditional Roman constitution through which a monarchy took shape under the guise of a restored Republic. In a series of articles Badian sought a similar cynicism and calculation in the policies of Alexander, and with extraordinary brilliance he successfully refashioned the image of Alexander into something far less heroic than Droysen, Berve, or Tarn would have recognized.

Badian's successor in these studies toward the end of the twentieth century was A. B. Bosworth, who combined a deep knowledge of the ancient sources with a broad understanding of the Macedonian monarchy from which Alexander emerged. He was less concerned than Badian to subvert accepted opinion, but no less dedicated to ferreting out the truth from the written record. The fundamental ancient text for all historians of Alexander has always been the *History of Alexander* that Arrian, a Greek-speaking rhetorician and philosopher from Asia Minor, had written in the first half of the second century AD. Bosworth undertook to write the first detailed commentary on this work, a magisterial achievement in two large volumes, published in 1980 and 1995. He successfully anchored Alexander studies so securely in the ancient testimony that flamboyant or revisionist accounts such as those that had gone before had now to be reassessed in the light of it.

The American Philosophical Society is greatly indebted to Bosworth for his willingness to contribute a foreword to this translation of Droysen's *Alexander*. He has done this in the face of overwhelming problems of health that threatened to curtail his ability to write. As the most recent of the four major historians who have carried on the work that began with Droysen, Bosworth's name on the foreword that follows does honor to this first English publication of Droysen's masterpiece.

G. W. Bowersock

FOREWORD

Droysen: *Alexander the Great*

Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884) was one of the leading figures of historical studies in the nineteenth century. He was no shrinking violet, and he went so far as to proclaim himself the greatest historian of all time. That was taking self-praise much too far, but there are aspects of his work that are truly remarkable. Although trained as a classical philologist by the great August Boeckh in Berlin, he scandalized philologists of his time by preferring theory to source criticism, and this brought him the hostility of the historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). Droysen displayed a titanic appetite for hard work, which kept him at a breakneck pace for years on end. One can only admire his work on the Attic dramatists, which involved complete translations of tragedy and comedy, accompanied not merely by grammatical notes but full-scale commentaries.

By Christmas 1833 Droysen had become a familiar figure in Berlin society. His father had served as chaplain to Blücher in the War of Liberation and had obviously made important contacts by the time of his death in 1816. It was this group of senior soldiers that organized a subscription to cover at least some of the expenses of the young Droysen's education, but the important influence came from the household of the Mendelssohn–Bartholdy family, where in 1827 he was appointed domestic tutor for the brilliant young musician Felix. Droysen was treated like one of the family, as his extant correspondence with Felix shows. Droysen obtained a post as Privatdozent at the University of Berlin in 1833, which was the year in which he published his *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*. In early 1840 he moved from Berlin to Kiel, where he took up a junior professorship. Kiel was a small harbor town with some 12,000 inhabitants and a university with an outstanding faculty. Apart from Droysen himself there was the young Theodor Mommsen, who was working on the *Roman History* that brought him, many years later, one of the first Nobel Prizes. Here Droysen could work at his usual frenetic pace. In the years between 1833

and 1843 he produced no fewer than 750 pages of text in the two volumes of his *Geschichte des Hellenismus*.

In 1852 Droysen finally accepted a chair in Jena that he had declined in 1846, and he remained there until 1859. By now his historical interests had led him to prefer teaching modern history to ancient, although he continued to offer instruction in the latter to an increasingly sparse audience. He gave up his scholarly work on ancient history and allegedly refused to consider a publisher's request to write a *Greek History* as a pendant to Mommsen's great work on Rome.

In his work on antiquity, to which he returned several decades later, he can already be seen trying to find a way out of the historical straitjacket of Alexander and Hellenism. A striking example of this comes in the opening chapter of his biography of Alexander. In the first edition of this text (1833) Droysen undertakes to explain the origins of civilization in Hegelian terms. He takes the story from the beginning of creation, and follows its progress step by step, aiming ultimately at a union of East and West so close that many writers have written of fusion. Droysen's biography of Alexander begins as follows, with a typical example of the historian's youthful rhetoric:

Few men and few peoples have allocated them the privilege of a higher destiny than existence, of a higher immortality than timeless vegetation, than the nonentity of the disembodied soul. All are called, but on those whom History selects as the champions of victory, and the artisans of her thoughts, she bestows the immortality of fame, to shine like stars in the twilight of eternal being. He whose life rises above the sterile twilight of the temporal is denied peace in life and enjoyment of the present, and on him rests the destiny of a future; his aspiration becomes a lonely anxiety and unceasing labor for an end that is only achieved by his death; and even the quiet of the grave is disturbed by the boisterous funeral games over his heroic weapons and a new wilder struggle of the agitated peoples. Thus the chaos of humanity presses on wave after wave: over the waters soars the spirit of God, an everlasting Being, a creation without a Sabbath.

The future historian, a mere 25 years old, shows his colors in this brilliant prose. He selects a famous passage of Aristotle's *Politics* (3. 1284^a 3–12) to characterize the man of superlative excellence and declares, "There is no law that can be invoked against him, for he is himself law." With that Hegel comes to the fore again through the appeal to an evolution

from thesis and antithesis to synthesis in the great man who, confronted by laws and tradition, himself becomes law. It is interesting that Droysen himself appears infrequently in those passages of super-heated rhetoric that begin his biography of Alexander. His aim was to exhibit *Hellenismus* in action, to demonstrate that the Macedonian army was the instrument by which the work of the new age was consecrated and a match for any danger. Despite the disputes and disorder that Alexander's successors subsequently inflicted on his kingdom and the Hellenistic way of life that he introduced, Droysen continued to see in Alexander's conquests a unification of all things Greek under the Macedonian name. Droysen saw this as a fusion established for centuries to come and destined to endure.

In revising the Alexander biography in 1877 and republishing it as the first volume of his *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, Droysen enlarged his definition of the Hellenistic way of life as the force that united the Greek and Asiatic worlds. His language is carefully chosen and draws a sharp distinction between Hellenic and Hellenistic. He uses the latter as a concept to cover a specific field, both chronologically and geographically. Its correlative noun *Hellenismus*, which signifies both the Hellenistic age and its culture, was his name for what arose after Alexander's death and extended across the so-called Fertile Crescent, beginning in southern Egypt and continuing into Mesopotamia and Babylonia. Alexander had been able to extend his activities across the entirety of this geographical bloc, so that the world became his oyster as well as the realm of his successor kings, the Ptolemies in Egypt and the Seleucids in Syria. What Droysen and historians ever since have called the Hellenistic period had been known to the generation of his teacher Boeckh as the Macedonian age.

Droysen's immensely influential change in terminology reflected one of the most striking features of his work, namely, his devotion to Lutheran orthodoxy. In this view, historical events were no arbitrary or incoherent acts of divine will, but embodied God's determination, from the beginning, to guide, nurture, and consecrate Jews and heathens alike in anticipation of the coming of Christ.

This view seems to have arisen from Droysen's early contacts with his publisher, Friedrich Perthes, who had developed a close epistolary relation with the young scholar. By the end of 1833 Droysen had been ready to present a manuscript, which Perthes accepted. It looks as though Perthes

had solicited its author's views on the state of philosophy in Germany, and what emerged was a triadic structure that Droysen associated with three separate schools:

- (i) Friedrich Christoph Schlosser, dismissed as superficial rubbish;
- (ii) Leopold von Ranke, criticized for placing excessive emphasis on factual accuracy;
- (iii) Hegelians, an influential group of philosophers who concentrated on political philosophy under the influence of Hegel's thought.

In sharp contrast Droysen insisted that the basis of all human knowledge is empirical. Between 1843 and 1848 he followed what might be termed a road map for peace among these factions. In particular the year 1843 was groundbreaking. For his program Droysen used the historical tradition of the Reformation as his template, as well as a personal connection with the Prussian monarchy that he had cultivated at least since 1829. He allowed himself to present a blend of dialectical opposites, with the classical and medieval periods balancing each other and ultimately coming together in another impressive display of fusion. Droysen conceived of antiquity in terms of a tendency to remove God and the supernatural, whereas he saw the Reformation as filled with political promise. What happened then could instruct aspiring historians in the nature of historical change.

At the center of Droysen's thinking was the Prussian monarch, whom he regarded as the driving force for change. The process of re-orientation had begun long ago in Greece with the Athenians' self-destruction, followed by the appearance of Alexander as a great man who could become, in the Aristotelian sense, law. It continued through the centuries of Greek paganism that followed until traditional polytheism retreated as the Christian doctrine of the word made flesh eventually prevailed. It was clearly necessary to link God with the world. That was why Droysen admired the Reformation so deeply and considered it to be the start of modern history. Modernity in his view eliminated what was dross and combined what was best in the preceding stages. It merged a profound enthusiasm for classical antiquity with a more comprehensive religious outlook that embraced "the Hellenistic centuries."

By devoting himself wholeheartedly to the promotion of Hellenistic values, Droysen was now in a position to combine Christianity with the positive secular values of classical Athens. For him the term *Hellenismus*

brought together different strains of religious thought, and the Hellenistic period ended not with Augustus but with Jesus. Alexander the Great was the central pre-Christian figure. His military victories were the culmination of the antithesis between East and West, and his absolute powers were the basis for the cultural change that he initiated. Under his regime Alexander set in motion a policy of amalgamation that explicitly placed Persians and Macedonians side by side.

Droysen himself was engaged in a bitter struggle against Wilhelm Adolph Schmidt, who was his successor at Jena and, like him, a pupil of August Boeckh, as well as a pupil of Ranke. In a long review Schmidt had complained that Droysen, like Ranke, separated theoretical historical study from the critical examination of sources. Boeckh had famously encouraged both kinds of work. Droysen reacted sharply against Schmidt's complaint and suggested that his was the work of an immature youth (in fact, Schmidt was merely four years his junior) tackling problems beyond his grasp. Droysen could thus present himself as the perfect answer to the "source school" of Ranke.

But Droysen was never in a position that would give him real power and influence within political circles. The closest he came was his participation in the debates that were held throughout the troubled year 1843, when he delivered the so-called Verdun Oration. This was presented in conjunction with a splendid affair held in the city of Verdun to celebrate the 1000th anniversary of the three grandsons of the Frankish monarch, Louis the Pious, and the consolidation of Germany into a substantial kingdom. The celebrations were a reaction to French threats against the Rhineland in 1840 that had stirred the collective emotions of the populace.

The Prussian king, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, had established a Verdun Prize to be awarded for the best work on regional history, and members of the Ranke faction joined in launching a new periodical. This was intended to be the forerunner of a grandiose program of publication in which there would be a comprehensive compilation of available source material. Droysen was prepared, as he would have us believe, to make use of an extensive network of contacts that he had built up over the years (see, for instance, his interview with the Prussian Culture Minister Haldenstein in February 1834)¹ so as to provide access to the archives. He is attested as operating on a modest scale of confidentiality with the

Nippel (2008), 20–22.

Prussian monarch, to whom he sent the first volume of his *Hellenismus*. We do not know what the King made of this gift, but it is likely enough that Droysen himself proposed that he give his Verdun Oration, which he declared to have been a great success. It was certainly a bravura performance, skillfully disguising its main nationalist theme, mentioned only in passing, but it had a strong impact. There is no doubt that Droysen outstripped Ranke, who had attempted to annex the Verdun commemoration for his own purpose and had sent two of his acolytes to complicate the proceedings. Droysen's oration became a showpiece of erudition on the subject of the Treaty of Verdun. But it served subliminally to give notice that the question of German national unity was back on the agenda.

As a speaker Droysen was far from prepossessing. We have a number of eyewitness descriptions of his appearance, with a particularly striking one from his eldest son, Gustav: "He cut a minuscule figure, performing in a modest lecture hall with an audience only 30–40 strong, and was notable for his sparkling eyes. He spoke in well rounded periods, which he accompanied with gestures from the largest hands that I have ever seen on an academic. Then he uttered another sentence which I have never forgotten: 'History, then, has nothing to do with the living.'"²

Another visitor, Paul Fredericq,³ a Belgian scholar of considerable talents who specialized in the history of the Spanish Inquisition, was impressed by Droysen. The feeling was mutual. Fredericq was captivated by Droysen's use of irony, his attacks on plagiarism, and sideswipes directed at unnamed colleagues. Droysen must be the illustrious professor who, according to Fredericq, lamented the deterioration of historiography under Ranke's influence and its concentration on small fragmentary studies.

Droysen's influential work in the nineteenth century had a resounding impact on the historiography and thought of the twentieth. His *Alexander* is one of the masterpieces of German prose, displaying a surprising richness of texture (for a 25-year-old), and it can hold its own alongside other famous works of German literature. But we should always bear in mind that everything that Droysen wrote was rooted in his deep and devout Lutheran belief that *Hellenismus* led inexorably to the Christian revelation.

On a personal note, it has been a great pleasure for me to write this Foreword. I have renewed my acquaintance with the German language

Nippel (2008), 237.

Nippel (2008), 238.


and literature, which I have always found seductive. I believe Flora Kim-mich's important new translation, which will finally make Droysen's work accessible to non-German speakers, will become a standard part of any Alexander bibliography.

A. B. Bosworth

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BOOK ONE



CHAPTER 1

The name Alexander marks the end of one era of world history and the beginning of a new one.

Alexander ended the two hundred-year battles of the Hellenes with the Persians—the first great contest of the West against the East—by destroying the Persian empire, by conquering lands that reached from the deserts of Africa to the Jaxartes and the Indus and beyond, by extending Greek rule and Greek learning to the peoples of exhausted cultures, and by establishing the beginnings of Hellenism. History knows no other event so astounding. Never before and never since has so small a people managed to bring down the superior power of a giant realm so swiftly and so completely and to build on the ruins new forms of government and common life.

Where did the small Greek world find the boldness for such an undertaking, the strength for such victories, the means to bring about such consequences? How did the kingdom of the Persians—which had conquered and contrived to rule so many lands and realms for two hundred years, and which had kept the Hellenes on the Asiatic coast subjugated for precisely two generations and made itself the court of arbitration for the Greek islands and of the mainland—how did this great kingdom come to fall before the first thrust by the Macedonians?

Part of the explanation lies in a radical opposition of two systems, the Greek and the Persian, which had been laid down by geography and so potentiated by historical development that it was ripe for resolution when Alexander set out against Dareios.

* * *

Compared with the ancient civilizations of Asia, the Hellenes are a young people. Only gradually did tribes related by language drift together under that name. They were able to create a national unity but not to achieve political unity, a conjunction of good fortune and failure that became their history.

Of the prehistoric time before they began to call themselves Hellenes they relate vague and fabulous things. They believe themselves to be autochthonous in the mountainous peninsula full of bays that extends from the Skardos and the headwaters of the Axios southward to the Tainaron. They recall a King Pelasgos, who ruled in Argos, whose realm also embraced Dodona and Thessaly, the slopes of the Pindos, Paionia, and all the land “to the sparkling waters of Strymon.” All Hellas, they say, was once called Pelasgia.

The northern tribes remained in their mountains and glens, living as peasants and shepherds in a primitive piety that called the gods, without particular names, the Powers, “because they are all-powerful,” and that saw in the alternation of light and dark, life and death, in all natural events proof and examples of the gods’ stern rule. Other tribes were induced by want at home or by wanderlust to descend to the nearby sea and to cross it, seeking gain in war and piracy, or to establish new homelands by force and daring. For these tribes, everything depended on personal strength, and decisive self-sufficiency was the condition of effectiveness and assured success. Their picture of the gods changed: They saw themselves under the sway not of peaceful presences in nature, but rather of such powers as motivated and gratified them—powers of energetic will, decisive action, and forceful rule. They, too, changed in appearance and in spirit: they became Hellenes. Some were content to descend from their hills to the plains of Thessaly, Boeotia, and the Peloponnese and to remain there. Others were lured by the Aegean Sea and its lovely islands, the coast at its eastern edge, and, beyond the coast, the wide, fertile plains behind which mountains climb to the high plateau of interior Asia Minor. The gathering movement loosed ever new waves of humanity, which followed the first migrations.

At home, where “kings,” wandering in nearby glens or plains with their “hetairoi,” their companions in battle, drove out the people long settled there or conquered them, a signiory of companions developed. Soon enough it suppressed the kingdom with which it had begun or reduced it to a mere name, in order to found a closed and stable aristocracy. Those who had been driven out or left voluntarily, by contrast, wanting to establish themselves more securely abroad and among strangers and to expand more vigorously, sought and soon found freer forms for living and thus a swifter, bolder, more intense vitality. They overtook and far exceeded the homeland in riches, love of life, and joyful art. The songs of the Homeridai, from which the Hellenes in the narrow, yet rich confines

of the old homeland and the new learned the first beginnings of their recorded life, are the legacy of this turbulent period and its tribal wanderings.

This sea with its islands and its coasts round about was their world. Mountains enclose it from the approaches of the Hellespont to the Isthmos, from there to the Tainarian foothills. Even across the water, Kythera, Crete, and Rhodes mark the enclosure, which emerges again clearly in more imposing mountains on the Karian coast and, falling to the sea in rich river valleys, fertile plains, and sloping hills, climbs to snowy Ida and reaches around again to the Hellespont.

For centuries Hellenic life moved in this closed circle, coming most marvelously into flower among those who felt as one under the name "Ionic." "Whoever sees them there," the Blind Bard of Chios says of the Ionians' gathering on Delos, "the stately men, the fair-girdled women, their swift ships, their endless possessions, would think them safe from old age and death." Fed by successive emigrations, which other tribes from the coasts and islands and from the homeland soon joined, new Hellenic cities blossomed on the Propontis, on the Pontos up to the mouth of the Tanais, and at the foot of the Caucasus. In Sicily and southern Italy, a new Hellas arose; Hellenes settled the African coast on the Syrtis; Hellenic colonies were sown from the shores of the Maritime Alps to the Pyrenees. Thus in all directions, as far as their swift ships could carry them, the Hellenes expanded as if the world were theirs. They lived everywhere in close communities and nimbly accommodated themselves to their neighbors, of whatever language and culture, acquiring what appealed to them and adapting it, in a checkered variety of dialects, cults, and commerce, according to the place and nature of each city. They were always in rivalry with one another, and the emigrants vied with their mother cities. Nonetheless, when they streamed together from far and near for the Olympian and Pythian festivals, they all competed in the same contests, sacrificed at the same altars, and raised their voices in the same songs.

In these songs and in their countless myths and sagas of the adventures and migrations and battles of their fathers they found an image of themselves. The finest and best loved were those of journeys to the east; ever and again the songs turned their thoughts eastward. Zeus abducts the Sidonian princess from the East and names Europe after her. Io flees to the East to embrace the Hellenic god, whom Hera's jealousy denies her in the homeland. Astride the ram with the golden fleece, Helle tries to

escape to the East and find peace there, but she falls into the sea just before she reaches the farther shore. Then the Argonauts set out to fetch the golden fleece home from the forest of Kolchis, the first great voyage of heroes to the East. But with the heroes Medeia the sorceress returns, bringing hatred and bloodguilt into the royal houses of Hellas, until, despised and rejected by the *heros* of Athens, she flees back to her Median homeland.

The voyage of the Argonauts is followed by a second battle of heroes, a domestic war against Thebes, the first sorrowful example of the hostility and fraternal strife that will shake Hellas. In fateful delusion, Laios defied the oracle of the god and begat a son, and Oedipus, uncertain about his parents and his homeland, questioned the god. Seeking foreign lands, he returns home, slays his father, lies with his mother, rules in the city for which it would have been better had the riddle of the man-slaughtering Sphinx never been solved. When he finally understands his guilt, he destroys the light of his eyes and lays a curse on himself, his house, his city. And fate hastens to realize his malediction, until brother has struck down brother, until the epigones have avenged the death of their fathers, until the site of three- and fourfold bloodguilt lies under a heap of ruins.

Thus in profanation and bloodguilt the age of heroes plunges toward its close. The sons of princely houses, who sued for fair Helen, sit at home with wife and child, no longer do battle against giants and sacrilege. Then the heralds of Agamemnon summon them to a campaign eastward, invoking the oath that they had once sworn. For the Trojan prince whom Menelaos received as a guest in his palace has run away with his wife, celebrated Helen. From Aulis, the Greek princes set sail for Asia and with the princes, their companions and their troops. Over long years they fight and endure. Superb Achilles sees beloved Patroklos fall and cannot rest until he has slain Hektor, who killed him, and dragged the corpse around the walls of Troy. Then he too is slain, pierced by Paris's arrow, and, as the god proclaimed, the fall of Troy is near. In dreadful collapse the city expiates the crime of hospitality violated. The expedition of the Greeks has attained what they intended. But their homeland is lost to them: Some perish in the waters of the raging sea, others are tossed ashore in remote barbarian lands, still others find death in gory treachery that lies in wait on their own hearths. The age of heroes is at an end. Ordinary life begins, "the way that men just are."

Thus the sagas, the cautionary tales, the premonitions from earliest times. And as the songs of the Homeridai ebbed away before new songs, their prophecies began to come true.

Never before had the Hellenes had to test their mettle against powerful enemies. Each separate city had always been able to fend off or to evade adroitly any danger that threatened it. By language and custom, at religious observances or festivals, they were effectively one people; but politically they were countless cities and states, independent and equal, never brought together under one rule. The sole exception was the Doric oligarchy in Sparta, which, just as it had subjugated the ancient inhabitants of the Eurotas valley, had also conquered the adjacent borderlands of Argos and Arkadia, made helots of the Dorians in Messenia, and, finally, united most of the cities of the Peloponnese into a league in which each city, like Sparta, retained or renewed its oligarchy. Ruler of Peloponnesos, hostile to the already incipient unrest of the subjected lower orders, enjoying the distinction of having broken such tyranny as had sprung from brewing unrest in many places, Sparta stood as the protector of all that was genuinely Hellenic and as the foremost power in the Hellenic world.

At about this time, the ever expanding circles of the Greek world lapped up against an ominous countercurrent. To the west, the Carthaginians advanced to the Syrtis to contain the Cyrenaicans; they occupied Sardinia and combined with the Etruscans to drive the Phokaiaians out of Corsica. To the east, the cities of Ionia, divided among themselves and nearly all weakened by internal bickering, were no longer able to fend off the Lydian king; one by one, they concluded separate treaties with him and paid tribute for the little freedom that he conceded. Far to the east, Cyrus arose with his Persians, annexed the kingdom of the Medes, and established the power of the Medes and the Persians. Their armies triumphed on the Halys, advanced on Sardeis, broke the Lydian kingdom. In vain, the Hellenic cities of Asia appealed to Sparta; they attempted to resist the Persians on their own and were conquered one by one; the nearest islands also surrendered. All were obliged to pay tribute and to levy troops; in most there appeared a new kind of tyranny, abetted by the Great King, that of foreign domination. In others, the elevated classes, protected by the Persians, recovered their power over the demos. They vied with one another in eagerness to please: six hundred Hellenic ships followed the Great King's campaign against the Scyths, in which the north side of the Propontis and the coasts up to the Strymon also became Persian.

How these once proud and flourishing Ionian cities had been brought low! But not for long; they rose, aided only by Eretria and by Athens with ships that were, however, soon called back to their home port. The Ionian

march on Sardeis failed. By land and by sea, the imperial power of Persia closed in. There followed the defeat in the Bay of Miletos, the razing of that city, and the most terrible chastisement of the insurrectionists, reduction to servitude.

The fairest third of the Greek world had been wrecked and emptied by deportation and unending flight. The Phoenician fleets of the Great King ruled the Aegean. The Carthaginians began to advance from the western tip of Sicily, which they had made theirs, while the Hellenes of Italy stood by, fully taken up by their own bickering. War had broken out between Sybaris and Kroton and ended with the collapse of Sybaris, while the Etruscans, pressing southward, soon also conquered Campania. The strength of the Greek presence in Italy began to fail.

The Hellenic world understood well enough where the difficulty lay. At the time of the war against the Lydian king, Thales had cautioned all the cities of Ionia to unite into a single state in such a fashion that henceforth each city would become a constituent community of the state. And when the Persian conquest began, Bias of Priene urged all Ionians to emigrate to the far west and carry out the plan that Thales had proposed. But the whole previous development of the Hellenic world, its most characteristic strength and prosperity had been predicated on unhampered movement and mobility, on freedom to expand in all directions, to put out new shoots, on an endlessly lively particularism of small and smallest communities, a particularism that, smug and unyielding as ever, addressing itself only to the most immediate and most parochial matters, now proved to be the greatest threat of all, the true "Panhellenic curse."

Nothing inclined Sparta to become the saving force in Greece. And whatever effectiveness government by tyranny may have attained as it arose from new movement and greater mobility among the demos, it depended on the favor of the masses and suppression of the ruling class and had collapsed again and again.

Only in one place, Athens, was collapse followed, not by return to oligarchy, as Sparta had expected and contrived, but rather by bold libertarian reform, by a constitution that guaranteed "equal justice for all" and restricted the self-sufficiency of localities within an Attic state to communal matters alone. Thus Athens developed an internal strength that, hardly formed, sufficed to beat back a concerted attack by the surrounding oligarchies, led by Sparta. Sparta was prepared to take the extraordinary step of reinstalling a tyrant over Athens. But the other Peloponnesians hung back; only the Aiginetans persisted, seeing in Athens

a rival at sea. To defend herself against their superior fleet, Athens had to call back the ships she had sent in aid of the Ionians; and because she had come to the aid of Ionia, once Miletos had fallen, she had to fear the Great King's retribution.

That potentate's land army and his fleet were advancing from the Hellespont westward along the coast, overthrowing the Greek cities there, the Thracians in the interior, the Macedonian king in the north. The Thessalian nobles sued for Persian friendship, as did the ruling dynasties of Boeotia, full of bitterness toward Athens. The king's heralds fanned out over the islands and cities, demanding earth and water. Those sent to Athens were hurled from cliffs. That Sparta did likewise gave the two, again at sword's point, a common enemy. But when the Persians entered Euboeia, destroyed Eretria, and landed on the Attic coast at Marathon, Sparta hesitated to come to the aid of Athens. Among all the Hellenes, the Plataians alone fought alongside the Athenians; the day of Marathon saved both Athens and Hellas.

This was but the first skirmish. The Athenians had to prepare themselves for other, graver dangers. How was shown them by Themistokles, in boldness of thought and power of execution the greatest statesman Athens ever knew. Above all, never again should barbarians be in a position to surprise Athens from the sea; the fortunes of Sparta, too, and of all Peloponnesos, depended on closing the nearer seaways to the enemy's superior forces. The maritime states of Hellas—Aigina, Corinth, and Athens—together did not command as many warships as the Hellenes of Asia alone had put at the disposal of the Persian fleet. At Themistokles's request and on the proceeds of the silver mines of Laurion, the Athenians tripled the size of their fleet, dug a secure naval harbor at Peiraeus, and soon built the long walls to connect city and harbor. Making the mass of poorer citizens, who were not susceptible to service as hoplites, subject to the duty and the honor of service as rowers strengthened the democratic character of the state and gave that character the discipline of hard naval service.

The inexorable approach of the Great King's enormous military produced a second result.

When the Carthaginians erupted in Sicily about this same time, the Greek world must have seen just how threatened it was. But it went on bickering and feuding, divided by the most obstinate pettiness and at the point of crumbling. The tyrants of Syracuse and Acragas, by contrast, entered an alliance that consolidated the entire military power of Hellenic

Sicily and gave them a hope of withstanding Punic attack. How to arrive at similar agreement in Hellas? On Themistokles's advice, Athens accepted Spartan hegemony, and Sparta and Athens invited all Hellenic cities to join a military league, whose deliberative body would sit in Corinth. Because such a league would bind only its members, it was necessary to take the boldest step and make of the national community of language, cult, and intellectual life a political principle that would inform a confederation of all Hellenes, to last at least as long as the struggle against the barbarians. The synhedrion in Corinth deliberated and decided accordingly. It decreed that all feuding among Greek cities should cease until the barbarians had been conquered and declared giving aid to the Persians in word or deed to be high treason; any city that surrendered to the Persians without resistance would be dedicated to the Delphic god and decimated, once victory had been won.

The day of Salamis saved Hellas and victory on the Himera, Sicily. Back home, however, only the cities of Peloponnesos had entered the Hellenic League in numbers; in central and in northern Greece, aside from Athens, only Thespiiai and Plataiai had joined. The battles at Plataiai and Mykale liberated the lands up to Mount Olympos and beyond, the islands, the Ionian coast, and, in the following years, also the Hellespont and Byzantium. In that same period, the tyrant of Syracuse, with the Cumaeans, defeated the Etruscans in the Bay of Naples; the Tarentines, who had suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Iapyges, recovered and established themselves as rulers of the Adriatic.

But the Italian and Sicilian Hellenes did not join the league that had been formed on the Isthmos, and the league, under Sparta's feeble and suspicious leadership, could not force Boeotia, the Spercheios country, or Thessaly to join. Athens, which had mustered more ships at Salamis than all others combined and wrung independence of the islands and Ionia from Sparta, received command of the united sea power of the newly liberated lands, and Sparta acquiesced in what she could not prevent: a league within the league emerged.

Themistokles, in whom the Spartans saw their most dangerous enemy, had fallen meanwhile to the opposition in Athens, which saw and wanted to preserve in the league with Sparta a dike against a mounting democratic movement at home. He might have given the naval alliance that Athens agreed to a different and more solid form. The representatives who concluded the alliance contented themselves with a loose bond that granted equal rights to all member states and spared their particularism.

Only too soon, the harm in such organization became evident: The need to force the allied states to meet their obligations and to punish delay, resistance, and defection made of Athens, not the leading, but the dominant and indeed domineering city of the alliance and made the other free states her subjects, susceptible even to the jurisdiction of the Attic demos.

As ruler of a naval alliance for the protection of the seas and the struggle against the barbarians, Athens controlled the islands of the Aegean, the Hellenic cities of its northern coast as far as Byzantium, and the coast of Asia from the entrance of the Pontos to Phaselis on the Pamphylian Sea. Athenian control had a revitalizing effect that reestablished Hellenic trade and prosperity, now largely protected, and made of the city itself, forging boldly and creatively ahead in every direction of intellectual life at once, a center of Panhellenic culture in the fullest sense of that expression.

Though Sparta retained hegemony in name, her importance was dwindling. Secretly, she began to stir up discontent already simmering among the Attic allies, even while Argos, Megara, Achaia, and even Mantinea were entering alliance with Athens. The Messenians, reduced to helots, rebelled; the Spartans were unable to pacify them and appealed to Athens; then Sparta, fearing treachery and betrayal, sent back the aid Athens granted before hostilities had ended. All this led to a fateful decision. The Attic population turned against those who had advocated an expedition in aid of Sparta, radically strengthened the democratic institutions of the state so as to destroy the influence of these men forever, repudiated the Hellenic League and thus Spartan hegemony, and decided to invite all the Hellenic cities that did not belong to the naval alliance to enter a new and more general union.

The breach could not be healed. A fierce struggle followed, and not only in the Hellenic lands. Egypt, under a successor to the old pharaohs, had fallen away from the Great King and now appealed to Athens for help. An independent Egypt would have been a permanent threat to the flank of Persian power; the Syrian coasts, Cyprus, and Kilikia would have followed Egypt. Athens dispatched an imposing fleet toward the Nile—and this boldest undertaking of Attic politics failed. Egypt fell before Persia. After painful losses there and bloody, not always successful battles on her own frontiers, Athens concluded a peace with Sparta to strengthen her hand against the barbarians, forfeiting everything on the continent that she had taken away from the Spartan League.

Athens had desisted, but Sparta and the oligarchies were not mollified, and nothing had discouraged particularism. Then Athens tightened her

grip on the league and further embittered those whom she controlled, who were already hoping to receive support from the Spartans or the Persian king. Finally, Perikles undertook to preserve the peace and Athenian mastery of the seas—at its current level and no more—solely by a show of superiority, that is to say, by exercising prudent moderation and observing strictly the right of treaty, even while Athens disposed over ready power and a full treasury. This excessive restraint caused Athens to lose the initiative externally. Internally it sharpened the opposition of those who thought that by strengthening democracy further and establishing it among the allies, and by extending control to the Greek cities of the Pontos and Sicily and Italy, Athens could meet three threats to her power: the rivalry of Sparta and the oligarchies, the lurking hostility of the Persians, and the defection of allies.

These things led to the frightful war that was now to rage through the Hellenic world for thirty years and shake it to its foundations, and during which the abounding prosperity, culture, and fine art that had developed in Athens and under Athenian protection, and the ethical systems spreading with it, were to dwindle and decay.

There was one moment in this war—marked by Alkibiades and the Sicilian expedition—when the victory of Attic control and its expansion to the western seas seemed assured; the Carthaginians entertained the gravest fear “that the Attics would march against their city.” But the sovereign silliness of the man who carried an image of fulminating Eros on his shield of gold gave his oligarchic and his democratic opponents at home the opportunity to combine and topple him, who alone could have carried out the undertaking just begun. He went over to the Spartans, showed them how Athens could be mastered, procured for them the satrapies of Asia Minor and the Great King’s gold—contrary, to be sure, to Sparta’s explicit recognition that the Great King should recover what had once been his.

In enormous vicissitudes the war raged on. Bought with Persian gold, the Sicilian fleet appeared, to join the combined fleets of Sparta and Corinth and of defected Attic allies. The Attic people fought with ever-renewed resilience to save their collapsing democracy; they persisted in battle down to the last man and the last gold wreath in the treasury. After her last victory, at Arginusai, Athens succumbed to internal factionalism, treacherous generals, and hunger. Spartan Lysander broke the long walls and delivered Athens to the tyranny of the Thirty.

More than Athenian power had been reduced to ruins. In this long and frightful war, the nature of the Athenian demos had also changed. The reliable constituents of its once happy mix had vanished, and with the loosing of full democratic passion a caustic rationalism had gained the upper hand and favored the oligarchs. Unrestrained now under the government of the Thirty, they undertook to reduce the exhausted people to servitude. The last, ruined remains of what had once been the grand old families, thinned now by war, were present in the government. But the old peasant class, from which hoplites were drawn, had been thoroughly wrecked. Enemy encampments on Attic territory, first year by year and then for years on end, had driven it into the city, where, having lost its work, it fell into poverty, plunged into the maelstrom of urban life, and became a rabble. When those who had fled finally forced their way back, chased out the Thirty, and set up a democracy, they restored Athens and the Solonic constitution in name only. Everyone and everything was impoverished, penurious, weak, and feeble. In an excess of zeal, the Athenians then vitiated official edicts, blocked the influence of preeminent personalities to the extent possible, and invented new ways of thwarting any attempt to moderate democratic freedom. These measures froze this most precarious form of government in the most precarious phase of its fluctuations: in the descent into sobriety that follows a state of elation.

Thirty years earlier, with a cry of liberation, Sparta had gathered and consolidated all hostility, all fear and ill will toward Athens, and all particularism. Now she enjoyed full victory. Sparta was the delight of the oligarchs, who were returning everywhere, and Lysander was their hero, indeed their god; altars were erected to him and observances inaugurated. Sparta's old right to hegemony seemed at last to unite the Greek world.

But it was no longer the old Spartan city. The much admired Lykurgian constitution had required above all that the citizens own no property and be nothing but soldiers, strictly ordered and subordinated. Now that Sparta had prevailed, the nimbus that had once surrounded her began to fade. One saw instead the acquisitiveness, dissipation, degeneracy of every kind, the intellectual impoverishment beside imperiousness, the brutality beside treachery and hypocrisy that were at home in Sparta. The number of Spartiates sank steadily; in the following period there were only a thousand instead of the nine or ten thousand at the time of the Persian wars. Accustomed to rigid obedience and an appearance of discipline at home, Spartans ruled the more willfully and violently as

harmosts in the cities of Hellas, where they attempted to impose an oligarchic order to which even Sparta's old, much admired aristocracy had converted. Oligarchy was introduced everywhere; the losing party was driven out and the fugitives' possessions confiscated. The Hellenic world bubbled and seethed with fluctuating masses of political exiles and their designs and attempts to force their way home.

Sparta, it is true, promptly sent an army into Asia, but this was a mercenary army sent to support Cyrus the insurgent against the Great King, his brother. When Cyrus had fallen near Babylon, and the Ten Thousand, unconquered both in battle and in a long battle-laced wandering through a foreign world, had again reached the sea and returned home, and when the Great King's satraps had once again taken possession of the Hellenic cities of Asia and demanded tribute, then at last Sparta let young King Agesilaos set out for Asia. He began with a solemn sacrifice on Aulis, as if this were a national war of the Hellenes and he a second Agamemnon, except that the Boeotian authorities soon broke up the sacrifice and drove the company from the sanctuary. Neither Thebes nor Corinth nor Athens nor any other ally delivered the allied help demanded, and Agesilaos's first deed in Asia was to conclude a truce with the satrap.

Now the Hellenic lands were more embittered toward Sparta than they had ever been toward Athens. Thebes had backed the Athenian exiles' attempt to liberate their city. Corinth had had to countenance the murder of one of her most prominent citizens, whom she had sent to her daughter city Syracuse to mediate a partisan dispute that was weakening the city. That murder was the work of the party the Spartans supported, which then set up the tyranny of Dionysios. The ultimate outrage was how the Spartans overran Elis, the land of the peace of the gods, laid it waste, and cut it up into its districts, all in an attempt to reduce it to obedience.

The imperial palace at Susa, mindful that the Greek mercenaries had advanced almost as far as Babylon, may have watched Agesilaos's approach with misgiving and may have seen an even more pressing danger in a new insurrection in Egypt, with which Sparta promptly took up contact. Konon, an Attic exile and one of the ten strategoi of the Arginusans, proposed the surest defense: The satrap Pharnabazos was given the funds necessary to bring the more important states in Hellas into open hostilities against Sparta and to create a fleet, under Konon, that would drive the Spartan fleet from the seas. With yet another cry of liberation, Corinth, Thebes, Athens, and Argos formed a league of Hellenes and rose against Sparta. Their first victory resulted in Agesilaos's rapid return from Asia;

with the battle at Koroneia he forced a way back to Boeotia. But Konon had already defeated the Spartans and destroyed half their fleet. Then Pharnabazos and his fleet sailed for Greece, proclaiming everywhere that he brought, not subjugation, but freedom and independence; he even landed on Kythera, hard by the Lakonian coast, and appeared on the Isthmos, at the council of the Hellenic League, where he urged a vigorous continuation of hostilities. About to return home, he entrusted half the fleet to Konon, who hurried to Athens and restored the long walls, rebuilt the Attic fleet, and raised an army of mercenaries, all with Persian money. The light arm of the peltasts, which Iphikrates had invented and developed, rendered Sparta's tactical arts obsolete.

It was high time for Sparta to make a change, and the means lay close at hand. When the Persian gold ran out, the power and enthusiasm of Sparta's enemies was also at an end. Antialkidas, who had been dispatched to Susa, carried the day over Konon. The Great King sent the "command" to the Hellenes that he considered it proper that the cities of Asia should belong to him and the islands Cyprus and Klazomenai; Athens should receive Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros; all other Hellenic cities, great and small, were to be considered autonomous. He would proceed against any who did not accept these peace terms, by land and sea, with ships and gold, in league with those who did accept them. Antialkidas returned home by way of the Cyclades with a mighty fleet, mustered in part by the Greek satrapies of Asia Minor, in part by the tyrant of Syracuse, and the enemy's ships withdrew in haste.

This peace saved Persia. Prospective possession of Cyprus, which would take years to pacify, gave the Great King hope of putting down Egypt; Athens was content with the three islands awarded her; and the autonomy proclaimed in Hellas carried bickering into even the smallest territories, precluded every league, every local merger, every new consolidation of power in a Panhellenic sense, and made Sparta the keeper and guarantor of Persian policy over Greece.

When the rural and local leagues were dissolved, in keeping with the principle of autonomy, Sparta effectively completed the process of imposing oligarchy begun by Lysander and interrupted by the Corinthian War. Olynthos had united the cities of Chalkidike in a confederation and used threats to force the reluctant to join. The threatened cities appealed to Sparta, which sent a military expedition. After long resistance, Olynthos capitulated and dissolved her confederation. On the march out, the Spartans had attacked Thebes, imposed an oligarchy, driven out any

elements that were less than Spartan, and left a garrison on the Kadmeia. This was the meridian of Spartan power, also in the sense that here, as in all oppressive systems, every opposition to Spartan presence was an occasion to strengthen that presence, and the new resistance thus elicited justified the greater force required to suppress it.

But this calculation had overlooked something. Lysander had broken the power of Athens, but not the culture that had flowered in Athens and not the democratic movement of the moment that had accompanied this flowering. The more overbearing Spartan oligarchy became, the more the parties that opposed it turned toward this same democracy, which had always been Athens's strongest weapon against Sparta. The autonomy Persia had imposed conduced to precisely this effect. Old ties that had once bound smaller localities to a larger city loosened everywhere; autonomy, with its power to pit one locality against another, penetrated into the remotest corners, and with it the presumptuousness of freedom. The Hellenic world crumbled into ever smaller units, and in the seething caldron of this unleashed particularism there developed a superabundance of powers and institutions, of frictions and explosive elements that Sparta's mechanical, shallow rule by force would soon no longer be able to contain.

One further point. As long as the Attic naval league made the Aegean the center of the Hellenic world and the Hellenic cities that bordered the sea still felt the ready power of the league behind them, the barbarians to the east and to the north had prudently kept their distance. When the Thracian tribes on the Hebros had dared to advance, Athens laid Amphipolis on the Strymon, sent in ten thousand settlers, and barred the way westward to the Hellenic cities on the coast. The appearance of an Attic fleet in the Pontos had sufficed to secure the seaways and the coasts there; during the days of Attic dominance, the island Cyprus became more hellenized; even in Egypt, a Hellenic fleet had fought the Persians; Carthage herself had feared Athenian sea power.

In the peace of Antialkidas subsequently, not merely were the cities of the Asiatic coast forfeited; the sea in the center was lost. Its islands, autonomous in name only, and the coasts and bays of Hellas lay exposed. And just then the tribes in the north began to stir. The coastal cities from Byzantium to the Strymon, protected only by their walls and by mercenaries, would not have held out long against the press of Thracians. The still loosely knit Macedonian territories, whose bickering Sparta and the cities of Chalkidike now fed, as Athens once had, were themselves in

constant danger of being overrun by the Odrysians in the east, the Triballians in the north, and the Illyrians in the west. Behind them, Celtic tribes wandering between the Adriatic and the Danube pushed closer. The Triballians began their raids, which they would soon extend to Abdera. The Illyrians invaded Epeiros, prevailed in a great battle in which 15,000 Epeirotes perished, ravaged the land up into the mountains that separate Epeiros from Thessaly, then turned back to plunge through the more open mountain passes into Macedonia. To protect herself against such dangers, Olynthos had united the cities of Chalkidike in a confederation. When the Spartans destroyed that confederation, they laid the Greek world in the north open to the barbarians.

In the west, all the while, a greater danger loomed over the Greek world. Once the naval power of Athens had been broken, the Carthaginians in Sicily began to expand again and took possession of Himera in the north and Selinus, Acragas, Gela, and Camarina on the southern coast. To make peace, Dionysios of Syracuse left these cities in Punic tribute. The Celts crossed the Alps into Italy and conquered the Etruscan country on the Po, crossed the Apennines and burned Rome. The Samnites rushed the Greek cities of Campania and subjugated one after another, while Dionysios captured those in the Bruttian region. Only Tarentum remained standing.

At least the tyranny of Syracuse was still strong and capable. In ever renewed hostilities, Dionysios snatched the coast of the island up to Acragas from the Carthaginians, defeated the Etruscan pirates and plundered their treasury in Agylla, and, in a broadly conceived colonization of the Adriatic that extended to the mouth of the Po in the north and to the islands off the Illyrian coast, won control of that sea. This was a prince who, with orderly rule and provident governance, with forceful and unpredictable measures against unbridled democratic and particularistic “freedom” equally, with his army of Greek, Celtic, Iberian, and Sabelline mercenaries and a mighty fleet, with his swashbuckling, perfidious, cynical politics toward friend and foe alike, was, so it seemed, the last keeper and protector of the Greek world in the west—a *principe* after the great Florentine’s own heart as savior of the Italy of his day, at the pinnacle, furthermore, of contemporary culture, bringing philosophers, artists, and poets to his court and himself composing tragedies. The tyranny of Dionysios and the no less Machiavellian rule of the Spartans under Agesilaos were the typical Hellenic systems of those dark days.

Yet darker ones were to follow. Contemporary culture, with Athens at its center, and the schools of rhetoric and philosophy developed political

theories that devised the forms and functions of an ideal state, a state of perfect freedom and virtue that alone could cure all evil and secure deliverance, and concerned themselves little with actual circumstances and given conditions. For the moment, this was nothing more than a source of further confusion in an already swirling confusion of mastery and servitude, willfulness and powerlessness, of ruthless pursuit of wealth among all classes and a spiteful envy on the part of the poorer masses, who were the more obstreperous where democracy had given them equal rights and majority rule. But if one observes how the schools of Plato, Isokrates, and others, how philosophy and rhetoric, how enlightenment and reason in the free cities, at the courts of the dynasts and tyrants extended all the way to Sicily, Cyprus, and Pontic Herakleia, even to the courts of the satraps and gained influence there, then one sees clearly how a new kind of community, of the sovereignty of culture, one could say, overspread all the old particularism and local politics, far removed in spirit from Sparta's brutal oligarchy. The decisive reversal did not proceed from theory, but theory gave it the nimbus of a great deed and heightened its effects, when it at length arrived. Rising with the rising tide, theory undertook to realize itself.

For three years, Thebes endured Spartan harmosts, a Spartan garrison on the Kadmeia, the insolent willfulness of a ruling oligarchy that the garrison protected, and an unbroken stream of executions and banishments. Finally, the exiles dared to undertake to liberate their city. Led by Pelopidas, they ambushed and murdered the oligarchs in a skillfully executed treachery, then summoned the people to help them defend democracy and restore the city's ancient rule over Boeotia. Epameinondas, noble, philosophical, open-minded, visionary of a great future, joined the movement, giving it an idealistic élan. The garrison was obliged to withdraw from the Kadmeia; the cities of Boeotia, whose autonomy had been commanded by the "Great King's peace," were again drawn into a Boeotian league; Orchomenos, Tanagra, Plataiai, and Thespiiai, which all refused, were attacked, their walls broken, their community dissolved, and their citizens exiled.

The Spartans could not contain the movement. At this very moment, Athens righted herself and quickly and decisively undertook to build a new fleet and a new alliance, but under the flag of autonomy, presenting another threat to Sparta. Thebes reached beyond the Boeotian borders and tried to force the Phokians into the new league, allied herself with Jason of Pherai, who had been able to take Thessaly away from the dynasts and intended to attach a sustained military rule to his person. At Naxos,

the Attic commanders defeated the Spartan fleet. With the battle of Leuktra, Thebes opened the way to the Peloponnese, where noisy new life broke out once fear of Sparta had abated. Under the protection of victorious Theban forces, the yoke of oligarchy was everywhere thrown off, scattered village governments were united to form municipal communities, and even the Messenian helots were liberated and their state restored.

Athens owed its victory to a swift and adroit financial arrangement, which, however, had an internal effect that preserved of democracy little more than the form and the appearance. On the basis of a new census, the wealthier citizens had put up the funds necessary to build a new fleet and recruit a mercenary army, dividing themselves into groups in which the very richest men paid the necessary advances and took control of operations. The demos acquiesced in this plutocracy, which cost it nothing, and accepted it eagerly after the victory at Naxos, when the government created a new naval league and a prospect of power, disbursements, and cleruchies. The islands and coastal cities were glad to join, since the league promised protection and, most explicitly, took the autonomy the Great King had commanded as its basis. Balancing between declining Sparta and rising Thebes, Athens attempted to replicate her former glory. She resorted to force against the reluctant, such as Amphipolis, which had to be drawn in, since Athens had founded that city and needed it to control the coasts of Thrace. Athens used every means at her disposal—the help of the Macedonians, of the Thracian princes—but Amphipolis, seconded by Olynthos, held out against repeated attack.

A fourth power soon entered the contest for Hellenic supremacy. Mighty Jason of Pherai, invested by the Thracians with the office of tagos, or field marshal, in keeping with the custom of the land, recruited tirelessly and built ships, raised an army such as Hellas had never seen. He let it be known that he was arming against the barbarians in the east and intended to cross the sea in search of the Persian king. Apparently in consecration of this incipient work, he was quick to celebrate the Pythian festival at Delphi in solemn pomp, whereupon he was murdered by a cabal of seven youths, whom the Hellenic world then fêted as tyrannicides. After bloody feuding within the family, what remained of his power fell to his son-in-law, Alexander of Pherai, whose next-of-kin disposed of him a decade later.

Thebes had thus rid herself of a rival in her rear, and Sparta languished, badly hit. To overtake the new rise of Athens, Thebes, too, built a fleet and began to make herself felt at sea. Scarcely liberated and recently

united, Arkadia decided that she had no further need of Thebes and that she deserved to rule the Peloponnese. She went to the aid of the Argives, shielding their attack on Epidauros from Athens and Corinth; she invaded the Eurotas valley and snatched up part of Lakonia. But the tyrant Dionysios sent Sparta 2000 Celtic mercenaries, and the Arkadians were repulsed. The more hotly did they now turn on their western neighbors. They fell upon Olympia, intending to lead the next festival; they offered battle in the very sanctuary of the god, drove out the Elians, and the measureless treasures of the temple ran through their fingers like sand.

Here, as everywhere, it was all against all. All the passion and power left in the Greek world seemed intent upon crippling what was still strong and crushing what wanted to rise. In Hellenic politics there remained little or nothing of gratitude, loyalty, great thoughts, and national responsibilities, while roving bands of mercenaries and rootless exiles undermined every attempt at order and demoralized humanity.

Even Thebes did not feel strong enough to preserve what she had recently attained. She was afraid that Sparta and Athens would send to the Persian court to denounce the founding of Megalopolis and Messenia as a violation of the peace that "the Great King had commanded" and gain Persian gold to go on fighting. Pelopidas and a small delegation were sent from the Peloponnese to Susa, where Spartan ambassadors were already present and Attic ones promptly appeared. Before the Great King and his court these Hellenes then hung out the dirty laundry of their homeland. Pelopidas won a margin of favor. The Great King commanded that the Messenians remain autonomous, that the Athenians beach their ships, and that Amphipolis be autonomous under the protection of Persia; he would proceed in battle against any who did not adhere to these dispositions, moving first against any city that refused to join the campaign.

This was the Theban version of the peace of Antialkidas, and Thebes proceeded to summon the states of Hellas to receive the king's command. The Spartans refused it point-blank; the Arkadians protested the summons to Thebes; the Corinthians refused the oath on the Great King's peace; and in Athens the returning ambassadors were executed as traitors.

Then Pelopidas was captured and killed by that same Alexander of Pherai. Epameinondas set out over the Isthmos to restore order in the Peloponnese. He defeated the Spartans and their allies the Elians, Mantineans, and Achaians at Mantinea; but he died in battle. And the Spartan

king, aged Agesilaos, let his ephors charge him with a campaign into Egypt, recruited mercenaries with Egyptian money, and brought King Tachos, who already had 10,000 Hellenes in his pay, 1000 more, to defend an attempted restoration of pharaonic rule against the Great King.

The day of Mantinea put an end to Theban power. It had been wielded and ennobled by a few exceptional personalities and once these men had passed from the scene, Thebes could neither retain the liberated or newly founded states nor reconcile the devastated Boeotian cities and the neighboring Phokians, Lokrians, Malians, and Euboians, whom she held by force. After a brief, euphoric hegemony that had made her arrogant and insolent, Thebes in decline became more insufferable than ever.

Athens's second naval league attained no great heights either. Badly governed out of carelessness, greed, and underhandedness, and long accustomed to sending mercenaries into the field instead of citizens, Athens let her generals extort money from friend and foe alike instead of waging war; she let them post Attic officials and garrisons in the allied cities and even banish allied peoples, as on Samos, and distribute their houses and fields to Attic cleruchs. She ignored the rights and duties of the concluded league to the point that the stronger members seized the first opportunity to defect. She could not compel them to return and lost her naval supremacy a second time. But she retained Samos and a few other possessions, and she had 350 triremes in her berths, more than any other Hellenic state.

The Greek world in the west seemed no less in decline. Dionysios of Syracuse had kept tight and firm control until his death. Under his homonymous son, philosophy, in the person of Dion, Kallipos, and Plato himself, undertook to realize its ideals at the court of the tyrant, until that young man had had enough and showed the other side of his deformed and impoverished intellect. In the ten years of his unbridled rule and the no less unbridled decade that followed, the house of the bold founder decayed and his realm crumbled.

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The Greek world produced marvelous things in poetry, art, and all areas of intellectual life even at this time; the names Plato and Aristotle alone suffice to indicate what creations this period added to earlier ones. But the public and private conditions of Greek life were deteriorating and would become hopeless if matters continued to turn in a vicious circle.

Not only had the old cohesive social forms of belief and custom, of family life, of state and civic order been destroyed or corroded by the *aqua fortis* of rationalism; not only had settlement become impossible as political change in small communities accelerated; not only had a growing mass of drifting political exiles heightened the danger of new and worse explosions; had marauding mercenaries overrun the countryside, looking to be recruited and prepared to fight for or against freedom, tyranny, and fatherland, for or against Persians, Carthaginians, Egyptians, or for whatever else they could be hired. Also, and worse, this deeply cultivated Greek world undertook again and again to realize the ideal state and succeeded only in magnifying the wrongs it intended to right. It proceeded from false premises toward no less false ends; always intent on the autonomy of small and smallest communities, on absolute personal freedom and power sharing, it found no devices even to preserve autonomy and freedom, much less to protect its wealth of national assets or the very existence of the nation, now seriously threatened.

It was clear what Hellas needed. "Among the states that have enjoyed hegemony," writes Aristotle, "each has found in its interest to impose on its dependent cities a constitution like its own, democracy here, oligarchy there, while they considered, not the welfare of their cities, but rather their own advantage, with the result that never or seldom and only among a few has a prudent and moderate political system come about; and among the peoples it has become customary, not to desire equality, but either to dominate or to be dominated." Briefly and incisively the great thinker notes the feverish and exhausting condition that results: banishments, acts of violence, the return of exiles, the division of property, the cancellation of debt, the manumission of slaves in order to foment insurrection. One day the *demos* attacks property holders, the next the propertied class brings oligarchic force against the *demos*; nowhere do laws and a constitution protect the minority against the majority; in the hands of the one, they are a weapon against the other; security of the laws is lost, internal peace constantly endangered. Every democratic city is a refuge for democratic exiles, every oligarchic one a refuge for oligarchic exiles; and the exiles consider no means beneath them to effect their return and bring down the government, to inflict on those they defeat what they themselves have suffered. Among the small and smallest Hellenic governments there is no other system of justice than this state of war at the level of the most heated partisan bickering, and no sooner is a federation

concluded than it is blown apart again by the next change of government in one of the federated states.

Every passing moment showed more clearly and more ominously that the day of autonomous small states and of partial alliances, with or without hegemony, was over and that new political forms were needed, Panhellenic ones. These should be strengthened to the point that the conflated concepts of city and state would become distinct and the city would become a community within the state, as had been modeled in the Attic system of demes and attempted in the older naval league, though that result had been brought about by league force, not by exercise of equal communal rights among league members. And not only that: In the Greek world, meanwhile, too many forces, claims, and rivalries had sprung up, too many needs and too much excitement had become customary, too much liveliness had become a condition of life for that world to content itself with what it was and what it had or to continue to develop, confined as it was to a constricted space in which all small things loomed large and large things seemed small. It seethed with immeasurable elements, such as could have transformed a world; penned up on home territory, trapped in local ways, they could only consume themselves, like the dragon seed of Kadmos. Everything depended on putting an end to bickering that choked out all other discourse, opening a new and larger field of productive activity, igniting higher passions by means of large ideas, procuring light and fresh air for an abounding unextinguished lust for life.

Once Lysander's victories had broken long-standing Attic power, external threats closed in on the Greek world from all sides. The Greeks were more broken up than ever into wholly separate circles and losing territory on every national frontier. The Carthaginians had driven the Greeks in Libya back from the Syrtis; the Greeks in Sicily had lost the larger western half of the island also to the Carthaginians; the Greeks in Italy were giving up settlement after settlement to expanding Apennine tribes. The barbarians of the lower Danube, themselves pressed by Celts pent up in Italy, began their attempts to break into the south. The Hellenic cities on the west and north sides of the Pontos had difficulty fending off the Triballians, the Getai, and the Scyths; among those on the south side, at least Herakleia found some security in a tyranny set up by a pupil of Plato. The other Hellenic cities of Asia Minor, under the Persian king, were ruled and exploited more or less arbitrarily by his satraps, by dynasts,

and by obliging oligarchs. Persian influence controlled even the prosperous islands along the coast, and the Hellenic Sea no longer belonged to Hellenes. The peace of Antialkidas had enabled the court at Susa and the courts of the satraps to use the leading states' eagerly indulged bickering to undermine the Greek world more and more profoundly and, while the great political questions there were being decided by the "commands" of the Great King, to attract as many combat-ready Hellenes to their armies as they needed.

The idea of a national campaign against the Persians was unforgotten in Hellas. To the Hellenes it was what the struggle against unbelievers was for centuries to western Christendom. Even Sparta had raised this pretension from time to time to mask her lust for dominion and gain. Jason of Pherai took up the national cause eagerly and cited it in justification of the tyranny he established. The clearer the weakness and internal decay of the overextended Persian empire became and the easier and more rewarding the task of destroying it appeared, the more widespread and the more confident became the expectation that this could and would happen. While Plato and his school were at pains to find and realize the ideal state, Isokrates, whose influence was broader and of greater popular appeal, returned again and again to the notion that the battle against Persia had to begin, that such a war would be more a festival procession than a field campaign. Who could endure the disgrace of seeing these barbarians style themselves the keepers of the peace in Hellas, while Hellas was capable of deeds worthy of invoking the aid of the gods? And Aristotle notes: The Hellenes could rule the world if only they were united in a single state. The one idea was as obvious as the other; obvious, too, the idea of combining the two—uniting Hellas and marching against Persia—into a single undertaking and not delaying one for the sake of the other. But how to realize such ideas?

King Philip of Macedonia undertook to do so. One could say he was obliged to do so if he wanted to restore and secure the ruined kingdom of his house. Repeatedly, the politics of Athens, Sparta, Olynthos, Thebes, and the Thessalian strongmen had fed the bickering in the royal family, supported usurpation by scattered princes in the land, and prompted the barbarians on the frontiers to make incursions and raids into Macedonia. Because only the powerlessness of the Macedonian kingdom entitled them to do so, the kingdom needed only to establish sufficient power to demonstrate its rights against them; they would have no claim to more

considerate or more sparing measures than they had long permitted themselves against Macedonia and her interests.

Philip's successes rest on the secure foundation that he knew how to give his power: on the step-by-step progress of his policy, while Hellenic politics proceeded by haste then hesitation and constant miscalculation of means or ends; and above all on the unity, secrecy, speed, and consistency of his undertakings, which were considered out of the question precisely by those at whom they were aimed until they finally became ineluctable or irresistible. While Thessaly sank into ruin after Alexander of Pherai was murdered, while the Athenians turned full attention to the social war and the Thebans to the sacred war intended to bring the Phokians to heel, and while the Spartans tried to recover some remnant of their influence in the Peloponnese, Philip advanced his frontiers so far to the south and to the east that with Amphipolis he had control of the pass into Thrace; with the mining district of Pangaion, control of its gold mines; with the coast of Macedonia, control of the Thermaic Gulf and access to the sea; and with Methone, control of the way into Thessaly. At that pregnant moment, the Thessalians called him to their aid against the Phokians. He came, hardly withstood the well-led forces of these temple robbers, and repulsed them only after he had received reinforcements. Now he stood at the entrance to Thermopylai. He sent a Macedonian garrison into Pagasai and became master of that Thessalian port and the way into Euboia. Scales fell from Athenian eyes. Under Demosthenes, Athens went to war against the power that seemed to be reaching for dominion over Hellas.

No one can doubt Demosthenes's patriotism and his intentness on the honor and power of Athens; he is justly considered the greatest orator of all time. Whether he was an equally great statesman, whether he was statesman enough for Greek national policy, is another question. If the outcome of this struggle had gone against Macedonia, what would have been the future of the Greek world? At best, reestablishment of such Attic rule as had twice collapsed before, in the form either of an alliance that recognized the autonomy of the allied states and would have been able neither to hold off the barbarians in the north, nor to defy those in the east, nor to ally and protect the declining Greek world in the west; or in the form of Attic rule over subjugated areas, in the same fashion that Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were Attic possessions, in part as cleruchies, and, more loosely, Tenedos, Prokonnesos, the Chersonese,

and Delos. As the Athenians enlarged their rule, they would have met rising jealousy and sharpened resistance from rival states; they would only have augmented the deeply entrenched divisions and the fragmentation in the Hellenic world. And they would have welcomed any aid, whether from the Persians, the Thracians, the Illyrian barbarians, or from tyrants—wherever—to maintain themselves.

Or did Athens intend only to hold off the unpredictable changes that Macedonian rule threatened to impose on Hellas, only to keep conditions as they were? Conditions were as wretched and shameful as possible and became more unsustainable and more explosive the longer they persisted in the directionless, crippling pettiness to which the Greek world was losing one community after another. However much the Attic patriots believed they opposed Philip, or pretended to oppose him, in the name of freedom, autonomy, Hellenic civilization, and national honor, none of these would have been secured by an Attic victory, and none could have been maintained by the Attic demos's renewed rule over allies and subjugated places, by threadbare, worn-out democracy, its sycophants, demagogues, and mercenaries.

It was an error that does honor perhaps to Demosthenes's heart but certainly not to his intellect, if he could believe that with this chattering, unwarlike company of philistines, the Athenian citizenry—even if the power of his oratory could sweep it to brilliant decisions, could indeed galvanize it momentarily into action—he could still create a major politics, could still hold out in a long, hard war. It was an even graver error, if he believed that he could use alliances with Thebes, Megalopolis, Argos, and whatever other states, slapped together in the moment of danger, to stop the growing power of King Philip, who, even if one could take an encounter from him, would have returned with force redoubled, whereas all Hellenic alliances ended at the first defeat. Demosthenes must have known what it meant that he was not the military hero to execute the political projects he proposed and would have to entrust them, and with them the fortunes of the state, to commanders such as strong-headed Chares or dissolute Charidemus, who both understood well enough how to handle mercenary packs and procure for them the “fodder” they required. He must have known that back home in Athens, the rich, the lazy, and the self-seeking would band together against his growing influence, that his personal enemies, supported by these men, would use all the chicanery and cumbersomeness of government to frustrate his plans, whose worth was characterized after Chaironeia by the

bitter observation of an Athenian: “Had we not lost, we would have been lost.”

For an understanding of what followed the great turn of events at Chaironeia, it is necessary to trace the principal points of the contest between Athens and Macedonia that ended thus.

Demosthenes’s important political activity began when Philip’s successes against the Phokians, his influence on the factions of Euboia, and his advance beyond Amphipolis revealed the rise of a power that exceeded all previous assumptions in Hellenic politics. After Philip’s first successes against the Phokians, the Athenians occupied Thermopylai in 452. In doing so, they tipped their hand and showed their enemy how he should proceed. They still had their fleet and thus superiority at sea, but they had neither the speed nor the determined action necessary to suppress a Macedonian fleet still in construction. Philip saw in Athens his most dangerous foe in Hellas, and he intended to isolate and encircle her swiftly.

Four years earlier, while Amphipolis was still in contention, Olynthos, preeminent among the cities of Chalkidike, again in confederation, had allied herself with Philip against Athens and accepted from him Potidaia, occupied by Athenian cleruchs. The cleruchs, too, conducted themselves cleverly enough to gain advantage from the man they feared. Now the Olynthians responded to Philip’s first success against the Phokians by sending to Athens to propose an alliance. They gave asylum to the fugitive pretender to the Macedonian throne and refused to surrender him, and Philip seized the occasion to open hostilities. Help sent from Athens notwithstanding, the Chalkidic Confederation was defeated, Olynthos destroyed, and the other cities of the confederation made Macedonian dependencies (348).

At the same time, the Athenians had undertaken a fruitless expedition into Euboia. Most of the tyrants of the Euboian cities sided with Philip, giving him a position that threatened the flank of Attika. He, for his part, turned from Olynthos to make a third attack on the Thracian king Kersobleptes, who had supported Olynthos at Athens’s prompting. The Macedonian fleet was now strong enough to raid the Attic islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros and to intercept Attic merchantmen. It had even captured the *Paralos*, one of Athens’s sacred triremes, off the coast of Marathon and taken her off to Macedonia as a trophy. Finally, Thebes, hard pressed by the Phokians, sought help from Philip and invited him to occupy the pass at Thermopylai. To head off this gravest of developments,

Athens offered to discuss terms for a peace. Philip drew out the negotiations; Athens demanded the inclusion of the Phokians and Kersobleptes, temple robbers and a barbarian, in order to cover Thermopylai and the Hellespont, but ultimately she was willing to conclude a peace without these conditions (346). All these things show how Philip had gained in importance and Athens had lost. The supervening final crisis of the sacred war added a finishing touch.

The Phokians still occupied Thermopylai and the defected former Theban cities Orchomenos and Koroneia in Boeotia. The temple treasury at Delphi was nearly exhausted, but they had hopes of Athens, and the Spartan king Archidamos came to their aid with a thousand hoplites. By holding out a prospect of Spartan control of the sacred site at Delphi, Philip induced the Spartans to return home; having received safe passage with his 8000 mercenaries, the Phokian commander ceded Thermopylai to the Macedonians at the moment when the Athenian demos was already ratifying the peace. Philip advanced into Boeotia. Orchomenos and Koroneia surrendered, and Philip restored them to Thebes. Together with the Thebans and the Thessalians, Philip convened the Amphiktionic council, to which Athens sent no delegation. The council proceeded to pronounce judgment against the Phokians: They were expelled from the sacred league, their twenty-two cities dissolved, the walls destroyed. Those who had withdrawn with the mercenaries were condemned as temple robbers and declared outlaws. Only the execution of all able-bodied males, demanded by the Oitaians, was refused. By further disposition of the amphiktionies, the Phokians' vote was conferred on Philip, and conduct of the Pythian festival and protection of the Delphic sanctuary were entrusted to him.

Thus he rose to the top of the sacred league, which had now attained unprecedented political importance. That importance was next brought to bear on Athens, which hesitated to recognize the decisions just taken and the authority conferred on Philip. An amphiktionic embassy arrived in Athens to procure express assent. If it should be refused, the league would sanction Athens, and Philip's forces stood by to enforce these sanctions. Even Demosthenes thought it prudent to avoid another sacred war.

Philip's politics proceeded with a sure step. He had the kingdom of Epeiros under his hand; hope of a common war against Sparta brought him the cities of the Peloponnese; Elis, Sikyon, Megara, Arkadia, Messenia, and Argos were ruled by men well-disposed toward him. Then he occupied

Akarnania, concluded an alliance with the Aitolians and gave them Nau-paktos, which they desired. Athens was surrounded on the landward side and effectively immobilized. The Athenians still held the sea; their fleet secured the Chersonese for them and thus the Hellespont and the Propontis. There Philip would have to meet them in battle. Even while he assured them ever and again of his friendship and peaceful intentions, he fell upon Kersobleptes yet another time and his relatives the minor princes in Thrace, subjugated the territory on both sides of the Hebros, and secured it by founding a series of cities inland, whereupon the Hellenic cities on the Pontos up to Odessos were only too glad to enter into alliance with him. So great was the impression of his successes that the Getaien king on the lower Danube petitioned for friendship and sent his daughter to Philip as a bride.

These successes frightened Philip's Hellenic adversaries no less. The Athenians demanded restoration of the Thracian princes, their allies; they sent cleruchs to protect the Chersonese, now in danger, whom the city of Kardia refused to receive; they rejected Philip's proposal to submit the matter to arbitration and instead let Attic commanders attack and destroy places on the Propontis recently made Macedonian. These things brought on a new war.

Philip invoked the alliances he had concluded with Byzantium, Perinthos, and other cities that had made themselves independent of Athens in the social war to demand their support in his war against the Thracians. They feared his growing power and did not comply. Athens offered them alliance and military support. She had already lured most of the cities of Euboia away from Philip, concluded alliances with Corinth, Akarnania, Megara, Achaia, and Korkyra, and resumed contact with Rhodes and Kos. At the court in Susa, she drew attention to the threat that Philip's growing power posed for the Persian empire, whereupon Persia sent subsidies to the Attic commander in the Chersonese. The zeal of the Attic demos in defense of Hellenic freedom knew no bounds.

After victory over the Thracians, Philip turned against Perinthos and Byzantium, the key to the Pontos. If these cities should fall, Athenian power would be seriously compromised. The Athenians replied to an ultimatum from Philip by declaring that he had violated the peace he had pledged and sent Byzantium the fleet they had promised. Aid arrived also from Rhodes, Kos, and Chios, allies of Byzantium; neighboring satraps rushed to the support of Perinthos and sent troops into Thrace. Philip was obliged to withdraw.

He set out against the Scyths. The Scythian king Ateas on the near side of the Danube delta was a dangerous neighbor for his new settlement on the Hebros. Philip defeated him. Then he marched home through Triballian territory; they, too, were often troublesome neighbors on the Macedonian frontiers and should learn to fear his power. He was securing his rear before delivering the decisive blow against the Athenians.

They played into his hands. In the temple at Delphi they had renewed their offerings for the battle of Plataiai with the inscription: "From the booty of the Persians and the Thebans, united in common battle against the Hellenes." In the Amphiktionic assembly, the Lokrians of Amphissa protested on behalf of the Thebans and demanded heavy fines. The Attic delegate Aischines replied with the reproach that the Lokrians had farmed on Delphic temple land. He whipped up the assembly to the point that it decided to discipline these temple robbers forthwith. But the peasants of Amphissa chased out the amphiktionies and the Delphians who had accompanied them. After this disgrace, one saw fit to convene an extraordinary assembly that would do what was necessary to punish the desecrators. No embassy from Athens or from Thebes appeared, and Sparta had been excluded since the end of the sacred war. Those who did appear at the assembly decreed a sacred campaign against Amphissa and consigned that campaign to the neighboring tribes. It met with scant success; the Amphissans remained stoutly defiant. In autumn 339, the next regular assembly charged King Philip with punishing the temple desecrators and gave him command of the sacred war.

He was quick to respond, and not only for the purpose of disciplining the peasants of Amphissa. Athens had reopened the war against him and forced him back before Byzantium and Perinthos. A campaign in behalf of the Delphic god would let him bring his land forces close to the Attic frontiers and prosecute that war where the Athenians' sea power was of no help to them. But the Athenians themselves had started the business with Amphissa and were now obliged to turn against the man who came to finish it, showing all the world how wrong they were and how contradictory in their politics. Philip could count on Thebes, which had allied herself with him out of bitterness toward Athens, especially since the war against the Phokians, and out of gratitude for rescue by Macedonia. Control of Nikaia at the southern egress of Thermopylai, which he had given the Thessalians, opened his way into the south. He sent part of his army ahead from Herakleia at the northern entrance of Thermopylai through the pass in Doris, the nearest way to Amphissa. With the greater

part of the army, he set out over Nikaia through the pass that leads down to Elateia and into the upper Phokian valley of the Kephissos. In late autumn 339 he stood at Elateia and fortified his position there. The open frontiers of Boeotia and the road into Attika lay before him, behind him the passes that secured his communications with Thessaly and Macedonia.

He sent to Thebes and offered participation in booty and territorial expansion if she would join the campaign against Athens; if not, he demanded free passage. An Attic embassy arrived in Thebes at the same time; despite everything that had happened in the last twenty years, Demosthenes's efforts succeeded in setting up an alliance between Athens and Thebes. Thebes sent a corps of mercenaries to the aid of the Lokrians of Amphissa; Athens let them have 10,000 troops that she had raised; both cities called on the Phokian exiles to return home and helped them to refortify some of the most important places in the land. But the Macedonians advanced on Amphissa, defeated the enemy's mercenaries, and razed the city. To meet the principal concentration of Philip's forces in Phokis, the Athenians and the Thebans prepared with speed and put their citizens under arms. The Attic army proceeded to Thebes and joined with the Boeotian army. Two successful encounters raised their courage and their confidence; Corinth, Megara, and other Athenian allies sent auxiliary troops.

But Philip stood his ground. He added reinforcements from Macedonia; with those that his son Alexander brought up, his army stood at 30,000 troops. It may have been at this point that the king sent to Thebes to offer negotiations, and Demosthenes's loud protest defeated the boeotarchs' predisposition toward peace. If only the army of the allies, superior to the Macedonians with respect to number, had been equally able to seize the initiative militarily, for they occupied a fortified position at the entrance to Phokis, on the Kephissos. A movement by Philip to the left forced them back onto the Boeotian plain. At Chaironeia, Philip met them in battle (August 338). After long wavering, the hard-fought encounter was decided by a cavalry attack that Alexander led. It was a resounding victory. The allied army was blown to pieces and the fate of Greece rested with Philip.

It was not consistent with his politics, nor was he the triumphalist, to make Greece into a Macedonian province. Only the Thebans suffered the punishment their defection had merited. They were made to receive their exiles and compose of them a new synhedrion, which condemned or banished those who had led and misled the city. The Boeotian League

was abolished, and the communities of Plataiai, Orchomenos, and Thespiai reconstituted. Oropos, which Thebes had seized twenty years earlier, was restored to Athens. Finally, a Macedonian garrison was laid on the Kadmeia, a position from which not only Thebes, but also Attika and all of central Greece could be kept quiet.

Athens met with as much forbearance as Thebes with severity. In the first alarm after the defeat, the Athenians had set about preparing for a life-and-death struggle; they were about to place Charidemos at the head of the army and to arm the slaves. The fate of Thebes and the terms the king now offered cooled this ardor. Through a prisoner, the orator Demades, Philip offered to return all prisoners of war to Athens without ransom; to let Athens keep Delos, Samos, Imbros, Lemnos, and Skyros and come into possession of Oropos again; and to leave it to the Athenians—perhaps only ostensibly—whether to join the king's common peace with the Hellenes and the council he wanted to establish with them. The Athenians accepted, and the demos voted the king every kind of honor: it conferred Athenian citizenship on him, his son Alexander, and his field commanders Antipater and Parmenion, erected a statue to him, a "benefactor of the city," in the agora, and other things.

The king did not intend to found his works in Hellas on fear alone, and the Macedonian faction that he counted on or that formed anew was not composed entirely of traitors and bribe-takers, as Demosthenes would have it. It is significant that one of the king's most loyal adherents was Demaratos of Corinth, Timoleon's friend and fellow in the liberation of Sicily, who was inspired like none other by the grand idea of a national struggle against the Persians. Others, as well, may have been of the same persuasion as Aristotle when he observed that solely a kingdom was by its very nature competent to stand above the factions that were undermining public life in Hellas, only a kingdom could create a state system of the center, "for it is the responsibility of the king to ensure that property owners are not harmed in their possessions, that the demos is not treated arbitrarily or arrogantly." Tyranny, attempted so often, had proved unequal to the task, "for tyranny, unlike an ancient kingdom, stands not by its own right, but by the favor of the demos or by force and injustice."

Did Philip proceed accordingly?

Without touching Attic soil, he marched on to the Peloponnese. Megara, Corinth, and Epidauros, and other cities that had once intended to defend themselves behind their walls now petitioned for peace. The king obliged them, each on particular terms: the Corinthians on condition

that they surrender Acrocorinth to a Macedonian garrison. His progress through the Peloponnese was punctuated by similar conclusions of hostilities, with instruction to send plenipotentiaries to Corinth for the purpose of concluding a common peace. Only Sparta refused every offer. Philip marched through Lakonian territory to the sea; then, in keeping with a decision of a court of arbitration composed of all Hellenes, he drew Sparta's frontiers with Argos, Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messenia in such a fashion that the most important passes fell to those who would gladly have seen themselves delivered of all future fears by total destruction of the detested Spartan state.

The embassies of the states of Hellas—without Sparta—assembled in Corinth. There they established “the common peace and agreement for alliance,” perhaps on the basis of a proposal put forward by Philip, surely not by Macedonian fiat. Freedom and autonomy for every Hellenic city, mutually guaranteed undisturbed possession of property, unimpeded trade and perpetual peace among the cities: such were the tenets of this union. To secure them and to carry out common decisions, a “general council” was established, to which each constituent would send delegates. Their particular charge was to ensure “that in the allied states no banishment or execution contrary to prevailing law, no confiscation, no cancellation of debt, no redistribution of land, or manumission of slaves should be undertaken for the purpose of fomenting insurrection.” Between the states thus united and the Macedonian kingdom a perpetual league, both defensive and offensive, was declared. No Hellene should take up military service against the king or aid his enemies, on pain of banishment and destitution. The court with jurisdiction over violators of the alliance was lodged with the Amphiktionic council. Finally, the cornerstone of the entire structure: War was declared against the Persians “to avenge their desecration of sacred sites in Hellas,” and Philip was named field commander of this war on land and sea, with unrestricted powers.

Philip went back to Macedonia to make all necessary preparations for a great national war that he intended to begin the following spring. The military aid the satraps had sent into Thrace gave him full legal grounds for this war against the Great King.

How remarkable that the fortunes of Sicily took an opposite turn at just this moment. Miserably oppressed by tyrants and threatened by the Carthaginians, the Sicilian patriots had appealed to Corinth for help. The Corinthians sent valiant Timoleon with a small force. He broke the tyranny in Syracuse and in the other cities, one after another, and forced

the Carthaginians back into their old confines in the western corner of the island (339). He attracted large numbers of new Hellenic settlers into the liberated cities and restored their democratic freedom and autonomy. The kind of public life that was collapsing in the homeland seemed about to be revived in Sicily. But these new conditions survived the death of celebrated Timoleon in 337 only briefly; even before the Carthaginians rose to new attack, the democracies were moving toward oligarchy or tyranny and falling to bickering again. Greater Greece was the last place to which to look for rescue. The cities still standing there were being pressed ever harder by quickly gathering movement among the Italic tribes; King Archidamos of Sparta, whom the Tarentines had taken into their service, met death leading his mercenaries against the Messapii on the same day, it is said, as Philip prevailed at Chaironeia.

With this battle and the Corinthian League, a union had been forged that guaranteed internal peace and a common external national politics at least in the homeland of the Hellenes. This was a union not for mere tribal reasons but instead for reasons of state, as Thales and Bias had once recommended to the Ionians. It was not a hegemony, such as the Athenians at the height of their glory were able to maintain solely by changing it all too soon from leading into ruling, still less such as Sparta had tried to impose with the peace of Antialkidas, in the Great King's name and in execution of his politics. Rather, it was a league, with orderly council and court presiding over the allied states, with communal autonomy for each constituent, and with lasting peace among its members and unimpeded trade, all guaranteeing each. Finally, the league was made firm and enduring by the decision to go to war against the Persians, whereby essential matters of military command and of the external policy of each state were conferred by oath upon the commander of the league, the Macedonian potentate.

After the hard struggle and harsh measures that had been necessary to arrive at such a league, the Macedonian king did himself and the Hellenes honor when he assumed that the war against the Persians that now became possible—the potency of a common national cause achieved at last—and the external successes and internal benefits that the undertaking promised would erase from memory the many defeats and sacrifices exacted as the price of creating this league. Philip's repeated declarations and the responsibility he assumed in the league agreement were a pledge to the allies that his armed force was intended for a national struggle. More pertinently, his own interest had always required this policy of him:

to gather the strength of Greece so that he could dare challenge Persian power and, conversely, to undertake this struggle in order to unite more securely any sound forces that remained in Hellenic public life and bond them enduringly.

His power alone shielded Hellas like a protective wall against the barbarians of the north, to whom Italy's power had already succumbed. It had matured and now been formally invoked to lead united Hellas to success in the struggle against the barbarians in the east. This meant liberating the Hellenic islands and cities, which, since the fall of Athens, since Lysander and the peace of Antialkidas, had again passed under the Persian yoke, and opening Asia to free trade and the industries of Hellas, to an influx of Hellenic life. An excess of restless, seething elements running wild had made the Hellenic world deathly ill in its tangled small-state politics, and the Hellenic world, ailing, had only made that excess worse and more destructive. Opening Asia would give the Hellenes abundant space and opportunity, would give them the alluring prospect of finding new kinds of activity in new conditions and of growing strong again by working on new tasks. A cosmopolitan streak, coexisting with stubborn particularism, that had been developed in Greek life by foreign trade, the refugee problem, traffic in mercenaries, and the practice of courtesans, by enlightenment and high culture, would have to be formed appropriately by means of orderly change and of effects well anticipated, if it was not to squander uselessly what remained of national assets. In an Asian campaign it could be.

* * *

On the European side, matters thus stood poised for resolution. On the Asiatic side, correspondingly, the great Persian empire had reached the point where it seemed to have exhausted the power constituencies that had once created its successes and to be holding up only by the inertia of its very existence.

Little has come down to us concerning the nature and ways of the Persian empire and that little mostly superficial and interpreted by those who saw the Persians simply as barbarians, whom they despised. Only in the grand figure of Dareios, as one of the combatants at Marathon depicted it in his play about the Persian wars, does one sense something of the deeply powerful nature of this noble people. Perhaps it is permissible to develop and complete this impression by means of an account of the Persians' most immediate expression of their inner life, their religion and their

sacred history. These bear witness to the higher ethical power, vis-à-vis the other peoples of Asia, with which the Persians enter history, to their grave and solemn understanding of what the individual and the group live for.

Their religion requires purity in works, purity in word, purity in thought. Truthfulness, sanctity of life, dutifulness in full self-denial—such is the law that became manifest through Zarathustra, the herald of the holy word. Their sagas of Jamshid and Gustasp and of the battles against the Turanians develop models of what the true life should seek and what it should avoid in ways quite unlike the Hellenes' poems of Troy, Thebes, and the Argonauts.

In remotest prehistoric times, wild hordes swarmed over the high plateaus from Demavend to the river Sindh. Then Haoma appeared, herald of the old law, savior of mankind, and imparted his teachings to the father of Jamshid; and man began to settle and work the land. And when Jamshid became king, he ordered the life of his people and the estates of his realm; in the glory of his rule, no animal died, no plant withered, water and fruit were never wanting, there was neither frost nor heat, nor death nor suffering, and peace in all places. In his pride, he said: "Understanding is through me; no king is my equal; the earth has become as I desired; food and sleep and pleasure come to men through me; power is mine and I have removed death from the world; therefore they must call me Creator and pray to me." And god's glory faded from him; Zohak the destroyer eclipsed him, drove him out, and began a terrible reign. There followed a time of wild disturbance, out of which finally victorious Feridun the hero went forth; Feridun and, after him, his house "of the men of the first religion" ruled over Iran, engaged again and again in hard battle with the wild Turanians, until Zarathustra the messenger of heaven appeared under the sixth king after Feridun, Gustasp, to instruct him how he should think, speak, and act in keeping with the law.

The basis of the new law was the eternal struggle between light and darkness, of Ormuzd and the seven arch-princes of light against Ahriman and the seven of darkness; these two and their hosts battle for mastery of the world. All creation belongs to the light, but darkness participates in this ceaseless struggle; man alone stands between the two and exercises free will to help the good or to make place for evil. Thus the sons of the light, the Iranians, fight the great fight for Ormuzd, a fight to subject the world to his rule, to order the world in keeping with the example of the realm of light and keep it prosperous and pure.

Such is the belief of this people and such are the impulses out of which its historical life developed. They are partly tillers of the soil, partly herdsmen in the rugged mountain country of Persis among noble families whose countless fortresses are still legendary centuries later. At their head stands the tribe of the Pasargades, to whose noblest house, that of the Achaimenids, the tribal crown belongs. And then Prince Cyrus saw so much arrogance, decadence, and contemptible ways at the court of the Great King at Ecbatana that he thought it well to make his stern people the ruling house. He calls the tribes together, saga tells us, and first puts them to work bringing a field under cultivation and feeling the full weight of subjugation, then summons them to a feast; he calls on them to choose between the serf's sad life, bound to the soil, and the more glorious life of the victor, and they choose battle and victory. He sets out against the Medes, conquers them, becomes master of a realm that extends to the Halys and to the Jaxartes. He goes on to conquer the Lydian kingdom and the land to the sea of the Iaones and the Babylonian realm to the frontier of Egypt. Cyrus's son Kambyzes annexes the land of the pharaohs; not one of the ancient peoples or realms holds out against the strength of this young people. But the Medes seize upon the Great King's campaign into the desert beyond Egypt and his abrupt death; their priests, the magi, name one of their own Great King, call him Cyrus's younger son, and exempt the tribes from military service and tribute for three years; and the tribes gladly submit. Years later, Dareios the Achaimenid rises up with the chiefs of the six other tribes; they murder the magus and his most prominent followers. "The rule that was snatched away from our house, I brought back; I restored the sanctuaries and the worship of him who is our realm's protector; thus by Ormuzd's grace I regained what had been taken away, I established the good fortune of the realm, Persia, Media, and the other provinces, as before": so says an inscription of Dareios.

Dareios organized the empire. Since there was no Persian culture that, like the Babylonian or the Assurian, could persuade the hearts and transform the lives of those who had been subjugated by arms, since the religion of light, the most characteristic strength and excellence of the Persian people, sought no converts, the unity and security of the empire had to be erected and maintained by organizing the force that had founded it and would rule it. This was the complete opposite of what had become the essence of the Greek world: here, one people, driven by inexhaustible excitability and peculiarity to differentiate itself into

countless small and smallest circles in free autonomy and living apart; in the Persian empire, many nations, mostly exhausted and no longer capable of an own way of life, hurled together by armed might and held there by the strict and proud preeminence of the Persian people and the Great King, that “god-like man,” who presides over all.

This monarchy, stretching from the Greek Sea to the Himalaya, from the African desert to the steppes of the Aral Sea, leaves the peoples to their own ways and their accustomed conditions, protects them in that “which their law requires,” and is tolerant toward all religions. It provides for trade and for the prosperity of the peoples, and lets them choose their tribal chiefs as long as these submit and pay tribute. But it imposes over them far and wide a stoutly joined framework of military and administrative unity supported by men drawn from the ruling tribe of “the Medes and the Persians.” One religion, a hard, strictly practiced way of life in field and forest, education of a young nobility intended for service at the court and under the gaze of the Great King, and, further, an armed force of ten thousand immortals gathered at this court, two thousand lancers and two thousand horsemen, tribute and gifts pouring into the imperial palace from every corner of the far-flung empire and heaping up in the treasury, an orderly hierarchy of ranks and offices for the noblemen gathered at court, culminating in the “table mates” and “kinsmen” of the Great King—all these things together give the capital of the realm the force and mass to make it a cohesive and controlling center of power. A network of military roads built throughout the empire, post stations with relays ever at the ready, fortresses at every important pass or border crossing all secure communications and assure the swiftest possible intervention of central power. The Great King’s messengers can carry dispatches from Susa to Sardeis—350 miles—in less than ten days, and in every countryside troops stand poised to enforce what these dispatches command.

For administrative purposes, Dareios divides the empire into twenty satrapies, but not according to nationality or for historical reasons; rather, these are geographical areas determined by natural frontiers. The relationship of local peoples to the realm consists in obedience, paying tribute, military service when a levy is raised, and maintaining the satrap with his court and the standing troops of the Great King in the provincial capitals and frontier fortresses. The satraps—“kings subject only to the Great King”—answer for the obedience and order of the satrapy, for whose protection and enlargement of territory or of tribute they may wage war

and conclude peace, with or without orders from the imperial palace. They in turn may entrust various districts of their territory to native chiefs or others whom they favor, who raise tribute and keep order. The troops stationed in the satrapy are at their disposal, but under commanders whom the king appoints directly, often with military command of several contiguous satrapies. The vigilance and competence of the troops, the loyalty of the satraps, the Great King's constant oversight, exercised by his emissaries—this graduated pyramid of monarchical organization is the instrument that holds the subject lands and peoples together.

In opulent dotations, in a stream of gifts and honors by grace and favor, in highly paid military service, the nobles and the people of Persia participate in their king's rule. Balancing these things, sustained surveillance and control, strict discipline, the king's arbitrary and often bloody power to punish keep those called to service fearful and dutiful. Woe betide the satrap who neglects to provide for land cultivation, or for the prosperity of his province, or for water supplies, who builds no paradises, whose province loses population or falls behind in development, or who oppresses his subjects. It is the king's wish that the satraps be rightful servants of the true word by nature and by deed. They should all look to the king and only to him; just as Ormuzd, whose image and instrument he is, rules the world of the light and struggles against that of ruinous, evil-minded Ahriman, just so is the Great King infinite and infallible, over everyone and everything.

These basic traits of the power structure derived from what was most characteristic of the Persians, their traditional perfect loyalty to their tribal chief and the proud note of legitimacy in their ancient hereditary order. This grandiose organization of despotic power rested on the assumption that the personal worthiness and strength of a ruler would renew itself in every successor; that the court and harem close at hand, the satraps and military officers far away would not cease to be controlled and determined by him; and that the ruling people would remain true to itself, its ancient ruggedness and austerity, and its unquestioning devotion to its god-king.

Under Dareios, Persian power reached its fullest flowering; the very subject peoples blessed its rule. Even in the Greek cities there were respected men everywhere who, to perpetuate a tyranny, gladly submitted, with their fellow citizens, to the Persian yoke; the noble Persians' moral estimation of the clever Hellenes will not have been heightened by this quality. After Dareios and after the defeats at Salamis and Mykale, the

first signs appeared of the stagnation and decline into which the empire, incapable of internal development, would slip when it ceased to grow by conquest and victory. At the end of Xerxes's reign, a flagging of despotic power and growing influence of court and harem had already become noticeable. The conquered territory on the Thracian coast, the Hellespont and the Bosporos, and the Hellenic islands and cities on the coast of Asia Minor had been lost. Soon certain of the subject peoples tried to liberate themselves; the Egyptians rose and restored their ancient dynasty, supported by Hellas. The more successfully the satraps of the anterior lands resisted central power and the more they saw the personal will and strength of their ruler slacken, the bolder they became to act in their own interest and set their sights on a more independent, hereditary rule in their own satrapies. The well-joined structure of the empire was still stout enough and the accustomed discipline and loyalty of the Persian people and nobility sufficiently vigorous to overcome these eruptions here and there.

The danger became graver at the end of the reign of Dareios II (424–04), when his younger son Cyrus rebelled against the older Artaxerxes II, who had already assumed the tiara. Cyrus, unlike his brother, had not been born before his father ascended the throne, but rather during his father's reign, and he believed that he enjoyed the same superior right that Xerxes had asserted to succeed Dareios. His father had sent him, the favorite of his mother Parysatis, as "karanos" (chief) to Asia Minor and, it seems, given him the satrapies of Kappadokia, Phrygia, and Lydia. The satraps on the seacoast, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, observers of and participants in the hard struggle between Athens and Sparta and in rivalry with one another, had favored first one side, then the other. Cyrus, however, espousing a politics surely correct and in keeping with the interest of the empire, swiftly and decisively took the side of Sparta. Even the Greeks noted that this young prince was intelligent and energetic and talented in military matters, after the austere fashion of his people. He could show the Spartan Lysander a park that he said he had laid out mostly with his own hands and, when Lysander cast a skeptical eye on the Persian's gold chain and magnificent dress, swear by Mithras that he took nothing in the morning until he had done his duty in agriculture or battle exercise. He knew and valued the military art and capableness of the Hellenes. Now that Persian support had helped Lysander overcome Athens and, with the fall of Athens, the sea power that had done the empire serious damage was gone, and now that Sparta had expressly

consented to the return of the Greek cities of Asia under Persian rule, Cyrus may have had no misgivings about recruiting 13,000 Greek mercenaries, a checkered mix gathered from all the Greek states, to which Sparta added 700 hoplites sent to Issos, as the best part of the army with which he intended to take possession of the empire to which he was entitled. Tissaphernes, satrap of Ionia and Cyrus's personal enemy, had sent timely warning to Susa, and Artaxerxes set out against the rebel with the levy of the empire. At the entrance to Babylon near Kunaxa, they met in battle. After Cyrus's Greeks prevailed in their wing, Cyrus led 600 horsemen in a storm of the 6000 horsemen who surrounded the king, broke through, reached the king, and wounded him, then perished under the blows of the king and his loyalists. The king's wound was healed by his Greek physician Ktesias. Among the captives of the harem that now fell to the king were two Greek women whom their parents had brought to Cyrus at Sardeis. The one, a Milesian, fled into the Greek camp; the other, the beautiful, deeply cultivated Milto of Phokaia, passed into the Great King's harem, where she long played an important role, according to the Greeks.

On the face of it, the Great King's power was established at Kunaxa. But it was a sign of deep decay that many noblemen in the imperial army had gone over to the insurgent just before battle. It was a more ominous symptom that a paltry pack of Greeks had broken through the massive lines of the imperial army and prevailed on the battlefield and that it then marched in closed ranks straight through the realm all the way to the Pontic coast. Did the organization of the empire amount to so little that an enemy army could ignore three, four satrapies and their frontier fortresses, unpunished? Never in life would the insurgent have been able to cross the passes of the Tauros, if the satrap of Kilikia, from the ancient line of the Syennesis, and the Persian fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos, had done their duty. Above all, that Cyrus could keep excessive forces in the anterior satrapies, which were shot through with Greekness from their coasts to the hills, and then could attract massive numbers of Greek fighters showed that one would have to proceed more cautiously and more strictly with these satrapies. The error lay not with the satrapy system itself but rather with central power, if karans and satraps had become accustomed to pursuing their own politics and presiding like local lords, having gathered among city tyrants, tax farmers, and well-paid favorites a personal following that made them powerful enough to defy their superiors and oppress their inferiors.

Perhaps it was not originally in this connection that the number of the satrapies in Asia Minor—only four under Dareios I—was raised, specifically, that the large satrapy of Phrygia, which comprised all the interior highlands from the Propontis to the Tauros and the Armenian mountains, was broken up into three satrapies, Phrygia on the Hellespont, Great Phrygia, and Kappadokia; that all of Karia and the south coast to Kilikia were detached from the satrapy of Ionia; and, finally, that Kilikia was left henceforth without a satrap and, it seems, placed immediately under the empire.

The Spartans under Agesilaos were already present in the anterior lands to open hostilities against the empire. When Tissaphernes, who had returned to his satrapy, proceeded no more energetically against the enemy and achieved no more, the queen mother had what she needed to avenge the death of her favorite child. A successor to Tissaphernes was sent, with orders to murder him.

The gravest development was that Egypt had taken up arms. Egyptian troops had still fought in the army of the Great King at Kunaxa, but in the Greek army it was already known that Egypt had fallen away. Aforementioned Tamos fled with the fleet to Egypt, and Sparta took up contact with Memphis, which sent subsidies and promised further help. Only too easily could the Phoenician cities follow Egypt's example and draw in Cyprus, where the king Euagoras eagerly promoted Greekness. The entire maritime power of Persia was at risk, while the Greeks' land forces were pressing the satrapies of Asia Minor. The old Periklean threat, now magnified, hung over the empire again. How to meet it?

Konon the Athenian, who had taken refuge at Euagoras's court after the final Attic defeat, showed the way. On his advice, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia received orders to assemble a fleet and use Persian gold to enable the states of Hellas to open hostilities against Sparta. When Konon prevailed at Knidos, when Thebes, Corinth, and Athens rose, and when Pharnabazos brought his fleet to the Lakonian coast and appeared in person before the assembly of the allies at Corinth, Agesilaos saw himself obliged to return home in haste. Now hard pressed, Sparta sought the Great King's favor and alliance; she sent Antialkidas to conclude the peace in which Sparta sacrificed the Greek cities of Asia to the empire, and Cyprus into the bargain. No longer militarily, but certainly diplomatically, Persia became master of the Greeks. Looking with favor now on Sparta, now on Athens, now on Thebes, the court at Susa held the still quarreling

Greek states in suspense and kept them guessing; it let them tear themselves and one another limb from limb.

But the unrest in Hellas was also an opportunity for the Great King's rebellious states, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Syrian coast, to glean support there, and the satraps of Asia Minor no longer restricted themselves to instructions from Susa in their relations with the chaos in Greece. Mild Artaxerxes did not have the firm hand necessary to pull up sharply. In ten years of fighting, he attained no more from the Cypriot king than that Cyprus consented to pay tribute as before. He sent an army of Hellenic mercenaries into Egypt, led by Iphikrates, and still could not make himself master of that kingdom. As hard as he tried, he could not subdue the rebellious Kadousians in the mountains of the Caspian Gates, and the hill tribes behind Susa, Ecbatana, and Persepolis had slipped from his control: when the Great King passed through their territory with his court, they demanded tribute for his passage and received it. Certain satraps in Asia Minor had risen: Ariobarzanes in Hellespontine Phrygia, Autophrades in Lydia, Maussolos, Orontes; only the treachery of Orontes, whom they had chosen as their leader, saved the peninsula for the Great King.

The historical record—the Greek record, to be sure—represents the weakness of aging Artaxerxes among his court even more pitifully. He seems to have been tossed about like a medicine ball by his mother, his harem, and his eunuchs. At ninety, he named his son Dareios his successor and let him assume the tiara right away. And yet Dareios is said to have been moved by his father's refusal of a favor to stir up a plot against his father's life, which he paid for with his own when the plot was betrayed to the old king. Ariaspes was now first in succession and after him, Arsames. But a third son, Ochos, so it is said, drove the former to suicide by false reports of their father's displeasure and had the latter removed by hired assassins. Immediately thereafter, Artaxerxes II died (358). Ochos succeeded him.

Ochos appears in the tradition as an oriental despot of the first water: bloodthirsty, cunning, energetic, and lascivious, only the more formidable for the cold, calculating decisiveness of his acts. Such a personality could certainly pull shaken Persian power together internally, prop it up with an appearance of renewal and strength, and force the rebellious peoples and the defiant satraps into submission just by accustoming them to gazing silently upon his tantrums, his bloodlust, and his wild debauchery. He began by murdering his younger brothers and their following; and

the Persian court, full of admiration, called him by his father's name, whose one virtue had been mildness.

The way the throne had passed, perhaps also the bloody events that had preceded, became an occasion, or a pretext, for new risings in the anterior satrapies and for a bolder course by Egypt. Orontes, who held Ionia, and Artabazos, who held Hellespontine Phrygia, both rose; Attic inscriptions attest to contacts between Orontes and Athens. Artabazos had acquired two men from Rhodes, the brothers Mentor and Memnon, both fine warriors, had married their sister, and had put his Greek mercenaries under their command. The Attic commanders Chares, Charidemus, and Phokion stood by him. Other satraps remained on the Great King's side, specifically, Maussolos of Karia, of the ancient dynasty of that land. He brought about the defection of Attic allies (357), starting with the Rhodians, the Koans, and the Chians. Athens aided the rebellious satraps the more eagerly; Chares defeated the imperial army sent against them, and the Athenians celebrated as if at a second Marathon. But a Persian embassy appeared in Athens to complain of Chares and threatened to send three hundred triremes to the aid of Athens's enemies. The Athenians were quick to soothe the king's anger and concluded a peace with the rebellious allies (355). Artabazos fought on without Attic help; his brother-in-law Memnon undertook an expedition against the tyrant in the Kimmerian Bosporos, with whom Herakleia, the most important city on the Bithynian coast of the Pontos, was at war. Artabazos himself gained support from the Thebans, who sent him their field commander Pammenes with five thousand mercenaries; with their help, he defeated the king's troops in two battles. Then Artabazos had the Theban commander laid in irons, because he seemed to be in negotiation with the enemy; Pammenes may have been taking instructions from Thebes, where the Great King had had large sums sent. At this point, Artabazos's fortunes changed abruptly and he was obliged to flee (ca. 351); he and Memnon took refuge at the Macedonian court; Mentor went to Egypt.

Egypt had long been the hearth on which the struggle against Persian power burned most brightly. During Artaxerxes II's reign, a great expedition had been prepared there by Tachos, Nektanebo's son. With an army of 80,000 Egyptians, 10,000 Greek mercenaries, to which Sparta added 1000 under aged Agesilaos, and a fleet of 200 ships under the command of Athenian Chabrias, Tachos intended to conquer Syria. But King Tachos's mistrust and slights had made such an enemy of King Agesilaos, and his

extortion such an enemy of the Egyptian people that while he was away in Syria, his uncle's son Nektanebo II could set himself up as pharaoh. When Agesilaos threw his Greek troops to this new master, Tachos's sole resort was to flee to Susa and beg for mercy. Nektanebo in turn found in Mendes a pretender who attracted followers in number. Events reached such a point that the pharaoh, surrounded together with his Greeks, came to be pinned down more and more narrowly by wall and ditch, until aged Agesilaos with *his* Greeks advanced against these 100,000 troops, broke up the entire Mendes band, and put it to flight. It was the old Spartan king's last act; about to sail home to Sparta, he died (358).

The scant documentation of this time states only that Artaxerxes II sent his son Ochus against Egypt, that the undertaking failed, that Ochus, made king, promptly fought the Kadousians and prevailed.

Shortly thereafter, about 354, Athens was much alarmed over huge preparations that King Ochus was said to be making, greater than any since Xerxes's time. It was rumored that he would subdue Egypt first, then attack Greece, for Dareios, too, had first conquered Egypt and then addressed Hellas, and Xerxes had first crushed rebellion in Egypt, then set out against Hellas. The Athenians talked as if he were already on the way: His fleet stood ready to bring troops across the sea, the treasury would follow, carried by 1200 camels; with his gold, he would hire immense numbers of Hellenic mercenaries for his Asiatic army; Athens should remember Marathon and Salamis and declare war.

But the imperial army was not to be assembled so soon. And before it could come, Phoenicia rose to join the continuing rebellion in Asia Minor. At a congress in Tripolis, the Sidonians under their prince Tennes persuaded the other cities to defect; they allied themselves with Nektanebo, destroyed the Persian palaces and paradises, burned the magazines, murdered the Persians in their cities. They all, and particularly rich and resourceful Sidon, armed with speed, hired mercenaries, and prepared their ships. The Great King, whose imperial army was massing near Babylon, ordered the satrap of Syria, Belesys, and Mazaïos, who administered Kilikia, to attack Sidon. But Tennes, supported by 4000 Greek mercenaries whom Nektanebo had sent him under Mentor's command, withstood the assault. Simultaneously, the nine cities of Cyprus rose and allied themselves with Egypt and Phoenicia, hoping to be, like them, independent under their new princes. They too equipped their ships and hired Greek mercenaries. Nektanebo himself was optimally prepared; the Athenian

Diophantos and the Spartan Lamios took command of his mercenaries. “Deeply disgraced,” says an Attic orator of the time, “Ochos was obliged to withdraw.”

He prepared a third campaign and called on the Hellenic states to support him. Hellas was in the last stages of the sacred war; Thebes at least sent 1000 mercenaries under Lakrates, Argos 3000 under Nikostratos; 6000 troops were raised in the Greek cities of Asia and put under Bagoas’s command. The Great King ordered Satrap Idrieus of Karia to attack Cyprus; he himself turned to attack the Phoenician cities. In the face of such superior forces, the Phoenicians lost their courage. Only the Sidonians were determined to put up the ultimate resistance; they burned their ships to make flight impossible. But on Mentor’s advice, King Tennes had already begun negotiations, and these two betrayed the city. When the Sidonians saw that the citadel had fallen and the gates had been captured and that all rescue was out of the question, they put their city to the torch and died in the flames; 40,000 are said to have perished. The Cypriot kings lost heart and submitted.

With the fall of Sidon, the way was open into Egypt. The army of the Great King marched south along the coast; not without important losses, it crossed the desert that separates Asia and Egypt and arrived under the walls of the frontier fortress Pelusion, defended by 5000 Greeks under Philophron. The Thebans under Lakrates, eager to protect a reputation, attacked immediately and were repulsed; only nightfall saved them from heavy losses. Nektanebo had reason to hope to hold out in battle; he had 20,000 Greeks and as many Libyans, and 60,000 Egyptians; countless ships on the Nile were equipped to block any attempt at crossing, even if the trenches dug along the right bank were taken.

The Great King divided his forces. He himself went up the Nile to threaten Memphis. The Boeotian mercenaries and Persian infantry under Lakrates and the Lydian satrap Rhoisakes were to storm Pelusion; the mercenaries from Argos under Nikostratos and 1000 chosen Persian troops under Aristazanes were sent with 80 triremes to attempt a landing behind the lines at Pelusion; a fourth division, among them Mentor’s mercenaries and Bagoas’s 6000 Greeks, advanced southward from Pelusion to cut communications with Memphis. Audacious Nikostratos made the landing behind enemy lines and defeated both the Egyptian troops deployed there and the Greek mercenaries under Kleinias of Kos, sent in haste to their relief. Nektanebo rushed to bring his troops together and

fall back toward Memphis. After stout resistance, Philophron surrendered Pelusion in return for unmolested retreat. Mentor and Bagoas turned against Bubastis; a call for surrender and a threat to answer useless resistance with the same punishment Sidon had suffered brought the split between the Greeks, who were prepared to risk their lives, and the cowardly Egyptians into the open, and the Greeks fought on. The capture of the city, which would have cost Bagoas, the king's favorite, his life had Mentor not come to his rescue, was followed by investment of the remaining places in lower Egypt. Facing the approach of superior forces, Nektanebo no longer thought himself safe in his capital; he fled with his treasury upstream into Ethiopia.

Thus Egypt fell to Artaxerxes III (ca. 344). The land had been estranged from the empire for sixty years, and he let it feel his anger. The days of Kambyses returned. Countless executions followed, and plundering of the worst kind. With his own hands, the Great King impaled Apis the sacred bull; he ordered that the temples be stripped of their ornament, their gold, even of their sacred writings. "The Dagger" he was called henceforth by the people. Once Pherendakes had been installed as satrap and the Greek soldiers sent home richly rewarded, the king returned to Susa with immeasurable booty, covered with glory.

When Artaxerxes III had first begun to rearm a decade earlier, what mortal danger for Hellas had the Attic orators not foreseen, should Egypt become Persian again. Now Athens feared nothing so much as the growing power of the Macedonian king, who was already reaching for Perinthos and Byzantium. And indeed Philip had good reason to move with dispatch, before mighty Persia, which could win as many Greek mercenaries and Greek allies as she wanted to pay for, plunged into Europe; his territory would be the first to be overrun by barbarians.

The Persian empire stood as powerful again as in its best days. It had learned to wage its wars with Greek field commanders and Greek mercenaries, a tactic that seemed to assure its new position of power as long as the Greek world continued to seethe with unorganized forces and remained splintered into countless autonomies that were being constantly shunted among changing factions. The Great King had recovered the entire realm of his ancestors except what Dareios and Xerxes had annexed to the empire beyond the Hellespont: Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. In his chiliarch Bagoas and Rhodian Mentor he had two excellent instruments for carrying on. These two men, sworn partners, served their master

and guided him. Bagoas was omnipotent at court and in the upper satrapies; Mentor was entrusted with the coast of Asia Minor and served simultaneously, it seems, as *karan*: like Cyrus before him, he stood at the pinnacle of military power in Asia Minor. On Mentor's petition, the Great King pardoned Artabazos, Memnon, and their families, who had all taken refuge at the Macedonian court. They returned to Persia.

An anecdote that has come down concerning Mentor about this time throws light on important connections. A Bithynian, Eubulos, by trade a money changer, had brought the city of Atarneus, fortified Assos, and the rich coastal lands opposite Lesbos into his control, probably by means of tax farming. He bequeathed these holdings to his loyal Hermias, a three-time runaway slave, as gossipy Athens observed, where Hermias was known as Plato's pupil and a friend of Aristotle. After Plato died, Aristotle accepted Hermias's invitation to Atarneus (345) and stayed at length. Mentor turned his attention on this wealthy "tyrant," invited him to a meeting to show him the way into the Great King's favor, and had him seized and sent to Susa, where he was crucified. Mentor meanwhile had confiscated his possessions and his territory. Only his daughter escaped. She fled to Aristotle, who took the destitute "but brave and virtuous girl" as his wife.

It was in the days when Philip set out against the Thracians; Byzantium and Perinthos seemed threatened. Demosthenes urged the Athenians to send an embassy to the Great King to expose the purpose of the Macedonian preparations; after all, one of Philip's most powerful friends, privy to all his plans, had already been picked up, he said, and handed over to the king. Arsites, satrap in Hellespontine Phrygia, sent the Perinthians money, provisions, weapons, and mercenary troops under Athenian Apollodoros. But the Great King replied to the Athenian embassy's request for Persian subsidies by a "most haughty and barbaric writing." Whether he merely despised the Athenians or actually intended their destruction, affairs in Hellas progressed rapidly and accomplished themselves just as the Great King met with an abrupt end.

Since his glorious return from Egypt, he had been sitting in his imperial palace ruling with unbridled arbitrariness and cruelty. Everyone feared and hated him, and the one man whom he trusted betrayed him. His confidant Bagoas was an Egyptian. Much given over to the belief and false beliefs of his country, to whose defeat he had himself contributed, Bagoas had not forgotten the desecration of the temples at home and the murder of sacred Apis. The more bitterness toward the Great King

grew in the realm and at court, the bolder became the plans of his guileful favorite. The eunuch won over the king's physician, and they prepared a poisoned chalice that put an end to the hated king. The empire fell into the eunuch's hands. To maintain his position more securely, he had the king's youngest son, Arses, consecrated king and had his brothers murdered. Only one, Bisthanes, escaped. These things happened about the time of the battle of Chaironeia.

Arses, who had not forgiven Bagoas the murder of his father and his brothers, soon felt the eunuch's impertinent overbearingness. Bagoas moved to anticipate him. After a reign of hardly two years, he had the king murdered with his children. For a second time, the tiara passed into his hands. But the royal house had been desolated; the sons of Artaxerxes II had been murdered by Ochos's agency, the sons and grandsons of Ochos by Bagoas's, leaving only Bisthanes, who had saved himself by flight. The Dareios whose father Artaxerxes II had granted the tiara and refused a favor had a son Arbupalos, who was still alive. But the Persians preferred Kodomannos, a lateral descendant of the house of the Achaimenids. He was a son of Arsames, Artaxerxes II's brother's son, and of Sisygambis, daughter of the same Artaxerxes. In Ochos's war against the Kadousians, Kodomannos had taken up a challenge by their chieftain, a giant, when no one else dared do so, and overcome him. The Persians cited him for bravery; young and old celebrated his name; King Ochos lavished praise and presents on him and gave him the satrapy of Armenia. Whether Bagoas yielded to the Persians' choice or flattered himself with the hope that Kodomannos would remain lastingly indebted to him for the tiara received from his hand, soon enough he would come to see how greatly he had deceived himself. The young king—Dareios is the name he took—hated the murderer and despised his counsel. Bagoas decided to remove this king, too. He prepared a poisoned chalice. Dareios, however, had been warned. He called the eunuch to him and offered him the chalice as a sign of particular favor. Thus belatedly did Bagoas receive his just deserts.

The reins of power lay in the hands of a king such as Persia had long not seen. Handsome and grave, as Asiatics like to think their ruler, gracious toward all and venerated by all, rich in all the virtues of his great ancestors, free from the abominable vices that had sullied the lives of the recent kings and made them the ruin of the empire, Dareios had acquired the realm without guilt or bloodshed and seemed called to heal it of the harm that had weakened it. No rebellion disturbed the beginning

of his reign. Egypt had been restored to the empire, and Baktria and Syria were loyal to the king and obedient. From the coast of Ionia to the Indus, Asia seemed secure as it long had not been, united under noble Dareios. Yet this king was to be the last grandson of Cyrus to rule over Asia, as if an innocent life had to expiate what could no longer be healed.

The weather that would destroy Persia was rising far to the west. The maritime satraps had already sent word that the Macedonian king had concluded peace and alliance with the states of Hellas, that he was equipping his army to invade the provinces of Asia Minor the following spring. Dareios wanted to avoid this war at all costs. He may have had an inkling that his sprawling realm, decayed internally and dying off, needed only a push to collapse altogether. Thus hesitating, he missed the last possibility to anticipate the attack that he feared.

Just as Dareios was taking charge of the kingdom, King Philip sent the first troops, under Parmenion and Attalos, across the Hellespont to fortify themselves in the Greek cities of the nearest satrapies. The members of the Hellenic League had already received instructions to send their contingents to Macedonia and their triremes to the Macedonian fleet. Philip himself would soon set out in the van of the Macedonian–Hellenic forces to begin the great work that he had been preparing.

CHAPTER 2

But was Philip, were his Macedonians, Greeks and therefore entitled to take up the struggle of the Hellenic people and Hellenic history against the Persians?

The defenders of the old particularistic politics and of Hellenic “freedom” denied it often enough, and their great spokesman Demosthenes carries his patriotic zeal to the point of protesting that Philip was neither a Hellene nor related to the Hellenes, but one of those barbarians who are not useful even as slaves.¹

Older sources give a different account. Aischylos, as we have seen, has King Pelasgos of Argos say that the territory of his people, called, after him, Pelasgians, extends as far as the sparkling waters of the Strymon and encompasses the mountain country of Dodona, the land along the Pindos, and the broad districts of Paionia. For the man who fought at Marathon, therefore, the peoples who inhabit the basins of the Haliakmon and the Axios are of the same descent as the ancient inhabitants of the lands from Olympos to the Tainaron and as those to the west of the Pindos. The high Pindos divides Thessaly from the hill country of Dodona and from Epeiros, and its northern extensions to the Shar-Dagh, the ancient Skardos, form the separation between Macedonia and Illyria. The mountains then turn eastward to the headwaters of the Strymon and, farther southeastward as the Orbelos on the left bank of the Strymon, reach down to the coast, completing the natural frontier of Macedonian–Paionian territory also against the Thracian peoples to the east and the north. In the area thus encompassed, the Haliakmon, the Axios with its tributaries, and the Strymon flow through a second and a third mountain chain, which, nearly concentric with Pindos–Skardos–Orbelos, embraces the innermost coastal plain, that of Pella and Thessalonike on the Thermaic Gulf. This double wreath of basins, through which the three rivers flow and the Axios and the Haliakmon reach the sea in close proximity on the coastal plain, causes the populations of these countryside to fall into cantonal clans, as if by nature, and makes the coastal plain their center and their common feeding ground.

According to Herodotos, the people later called Dorians were pushed out of Thessaly and migrated along the Pindos into the valley of the Haliakmon, where they came to be called Macedonians.² Other sagas would have it that Argeas, the original ancestor of the Macedonians, set out from Argos in the Orestis, at the springs of the Haliakmon, and thus explain the name “Argeads,” as the royal house indeed is called.³ According to yet another tradition,⁴ which became generally accepted, three brothers, Herakleids from the princely house of Argos, which descends from Temenos, appeared in the north among the Illyrians, then in the uplands of Macedonia, and finally settled in Edessa, beside the great cascades where the waters fall into the broad, fertile coastal country. In Edessa, also called Aigai, the youngest of the three brothers is said to have founded the kingdom, which spread gradually to unite neighboring Emathia, Mygdonia, Bottiaia, Pieria, and Amphaxitis in the name of the Macedonians. They belonged to the same Pelasgian tribes as had once held all Hellenic territory and among whom others as well later seemed barbarian or half-barbarian to the Hellenes, whose development had outpaced theirs. The religion and the customs of the Macedonians give evidence of this common origin. Even if this people mixed with the Illyrians or the Thracians along their shared frontiers, the Macedonian language is related to older dialects of the Hellenic language.⁵

In later times the term “hetairos” remained in use in the Macedonian military system. If the term came in with the founding of the kingdom, as we cannot doubt, then the lot of the Macedonian Herakleids resembled that of their ancestors in the Peloponnese: They migrated into a foreign land and founded their ascendancy and their authority on the subjugation of the original inhabitants. Here, however, more than in another Doric region, the old mixed with the new and fused into a whole that preserved the freshness but also the coarse toughness of the forefathers—the time of heroes, one might say, in its unpoetic version. They practiced customs worthy of the ancient Franks. Whoever had not yet killed an enemy had to use a halter as his belt;⁶ whoever had not yet brought down a charging boar did not recline but rather sat upright at the banquet table;⁷ at a funeral ceremony, the daughter of the deceased had to put out the pyre on which the corpse had been burnt.⁸ It is related that the trophies of the first victory Perdikkas won over the native tribes were mauled overnight by a lion as a sign by the gods that no enemy had been conquered, but rather a friend had been acquired.⁹ It remained Macedonian custom to erect no trophies over a conquered enemy, whether Hellene or barbarian,

and, it is said, neither Philip after Chaironeia nor Alexander after his victories over the Persians or the Indians did so.

At the time of these victories, Aristotle writes that kingship in the Hellenic lands survived only in Sparta, among the Molossians, and in Macedonia. It survived among the Spartans and the Molossians because it had been so diminished in vested power that kings were no longer envied. Everywhere else kingship had neglected to win the support of the common people and had been forced to yield to the rise of a noble class. Then the common people, long suppressed and given no part in the conduct of public life, finally rebelled, deprived the noble families of their privileges, and reduced them to the same rights as the democratic community. Macedonia, by contrast, had retained its traditional kingship, because here no friction or hostility developed in the relations of the estates; "exceeding all others in riches and honor," the kingdom remained standing.¹⁰

Other dangers were present here. The crown belonged to the royal house, but succession had not yet been so regularized as to be beyond doubt or contest. The more untrammelled royal power remained, the more it demanded of its retainer in personal ability and achievement; only too often an underage, incapable, or passive successor had to give way before a more able brother or cousin. Thus after the death of Alexander I, the Philhellene, his younger son Perdikkas II did not rest until he had pushed aside his older brothers Amyntas, Philip, and Alketas,¹¹ thus Perdikkas's son Archelaos, born to an irregular marriage, dispossessed the rightful heir and murdered him before he grew up.¹² In other cases, guardianship, the regularized form of prostatesia, furnished the means of usurpation.¹³

Yet another point: Numerous examples indicate that parts of the land were ceded to younger sons of the king, even to strangers, as outright, heritable property, subject, to be sure, to the king's superior authority, but nonetheless with so princely a warrant that these princelings could raise a levy and keep their own troops. Thus the younger brother of Alexander the Philhellene, Arrhidaios,¹⁴ received the principality Elymiotis in the uplands and it remained in his line; thus Perdikkas's brother Philip received an area on the upper Axios. The kingdom could not consolidate its power unless it kept these princely houses in obeisance, in particular, not while the Paionians, the Agrianians, the Lynkestians, and other bordering peoples under independent princes gave them backing. At the time of the Persian wars, Alexander the Philhellene seems to

have been the first to compel the Lynkestians, the Paionians, the Orestians, and the Tymphaians to recognize Macedonian suzerainty;¹⁵ but the princes there retained their princely status and thus their princely holdings.

Too little is related about the laws and governance of Macedonia to indicate the extent of the king's power. If King Archelaos could create a number of new arrangements during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, if King Philip II could reform the monetary system of the land, until then wholly unstandardized, and if he could create an entirely new military system, then the kingdom must have enjoyed an expansive warrant for normative prescription. But surely custom and tradition determined what was lawful and filled gaps in the body of law.¹⁶ One can fairly say that the kingdom was as far removed from Asiatic despotism as was its people from bondage and servile submissiveness. "The Macedonians are free men," writes an ancient author,¹⁷ not serfs like the mass of the people in Thessaly, not helots, as in the land of the Spartans, but rather a peasantry, not without unencumbered, heritable property, certainly not without a local body of laws, with local council and local court,¹⁸ every man susceptible to military service upon call-up by the king. Even in later times, the army represented a gathering of the people and was convened as a popular assembly for purposes of counsel and court.

In this army, a numerous nobility comes to the fore under the name "hetairoi," military companions, known already to Homeric song.¹⁹ One would hardly call these noblemen an aristocracy; very likely, what distinguished them was only larger land holdings, a memory of noble descent, and closer proximity to the person of the king, who rewarded loyal service with honors and gifts. Even the families of princely rank, who had enjoyed independent rule in the upper territories and remained in possession after they came to depend on the more powerful Macedonian kingdom, will have consented, with their following, to the terms and conditions that obtained in the kingdom. No larger cities of the Hellenic type were present in this land of peasants and gentry; those on the coast were Hellenic colonies and independent communities, in conscious contrast to the interior.

About the time of the Persian wars, under the first Alexander, the Philhellene, as Pindar calls him, Macedonia took up more lively contact with the Greek world. Alexander's father, in fact, had offered the Athenian exile Hippias son of Peisistratos asylum and property in his land. Alexander himself was obliged to follow the Persian army to Hellas, but he did

what he could—for example, in the battle of Plataiai—to help the Hellenes. On the strength of his proven descent from the Temenids of Argos, he was admitted to the Olympian games, recognition that he was a Hellenic.²⁰ Like him, his immediate successors²¹ applied themselves with more or less energy and adroitness to bringing their country into immediate contact with the trade, political life, and culture of the Greek world. The proximity of the rich trading colonies in Chalkidike; the manifold intercourse they occasioned with the principal powers of Hellas, which jostled to possess them and sought or feared Macedonian influence; and the virtually unbroken battling in Hellas itself, which prompted many a famous name to leave home and seek refuge and honors at the opulent court at Pella, all favored progress in Macedonia.

The reign of King Archelaos was especially important and successful. While the rest of Hellas was being stirred up and pulled apart by the Peloponnesian War, Macedonia moved rapidly ahead under his circumspect leadership. He built strongholds, which the land had lacked, laid out roads, and developed further a military order already begun. “All in all,” says Thucydides, “he did more for Macedonia than the eight kings before him.”²² Athletic and artistic festivals that he founded after the Hellenic fashion were celebrated at Dion, not far from Orpheus’s grave, from Olympian Zeus and from the Muses.²³ His court, a gathering place of poets and artists of all kinds and the meeting point of the Macedonian nobility, became an example for the people and its continuing development.²⁴ Archelaos’s contemporaries spoke of him as the richest and happiest of mortals.

After his reign, internal bickering resumed worse than ever. It may have been caused or fanned by reaction to the innovations imposed by growing royal power and addressed to the new culture and custom that the kingdom had taken up. These tendencies, by the nature of things, found exponents in the princely houses and among some of the companions and were eagerly promoted by the policy of the leading states in Hellas, while the popular masses, it seems, remained indifferent.

The Lynkestian prince Arrhabaios,²⁵ in alliance with the Elymiot prince Sirrhas, had risen in arms against King Archelaos, perhaps on the pretext of avenging the removal of the rightful successor, perhaps in behalf of Amyntas, Arrhidaios’s son, next in succession in the royal house. Archelaos purchased peace by marrying his daughters, the elder to Sirrhas, the younger to Amyntas.²⁶ Then he was killed while out hunting, by accident, it was said.²⁷ His minor son Orestes succeeded him in 399, under the

guardianship of Aeropos; the guardian murdered his ward, himself became king. Aeropos is surely the son of Arrhabaios of the princely Bacchiad house of Lynkestis, on the frontier of the Illyrians, with whose help his ancestors had so often fought the Macedonian kings. The deeds of Aeropos and his sons and grandsons in the next sixty years mark them as firmly opposed to the new monarchical tendencies of the royal house, as exponents of traditional, looser relationships. Ever renewed insurrection and shifting succession point to struggles between the royal house and particularistic parties. Aeropos was able to preserve the kingdom, but when he died in 392, Amyntas the Small seized power; he was murdered by Derdas in 391,²⁸ and Aeropos's son Pausanias became king. He in turn was ousted by Amyntas, Arrhidaios's son (390–69), with whom the oldest line of the royal house resumed its rights.²⁹

The years of Amyntas's rule are full of disorder that seems to have weakened Macedonia and made it easy prey to every incursion. Summoned perhaps by the Lynkestians, the Illyrians invaded and ravaged the countryside, defeated the king's army, and forced him to flee. Argaios held the kingdom for two years; whether he was of the royal house, a brother of Pausanias, or a Lynkestian, cannot be determined. With Thessalian help, Amyntas returned and regained the kingdom, though in a wretched state; the cities and the coastal regions were ruled by the Olynthians; even Pella closed its gates to the king. He married Eurydike, who belonged to both princely houses—of Elymiotis and of Lynkestis—perhaps in order finally to bring about reconciliation.³⁰

There followed the effects of the peace of Antialkidas and the Spartan campaign against Olynthos. Amyntas joined the campaign, as did Derdas, prince of Elymiotis, with four hundred horsemen. But Derdas was taken prisoner, and victory was long in coming. When Olynthos had finally been conquered (380), Thebes rose. Spartan defeat at Naxos and at Leuktra followed; Olynthos reconstituted the Chalkidic Confederacy; Jason of Pherai united Thessalian power and forced Alketas of Epeiros and Amyntas III into his league; on the threshold of significant success, he was murdered (370). Feeble Amyntas, who would not have been able to fend him off, died shortly afterward; the eldest of his three sons, Alexander II, succeeded. His mother, a Lynkestian, prepared his swift destruction. She had long been secret mistress of Ptolemy, of unknown provenance, husband to her daughter. She caused him to rise against Alexander, who was away fighting for the Thessalians at their invitation and with good success. Alexander returned home in haste and lost a

battle to Ptolemy. Then Thebes rushed in to cripple Macedonia before she could make further gains in Thessaly. Pelopidas presided over a settlement in which Alexander gave thirty pages as hostages, and Ptolemy, it seems, received a partial principality with the city of Aloros, after which he is called—a settlement made to ruin the king the more surely. He was murdered during a festival dance; his mother gave the murderer her hand and, in the guise of guardianship of her two younger sons, Perdikkas and Philip, the kingdom (368–65). Called home from Chalkidike by many Macedonians, Pausanias rose against Ptolemy and made rapid progress.³¹ Eurydike fled with her two children to Iphikrates, who was nearby with an Attic force; he suppressed the uprising. Ptolemy stood none the more securely, for all that. The murder of Alexander was a breach of the treaty with Thebes; the friends of the murdered king appealed to Pelopidas, who was in Thebes with an army; he came with a hastily raised force, but Ptolemy's gold suborned it. Pelopidas contented himself with concluding a new treaty; as security Ptolemy put up fifty companions and his son Philoxenos. It may have been on this occasion that Philip, too, came to Thebes.

But Perdikkas III, when he had grown up, avenged his brother's murder by murdering the usurper. To escape Theban influence, he declared for Athens and fought with distinction beside Timotheos against the Olynthians. Then, however, the Illyrians crossed the frontier and attacked, perhaps brought in by the Lynkestians. Perdikkas resisted them at first, but subsequently he and 4000 troops met death in a major battle; the Illyrians ravaged the land, the Paionians invaded from the north.

These were the conditions under which Philip took charge in 359, initially in behalf of Perdikkas's minor son Amyntas. He was already in the country, probably since Ptolemy's end. By the terms of an accord that Plato is supposed to have urged on Perdikkas, he had received a partial principality; the troops he kept there gave him a first foothold.³²

The risks were enormous. The Illyrians and the Paionians were still present in the land; the older pretenders, Argaios and Pausanias, soon arrived from Athens, backed by the Thracian king; three bastard sons of Amyntas his father raised a claim to the throne. Supported by the ready wishes of his countrymen, Philip withstood the immediate emergency. With prudence, adroitness, and decisiveness he saved the land from the Illyrians, Thracians, and Paionians; the kingdom from the pretenders; and the royal house from new intrigue and troublemaking. The Athenians had been so foolish as to abandon the common cause against him in

return for his recognition of their claim to Amphipolis. Now they began to have misgivings about his successes and concluded a defensive and offensive pact with the princes of Illyria, Thrace, and Paionia, so that barbarian invasions from three sides at once might destroy Macedonian power before it had been consolidated and grew stronger. But Philip, who had already taken Amphipolis and won over its citizenry, showed up promptly on his frontiers, and the barbarians, in no way yet prepared for action, hastened to submit to him.³³

By about 356, Macedonia's frontiers with the barbarians had been secured for the moment. Partisan machinations at court soon subsided; among the Lynkestian partisans, Ptolemy and Eurydike were dead; one of the sons of Aeropos, Alexander, was eventually won over by marriage to a daughter of loyal Antipater; the two others, Heromenes and Arrhabaios, by other forms of favor; Arrhabaios's sons Neoptolemos and Amyntas were brought up at court.³⁴ The two pretenders Argaios and Pausanias vanish from the historical record. Finally, Philip bound Perdikkas's son Amyntas, the rightful heir in whose name he had taken over the government, to his interests by marrying his daughter Kynane to him, once he had grown up.³⁵

Thus did Macedonia come into the hands of a prince who, with deliberateness and address, developed and applied the excellences of his realm and raised them to the point where they finally became adequate to the grand idea of leading the Greek world to war against the Persians. The historical record that has come down to us is silent about the means by which Philip attained his astonishing successes. Although it observes every move of the astute hand that drew in one Greek state after another, it tells us next to nothing about the body to which this hand belonged and that produced this power and assurance. Alluring gold, which the record has this hand show and dispense at just the right moment, appears as virtually the sole and, in any case, the essential means with which Philip operated.

If one examines the internal affairs of his state more closely, two moments come to the fore, set in motion earlier, but developed by Philip in their full significance to furnish a basis for his power.

"My father," says Alexander, in Arrian, to the restive Macedonians at Opis in 324, "when he became king, took you up as penniless nomads, clothed mostly in animal skins, grazing sheep in the hills and fighting miserably enough to protect them from the Illyrians, Thracians, and Triballians. He dressed you in the soldier's mantle and led you down to

the plain, taught you how to meet those neighboring barbarians in battle.” Earlier, when war broke out, surely every able-bodied male joined the effort, only to return to his plow or his flock at the conclusion of hostilities. The dangers under which Philip took over the realm and the battles in which he had to protect his country, threatened on all sides at the outset of his rule, caused him to resume what King Archelaos had begun, and which may have been lost in the ensuing unrest, and to carry it further.³⁶ The military obligation of the land furnished a basis on which he could build a national army, which, repeatedly strengthened, finally may have numbered 40,000 men.³⁷

He understood not only how to form it but also how to give it discipline and military effectiveness. He is reported to have done away with the useless supply train, the baggage wagons of the infantry, and to have restricted the cavalry to one groom per rider, and to have often taken his troops on marches of six or seven miles under full equipment and provisions, over several days, even in summer heat. So strict was military discipline that in the war of 338 two high officers were cashiered for bringing a lute girl with them into camp.³⁸ In actual service, a firm hierarchy of those who give orders and those who obey developed, and a gradation of ranks in which only merit and recognized ability led to advancement.

The good effects of this military system soon became evident. The system caused the various regions of the realm to think of themselves as a single whole and the Macedonians to feel themselves one people, and it integrated newly acquired areas into consolidated Macedonia. Above all, in this unity and in the military type that it fostered, the system gave the Macedonian people the self-confidence of effectiveness in battle and the ethical strength of established order and subordination under the supremacy of the king. To him, in turn, for his purposes, the peasantry of the land afforded tough, malleable material, and the nobility with its companions furnished the elements of an officer class marked by a sense of honor and ambition to distinguish itself.³⁹ Such an army was necessarily superior to the mercenary packs of the Hellenic states, to say nothing of a conventional levy of their citizens; a people so tough and unspoiled was necessarily superior to the overeducated Greek world, made irritable or dull and apathetic by democracy and urban life. It was the good fortune of this Macedonian land to have preserved its ancient strength and its ancient ways until the moment arrived to validate them in large endeavors. The kingdom had prevailed in its struggle with the nobility, not a defiant

aristocracy, as in Hellas centuries earlier. And this kingdom of a free and powerful peasantry, this military monarchy now gave the people the form, the strength, and the direction that the Hellenic democracies also recognized as essential but had been unable to retain and to develop into lasting organization.

Conversely, education and culture, the most characteristic achievement of Hellenic life, had to be introduced into popular life in Macedonia and the work of earlier princes carried forward. The example of the king and his court was of immense importance here, and the nobility of the land soon came to compose the cultivated sector of the nation, naturally and to great effect—a distinction that had not developed in any of the important states in Greece. For the Spartans all were crude and uncultivated and mere masters toward the helots and free foreigners in the land; and while the free Athenians might think themselves at least, and without exception, deeply cultivated, elsewhere democracy had put an end to any lordly class only to depress the general level of intellectual life as a great gap opened between rich and poor.

Philip had lived in Thebes in the days of Epameinondas; one of Plato's pupils, Euphraios of Oreos, had early influenced his destiny; Isokrates called him a friend of letters and culture, and his summoning Aristotle as tutor to his son proves the point. He seems to have devised a course of general instruction, intended most immediately for the pages in his entourage, which would provide for the formation of young noblemen whom he wanted to attract to the court, attach to his person, and prepare to serve the kingdom directly. The nobility found ample opportunity to distinguish itself and be rewarded for its deserts while serving as pages and, for older boys, as the king's bodyguards (*somatophylakes*) among the companions, as commanding officers in the various divisions of the army, and in embassies to the Hellenic states, now frequent. But these noblemen were wanting in the cultivation and the Attic manners that the king wanted to see in them and that he himself possessed. Philip's most adamant enemy had to concede that Athens had hardly his like in social graces. If life at his court usually proceeded in crude Macedonian fashion by revelry and noise and drunkenness, "like centaurs, like Laistrygonas," as Theopompos describes it contemptuously,⁴⁰ nonetheless the court festivals, reception of foreign embassies, and celebration of games were splendid and in keeping with Hellenic fashion and taste. They were magnificent and grand; nothing was small or stingy. The proceeds of crown lands, of taxes on real property, of harbor fees, and of the mines

in Pangaion, which yielded 1000 talents annually, and, above all, the order and economy that Philip had introduced into his administration raised his kingdom to a level of excellence that had been seen but once in the Hellenic world, in Periklean Athens.⁴¹

Even Attic ambassadors could be impressed by the court at Pella, with its opulence, its military brilliance, and the nobility that gathered there. Several of these noble houses, as noted previously, were of princely origin, for example, the Bacchiadae of Lynkestis, the Polyperchons, princes of the Tymphaian country,⁴² and the house of Orontes, to whom the region Orestis appears to have belonged.⁴³ Orontes's elder son Perdikkas was given command of the phalanx of Orestis, which, it seems, passed to his brother Alketas when Perdikkas became hipparch. The most important of these princely houses, that of Elymiotis, was a lateral line of the royal house and descended from Prince Derdas, mentioned above, of the time of the Peloponnesian Wars.⁴⁴ About 380, a second Derdas had possession of the land and, allied with Amyntas of Macedonia and the Spartans, set out against Olynthos; later, around 350, he is mentioned as having been taken prisoner by the Olynthians. If Philip took his sister Phila as a wife,⁴⁵ his purpose will have been to associate Derdas more closely or to mend a quarrel. Derdas's brothers Machatas and Harpalos are mentioned in the king's suite.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, between Philip and this family there was always poorly concealed tension, which the king may have deliberately kept alive to create doubts about his favor and hold the family at a distance and in uncertainty. In a legal dispute over which the king presided, Machatas could scarcely gain a just decision, and Philip did not neglect to use an injustice committed by a relative of the house to affront the family publicly. Petitions that Harpalos presented in behalf of his brother Machatas were rebuffed with some acerbity.⁴⁷

Of the numerous noble houses that gathered at the court at Pella, two deserve mention for their particular importance: the house of Philotas and the house of Iollas. Philotas's son was the loyal and prudent field marshal Parmenion, whom Philip repeatedly put in command of his most important expeditions; to him Philip owed victory over the Dardanians in 356, with him Philip occupied Euboia in 343. Parmenion's brothers Asandros and Agathon, and even more his sons Philotas, Nikanor, and Hektor, later had an important part in his distinction. His daughters married the noblest sons of the land, one Koinos the phalanx commander, the other Attalos, uncle of a later wife of Philip. Iollas's son Antipater, or Antipas, as the Macedonians called him, was no less in honor and

influence, as is shown by the king's remark: "I slept well, for Antipas had the watch."⁴⁸ His proven loyalty and the sober-minded clarity with which he understood military and political matters alike⁴⁹ made him immanently suited to the high office of viceroy, which he soon assumed. Betrothal to his daughter seemed the surest way to win over the high Lynkestian house; his sons Kassandros, Archias, and Iollas became important later.

Thus the court and the nation as Philip formed them. One might add that the monarchical element in Macedonian public life became preponderant as much by virtue of the historical position of this state as by virtue of Philip's personality. Only in this full context is the king's character and mode of action comprehensible. At the center of the most peculiar contradictions and contrasts, a Greek to his people, a Macedonian to the Greeks, he exceeded the former in Hellenic craftiness and cunning, the latter in Macedonian toughness and energy, and both in the sharp formulation of his goals, the orderly realization of his plans, and his stealth and swiftness of execution. He knew how to remain forever a puzzle to his foes, how always to show up otherwise, elsewhere, in another direction from what they expected. Disposed by nature to pleasure and debauchery, he was in his inclinations as changeable as he was ruthless. He often seemed entirely ruled by his passions and was in any given case entirely master of them, as cold and clear-eyed as his intentions required, and one may wonder whether his true nature emerged in his strengths or in his weaknesses. In him contemporary culture, its polish, intelligence, frivolity, its marriage of grand ideas and finely calibrated suppleness, presents itself in a single portrait.

His exact opposite was his wife Olympias, daughter of the Epeirote king Neoptolemos, descended from Achilles. As a young man, Philip had met her at the mysteries celebrated on Samothrace and married her with the permission of her uncle and guardian Arybbas.⁵⁰ Beautiful, secretive, glowing with banked fires, she was deeply devoted to the mysterious rites of Orpheus and Bacchos, the dark magical arts of Thracian women. In the nocturnal orgies, it is reported, one saw her leading all the rest in wild enthusiasm, brandishing thyrsos and snake, storming through the mountains. Her dreams reproduced the fantastic images that thronged her mind; in the night before her wedding she dreamt that a powerful thunderstorm was raging around her, that a bolt of lightning flew flaming into her womb and a wild fire shot out and spread farther and farther in consuming flames.⁵¹

If the historical record says that in addition to many other signs in the night of Alexander's birth, the temple of Artemis at Ephesos—where a megabyxos presiding over castrates and hierodules represented a truly oriental temple to the Hellenes—burned down and that Philip received the news of his son's birth at the same time as three victory announcements,⁵² then the record pronounces in the language of fable the meaning of this richest of heroic lives and the great idea of a connection between hero and fable that scholarship has often tried to establish, sometimes carefully, sometimes presumptuously, and always in vain.

Of King Philip, Theopompos says, "All in all, Europe never saw such a man as the son of Amyntas."⁵³ But some final touch not in his nature was lacking in him, the calculating, clear-eyed, tireless worker, and he never brought to completion the work in which he saw his life's goal. He may have seized on the idea of a Persian campaign as a means of uniting the Greek world and of raising the sights of his Macedonians; this was the idea to which the history and culture of the Greek world led him. The compulsion of the conditions with which he had to contend so long and so hard drove him to the idea, but not the necessity and irresistible power of the idea to its realization. One could even doubt whether he believed in it when one sees him make ever renewed preparations, then hesitate, and finally side-step. Preparations certainly were necessary, but heaping Pelion on Ossa brings us no closer to the gods' Olympos. No doubt he saw beyond the sea the land of Macedonia's victories and its future; but then his gaze would darken and his plans would cloud up in vague and wishful thinking. This same longing for the great deed communicated itself to his entourage, the nobility, and the entire people; it became the ever perceptible tonic note of Macedonian life, the beckoning secret of the future. The Macedonians fought the Thracians and conquered the Greeks, but the East was the goal for which they fought and conquered.

In these surroundings Alexander passed his childhood, and soon enough the sagas of the East, of the sweetly flowing river of gold and of the wellspring of the sun, of the golden vine with emerald grapes and the meadows of Dionysos at Nysa will have captured the boy's imagination. As he grew up he heard about the victories at Marathon and Salamis, of the sacred temples and graves that the Persian king with his enslaved armies had desecrated and destroyed; and he heard how his ancestor, the first Alexander, had had to bring the Persians earth and water and

serve their military against the Hellenes, how Macedonia would now set out for Asia and avenge these ancestors. When ambassadors from the royal palace of Persia came to Pella, he questioned them minutely about the armies and peoples of the empire, about law and custom, about the ways and life of the people; the Persians were astonished at the boy.⁵⁴

It was of no less importance that Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity, became tutor to the youth. Philip is supposed to have approached him at the time of his son's birth and to have written him: "Not that he has been born makes me happy, but that he has been born in your lifetime. Educated and formed by you, he will be worthy of us and equal to the destiny that will fall to him."⁵⁵ The man who subjected the world to the supremacy of the mind educated the one who would subject the world by the sword; to him belongs credit for teaching the passionate boy to revere ideas and respect their grandeur, for instilling in him the idea of greatness, which led him to despise indulgence and avoid debauchery,⁵⁶ which ennobled his passions and gave his power measure and depth. Alexander venerated his tutor all his days, remarking that he owed only his life to his father, to his tutor that he lived worthily.

Under such influences, his genius and his character were formed. Full of energy and hungry for glory, he probably did mourn his father's victories, thinking they would leave him nothing more to do. His model was Achilles, from whom he proudly claimed descent and whom he wanted to resemble in glory and suffering. As Achilles had loved his Patroklos, Alexander loved his boyhood friend Hephaisstion. And if he thought his great ancestor blessed because Homer had preserved the memory of his deeds for posterity, the heroic sagas of East and West have never ceased to adorn Alexander's name with all the splendor of human and superhuman greatness. He loved his mother more than his father; from her he had his capacity for enthusiasm and the deep intensity of his feelings, which distinguish him among the heroes of both ancient and modern times.⁵⁷ His looks were in keeping with his nature: a quick step, a penetrating glance, streaming hair, and a strong voice announced a hero; in repose, the mildness of his mien enchanted, as did the roses of his cheeks, the moistness of his gaze, and the way his head inclined a little to the left. He excelled in mounted exercise. As a boy he had tamed the wild Thessalian steed Bukephalos, whom no one else had dared approach and who became his battle mount in all his wars. He performed his first trial of arms under his father's direction; while Philip was besieging Byzantium, Alexander subjugated the Maidans and founded a city there that bore his name.⁵⁸ He attained even greater renown at the battle of Chaironeia,

which was won by his personal valor. The next year, he defeated the Illyrian prince Pleurias in a very difficult battle.⁵⁹ In him his father saw, without envy, it seems, the man who would eventually bring his plans to fruition. After all the troubles that questions of succession had brought upon the land, he will have been reassured about its future, for he saw at his side a successor equal to the highest requirements of the kingdom. "Macedonia will be too small for him," he is supposed to have remarked. Unlike his father, he "will not have to regret many things that can no longer be changed."⁶⁰

Then differences arose between father and son. Alexander saw his mother neglected by Philip, Thessalian dancing girls and Greek courtesans preferred to her. The king went so far as to choose another wife among the noble daughters of the land, Attalos's niece Kleopatra. The wedding feast, so the story goes, was celebrated brilliantly and noisily, in Macedonian fashion; there was much drinking and laughing. When all had been warmed by the wine, Attalos, the bride's uncle, called out: "Pray to the gods, you Macedonians, that they will bless our queen's womb and give the land a rightful successor." Alexander was present; enraged, he shouted: "Do you consider me a bastard, you slanderer?" and flung his wine cup at Attalos. The king sprang up in fury, drew his sword, and rushed his son to run him through. The wine, his anger, his wound from Chaironeia made his step uncertain; he staggered and fell to the floor. Alexander's friends rushed him out of the hall. "Did you see, fellows?" he said on the way out, "My father wants to go from Europe to Asia and can't even get from one table to the next." With his mother he left Macedonia; she went home to Epeiros, he went on to the Illyrians.⁶¹

Not long afterward, Demaratos, the Corinthian guest friend, came to Pella. The king received him and asked how things stood among the Hellenes: Were they keeping the peace and living in harmony? Taking a liberty, the noble guest replied: "My lord, well might you ask about peace and harmony among the Hellenes, you who have filled your own house with hatred and hostility and estranged those who should be your nearest and dearest." The king did not reply. He knew how much Alexander was loved, what he was thought to be and in fact was. He was afraid he might have given the Hellenes occasion to spread a bad report of him and to make worse plans. Demaratos himself had to act as intermediary; father and son were soon reconciled; Alexander returned.

But Olympias did not forget that she had been insulted and put aside. She remained in Epeiros; she pressed her brother to take up arms against Philip, to make himself independent of Macedonia.⁶² She will not have

failed to warn her son and to incite him. Reason for misgiving was present in plenty; Attalos and his friends enjoyed preference everywhere. And when Arrhidaios, the king's son by Thessalian Phila, was proposed to ambassadors of the Karian dynast Pixodaros, who sought an alliance with Philip and wanted to see the two houses be allied by marriage, Alexander did not doubt that his right of succession was threatened. His friends agreed; they advised him to oppose his father's plans quickly and decisively. A confidant, the actor Thessalos, was sent to tell the Karian dynast that he ought not to sacrifice his daughter to that imbecile bastard; Alexander, the king's rightful son and eventual heir, was prepared to become son-in-law to so powerful a prince. Philip discovered the affair and his anger knew no bounds. In the presence of young Philotas, one of Alexander's friends, he reproached his son the shamefulness of his mistrust and secretiveness; he was not worthy of his high birth, his good fortune, his vocation, if he was not ashamed to wed a Karian's daughter, slave to her barbarian father. The friends who had advised Alexander—Harpalos, Nearchos, Ptolemy Lagos's son, the brothers Erigyios and Laomedon—were banished from the court and from the land; Thessalos's extradition was demanded in Corinth.⁶³

The year 336 arrived. Preparations for the Persian war were proceeding with the greatest dispatch. The contingents of the allied states had been called up and an important expeditionary force under Parmenion and Attalos was sent ahead to Asia to invest places beyond the Hellespont and free the Hellenic cities there, to open the way for the great allied army.⁶⁴ It is curious enough that the king thus split his forces, and more curious yet that he risked a part of them that was not adequate to all events, before he was entirely sure of political matters at home. The movements in Epeiros had not escaped him; they seemed to point to a war that not merely threatened to delay the Persian expedition still further but also would yield no important gain even if it were brought to a happy conclusion, and in the other event would destroy with one blow the laborious work to which the king had devoted twenty years. That war had to be avoided; the Molossian could not be left in such an unreliable relation to Macedonia. He was won over by a proposal that both honored him and secured his power. Philip betrothed to him his daughter by Olympias, Kleopatra. The union was to be celebrated in the autumn of that same year, at a festival of the highest pomp that would also celebrate united Hellas and consecrate the undertaking against Persia. For to Philip's question whether he would vanquish the Persian king, the Delphic god

had replied: "Behold, the bull is wreathed; now it will end; the sacrificer is ready."

Among the young noblemen at court was Pausanias, distinguished by his beauty and by the king's highest favor. He had been painfully insulted by Attalos at a banquet and had turned in indignation to the king, who certainly took exception to what Attalos had done but was content to mollify the injured party with gifts and by receiving him into the ranks of his bodyguard. Thereupon Philip wed Attalos's niece and Attalos, Parmenion's daughter. Seeing no hope of vindication, Pausanias nursed his resentment and his thirst for revenge, and his hatred of the man who had deprived him of that satisfaction. He was not alone in his hatred; the Lynkestian brothers had not forgotten what their father and their brother once had been. They took up secret contact with the Persian king; they were the more dangerous for not appearing so.⁶⁵ In all secrecy, more and more malcontents found their way to one another. Hermokrates the Sophist fanned the flames with the sly art of his oratory and gained Pausanias's trust. "How does one attain the greatest glory?" the young man asked. "Murder the man who has done the greatest things," was the Sophist's answer.⁶⁶

Autumn came and with it the wedding celebration.⁶⁷ It was to be observed in Aigai, the old residence and, after Pella's rise, still the sacred burial place of the kings. Guests streamed in from all directions; in solemn pomp high emissaries arrived from Greece, many with gold wreaths for Philip,⁶⁸ and the princes of the Agrianians, Paionians, Odrysians, the grandees of the realm, the equestrian nobility of the land, innumerable folk. In loud rejoicing, among greetings and conferral of honors, in processions and banquets the first day passes; heralds summon to the theater next morning. Before daybreak the throng presses through the streets, moving in brightly swirling eddies toward the theater. Surrounded by his pages and his guard, the king approaches, dressed for the occasion. He sends his company ahead into the theater, thinks he does not need them in the friendly crowd. Pausanias falls upon him, stabs him in the chest, and, as the king sinks to his knees, runs to horses waiting at the gates. He stumbles and falls. Perdikkas, Leonnatos, and others of the guard overtake him and run him through.

The crowd breaks up in wild confusion. Everyone is aghast; everything is in ferment. Who shall receive the realm? Who shall save it? Alexander is the king's first born. But they fear his mother's wild hatred, toward whom, to please the king, not a few of them have shown contempt and

disrespect. She is already in Aigai to hold her husband's funeral; she seems to have suspected these dreadful things, to have known in advance. They say that the murder of the king is her doing and that she kept the horses ready for the murderer. Alexander too knew about the murder, yet another sign that he is no son of Philip, but rather was conceived and born by black magic; that explains the king's loathing of him and his savage mother, that explains the marriage to Kleopatra. The boy she has just borne should have the realm;⁶⁹ did not Attalos, her uncle, have the king's confidence? He should have the regency. Others think that Amyntas, Perdikkas's son, has the best claim to the kingdom; as a child he was obliged to give Philip the reins of the threatened realm; only Philip's excellence could justify this usurpation; Amyntas's claim to the kingdom never lapsed; his long renunciation proves his worthiness.⁷⁰ The Lynkestians and their retainers enter a rebuttal: If older claims against Philip's issue are to be revived, then before Perdikkas and Philip's father, their father and their brother possessed the realm, of which they should no longer be deprived by usurpers. Amyntas and Alexander, furthermore, were little more than boys; Amyntas had lived removed from the power and hope of rule since childhood; Alexander, under the influence of his vengeful mother, through arrogance, wrongheaded education after the current fashion, and contempt for the old ways, was a greater threat to the liberties of the land than even his father Philip. They, on the other hand, were friends of the nation and descendants of a house that had always tried to preserve ancient ways. Having grown old among the Macedonians, intimately acquainted with the wishes of the people, friends of the great king in Susa, they alone could protect the land from his wrath when he came to demand satisfaction for the war that Philip had rashly begun. What luck that the hand of their friend had timely delivered the land of a king who disregarded justice, the welfare of the people, oath and virtue.

Thus the parties. But the people hated the regicides and had no fear of war. They forgot Kleopatra's son, since the promoters of his cause were far away; they knew nothing of Perdikkas's son, whose inaction seemed proof enough of his incapacity. On Alexander's side were justice and the sympathy that undeserved insults elicit, furthermore the brilliant reputation he had won in war against the Maidans and the Illyrians and in the victory at Chaironeia, and finally, his even more brilliant reputation for culture, charming manners, and valor. He had even presided over affairs of state, with good success; he had the love and trust of the people;

most particularly, he could be sure of the army. Lynkestian Alexander saw that his cause was hopeless; he hurried to Olympias's son and was the first to hail him as king of the Macedonians.⁷¹

Alexander's beginning was "no simple assumption of an unchallengeable legacy"; at twenty he had to show whether he had the calling and the strength to be king. He took up the reins of power with a firm hand and unrest subsided. In keeping with Macedonian custom, he summoned the army to renew its oath of allegiance: Only the king's name had changed, he told them, the power of Macedonia, the order of things, the hope of conquest were the same. He kept the old obligation to service and released those who served from all other burdens and obligations.⁷² He ordered frequent exercises and marches; these restored the martial spirit of the troops, which may have slackened during recent events, and assured the men of his control.⁷³

The king's murder demanded the severest punishment, which was also the surest way to stabilize the new regime. It came to light that the Lynkestian brothers had been bribed by the Persian king, who feared a war with Philip, and had conspired in the hope of using Persian power to take over the kingdom; Pausanias had been the ignorant tool of these secret plans. The conspirators were executed during the days of the funeral rites, among them the Lynkestians Arrhabaios and Heromenes. Their brother Alexander was pardoned because he had submitted; Arrhabaios's son Neoptolemos fled to the Persians.⁷⁴

CHAPTER 3

Alexander had taken up the reins of power speedily and with a firm hand and restored peace internally. But deeply disquieting news was coming in from abroad.

In Asia Minor, Attalos, counting on his troops, whom he knew how to win over, had conceived a plan to seize power on the pretext of representing the interests of his great-nephew, Kleopatra's son. His military force and, even more, the contacts he had taken up with Macedonia's enemies made him very dangerous. Renewed unrest in the Hellenic lands gave rise to fears of a general defection. Upon hearing of Philip's death—Demosthenes first received the news by secret messengers from the general Charidemus, who was probably stationed near the Thracian coasts¹—the Athenians had celebrated and voted honors to the memory of the murderer.² Demosthenes himself had requested that measure: speaking before the council, he called Alexander a patsy³ who would not dare venture beyond Macedonia; he resorted to every possible stratagem to promote an open break with Macedonia in Athens, Thebes, Thessaly, all Hellas, as if the oath the members of the league had sworn the father did not bind them also toward his son.⁴ He sent messengers and letters to Attalos and negotiated secretly with Persia for subsidies to be used against Macedonia. Athens armed eagerly for war and prepared the fleet; Thebes undertook to drive the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia; the Aitolians, who had been friends of Macedonia, resolved to force the return of those whom Philip had driven out of Akarnania; the Ambrakians expelled their Macedonian garrison and set up a democracy; Argos, the Elians, the Arkadians were all prepared to throw off the Macedonian yoke; Sparta had never submitted to it.⁵

Alexander sent ambassadors with assurances of his good will and of his respect of existing freedoms—to little effect. The Hellenes exulted in their conviction that the old days of freedom and glory had returned. They had no doubt that they would prevail: at Chaironeia, they said, the entire Macedonian army under Philip and Parmenion had had difficulty

conquering the armies of Athens and Thebes; now all Hellas had united against a mere boy; he was not even sure of his own throne and would rather stroll around Pella than dare to do battle with Hellas; his one proven field commander, Parmenion, was in Asia and with him an important part of the army, and they were already being pressed by the Persian satraps; another part, under Attalos, was prepared to declare itself against Alexander and for the Hellenes. Even the Thessalian cavalry and the Thracian and the Paionian foot soldiers had been withdrawn from the Macedonian force; not even the way into Hellas was open to Alexander any more, should he attempt it and risk exposing his realm to incursions by its northern neighbors and to attack by Attalos. And in truth, the tribes to the north and the east were threatening to remove themselves from Macedonian dependency or to seize the first opportunity to make raids across the Macedonian frontiers.

Alexander's situation was awkward and urgent. His friends—those recently banished had now returned—implored him to relent before all was lost: he should make peace with Attalos and gain the loyalty of the advance army, not interfere with the Hellenes until their initial euphoria had passed, win over the Thracians, Getai, and Illyrians with gifts, and disarm those who had broken away by offering clemency. By doing so Alexander would surely have been able to secure his position within Macedonia and become a successful king in his own country; he might have been able gradually to acquire the same influence over Hellas and the same power over the surrounding barbarians as his father had enjoyed, even finally to plan a campaign into Asia, as had his father all his life. But Alexander was made of sterner stuff. The decision he took shows him in all the force and daring of his nature. As was said of a hero of later centuries, "His genius drew him on."

The jumble of dangers fell into three groups: the north, Asia, and Hellas. If Alexander set out against the tribes of the north, Attalos would gain time to build up his forces and perhaps to bring them into Europe; the alliance of the Hellenic states would have time to grow stronger, and he would find himself obliged to meet as perfidy and open national rebellion what for the moment could still be punished as partisanship and the promptings of criminal demagogues bribed by Persian gold. If he set out against Hellas, even a minor force could block his advance through the passes and long delay it, while nothing prevented Attalos from operating in his rear and combining with the mutinous Thracians. Wholly excluded was any march against Attalos himself: the Greek states

would be left too long to their own devices, Macedonian would be set against Macedonian in a civil war whose outcome might be determined by Persian satraps, and finally Attalos, who ought to be seen as a mere criminal, would be treated as a power, and in attacking that power the king would lower himself in the eyes of both the Hellenes and the barbarians. If one could manage to meet Attalos adroitly, this chain of consequence could be broken and the rest would follow.

Attalos was condemned to death for high treason. One of "the friends,"⁶ Hekataios of Kardia, was ordered to lead a corps across to Asia, combine with Parmenion, and deliver Attalos dead or alive. Because nothing more grave than ravaging incursions was to be feared of the enemies to the north and an eventual campaign could easily conquer them, the king decided to take his army into Hellas before he could be opposed there by a significant military force.

About this time, messengers from Attalos arrived in Pella to say that rumors being spread about him were slander, to give assurances of his devotion in dulcet tones, and, as a sign of his sincerity, to deliver to the king letters that Attalos had received from Demosthenes concerning preparations in Hellas.⁷ Alexander saw in these documents and in the feelers Attalos had put out indications that he would meet little resistance in Hellas and did not retract his order; he could rely on the loyalty of aged Parmenion, even though Attalos was his son-in-law.

He now set out against Thessaly. He marched along the coast toward the passes of the Peneios and found the main pass at Tempe and the side pass Kallipeuke heavily invested. To take them by force would be difficult and every delay heightened his risk. Instead, Alexander opened a new passage. South of the main pass, the cliffs of Ossa rise, less steep on the sea side than toward the Peneios. Alexander led his men to these more gentle slopes, had them hack steps into the stone where necessary, crossed the mountains, and arrived on the plain in the rear of the Thessalian pickets.⁸ Without striking a single blow, he had made himself master of a land that he wanted to win over, not conquer, in order to acquire the Thessalian cavalry for the Persian war. He summoned the Thessalian noblemen to an assembly. There he reminded them of their common descent from the line of Achilles and of the favor of his father, who had liberated the land from the bloody tyrant of Pherai and, by restoring the ancient tetrarchies of Aleuas, made it forever safe from insurrection and tyranny.⁹ He desired nothing more, he said, than what they had freely given his father and recognition of the title of commander in Hellas

conferred on Philip in the Hellenic League.¹⁰ Like his father, he promised not to disturb individual families or the districts in their rights and freedoms, but to protect them, and to give their horsemen a full share of booty in the Persian wars and honor Phthia, home of their common ancestor Achilles, by exempting it from taxes.¹¹ The Thessalians were quick to accept such favorable and honorable terms, to confirm Alexander in his father's rights by common decree, and finally to join Alexander's campaign to suppress unrest in Hellas, if necessary.¹² With the same obligingness that won over the Thessalians, Alexander acquired the adjacent Ainianians, Malians, and Dolopians—¹³tribes that each had a vote in the Amphiktionic council and whose adherence opened to him the way through Thermopylai.

The swiftness with which Alexander had taken and pacified Thessaly left the Hellenic states no time to invest the important passes of the Oita mountains. Alarmed at the proximity of the Macedonian army, they swiftly took on an air of deep peace. Alexander did not want to resort to force and thereby give importance or a useful pretext to a movement that he wanted seen as nothing more than foolish partisan machination. And because the arrangements that Philip had created still obtained, he summoned the amphiktionies to Thermopylai,¹⁴ where he demanded and obtained a general decision to recognize his title as commander. In the same spirit, he accorded the Ambrakians the autonomy they had already seized by driving out their Macedonian garrison: He had wanted to offer them autonomy himself, he told them, and they had merely anticipated him.

The Thessalians and the amphiktionies had recognized Alexander's title, but no delegation from Thebes, Athens, or Sparta appeared at Thermopylai. Perhaps it was at this point that Thebes broke away; she could count on the consent of many states, perhaps on their aid. But none of them had armed: Sparta had not been able to recover since Epameinondas had encamped on the Eurotas; Macedonian garrisons lay on the Kadmeia, in Chalkis, on Euboia, and in Acrocorinth;¹⁵ in Athens, as always, there was much declaiming and little action; even when news arrived that the king was now in Thessaly, that the Thessalians had joined him and he was about to move into Hellas, and that he had expressed great anger at the Athenians' delusions, their arming proceeded no more rapidly, though Demosthenes never ceased to preach war.¹⁶ A swift advance by the Macedonian army could stop serious mischief in Hellas.

Alexander led his troops down from Thermopylai onto the Boeotian plain and pitched camp near the Kadmeia. He met no trace of Theban resistance. When Athens learned that Thebes was Alexander's, so that a two-day march would bring the enemy before her gates, even the most dedicated liberationist lost heart. The Athenians decided to put their walls immediately on the defensive, to vacate the open countryside, and to transport all movable goods into town, "so that the much admired and much contested city became a cow stall and a sheep pen."¹⁷ At the same time, Athens decided to send ambassadors to meet the king and appease him, to beg his pardon that the city had not recognized his title to command immediately; perhaps one could still salvage possession of Oropos, received two years earlier from Philip.¹⁸ Demosthenes, who was among the ambassadors, turned around on the Kithairon, either because he remembered his letter to Attalos or so as not to expose his relations with Persia, leaving it to the other ambassadors to deliver the entreaties of the Attic demos.¹⁹ Alexander received them graciously,²⁰ forgave past misdeeds, renewed the agreements concluded with his father, and required only that Athens send plenipotentiaries to further negotiations in Corinth. The demos thought it appropriate to vote the young king even greater honors than it had voted his father two years earlier.²¹

Alexander proceeded to Corinth, where the plenipotentiaries of the allied states had been convened.²² Sparta too may have been summoned; mention of Sparta's declaration that it was not her custom to follow, but to lead²³ points to this conclusion. Alexander could have compelled the Spartans without difficulty, but that would have been neither wise nor worth the trouble; all he wanted was the swiftest possible pacification of Greece and recognition of Macedonia's title to command the offensive against Persia. To this end, the oath of the league was renewed and solemnly taken, and Alexander was named unconditional commander of the Hellenes.

Alexander had arrived at what he wanted. It would be interesting to know how the Hellenic countries were disposed toward him at this moment: probably neither as indignantly nor as purely sycophantically as the Attic orators in their endlessly rehearsed insistence on freedom or the Greek moralists of imperial Roman times, affecting a hatred of tyrants, would have us believe. Another school of thought prompted the Asiatic Hellenes to dispatch Delios of Ephesos, Plato's pupil, who "urgently pressed and incited" Alexander to begin the war against Persia.²⁴ Among

Alexander's closest friends were Erigyios and Laomedon, born on Lesbos and settled in Amphipolis, who doubtless knew well enough the wretchedness of their native land under Persia's proxies—a sad commentary on the autonomy that the Great King had assured the islands from Rhodes to Tenedos under the terms of the peace of Antialkidas. The Greek world in Asia could be saved only if Alexander came and prevailed.²⁵ In Hellas proper, only Thebes had lost her autonomy—not without her own fault; in Athens, the mood of the most frivolous mob that has ever ruled depended entirely on its latest impressions, its freshest hopes; and Sparta's resentful turning away is more eloquent of weakness than of strength, of bad temper more than of solid sense of self. One may presume that the more thoughtful part of the Hellenic people was well disposed toward the great national undertaking now about to begin and the youthful hero who offered himself.

The days that Alexander passed in Corinth seemed to prove this. Artists, philosophers, and political men came from far and wide to see the young king, Aristotle's pupil. They pressed about him to capture a glance, a word from him. Only Diogenes of Sinope remained unmoved, keeping to his tub near the palaistra before the walls. Alexander sought him out and found him lying in the sun beside his tub, greeted him, and asked if he had any wish. "Would you please not block my sunlight," was the philosopher's reply. The king turned to his retinue and said: "By Zeus, if I were not Alexander, I would like to be Diogenes."²⁶ One of countless anecdotes concerning this eccentric.

When winter came, Alexander returned to Macedonia to prepare for the deferred campaign against the barbarian tribes on his frontiers. Attalos presented no further obstacle: Hekataios had combined his force with Parmenion's; because they did not believe themselves strong enough to seize Attalos in the midst of his troops, whose loyalty he commanded, they had him murdered, in keeping with their orders;²⁷ the ill-used troops, partly Macedonians, partly Hellenic mercenaries,²⁸ abandoned their mutiny.

Such were conditions in Asia. Back in Macedonia, Olympias had used the absence of her son to drain the cup of vengeance to the last drop. The murder of the king was, if not her work, certainly her wish. But those for whose sake she and her son had endured humiliation were still alive; the young widow Kleopatra and her infant should die too. Olympias had the child murdered on its mother's lap and compelled the mother to hang herself with her own girdle.²⁹ Alexander is reported to have been

angry with his mother; more than that the son could not do. His enemies had not yet lost heart; new plots were still being uncovered; Amyntas, son of King Perdikkas, to whom Philip had given his daughter Kynane in marriage, was implicated in a plan to murder Alexander and executed.³⁰

Meanwhile, the advance corps sent into Asia had spread out eastward and southward along the coast. Independent Kyzikos on the Propontis supported its left flank; on the right, Parmenion had occupied Gryneion south of the Kaikos. In Ephesos, the demos had risen to drive out its Persian-inclined oligarchy, offering an important support for Parmenion's further advance.³¹ Surely the demos everywhere, oppressed by tyrants, as in the cities of the island Lesbos, by oligarchs, as on Chios and Kos, and held in Persian obeisance, watched the progress of the Macedonian troops with mounting excitement. Sending them ahead may have been an error and an embarrassment for Alexander's beginnings. But now this corps and the disturbance it created could at least cover the rear of the Thracian campaign: the positions it occupied and the Macedonian fleet, which lay in the Hellespont, precluded any Persian attempt to cross into Thrace.

It was, however, urgently necessary to let the Thracians, Getai, Triballians, and Illyrians feel the superiority of Macedonian arms, so that stable relations could be established with them before the great undertaking into Asia began. These tribes, which bordered Macedonia on three sides, had been made Macedonian subjects or obligated allies of the Macedonian kingdom in Philip's time, or, like the Illyrians, hampered in their depredations by repeated defeats.³² Now that Philip was dead, the barbarians thought the time had come to throw off their burdensome dependence and sweep through the countryside pillaging and destroying in old-time independence under their chieftains, as had their fathers before them.

Thus the Illyrians rose under their prince Kleitos,³³ whose father Bardylis, first a charcoal burner, then king, had united the various districts for common raiding. In the difficult days of Amyntas and Alorite Ptolemy, he had occupied the Macedonian borderlands, until Philip in hard battle finally threw him back behind the Lychnitic Sea. Kleitos now intended at least to take the passes south of that sea. Making common cause with him, the Taulantians, who lay behind and beside the Illyrians down to the coast at Apollonia and Dyrrhachion, armed under their prince Glaukias. Equally, the Autariates, who had lived for two generations in the valleys of the Brongos and the Angros (the Serbian and Bulgarian Morava), roused themselves on seeing the movement of their fellow tribesmen in

Illyria and a prospect of booty and prepared to invade Macedonian territory.³⁴

More dangerous was the numerous Thracian tribe of the Triballians, traditional Macedonian enemies, who now lived north of the Haimos mountains and downstream along the Danube.³⁵ About 370, when the Autariates pushed them out of their traditional territory on the Morava, they had found their way over the mountains to attack Abdera and carried their booty back to the Danube, where they drove the Getai from their settlements. The Getai withdrew to the broad plains on the left bank of the Danube, inhabited, as were the boggy forests of the mouth of the Danube and the steppe of the Dobrudja, by the Scyths under old King Ateas. They pressed the old king so hard³⁶ that he finally asked his Greek friends in Apollonia to intercede for him and appeal to Philip. But before Philip arrived, Ateas made peace with the Getai; he turned his weapons against the man who was coming to his aid and paid with a heavy loss (339). Philip, returning to Macedonia through Triballian territory and carrying rich booty, was attacked by those he may have intended to intimidate, who seized part of his booty and left him with a wound that forced him to return home without first punishing them. In the following autumn, the amphiktionic war took him to Hellas; then the conquest of Thebes, the ordering of the Corinthian League, eventually the war against the Illyrian Pleurias required his attention. Before he could address himself again to the Triballians, death overtook him. Why should the demands upon a young king and the well-known tensions at the court in Pella not tempt the Triballians as much as the Illyrians?

If they now rose, the nearest Thracian tribes on the Haimos—the Maidans, Bessi, and Korpillians, “fearful robbers even to other robbers”—would not have resisted their invasion but rather would have joined them and made them that much more dangerous. The so-called independent Thracians farther south as far as the Nestos valley in the Rhodope would also have made the Triballians’ cause their own, as they had at the time of the raid on Abdera. And the Macedonian kingdom was far from absolutely assured of the adjacent, half-subjugated areas to the north, specifically of the still important principality of the Paionians between the Strymon and the upper Axios, though for the moment they were keeping quiet.³⁷ No less undependable, apparently, were the Thracians in the Hebros basin down to the Propontis in the south and the Pontos in the east. These had once been many little principalities, but they had found a form of cohesive union in the Odrysian kingdom, from whose founder,

Teres, the Odrysian king in the Periklean period, they were all descended. In long, hard battles, King Philip had split them up again into smaller and smaller entities and driven them into dependency.³⁸ Athens's demand that Philip restore Kersobleptes and aged Teres had caused the costly war of 340.

It is possible that Philip brought order into Thracian affairs after the victory at Chaironeia. There is no doubt that certain of these princes kept their patrimony,³⁹ but in Macedonian dependency, which they will have found burdensome enough, especially since Macedonian settlements on the Hebros and perhaps a Macedonian strategos as governor obliged them to keep the peace.⁴⁰ These peoples had not used the confusion that followed Philip's murder to proceed to open hostilities, nor did they take up contact with the conspirators, with Attalos, or with Athens. Nonetheless, in Alexander's council misgivings about them were so strong that everyone considered accommodation and, if they defected, even clemency more advisable than a harsh requirement that they submit and respect existing treaties. Alexander saw that accommodation and half-measures would reduce Macedonia, invincible in the offensive, to a defensive position, make the wild and rapacious barbarians even bolder, and render the Persian war impossible, since he could not abandon his frontiers to barbarian attack in his absence, and he could not do without these tribes as light infantry in his army.

Now the unrest in Hellenic country had been tamped down, and the season was so far advanced that an army could cross the mountains without significant hindrance.⁴¹ Those of the indicated tribes that belonged to Macedonia had undertaken nothing decisive, or, in any event, they appeared to contemplate no further exploits once Alexander had returned to Macedonia. Nonetheless, to frighten them out of any thought of defection or revolution and to demonstrate at the same time the superiority of Macedonian arms and a firm intention to put them to good use, the king decided to proceed against the Triballians, who had not yet been punished for attacking and robbing Philip on the march home from his campaign against the Scyths.

Two ways over the mountains into the land of the Triballians were open to the king: either up along the Axios through the passes to the north and down through the territory of the perpetually loyal Agrianians onto the Triballians' plain or eastward through the territory of the independent Thracians in the Hebros valley and up toward the Haimos, to fall upon the Triballians on their eastern frontier. The second way was

preferable because it led through the territory of unsecured tribes, in particular of the Odrysian Thracians. Before setting out, Alexander asked Byzantium to send a number of battle ships to the mouths of the Danube to enable him to cross the river.⁴² He left Antipater behind in Pella to administer the realm.⁴³

From Amphipolis the king first marched eastward,⁴⁴ then up the Nestos valley, keeping Philippoi and the Orbelos to his left and driving the so-called independent Thracians back into the high mountains.⁴⁵ Then he crossed the Rhodope and entered Odrysian territory to reach the Haimos passes.⁴⁶ After ten days' march, it is reported, Alexander stood at the foot of the mountains. The way, a steep, narrow defile between high peaks, was invested by the enemy, some of them mountaineers of the area,⁴⁷ others independent Thracians, who appeared determined to block any passage with full force. They were armed only with daggers and hunting spears; their heads were protected by fox hides rather than helmets, making them no match for the heavily armed Macedonians. Their plan was to shatter the enemy line as it approached the pinnacle by rolling down the many carts with which they had occupied the high ground and attacking the broken ranks in the confusion that followed. Alexander saw the danger. Having persuaded himself that passage was impossible at any other place, he instructed his infantry to open their lines, terrain permitting, as soon as the carts began to roll and let them pass through the gaps. Where the troops could not move laterally, they were to drop to one knee in closed ranks and cover their heads with their shields in an unbroken line, so that the carts would pass over without touching them. The carts shot past, partly through the gaps, partly over the covering of shields, and did no harm. With a shout, the Macedonians rushed the Thracians. Volleys by the archers, moving in advance of the right wing, threw the enemy back as it was about to collide with them and covered the ascent of the heavy infantry. When these followed in closed phalanx, they easily drove the badly armed barbarians from their emplacement, with the result that they could not hold out against the king as he approached with the shieldbearers and Agrianians on the left wing; they threw away their weapons and fled down the mountain as best they could. They lost 500 dead; their women and children and all their possessions fell to the Macedonians as booty and were sent to market in the port cities under Lysanias and Philotas.⁴⁸

Alexander now proceeded down the more gentle northern slope of the mountains into the Triballians' valley and across the Lyginos, at this

point three days' march from the Danube.⁴⁹ When Syrmos, the Triballian prince, learned of Alexander's campaign, he had sent the Triballian women and children ahead to the Danube, with orders that they be ferried across to the island Peuke;⁵⁰ the neighboring Thracians had already fled precisely there,⁵¹ then Syrmos himself with his attendants. The great mass of the Triballians, however, had moved back toward the river Lyginos, from which Alexander had set out the previous day, very likely to take control of the passes in his rear. As soon as the king learned this, he turned around to go in search of them and surprised them just as they finished pitching camp; they quickly took up positions along the edge of a forest that bordered the river. While the columns of the phalanx were still coming up, Alexander let the archers and slingers move rapidly ahead to draw the enemy onto open land with their volleys. The enemy rushed forward and when they had ventured too far, particularly on their right wing, three cavalry units (iles) swooped down on them from left and right; the iles of the center advanced quickly and, behind them, the phalanx. The enemy, which had held firm until then, could not withstand the press of armored riders and the closed phalanx and fled through the forest back to the river. Three thousand perished in the flight; the others escaped, favored by the darkness of the forest and by nightfall.

Alexander continued his march and arrived on the third day at the banks of the Danube, where he found the ships from Byzantium waiting. He had the archers and heavy infantry man them immediately to attack the island to which the Triballians and Thracians had fled. But the island was well guarded, the riverbanks steep, the narrow current extremely swift, the ships too few, and the Getai on the far shore seemed poised to join the Triballians against the Macedonians. Alexander recalled his ships and decided straight away to attack the Getai on the farther shore: if he could subdue them and gain control of both riverbanks, the Danube island could not hold out.

The Getai,⁵² some 4000 horsemen and more than 10,000 foot soldiers, had taken up positions on the north bank of the Danube before a poorly fortified city, somewhat set back from the river. They may have expected that Alexander's crossing would take several days, giving them ample opportunity to attack and destroy individual units as they landed. It was mid-May; the fields before the Getaien city were planted in grain, which now stood high enough to conceal landing troops.⁵³ Everything depended on taking the Getai in a quick assault. The Macedonians supplemented the ships from Byzantium by requisitioning a number of smaller boats

in the area, used otherwise for fishing, piracy, or visiting neighboring villages. They also stuffed their tent skins with straw and fastened them securely. In the dead of night, 1500 riders and 4000 foot soldiers crossed the river, led by their king, and landed below the city under cover of the great grain field. At daybreak they moved through the rows, behind the infantry, which had been instructed to flatten the stalks with their sarissas and advance until they arrived at an unplanted field. There the cavalry, which had followed the infantry to this point, took the lead on the right wing, under the king, while on the left, next to the river, the phalanx under Nikanor advanced in an extended line.

The Getai, startled by the inconceivable boldness of the Macedonian king, who had crossed the greatest of all rivers effortlessly and in a single night, and no match for the press of the cavalry or the strength of the phalanx, retreated hastily into their city. When they saw the enemy advancing also on the city, they fled into the interior, taking with them as much of wife and child as their horses could carry. The king entered the city, razed it, sent the booty back to Macedonia under Philip and Meleagros, and sacrificed at the river's edge to thank Zeus Savior, Herakles, and the river god. He had no wish to extend the frontiers of his control into the vast plains that spread out north of the Danube. Now that the Getai had been made acquainted with Macedonian strength, the wide river was a secure frontier, and there was no further tribe in the area whose resistance he had to fear. When the king had marked the northernmost object of his operations with his offering, he returned to camp on the other side of the river, ending an expedition that had cost him not one life.⁵⁴

News of so swift and so successful an exploit brought ambassadors from the tribes living near the Danube into the king's camp, bearing gifts and entreating peace, which was gladly granted them. The Triballian prince Syrmos, who must have seen that he would not be able to hold his Danube island, also submitted. From the mountains on the Adriatic, an embassy of Celts arrived—as described by an eyewitness, great in stature and thinking great things of themselves—who, having heard of the king's great deeds, sued for his friendship. Over a meal, the young king asked them what they feared most. He thought they would name him. They replied: Nothing except that the sky might one day fall on them; but for them the most important thing was the friendship of such a hero. The king called them friends and allies and sent them home laden with gifts, but thought ever after that the Celts were braggarts.⁵⁵

With the conquest of the independent Thracians, the Odrysians had also been quieted; with the victory over the Triballians, Macedonian

ascendancy over the peoples south of the Danube had been established; by the defeat of the Getai, the Danube had been secured as a frontier. Thus the purpose of the expedition had been achieved, and Alexander hurried southward through the territory of his allies the Agrianians to return to Macedonia.⁵⁶ He had just had word that Prince Kleitos and his Illyrians had taken the pass of Pelion, that the Taulantian prince Glaukias was approaching to combine with Kleitos, and that the Autariates, cooperating with these two, were preparing to attack the Macedonian army as it passed through the mountains.

Alexander's situation was difficult. He was more than eight days' march removed from the passes on the western frontier, which the Illyrians had already crossed, and in no position to save Pelion, the key to the valleys of the Haliakmon and the Apsos (Devol). If an attack by the Autariates delayed him even two more days, the united Illyrians and Taulantians were strong enough to penetrate from Pelion into the heart of Macedonia, occupy the important line of the Erigon river, and, while they kept their communications with home open through the pass of Pelion, cut the king off from the southern regions of his realm and from Greece, where dangerous unrest had again been observed. Philotas lay with a strong garrison on the Kadmeia, and Antipater had enough troops in Macedonia to support him; but without the military force that accompanied the king, they could do little, and this military force was now seriously pressed. Much was at risk; one ill-fated encounter and everything that Alexander and his father had laboriously put together could fall apart.

Langaros, prince of the Agrianians, who had given unambiguous proof of his loyalty already in Philip's lifetime and whose contingent had fought with superior valor in the campaign just concluded, came out to meet Alexander, bringing his shieldbearers and the finest, most effective of his other troops. Concerned about the delay that the Autariates might cause him, Alexander asked Langaros about their strength and weaponry. He need not worry about these people, Langaros told him; they were the worst warriors in the mountains. If the king permitted, he would himself invade their country and keep them busy defending themselves, so that they would have no time to contemplate attack. Alexander gave his consent and Langaros entered their valleys, plundering and wasting, so that they were no further threat to the Macedonian march. Alexander recognized the loyal services of his faithful ally, betrothed him to his half-sister Kynane, and invited him to come to Pella at war's end to celebrate the marriage. Langaros died of illness shortly after the campaign.

In the mighty mountain rampart that rises to form the watershed between the rivers of Macedonia and those of Illyria southeast of the Lychnitic Sea (Sea of Ochrida), a gap nearly two miles wide, through which the Apsos (Devöl) flows westward, creates a natural gate between the Macedonian upland and Illyria, and King Philip had not rested until he had extended his territory to that sea. Among the emplacements and citadels that control the ways there, the mountain fastness Pelion was the best and the most important.⁵⁷ Situated like an outwork against the surrounding foothills that run into Illyria, it also guarded the way that led from the Erigon valley southward to the Haliakmon valley and into southern Macedonia. The road from here to Pelion went up along the deeply graven bed of the Apsos and was so narrow in certain places that an army could hardly pass four-abreast. This important position was already in the hands of the Illyrian prince. Alexander moved up the Erigon in forced marches to attempt to retake the fortress before the Taulantians could reach it.

When he arrived before the city, he pitched camp beside the Apsos, intending to storm the stronghold the following day. Kleitos had invested the wooded hills surrounding the city as well and thus threatened Alexander's rear, should he attempt to attack. After the custom of the country, Kleitos sacrificed three boys, three girls, and three black rams and then moved forward as if to engage the Macedonians hand-to-hand. But as soon as the Macedonians advanced against the hills, the Illyrians hastily abandoned their reinforced positions, leaving behind even their sacrificial offerings, which fell into Macedonian hands. They retreated into the city, under whose walls Alexander now encamped, intending to cordon it off by circumvallation and force a surrender, now that attack had failed. But next day Glaukias appeared on the hilltops with a strong force. Alexander had to give up any hope of storming a fortress full of troops with his forces at their current level and an enemy on the hills in his rear.

The greatest caution was in order. Philotas, who had been sent out to forage with a group of cavalry and the necessary carts, almost fell into the hands of the Taulantians; only Alexander's coming up quickly with the shieldbearers, Agrianians and archers, and 300 cavalry saved both Philotas and the important transport. The position of the army was becoming more delicate with each passing day. Alexander was virtually pinned down on the plain. He had neither enough troops to undertake anything decisive against the forces of the two princes nor sufficient provisions to hold out until reinforcements arrived. He had to withdraw, and this

movement seemed even more dangerous. Kleitos and Glaukias believed, not without reason, that this extremely unfavorable terrain had delivered the king into their hands. They had invested the towering mountains with numerous cavalry, many javelin throwers, slingers, and heavy infantry, who could descend upon the army in that narrow defile and massacre it while the Illyrians from the fortress attacked the retreat in the rear.

Alexander disappointed the hopes of his enemy by means of a bold maneuver such as only a Macedonian army could execute. While most of the cavalry and all the light infantry drew up against the enemy in the city and obviated any danger from that quarter, the phalanx advanced in the plain in a formation 120 men deep, its flanks covered by 200 riders, moving in deep silence, so that commands could be passed quickly. The plain was enclosed by a horseshoe of hills from which the Taulantians threatened the flanks of the advancing ranks. But the entire four-sided formation lowered its spears and pressed forward against the hills, then pivoted right and advanced in this direction, and turned again when another band of enemy threatened the new flank. Thus alternately, switching frequently from one position to another with the greatest precision, the Macedonians advanced between enemy hills and finally formed up out of their left flank "as in a wedge," as if they intended to break through.⁵⁸ When the Taulantians saw these unassailable movements performed with such order and swiftness, they gave up attack and withdrew from the forward heights. The Macedonians then raised their battle cry and beat their lances against their shields. Panic seized the barbarians, and they fled over the hilltops into the city.

A single band still held a rise on the route of withdrawal. Alexander ordered the companions of his officers' guard⁵⁹ to mount and gallop toward the rise; if the enemy moved to resist them, half the guard was to dismount and fight on foot among the mounted guard. But as soon as the enemy saw itself being stormed, it withdrew right and left from the rise. The king occupied the hill and let the remaining files of the cavalry and the 2000 archers and Agrianians come up quickly. He then had the shieldbearers and after them the phalanges ford the river; on the other side they were to form up in battle ranks on the left and bring up the catapults. He himself remained with the rear guard on the rise and observed the movements of the enemy, who were moving forward along the mountains to attack Alexander and the last of the retreat and hardly noticed the crossing of the army. A sortie against them by the king and the battle cry of the phalanx, as if it intended to come back across

the river and charge, frightened them back, and Alexander led his archers and Agrianians at a dead run into the stream. He crossed first, and as soon as he saw that his rear guard was being pressed, he set the catapult against the enemy and had the archers turn and shoot in midstream. While Glaukias with his Taulantians stayed prudently out of range, the last of the Macedonians crossed the river. In the whole perilous maneuver, not one man had been lost. Alexander, who had fought at the most dangerous points, had been wounded in the neck by a cudgel blow, in the head by a sling stone.

By this maneuver, Alexander had not merely saved his army from obvious danger; he had also gained a vantage point on the riverbank that allowed him to monitor all the movements and operations of the enemy and to keep it immobilized, should he want to add reinforcements.⁶⁰ In the event, the enemy gave him an earlier opportunity to mount a surprise attack that put a quick end to this war. Believing that Alexander's retreat had been prompted by fear, the enemy pitched camp in a long line before Pelion and did not protect itself by trench and mound or post forward sentries with the necessary care. These things were reported to Alexander. During the third night, he returned across the river undetected, taking with him the shieldbearers, Agrianians, archers, and two phalanges. He let the archers and Agrianians advance without waiting for the phalanges. They broke into the camp from the side, where resistance was least possible, startled the enemy out of deep sleep, and struck them down, unarmed, leaderless, and unresisting, in their tents, in the long central corridor of the camp, and in a disordered retreat. The Macedonians took many prisoners and pursued the rest up to the mountains of the Taulantians; the few who escaped had to throw away their weapons. Kleitos himself had taken cover in the city. He put it to the torch and fled to Glaukias in Taulantian country.⁶¹ Thus the old frontier with Illyria was reestablished. The vanquished princes were offered a peace, apparently on condition that they recognize Macedonian suzerainty.⁶²

The quick, hard blows with which the king had overcome the Illyrians, more than once in daring attacks, betray his impatience to get finished here. While he still had his hands full with this enemy, unrest had broken out in the south. If he did not contain it quickly, it might delay the grand plan of a Persian campaign or preclude it altogether.

At the council in Corinth, the Hellenes had recognized Alexander's title to command and sworn to an alliance with him. But now that he

and his military force were far away, the words of those who recalled ancient freedom and glory fell on open ears and open hearts. As long as the imperial palace at Susa expressed disdain for Alexander's youth, the Hellenes had kept prudently silent. In Athens, the Great King's recent words will have reverberated still: "I am not going to give you any money; don't even ask, since you won't get anything."⁶³ Then, little by little, the Great King's men began to see what an enemy the empire had acquired in Alexander. Memnon, whose brother was probably no longer alive, had been sent to lead 5000 Hellenic mercenaries against the Macedonian troops just landed in Asia. But restiveness among the Asiatic Hellenes still promised trouble. There was no more effective response than the well-tried measure of fighting the enemies of the empire, in Hellas, with Hellenes.

A decree went out from Dareios to the Hellenes, summoning them to war against Alexander. Dareios sent money to the individual states; to Athens he sent 300 talents, which the demos still had the good sense to refuse. But Demosthenes accepted the money, intending to use it in the interest of the Great King and against the sworn peace.⁶⁴ He was in correspondence with the Great King's commander, obviously in order to give and receive information for the battle against Alexander. Hand in hand with Lykurgos and other like-minded popular leaders, he did what was necessary to prepare and bring on a new contest with Macedonian power: in particular, he stirred up the Theban exiles, many of whom had found refuge in Athens. The farther away Alexander was and the longer he stayed, the greater grew the courage and the zeal of the agitators. Rumors of a Macedonian defeat in Triballian country were being spread and found credence. In Arkadia, too, in Elis, Messenia, and among the Aitolians, the old taste for revolution and new hopes revived. More than any others, the Thebans felt the yoke of Macedonian rule: the garrison on their citadel was a constant reminder of their disgrace and the eclipse of their glory.

Then came a reliable report of Alexander's death in battle against the Triballians.⁶⁵ Demosthenes brought someone before the assembled people who could point to a wound received in the same engagement, he said, in which he had seen Alexander fall. Who could doubt it? Who would not have been pleased to let himself be persuaded by those who said that the time had come to throw off the Macedonian yoke? The treaties that they had concluded with Alexander ended with his death, they told themselves; the Great King was prepared to protect the freedom

of the Hellenic states and had deposited ample subsidies in the hands of men who, like him, wanted nothing but the well-being and freedom of the Hellenes; it was to be used to support all undertakings against the Macedonians. What promoted these plans most effectively was not Persian gold but that, besides Demosthenes, unimpeachable Lykurgos spoke for them. The essential thing was to move quickly and commit a great act of general uprising that would give the movement a center.

In painfully punished Thebes and among Theban fugitives and exiles in Athens and elsewhere, the mood inclined toward risking everything. A band of exiles had once marched out of Athens, resolved to liberate the Kadmeia; Pelopidas had led that heroic deed, and the victories of Leuktra and Mantinea had been its finest fruits. Granted, in the treaty of alliance, every city had pledged explicitly not to permit the fugitives it harbored to undertake to force their way home; but the king with whom they had sworn that alliance was now dead. Certainly not without Demosthenes's consent, perhaps supported by him with part of the Persian gold he had taken, a number of exiles left Athens and arrived in Thebes under cover of darkness, where their friends were expecting them. They set to work by murdering two leaders of the Macedonian faction as these came down from the Kadmeia, suspecting nothing.⁶⁶ They then convened the citizenry and deliberated what had to happen, what could be hoped. They entreated the people to shake off the Macedonian yoke, in the precious name of freedom and ancient glory. All of Greece and the Persian king were ready to come to their aid, they said. And when they proclaimed that Alexander had fallen in Illyria and was no longer to be feared, the people resolved to restore their ancient freedom, install boeotarchs again, drive the garrison from the Kadmeia, and send embassies to the other states to ask for help.

Everything seemed to promise the greatest success: the Elians had driven out the faction that favored Alexander, the Aitolians were stirring, Athens was arming, Demosthenes sent weapons to Thebes,⁶⁷ the Arkadians marched out to aid the Thebans. And when embassies from Antipater came to the Isthmos to remind those who had advanced that far of the concluded treaties and ask for the allied help the treaties bound them to, no one listened to them;⁶⁸ they listened instead to the imploring request of the Theban ambassadors, who came to call them to the protection of their sacred cause, bearing olive branches wound in wool.⁶⁹ The Thebans cordoned off the Kadmeia by palisades and other works, so that the garrison there could receive neither help nor provisions; they had freed

their slaves and armed them and the alien residents; they had laid in stores and were fully supplied with weapons. The Kadmeia would soon fall, Thebes and all Hellas would be free, the infamy of Chaironeia avenged, and the council of Corinth, that phantasm of independence and security, would vanish before the rosy light of a new dawn already breaking over Hellas.

Then a rumor spread that a Macedonian army was approaching in forced marches, was standing at Onchestos, only two miles away. The leaders reassured the people: that would be Antipater; with Alexander dead, there was no further need to fear the Macedonians. Messengers arrived to say that it was Alexander himself. They were received with ill grace: surely they meant Alexander the Lynkestian, Aeropos's son. Next day the king, believed dead, stood under the walls of the city with his army.⁷⁰

This march takes pride of place among all the many sudden, surprising, muscular moments of this, the king's first war. A fortnight earlier, Alexander had struck the last blow at Pelion; at news of what was happening in Thebes, he had broken camp and marched through the mountains to Pellineion on the upper Peneios in seven days. After moving rapidly to the Spercheios, through the passes at Thermopylai, and into Boeotia, he stood at Onchestos, two miles from Thebes, almost sixty miles from Pelion.⁷¹ As a first consequence of his sudden appearance, the Arkadian auxiliary troops did not dare to advance beyond the Isthmos; the Athenians held back their divisions until the first battle against Alexander had been decided; and the Orchomenians, Plataians, Thesbians, Phokians, and other enemies of Thebes, who had believed themselves delivered over to the full fury of their old tormentors, joined the Macedonians, eager for battle.

The king did not intend to resort to force right away. He led his army up from Onchestos and let it pitch camp before the northern walls near the gymnasium of Iolaos. He expected that the Thebans, brought face-to-face with his forces, would see the folly of their undertaking and seek an amicable accord. They had no prospect of finding help, and yet they were so far removed from yielding that they promptly sent their cavalry and light infantry out on a sortie that pushed back enemy outposts, and they pressed the Kadmeia even harder. Alexander still withheld a battle that, once begun, would do grave harm to a Hellenic city. On the second day he moved his army before the southern gate, which leads out toward Athens and lies adjacent to the Kadmeia within the walls. He pitched

camp here so that his proximity would support the Macedonians in the citadel. He still delayed an assault. He is said to have announced to those within the city that if they surrendered Phoinix and Prothytes, the authors of this mutiny, everything would be forgiven and forgotten.⁷² Many in the city desired and recommended a message to the king begging pardon for what had happened. But the boeotarchs, the exiles, and those who had called on them to return, expecting no friendly reception by Alexander, prodded the crowd toward adamant resistance: They are said to have replied that if the king wanted peace, he should surrender Antipater and Philotas;⁷³ a call is said to have gone out inviting any who wanted to unite with them and the Great King to liberate Hellas to join them in the city. Alexander still did not attack.

But Perdikkas, whose phalanx formed the advance guard of the Macedonian camp and stood near the enemy outworks, considered the moment so propitious to attack that he stormed the trench lines without orders, broke through, and fell on the enemy's forward pickets.⁷⁴ Amyntas, stationed with his phalanx next to Perdikkas, broke rapidly out of camp and followed him to an assault on the second mound. The king saw their movements and feared for their safety if they should have to face the enemy alone. He swiftly had the archers and Agrianians penetrate the circumvallation and the agema and the other shieldbearers move out, but halt before the outer fortifications. Perdikkas fell in the attack on the second mound, gravely wounded; but the two phalanges, working with the archers and the Agrianians, stormed the mound and took it, penetrated into the city by the hollow way of the Elektraen Gate, and arrived at the Herakleion. The Thebans turned suddenly with a loud cry and leapt on the Macedonians, with the result that these fled back to the shieldbearers, with heavy losses: seventy archers fell, among them their leader, the Cretan Eurybotas. At this moment Alexander brought his closed phalanx against the Thebans whom he saw in disorderly pursuit of fleeing Macedonians and threw them back. They retreated through the gates so hastily that the Macedonians could enter with them. In other places, the walls, which had been left undefended behind frequent outposts, could be scaled and occupied and contact established with the Kadmeia. The city was as good as lost. The garrison on the Kadmeia joined part of the invading force to penetrate to the Amphieion in the lower city; other Macedonians topped the walls and stormed the market. The Thebans fought with great valor and to little effect; the enemy pressed in from all sides. Alexander was everywhere, encouraging his men by

word and deed. The Theban cavalry, shattered in the streets, plunged through the yet uncaptured gates and out into open country; the infantry fled, every man for himself, out the gates, into the houses, into the temples, already filled with wailing women and children. Greatly embittered, less the Macedonians than the Phokians, Plataians, and other Boeotians now prepared a gruesome blood bath; even women and children were not spared; their blood defiled the altars of the gods.⁷⁵ Only nightfall put an end to the killing and plundering. Five hundred Macedonians are said to have fallen and six thousand Thebans to have been killed, before the king's order put an end to the carnage.

Next day Alexander convened the allies who had taken part in the battle and charged them with deciding the fate of the city.⁷⁶ Sitting in judgment over Thebes were those same Plataians, Orchomenians, Phokians, and Thespians who had so long endured terrible oppression by the Thebans, whose cities they had destroyed, whose sons and daughters they had outraged and sold into slavery. They decreed that the city should be razed, the land, except temple land, be distributed among Alexander's allies, all Thebans sold into slavery with wife and child, and that freedom should be granted only the priests and priestesses and the guest friends of Philip, Alexander, and the Macedonians.⁷⁷ Alexander ordered that Pindar's house and descendants be spared. Thirty thousand Thebans of every age and station were sold and scattered to the four winds;⁷⁸ the walls were pulled down, the houses emptied and destroyed. The people of Epameinondas was no more, the city was now a dreadful rubble heap, "the cenotaph of its glory." A Macedonian guard high on the solitary citadel protected the temples and "the graves of the living."

This was a stunning turn of events. Hardly a generation earlier, Thebes had enjoyed hegemony in Hellas, had let her sacred band liberate Thessaly and water its battle mounts in the Eurotas. Now she had been wiped from the face of the earth. Greeks of all persuasions are inexhaustible in regretting the fall of Thebes and all too often unjust toward the king, who found no way to spare the city. Subsequently, when Thebans in the mercenary bands of Asia fell into his hands as prisoners of war, he never treated them other than generously; even now, the battle hardly ended, he treated them so. A Theban noblewoman, it is told, was taken prisoner and brought before him in bonds. Her house had been pulled down by Alexander's Thracians, whose leader had violated her and then questioned her, under threat, about her valuables. She had led the Thracian to a well concealed in underbrush, into which, she said, she had dropped

her treasure. As he climbed down into the well, she had flung stones down after him and killed him. Now the Thracians brought her before the king's seat of judgment. She testified that she was Timokleia, sister of Theagenes, a field commander who had fallen defending the Hellenes' freedom against Philip at Chaironeia. As credible as the story is its ending: Alexander pardoned the high-minded woman and granted her and her relatives their freedom.⁷⁹

The fall and destruction of Thebes was well suited to dampen the Hellenes' breathless enthusiasm. The Elians leapt to bring back the adherents of Alexander whom they had banished; the Arkadians recalled their divisions from the Isthmos and issued a death warrant for those who had agitated for the campaign-in-aid against Alexander; the various tribes of the Aitolians sent ambassadors to the king and begged pardon for what had happened within their boundaries. Similar things happened in other places.

Despite their oath, the Athenians had let their Theban exiles return home and had obliged Demosthenes by voting to send aid to Thebes and to dispatch the fleet. But they had not used Alexander's delay of battle to mobilize their troops, which could have reached Thebes in two days. They were celebrating the great mysteries at the very moment (beginning of September) when fugitives brought news that Thebes had fallen. In consternation, they interrupted the festival and brought all movable property into the city. They held an assembly that decided, on Demades's recommendation, to send an embassy of ten men acceptable to the king to congratulate him on his happy return from Triballian country and the Illyrian war and on his suppression and just punishment of the insurrection in Thebes, and to beg the favor of being allowed to make good their city's ancient reputation for hospitality and mercy, also toward the Theban refugees.⁸⁰ The king demanded the surrender of Demosthenes and Lykurgos; of Charidemos, that bitter foe of Macedonian power, which had now put an end to his lucrative method of waging war; of Ephialtes, a recent ambassador to Susa; and of others. For these men, he said, were at the origin not merely of the defeat Athens had suffered at Chaironeia, but also of all the insults to Philip's memory that the Athenians had permitted themselves after his death, and to his son, the lawful heir to the Macedonian throne. They were no less answerable for the fall of Thebes than the agitators within Thebes itself. Those agitators who had found refuge in Athens would also have to be turned over.

Alexander's demands gave rise to the most vehement discussion in the popular assembly in Athens; Demosthenes entreated the people "not to behave like the fabled sheep that delivered their guard dogs to the wolf." Unable to decide, the people waited to hear the opinion of stern Phokion; his counsel was to purchase the king's forgiveness at any price and not let foolish resistance add the destruction of Athens to that of Thebes; the ten men whose surrender Alexander demanded should now show their love of the fatherland by their readiness to make the supreme sacrifice. Demosthenes, however, persuaded the people by his oration, and the orator and Macedonian sympathizer Demades by means of five talents, that Demades should be sent to the king to request that those susceptible to punishment be made subject to the verdict of the Athenian people.⁸¹ The king granted the request, partly out of respect for Athens,⁸² partly out of consideration of the Asian campaign: he wanted no troublesome discontent in Greece during his absence. The king required only that Charidemos, that profligate adventurer whom even Demosthenes had once held in detestation, be banished. Charidemos fled to Asia to the Persian king. Shortly thereafter, Ephialtes left Athens and went to sea.⁸³

Once Hellas had been pacified and sufficient measures taken against future unrest by destroying Thebes and keeping the Macedonian garrison on the Kadmeia, Alexander broke camp before Thebes in autumn 335 and returned rapidly to Macedonia. One year had sufficed to secure his much-threatened kingship. He was now assured of obedience by his barbarian neighbors, of peace and quiet in Hellas, and of the loyalty of his people. He could designate the following spring as the beginning of the undertaking that would decide the fate of Asia and decide history for centuries to come.

The next months were dedicated to preparations for the great war. From Greece, Thessaly, and the mountains of Thrace the battle packs of the allies arrived; mercenaries were hired and ships equipped to cross to Asia. The king held consultations⁸⁴ that would enable him to plan the operations of the field campaign in keeping with reports he had gathered about the military strength and the organization of the Persian empire, the nature of the eastern lands, and the strategic importance of river valleys, mountain chains, cities, and countryside. How we would like to know more about this, to wit, whether those at the court in Pella had any notion of the geographical features of the realm they proposed to invade, of how far it extended beyond the Tauros, then beyond the Tigris.

They certainly knew Xenophon's *Anabasis* and perhaps Ktesias's Persian history; they could have learned much from Hellenes who had taken service in Asia, from Persian embassies, from Artabazos and Memnon, who had lived for years as exiles at the Macedonian court. But as carefully as they may have collected reports, these could have yielded little more than uncertain material for planning a war as far as the Euphrates or, at all events, the Tigris. Of the topography of the lands farther east, of the distances there they doubtless had no inkling.

Then affairs at home were set in order. Antipater was made viceroy with sufficient military to assure quiet in Greece, secure the Macedonian frontiers, and keep the affiliated peoples round about subdued.⁸⁵ The princes of the allied barbarian tribes were invited to take part in the campaign, to protect the realm from their eventual restiveness and because the tribesmen in the army would fight more valiantly under their own chiefs.⁸⁶ One further concern was particularly raised by Antipater and Parmenion in the war council: In the event of unanticipated misfortune, who should succeed to the throne? They implored the king to take a wife before opening the campaign and await the birth of an heir.⁸⁷ He rejected their entreaties, saying that it was unworthy of him and of the Macedonians and the Hellenes to think of marriage and the marriage bed when Asia stood poised for battle. Should he wait until the already mustered fleet of the Phoenicians and the Cypriots approached, the already mustered imperial army of the Great King gathered and crossed the Tauros? He could not delay any longer if he hoped to win Asia Minor and thus a basis for further campaigns.

It is reported that he arranged his affairs as if he were taking leave of Macedonia forever. What belonged to him at home—farms, forests, villages, even harbor fees and other sources of income—he gave to his friends. When almost everything had been distributed, Perdikkas asked what remained for Alexander, to which the king replied, "Hope." Whereupon Perdikkas refused his own portion: "Let us who will fight with you have a part instead in your hope." And many friends followed Perdikkas's example.⁸⁸ The story is doubtless exaggerated, but true to the mood before they marched out. The king knew how to raise that mood higher and higher; the enthusiasm that filled him inspired his generals, the equestrian noblemen of his entourage, all the army that followed him. Led by this young hero, they confidently challenged all the world to battle.

Book Two



CHAPTER 1

At first glance, Alexander's undertaking seems to stand in no small disproportion to the means at his disposal. And only the smaller part of his task was to rout the enemy; he also had to consider how to make the results of his military successes lasting.

With respect to land mass, the area over whose resources he disposed amounted to scarcely one-thirtieth of the Persian empire. No less unequal were the population numbers here and there and the relative fighting forces on land and sea. When we consider that the Macedonian treasury was exhausted at the time of Philip's death and indeed five hundred talents in debt, while the treasure houses of the Great King in Susa, Persepolis, Ecbatana, and elsewhere were bursting with immense stores of precious metal, and that Alexander, once he had rearmed, retained a mere sixty talents of the eight hundred talents he had had to borrow for the purpose,¹ then his undertaking seems foolhardy and almost chimerical.

The records that have come down to us, by their very nature, can provide no answers to the questions that suggest themselves here. Even Arrian, intelligent historian though he was, reports only an external, effectively a military course of events, with an occasional moral appraisal of his hero, mentioning hardly more than the names of those who supported him militarily by word and deed. He says nothing of the administration, finances, and political organizations or of the general staff and cabinet of the king, the men who acted for him in these functions. He does not attempt to make clear to himself or to his reader how the deeds and successes he reports were made possible and were realized, by what means, to what extent they were planned in advance, by what goals and according to what practical considerations they were determined, by what powers of will, superior insight, and military or political genius.

Among the many questions thus indicated, it must suffice to single out the essential ones here on the threshold of this most astonishing run of military victories.

Not a few writers have attempted to account for Alexander's character and his genius by representing him as a fantast who set out for Asia with his no less divinely inspired band of warriors, intending to beat the Persians wherever he might find them and letting chance determine how he would continue next day. Others have maintained that he merely put into action an idea that his father had entertained, that philosophers, orators, and patriots had urged upon him, and that Hellenic culture had actually produced and developed.

An intention, before it has become deed, is only a dream, a phantom, the play of an aroused imagination. Only for the man who executes it does it take on form, flesh and blood, the impetus of its own proper motion, the here-and-now of its operation, and, with conditioning and opposition in space and time, ever renewed limitations, ever sharper definition, according to its weaknesses and its strengths. Did Alexander set out like an adventurer, like a dreamer, with nothing more than a summary intention to conquer Asia to the shores of the unknown seas that border it? Or did he know what he wanted and what he could will? Did he conceive his military and political plans and take his measures accordingly? It is not a matter of discovering methodical coherence in the sequence of his successes after the fact and then producing that evidence as proof. There probably are no proofs that before he began he could envisage what would come about eventually.

Perhaps one fact can be adduced for such a proposition, though our sources are silent on the matter. Aside from a few inscriptions and works of art, the only immediate remains of that time are coins, of which thousands survive, of gold, silver, and copper, bearing Alexander's stamp—silent witnesses that scholarship has at last induced to speak. When compared with the gold and silver coins of the Persian kings, of the countless Greek cities, and of the Macedonian kings before Alexander, they give evidence of a remarkable procedure.

As noted earlier, King Philip introduced a new monetary system in his territories. This measure, as a famous historian has remarked, was an approach from a great distance to conquest of Persia.² Philip's reform consisted in minting gold on the standard of the *dareikos* and silver on the standard closest to the commercial value of gold, whereas in the Hellenic world silver currency prevailed and in the Persian empire, a gold currency. Thus he set up a gold currency, "not in place of, but beside the silver currency that had been practiced exclusively in the Greek world; he introduced a double currency in his kingdom."³ In keeping

with the value of gold to silver, which in trade stood at 1:12.51, he took for his silver pieces, of which fifteen were to correspond to a gold piece of 8.60 grams, a norm of 7.24 grams; this essentially was the standard of the widely circulating silver coinage of Rhodes.

Alexander's gold coins are of the same weight and fineness as the "philippeoi," but his silver coins follow an entirely different system. These are tetradrachms of 17.00 to 17.20 grams and their smaller denominations, wholly in keeping with the Attic system, with a valuation of gold to silver of 1:12.30. This reduction was made with the intention of moving from his father's double currency back to the purely silver currency of the Hellenes, with the result that the "Alexander drachma" became the standard recognized monetary unit of the realm. A more important point for our question is that in the great mass of Alexander's drachma currency there occurs not one piece on Philip's standard.⁴

One would not assume that this reform was undertaken without important motives. If Philip introduced a double currency, his intention was to fix the price of gold and of silver and keep them in equilibrium as the price of gold fell in the course of trade with the Greek world, where a silver currency was used. If the price of gold continued to fall, silver would flow out of Macedonia, as it had out of Persia, to the extent that silver was worth more than the gold required to purchase it. Alexander's new monetary system effectively declared war on Persian gold. Gold was made a mere commodity. When the treasuries of the Persian king had been conquered and the lifeless gold piled up there was returned to trade, that commodity could continue to fall in value without similarly undermining prices in the Greek world, which were pegged to silver. Henceforth silver on the Attic standard was the uniform measure; the tetradrachm became the standard denomination in which almost all Hellenic currency systems could be reconciled and from which the many fractional pieces in these systems derived. Half a generation later, the Alexander drachma was the universal currency.

Whether this transformation of the Macedonian monetary system was also intended to provide financial aid in immediate money matters,⁵ whether Alexander and his advisors calculated the economic effect of the measure, whether they foresaw a further devaluation of gold once the Persian treasuries had been put into circulation—these are questions to which we have no answers. It is enough if a radical measure makes us notice to just what extent the great undertaking was planned in advance, before anyone proceeded to set it into motion.

A second preliminary question is how the undertaking on which Alexander embarked was to be based, or whether he intended to give up his base of operations as soon as he had crossed the Hellespont and, as the expression goes, burn his boats behind him. The course of presentation here will show why the alternatives thus posed cannot be treated further at this point. Alexander's immediate priority, at least, was to assure himself of his base; only to the extent that he had done so both militarily and politically could he hope to make a decisive first thrust and promote its effect.

Alexander controlled an area that extended from Byzantium to the Eurotas and inland across the Haimos and the Pindos to the Danube and the Adriatic. This area embraced the right angle formed by the northern and western sides of the Aegean Sea. The eastern side was formed by the shores of Asia Minor, which belonged to the Persian empire, but were in fact populated by Greek cities. Crete, which lies before the open south side of the Aegean, was Greek, but *sui generis*, as were Greater Greece and Sicily and the Greek cities in the north and south of the Pontos. Alexander was fully assured of the area that lies above the apex of the right angle and formed the keystone of his territory. In these Macedonian lands, including Tymphaia and Parauaia in the west and the Strymon country in the east, he was king by right of birth and commanded the unconditional loyalty of the nobility, the peasantry, and the cities, including those of Greek foundation, such as Amphipolis.

Other areas adjoined this heartland of his power and influence, left, right, and center, in the most various forms of political attachment, ranging from complete dependency to loose federation.

The Thracian country, that part of his realm that lies adjacent to the coast of Asia Minor and flanks it from the entrance to the Hellespont to the mouth of the Bosporos, was of particular importance. Philip had destroyed the Thracian empire, which had once controlled the Hebros basin as far as the mountains. Even if a remnant appears to have survived as the principality of the Odrysians, Thrace was dependent on Macedonia to the point of military fealty. To use the Roman term, Thrace was a province of the Macedonian state. To control it, the new cities Philipopolis, Kalybe, Beroa, and Alexandropolis had been founded on the dominant points of the land and colonized. These were not free colonies in old Hellenic fashion, but rather military stations, albeit with civil community and communal autonomy, populated by settlers brought in from near and far, some by force.⁶ The Thracian country, according to good

information at least on the period subsequent to 335, stood under Macedonian strategoi. We do not know how far beyond the Haimos passes the jurisdiction of a strategos extended and whether a second strategos administered the areas "on the Pontos," as an uncorroborated notice from the year 331 or 326 implies, or, alternatively, whether the tribes living in the territory from the Haimos to the Danube and its mouths were obliged merely to keep the peace and, after the campaign of 335, perhaps to pay tribute.

The Greek cities on the Thracian coast of the Pontos, from Appollonia and Mesembria to Kallatis and Istros, were probably on friendly terms with Macedonia in Philip's time, but they seem not to have entered into any closer relationship with Macedonia even after the campaign of 335.⁷ For that campaign, ships were sent from Byzantium to the Danube, doubtless by purely military alliance, for Byzantium minted no Alexander coins either in Alexander's time or in that of his successors; therefore it remained an independent state, like the Greek cities of the Corinthian League. Whether Byzantium joined the league or concluded separate treaties with Macedonia instead is unknown. It is most remarkable that almost all the Greek cities on the southern coast of Thrace minted Alexander coins, as did Macedonian Pella, Amphipolis, Skione, and so on. They therefore stood under Macedonian monetary law, like the Macedonian cities; like these, they were no longer autonomous states, though they enjoyed communal autonomy.⁸ Among these effectively king's cities of Thrace, Abdera, and Maroneia lie on the road to the Hellespont; Kardia at the entrance to the Chersonese; Krithote at the northern tip of the entrance to the Hellespont, opposite Lampsakos; Sestos and Koile at the crossing point to Abydos; and Perinthos and Selymbria on the Propontis.⁹

North of Macedonia, the principality of the Paionians and that of the Agrianians were under Macedonian suzerainty, with the right or the duty of service in the army of the king. From the Paionian princes at least we have coins from the time of Alexander, but neither according to the Macedonian standard nor with Alexander's stamp.¹⁰ The tribes to their north as far as the Adriatic, the Triballians, Autariates, Dardanians, Taulantians, and the Illyrians under Kleitos, were pacified in the campaign of 335 and obliged to conclude treaties in which they recognized their dependency on Macedonia; we do not know whether they had to pay tribute.

The relationship of the kingdom of Epeiros to Macedonia is very peculiar. After Philip snatched it away from Arybbas and awarded it to Arybbas's

nephew Alexander, Olympias's brother, and then extended it to the Ambrakic Gulf, it stood beside Macedonia like a natural support. Its young king's marriage to Philip's daughter and perhaps a kind of shared possession with Queen Olympias seemed to associate it more closely with Macedonian interests. How curious then that the Epeirotes neither enter the battles of 335 on the Macedonian side¹¹ nor participate in the great expedition to Asia. Instead, a year later the Epeirote king undertakes his expedition to Italy "with fifteen warships and numerous vehicles for the transport of ships and horses,"¹² and we do not even know whether he consulted with Macedonia.¹³ If that could be shown, we would gain important information for the interpretation of contemporary politics. But perhaps we should recall that the Molossian constitution was not that of a kingdom to nearly the same extent as the Macedonian; rather, Molossians were largely bound by oaths that the king swore the people and the people, their king, with the likely result that the king disposed freely only over the revenues of the crown lands. Thus the Molossian king may have undertaken his expedition to Italy, not in the name of the Epeirote state, but rather with a recruited army, at his own risk and expense, to fight in foreign service, like more than one Spartan king.

The relations in which the various Greek states stood to Macedonia have been described earlier. We must return to the matter here in order to touch upon a few points of political significance, which, however, cannot all be fully clarified.

The Corinthian League was not the first institution to attach the Thesalians to Alexander. By their own constitution their four districts were united into a commonwealth alongside Macedonia—the constitution that Philip had given them or renewed and which put the military and financial resources of the land effectively at the disposal of the Macedonian king.¹⁴ It is unclear whether the mountain tribes of Thessaly, the old-accustomed "affiliated cantons," the Dolopians, Ainianians, Malians, and so on, fell under the constitution or if only the Amphiktionic League bound them to Macedonia. The Aitolians, too, seem not to have belonged to the Corinthian League but rather to have renewed earlier separate treaties by which they had become lords of Naupaktos in 338.

The Corinthian League embraced "Hellas to Thermopylai";¹⁵ only Sparta had not joined. The articles of the league constitution, cited earlier, indicate that it was intended not only to serve the reigning power to secure hegemony over Hellas and the Hellenic contingents for prosecution of the Persian war, but also to secure a common peace among league lands

and to maintain their possessions as provided by the determinations of 338,¹⁶ thus precluding any further influence of Persian politics on individual allied states. Information about the organization of the league is so sparse that we cannot even make out whether the synhedrion in Corinth sat permanently or convened only at certain times,¹⁷ and whether Macedonia had a seat and a vote or stood outside the league, so that the king disposed over the contingents that were provided by treaty and the external policy of the allied states only as “unconditional field commander” for the Persian war. In the naval league of Periklean times, Athens had enjoyed a real ascendancy over the allied states and had exercised it sternly enough, even hearing their disputes in Attic courts.¹⁸ In the second Attic naval league, the Attic state and a body of the autonomous allies stood parallel in such fashion that the synhedrion of the allies, sitting permanently in Athens, negotiated with the council and the people of Athens concerning measures to be taken, and, upon application by the synhedrion, the demos of Athens made the dispositive decisions.¹⁹ If King Philip contented himself with a far looser arrangement at the founding of the Corinthian League, if Alexander, having twice had occasion, nonetheless demanded no tighter arrangement and forced none, it must have seemed to them either unnecessary or impossible to develop this federation, to use current expression, from *völkerrechtlich* to *staatsrechtlich*, from a union controlled by law among peoples to a union controlled by the law of sovereign states.

One must take account of this distinction to appreciate the consequences appropriately. The way the league was founded, broken, and sworn anew shows clearly enough that the oaths taken did not alone suffice to assure Alexander of the help of the allied states against the Great King and of their adherence to a common policy. A substitute at least could be fashioned from the partisan politics of virtually every Hellenic city and the traditional genuinely particularistic bickering and feuding among the cities, and Macedonian policy cannot be faulted if it favored loyalists to keep control from slipping into the hands of those who, in the nature of things, were Persian partisans, when they persisted in operating against the interests of the concluded league. As a further precaution, Macedonian garrisons lay in Acrocorinth, in Chalkis, on Euboea, and on the Kadmeia. To support them, not just to inspire respect among the barbarian tribes beyond the Haimos and in Illyria, Alexander at his departure left a significant military force behind in Macedonia, perhaps fully half the purely Macedonian troops, to be reinforced by each annual cohort

of new recruits and to function as a reserve of replacements being trained for the army in Asia.

There was one important deficiency. By a margin, Macedonian sea power was no match for Persian. The Great King could—and soon did—put four hundred warships to sea without difficulty; his was a fleet of Phoenicians and Cypriots, the best seamen of the ancient world. With the islands of the west coast of Asia Minor wholly at his disposal under tyrants and oligarchs, their autonomy under the terms of the peace of Antialkidas notwithstanding, he was master of the Aegean if he cared to be. If the states of the Corinthian League had combined their ships with Macedonia's—Athens alone had more than 350 in her berths—that sea could easily have been secured before the Persian fleet arrived. Neither at the founding nor at the renewal of the league did Macedonian policy find it possible or advisable to require significant maritime contributions by the Hellenic states.²⁰ Manifestly, political, not military, considerations determined its election to give the offensive against Persian power the form essentially of a land war, even in its opening campaign.

Alexander had to be sure that he would prevail on the strength of his land army, or more correctly—for here we arrive at our third question—he had to calculate the strength of the field army intended for Asia, its equipment, its organization, its various arms, in such fashion that he was fully assured of success.

King Philip had brought the Macedonian military to a level of approximately 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry; under him it received its own particular organization and training. This was the same military organization as Hellas had developed, adapted now to Macedonian conditions and further developed accordingly. This organization, obviously, intended to be able to use various arms—infantry and cavalry, light and heavy armor, levied troops and mercenaries—now trained and formed much more freely and more effectively than the Hellenic arts of war had ever managed. According to a not entirely reliable datum, on setting out for Asia, Alexander left 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry behind in Macedonia, under Antipater's command. They were replaced in the land army by 1500 Thessalian riders, 600 riders and 7000 infantry of allied Hellenic troops, 5000 Hellenic mercenaries, plus Thracian foot soldiers and Odrysian and Paionian riders.²¹ The most reliable tradition reckons the total strength of the army that marched to the Hellespont at “not much over 30,000 infantry and more than 5000 riders.”²²

The totality of infantry and cavalry was divided according to arms and in part according to local origin, not like the Roman legions and modern divisions, which combine all arms to form miniature armies. The enemy was the hordes of Asia, which lack military order and military art and are thrown together for a single strike. After a defeat they abandon all effort, and after a victory over organized troops they gain nothing but renewed risk. Against such an enemy, organization according to arms and origin has the advantage of being a tactical form of great simplicity and natural internal consistency. In precisely those places where Alexander's phalanx overcame Dareios's army, seven Roman legions fell before furious Parthian attacks. The army that Alexander led into Asia kept its fundamental Macedonian organization. The allied contingents that joined it and the new hirelings introduced beside the established body of recruits served only to supplement the organization into which they were integrated in keeping with its two-fold quality of mobility and steadfastness. Heavy infantry had been the prevalent arm in Hellenic tactic, until peltasts were added as a lighter infantry and overcame the Spartans. In the battle order of the Macedonian army, too, these two forms of infantry, the phalanges and the shieldbearers, were numerically the strongest force.²³

The special quality of the phalanx lay in the arming of the individual soldier and the arrangement of the ranks. The phalangites were hoplites in the Hellenic sense, though not altogether as heavy as the Hellenic hoplites.²⁴ They were equipped with helmet, breastplate, greaves, and a round shield as broad as a man.²⁵ Their principal weapon was the Macedonian sarissa, a spear fourteen to sixteen feet long, and the short Greek sword.²⁶ Intended for mass close combat, they had to be so positioned that they could both receive the most furious charge by the enemy with confidence and break through enemy ranks in a single thrust. As a rule, they stood sixteen men deep²⁷ and the spears of the first five ranks projected beyond the front, presenting an impenetrable, indeed unattackable, wall to the storming enemy. The rear ranks laid their sarissas on the shoulder of the man in front, so that an attack by this "battle pack" was altogether irresistible by virtue of a fierce double quality of weight and movement.²⁸ Only perfect gymnastic training of each man made possible the unity, precision, and speed with which this mass of men, pressed together in a narrow space, had to perform its most artful maneuvers.²⁹ In combat they were what the Tartar aga two millennia later called the closed Brandenburg battalions, those squares of pikemen and

musketeers: "walking fortresses." In the army that marched into Asia there were six *τάξεις* (regiments) or phalanges of these Macedonian hoplites,³⁰ the "pezhetairoi" or footguards, under the strategoi³¹ Perdikkas, Koinos, Amyntas Andromenes's son, Meleagros, Philip Amyntas's son, and Krateros. The regiments seem to have been recruited and formed by canton; Koinos's was from Elymiotis; Perdikkas's from Orestis and Lynkestis; Philip's, later led by Polyperchon, from Tymphaia.

The heavy Hellenic troops, mercenary and allied, stood under separate command. Antigonos, who later became king, was commander of the allied troops; Menandros, one of the companions, was commander of the mercenaries. For larger actions these allied troops and mercenaries seem to have been combined with Macedonian hoplites in such fashion that a certain number of battalions (*λόχοι*) of the Macedonian regiment, the pezhetairoi, and a certain number of battalions of allied and mercenary troops formed the phalanx of Perdikkas, Koinos, and so on.³² Total heavy infantry of Alexander's army may have amounted to 18,000 men.

Next, the peculiarly Macedonian troop of the shieldbearers (*hypaspistai*). To create an arm more agile in attack than the hoplites and heavier than the lightly armed, the Athenian Iphikrates had formed a corps with linen armor, lighter shield, and longer sword than the hoplites carried, under the name peltasts. This new order of arm found acceptance in Macedonia perhaps for troops that, unlike the levied militia, were kept in permanent service, as their name, which means trabants, lifeguardsmen (of the king), seems to indicate.³³ The campaign of 335 has given us numerous examples of how this corps was used. Terrain often hindered full use of the phalanx; more often, ambushes, quick movements, surprise attacks of all kinds were in order, for which the phalanges were not sufficiently mobile and the light troops not sufficiently resistant. The shieldbearers were particularly suited to taking and keeping high places, forcing their way across rivers, and supporting and exploiting cavalry attacks.³⁴ The entire corps, "the shieldbearers of the companions," as they were called, was led by Nikanor (whose brother Philotas commanded the mounted companions), son of Parmenion. The first regiment was called the *agema*, the king's escort of shieldbearers.³⁵

The first rank of the cavalry belongs to the Macedonian and Thessalian horse. Drawn from the equestrian nobility of Macedonia and of Thessaly, equal in arms, exercise, and excellence, they compete for distinction before the king, who usually leads them. The importance of this arm to Alexander's undertaking comes to the fore in every major battle that he

fought and perhaps even more clearly in such cavalcades as the final pursuit of Dareios and the chase after Bessos. Equally formidable as shock troops and in single combat, Alexander's cavalry was superior in both order and exercise to Asiatic horsemen in whatever numbers they appeared, and its opening attack on enemy infantry was usually decisive. Protected by helmet, gorget, breastpiece, shoulder and hip pieces, their battle mounts protected, too, on breast and forehead, they carried thrusting spears and swords at their sides.³⁶ The Macedonian companions were led by Philotas Parmenion's son, apparently with the title hipparch;³⁷ they are called "the mounted companions." They constitute eight *iles*, or squadrons, some called after their *ilarchs*, others after Macedonian places. In the battle of Arbela, the individual squadrons stood under Kleitos, Glaukias, Ariston, Sopolis, Herakleides, Demetrios, Meleagros, and Hege-lochos. Sopolis's squadron was called after Amphipolis on the Strymon, Herakleides's after the countryside of Bottiaia, and so forth. Kleitos's was called the king's *ile* and formed the *agema* of the cavalry. Among the Thessalians, the squadron of Pharsalos was the largest and the most effective; command of the Thessalian cavalry belonged to Kalas Harpalos's son.³⁸

Hellenic riders and allied contingents were also present in the army. They were usually ranged among the Thessalians, but as a separate corps, commanded by Philip Menelaos's son. Recruited riders from Hellas appear only in later campaigns.

Next, the light troops, mounted and on foot. They come partly from upper Macedonia, partly from the lands of the Thracians, Paionians, and Agrianians, equipped with defensive or offensive arms, according to the fashion of their respective countrysides. Practiced in the usual hunting and waylaying of their homelands and the countless small wars of their chieftains, they were particularly suited to flying combat, covering a march, to all those things for which one learned to use pandurs, hussars, ulans, and Tartars at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Among the light infantry, the most important numerically are the Thracians, under Sitalkes, doubtless of the princely house of Thrace.³⁹ They formed many regiments, an indication of their numbers.⁴⁰ They are described as "*akon-tistai*," javelin throwers; they seem to have carried the small shield, just as the Thracians furnished the model for the weapon of the peltasts.⁴¹ Then the Agrianians, also javelin throwers, under Attalos, perhaps a son of their prince Langaros.⁴² Finally, the archers, partly Macedonians, partly recruits, probably mostly from Crete; there is hardly a battle in which

they and the Agrianians do not form the front rank; in one year the captain of the archers had to be replaced three times; at the opening of hostilities he was Klearchos.⁴³ The light cavalry was composed partly of Macedonians, partly of Paionians and Odrysians, tribes whose proficiency in mounted service was famous from earliest times; their number is unknown. Ariston led the Paionians, Agathon Tyrimmas's son, the Odrysian Thracians, both probably from princely houses. These and the Macedonian corps of the sarissa bearers under Lynkestian Amyntas were subsumed under the designation "prodromoi," the skirmishers.⁴⁴

In these light troops, an element that had not yet been recognized in its full value by the Hellenic arts of war became prominent in Alexander's army. The light troops of the Greek armies before Alexander had acquired no great importance with respect either to their numbers or to their deployment and had not escaped a certain contempt, for they were made up in part of the lower social orders, in part of barbarian mercenaries, and their strong point was attack from ambush, noisy assault, and spuriously disorderly retreat, maneuvers that Hellenic warriors found treacherous and repugnant. The celebrated Spartan field commander Brasidas himself admitted that attack by these tribes, with their savagely reverberating battle cry and menacing brandishing of weapons, had something terrifying, their willful switching from attack to flight, from disorder into pursuit had something frightful that could be countered only by the strict orderliness of the Hellenic battle pack. Now these light troops emerged as essential components of the Macedonian army, to be exploited in its action according to the merits of each national way of waging war, and, for their part, restrained and made more useful by the firm discipline that was enforced in this army.

About the marching order and camping order of the army we know nothing worthy of mention. For larger actions, troops were arrayed according to a scheme that can be described here in its characteristic points and not repeated in subsequent accounts. The center was formed by the heavy infantry in a regularly alternating sequence of the six phalanges, each under its commander. The phalanges are adjoined on the right by the regiments of shieldbearers and, to their right, the eight squadrons of Macedonian riders, also in regularly alternating sequence. The light troops of the right wing, the squadrons of sarissa bearers and Paionians, the Agrianians and archers, were used, according to circumstances, as skirmishers, for preliminary attack, to cover the flanks of the army at the tips of the wings, and so on. On the left wing, the Thracians under

Sitalkes, peltasts that correspond to the shieldbearers on the right wing, about the phalanx, unless they are being used elsewhere, for example, to protect a camp. Then, the mounted Hellenic contingents, the Thessalian riders, finally, the light troops of this wing, Agathon's Odrysian riders, in subsequent years, a second division of archers. The center of the battle line fell between the third and the fourth phalanx, and from this point the two "wings" are calculated, the right, usually used for attack, under Alexander's command, the left under Parmenion's.

The singularity of Alexander's army emerges most sharply in two features.

In Greek armies, the number of riders had always been small; in Epameinondas's battles their proportion to infantry rises to 1:10. In Alexander's army it nearly doubles: 1:6. At Chaironeia, Alexander, riding in the van of the massed horse of the left wing, brilliantly decided a battle that had almost been lost. For the contest with the armies of the Great King, whose strength lay in the horsemen of Asia, Alexander enlarged precisely this arm and gave it the offensive: he intended to engage the enemy on its strong point.⁴⁵

We should bear in mind that the Greeks and the Macedonians knew neither the stirrup nor the horseshoe; equally, no doubt, the riders of Asia, who otherwise would have been the superior. The more does one appreciate the enormous hardships of the long winter marches unshod over icy mountain roads that Alexander imposed on the horses of his cavalry in the late campaigns. No less a hardship was it for a rider to keep his seat without stirrup or saddle, astride no more than a securely fastened blanket. The absence of stirrups hampered a rider in combat in a way we can hardly imagine: unable to stand in stirrups, he was obliged to thrust and strike from sitting position, using only the strength of his upper body. The more therefore did the army depend on the vehemence of a shock in closed ranks to break through enemy lines. The training of a rider seems to have intended to accustom him to the freest possible movement while mounted, as can perhaps still be seen in contemporary statuary.⁴⁶

A more sharply defining characteristic of this army is the presence not merely of officers but of a true officer class. Just as Gustav Adolf's gymnasium illustre was a proper "academy of mounted exercise" for the cavalry officers of later centuries, the "somatophylakia," the corps of king's pages, was a military and academic preparatory school for young Macedonian noblemen. It produced the companions of the cavalry, the officers of the

shieldbearers, the footguards, and the sarissa bearers, and so forth, who then rose through the ranks, as we know from numerous examples. At the highest rank, or in any case, that most immediate to the king, were the seven bodyguards and, it seems, those called companions in the narrow sense, the one and the other always at the king's disposal for counsel and service and temporary commandos.⁴⁷ The highest ranking officer after the king was aged Parmenion and, at home, Antipater, we do not know whether with particular title. Thereafter, in an unknown sequence of superiority,⁴⁸ the hipparchs of the various mounted corps and the strategoi of the phalanges, the shieldbearers, the allied Hellenic troops, and the mercenaries; then the ilarchs of the cavalry, the chiliarchs of the shieldbearers, the taxiarchs of the footguard, and so on. When the "hegemones" of the allied troops or of the mercenaries were summoned on occasion to the war council,⁴⁹ these seem to have been commanders such as Sitalkes of the Thracian javelin throwers, Attalos of the Agrianians, Agathon and Ariston of the Odrysian and Paionian riders, perhaps also the leaders of the Hellenic contingents and of the battalions of Hellenic mercenaries.⁵⁰

Thus Alexander's army.⁵¹ His father had organized it and made it fit by means of sharp discipline and numerous field campaigns; by close association of the Thessalian and the Macedonian riders, he had created a cavalry such as the Hellenic world had never seen. But Philip had not risen to the full effectiveness of his own military superiority, to the point of fully and freely wielding—even, one might say, of understanding—his own strength. At Chaironeia, where he led the Macedonian riders of the right wing, he had not broken through the advancing line of the enemy; indeed, he had let the phalanx fall back, albeit in good order. Alexander broke into the hotly pursuing enemy line with the Thessalian riders of the left wing and carried the day. Here, and even more in the battles of the year 335, Alexander demonstrated that he understood how to use the irresistible offensive power of his army more boldly, more abruptly, always decisively and, no less, that he was at once field commander and the foremost soldier of his troops—in the full sense of the expression, its first rank. Like nothing else, his practice of personally entering the fray, of always positioning himself at the fore of the decisive blow to the enemy aroused the emulation of his officers and their men. In numbers his army was small, but formed so organically, the individual arms raised to such a level of tactical training, so well led that it marched into Asia with the full moral superiority of confidently expecting victory.

* * *

The Persian empire was ill-adapted to resistance. Sprawling, composed of countless subject peoples, its administration and its military poorly organized, it necessarily would fall.

If one examines the condition of the Persian empire at the time when Dareios III took the throne,⁵² one sees immediately that it was already in a state of dissolution and ripe for destruction. The reason was not the moral corruption of the court, the ruling house, or the subjected peoples. Moral corruption, constant companion of despotism, never puts an end to despotic power, which is capable, for its part, of repeated broad diplomatic and political successes in the midst of the most wanton palace and harem intrigue, of unrelieved plotting and atrocity among the great, of bloody problems of succession, and unnatural cruelty toward defeated partisans, as the Osman empire demonstrated long enough. Persia's misfortune was a series of weak rulers who proved unable to tighten the reins of power enough to preserve the empire. Consequently, fear dwindled among the tribes, obedience among the satraps, and, in the empire, the unity that alone held it together. The tribes, which had retained their traditional religion, laws, and mores and, in part, their native princes, were overtaken by longing for independence; the satraps, all-too-powerful governors of huge, remote stretches of country, were overtaken by desire for independent power; the ruling class, which, possessing power and accustomed to it, had forgotten the conditions for establishing and for keeping power, was overtaken by indifference toward the Great King and the house of the Achaimenids. In the hundred years of almost total inactivity that followed Xerxes's campaign into Europe, the Greek lands had developed their own particular art of war, which Asia evaded and forgot how to combat. The campaign of the Ten Thousand had showed that the Greek art of war was more redoubtable than the enormous tribal armies of Persia; the satraps, when they rose, put their trust in Greek tactics, no less so King Ochus when he set out to put down the rebellion in Egypt, to such effect that the kingdom, founded on the victories of Persian arms, was obliged to maintain itself by means of Greek mercenaries.

Ochus, to be sure, had restored an apparent unity to the empire and knew how to use the bloody rigor that despotism requires to make his power felt. But it was already too late; he himself sank into idleness and weakness, the satraps kept their all-too-powerful position, and the tribes,

especially those of the western satrapies, remembered under renewed oppression that they had once been at the point of throwing off their oppressors. After new and terrible disorders, the throne had finally devolved upon Dareios. Instead of virtuous, he should have been forceful; instead of generous, ruthless; instead of lenient, despotic, if he was to save the empire. The Persians honored him and the satraps were loyal, but that was no salvation. He was loved, not feared, and Persia would soon discover how many of the grandees of the realm attached greater importance to their own advantage than to the will and favor of a lord in whom they found everything to admire except a great ruler.

Dareios's realm stretched from the Indus to the Hellenic Sea, from the Jaxartes to the Libyan desert. His regime, or rather that of his satraps, did not vary according to the character of the various tribes they presided over; nowhere was it popular, nowhere secured by internally consistent, thoroughgoing organization. It restricted itself to momentary shows of force, sustained extortion, and a kind of heritable power of office—wholly against the interests of a monarchic order—that had become customary during long periods of slack rule. As a result, the Great King's only control of his satraps was by resort to arms or by appeal to their personal advantage. The persistence of a tribal way of life in all the lands of the Persian empire left that decaying colossus the more incapable of mounting a defense. The peoples of Iran, Ariana, and the Baktrian country were bellicose enough and content with any rule that brought them war and booty. And Hyrkanian, Baktrian, and Sogdian horsemen composed the standing armies of the satraps in most of the provinces. But these tribal warriors knew no particular loyalty to the Persian crown. And however terrible in attack they once had been in the armies of the peoples under Cyrus, Kambyses, and Dareios, they were incapable of serious, sustained defense, especially when they found themselves face-to-face with the Greeks' level of military training and valor. To say nothing of the western tribes, kept in obeisance with difficulty, often only by bloody force, and quick to forsake the Persian cause whenever a victorious enemy approached their frontiers. The Greeks on the coast of Asia Minor could scarcely be held in dependency by oligarchy or by tyrants who owed their existence to the power of satraps or of the empire. The tribes in the interior of the peninsula, oppressed for two centuries, had neither the strength nor the engagement to rise in Persia's behalf; they had not even joined the earlier risings of the satraps of Asia Minor; they were dull and indolent and had forgotten their past. The same was true of the two Syrias, on the near

and far sides of the waters: long centuries of servitude had broken the spirit of these tribes; they submitted to whatever was visited upon them. The old vitality survived only on the coast of Phoenicia, more a danger than a resource for the Persians, and solely jealousy of Sidon and solicitousness of her own advantage kept Tyre loyal to Susa. Egypt, finally, had never abandoned or disavowed her hatred of these foreigners, and Ochos's depredations might cripple Egypt but could never subdue her. All these countries, conquered by the Persian empire to its own destruction, were as good as lost if Persia was boldly attacked from the west.

For these reasons, the foremost concern of Persian policy had long been to feed the jealousy among the Hellenic states, to weaken the strong and stir up and support the weak, and to use an elaborate system of bribes and of pitting one against another to thwart the Hellenes in any attempt at combined effort, which Persia could not have withstood. This had long worked. Then the Macedonian kingdom, sure-footed and moving swiftly, threatened to defeat all these efforts. After the victory at Chaironeia and the subsequent founding of the Hellenic League, the royal palace in Susa must have seen what was coming.

Dareios, who had become king about the time Philip was murdered, was the first to take measures against the troops that had already crossed the Hellespont. He gave Rhodian Memnon, Mentor's brother, command of whatever Hellenic mercenaries were on hand, with orders to march against the Macedonians and protect the frontiers of the realm. Obviously, a single foreign corps could thus be stopped without difficulty but not the entire Macedonian–Greek army, whose *avant garde* this was and which was preparing momentarily to cross into Asia. And at this late date, it was no less impossible to raise and muster an imperial Persian army and send it into Asia Minor to arrive before the Hellenes. The simplest, smartest solution was to strike at the root of the threat. Contact with persons present at the Macedonian court was sought and found and King Philip—thus Alexander in a subsequent letter to the Great King⁵³—murdered with Dareios's knowledge and his connivance. The much feared invasion seemed to have been obviated at a single stroke; the unrest that broke out subsequently in Thessaly, Hellas, Thrace, and Illyria dispelled all remaining misgivings. And when Attalos, who had troops at his disposal and was cooperating with the leading men of state in Athens, declared himself opposed to Alexander's succession, Persian intrigue seemed to have triumphed again. Memnon had already moved against Magnesia, which Parmenion and Attalos had occupied, and in adroit maneuvers had

caused them painful losses. Alexander, meanwhile, had set Macedonian affairs to rights and pacified Greece; Attalos had been disposed of and his troops quickly restored to loyalty; Parmenion with one part of the army had taken Gryneion and turned toward Pitane, while with the other, Kalas Harpalos's son⁵⁴ was looking for a foothold in the interior of Trojan country. When the Macedonian king set out against the Thracians, Triballians, and Illyrians, the Persians won another reprieve. The imperial army and the sea power of the coasts were called up, but for the moment Susa had to count on insurrection and defection in Hellas and to wait and see how far Memnon would get with his small force.

The most important point of defense against an invasion from the Hellespont was Kyzikos. Situated on an island, separated from the nearby mainland only by a shallow arm of the sea, surrounded by mighty walls built in the last decades, and equipped with berths for two hundred triremes, this densely populated free city offered anyone who possessed it or anyone whom it joined a position that controlled the Propontis, the Asiatic coast as far as Lampsakos, and the eastern entrance to the Hellespont. Of great value to the Macedonian corps in Asia was the city's disinclination toward the Persian cause. Memnon thought he could take Kyzikos by surprise attack. He led 5000 hired Greeks out of his territories⁵⁵ and approached in forced marches. He almost succeeded, for the city had left its gates open, thinking it was Kalas's army that its sentries saw approaching. Having failed in his attempt, Memnon ravaged the municipal lands and hurried on into Aiolis, where Parmenion was investing Pitane. The city was appalled to see Memnon appear. He then moved out toward Troas, where he found Kalas well advanced. The city of Lampsakos, which belonged to Memnon, gave him an excellent base of operations. Superior in troops, he prevailed in a single engagement, and Kalas was obliged to fall back to the Hellespont and confine himself to the strong point of Rhoiteion.⁵⁶

It is unclear whether Kalas could hold even this position. Soon after, in any event, Parmenion was at the court in Pella. The king may have recalled him after the northern campaign, persuaded that now only the points that protected a crossing into Asia had to be held, as a bridgehead, in effect. A small number of troops in Rhoiteion and perhaps in Abydos would suffice, if they were seconded by the fleet.⁵⁷ The more remarkable then that Memnon, a superb field commander, did not press harder and mop up the entire coast. Afterward, the satraps accused him of trying to prolong the war in order to make himself indispensable. That may have

been the reason, or the jealous satraps may have denied him the means to do more.

In spring 334, the Great King's fleet was ready to sail; the satraps and commanders in Asia Minor had been ordered to advance to the coast and challenge the Macedonians at the doorstep of Asia. The army was massing on the plain of Zeleia, 20,000 Persian, Baktrian, Median, Hyrkanian, and Paphlagonian riders and as many Greek mercenaries—⁵⁸ a force, as it soon proved, large enough and brave enough to stop the enemy, had it been well led. But the king had appointed no supreme commander; all decisions were to be taken in joint deliberation by the generals. These were, besides Memnon: Arsites, hyparch of Hellespontine Phrygia, the territory immediately threatened; Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia; Atizyes, satrap of Great Phrygia; Mithrobuzanes, hyparch of Kappadokia; the Persian Omares and other Persian grandees.⁵⁹ Without doubt, Memnon was the most proven among them, if not the only field commander. But hated as a Greek and as a favorite of the king, he had less influence in the war council than would have profited Persia.

While these preparations were in progress in Asia Minor, Alexander's own had reached the point where he could set out in early spring 334.⁶⁰ He marched over Amphipolis on the Strymon along the coast to Abdera, Maironeia, and Kardias; on the twentieth day he was in Sestos. His fleet already lay in the Hellespont. Parmenion received orders to take the cavalry and the greater part of the infantry from Sestos across to Abydos. Alexander took the remaining infantry to Elaius, opposite the Trojan shore, where he sacrificed on the burial mound of Protesilaos, the first of the heroes of the Trojan War to fall, praying that his campaign into Asia might enjoy greater favor than had theirs. Then the army went on board ship. In the next days, 160 triremes and many transport ships⁶¹ crossed between the shores of the Hellespont, lush and green in earliest spring, which Xerxes had once subjugated and scourged. Alexander himself took the helm of the royal trireme and steered from Protesilaos's grave toward the bay called the Harbor of the Achaeans since the days of Agamemnon and Achilles, where the funeral mounds of Ajax, Achilles, and Patroklos rose. Midway, he sacrificed to Poseidon and poured a libation to the Nereids. As the Macedonian ships approached the other shore, Alexander's was the first to touch ground. Standing at the prow, the king hurled his lance into enemy soil and, dressed in full armor, leapt first onto land. He ordered that altars be built to mark the site henceforth. With his commanders and the escort of the shieldbearers,

he proceeded to the ruins of Ilion, sacrificed in the temple of Ilian Athena, dedicated his arms to her, and replaced them with arms he took from the temple, specifically, the sacred shield said to have belonged to Achilles.⁶² At the altar of Zeus Protector of Altars, where Achilles's son had murdered Priam, he sacrificed to the old king's shade, to propitiate its anger at the house of Achilles, from which he claimed descent. Above all, he honored the memory of his great forebear, laying garlands and pouring libations on his grave, as did his friend Hephaistion, on the grave of Patroklos; games of all kinds followed. Many natives and Hellenes came bringing gold wreaths for the king, among them Athenian Chares, lord of Sigeion, whom Alexander had demanded as a hostage a year earlier. The king concluded the festivities by ordering Ilion rebuilt; he gave the citizens of the new city autonomy, exempted them from taxes, and promised to remember them further.

He went on to the plain of Arisbe, where the rest of the army, under Parmenion, had pitched camp after landing at Abydos.⁶³ They set out immediately to meet the enemy, which they knew had massed about fifteen miles to the east, at Zeleia. They marched over Perkote toward Lampsakos, Memnon's city;⁶⁴ its citizens knew no other salvation than to send an embassy to beseech the king's forgiveness; it was led by Anaximenes, well known as a learned man and received at Philip's court; at his intercession, Alexander pardoned Lampsakos.⁶⁵ The army marched on not far from the coast, Lynkestian Amyntas in the van with a squadron of cavalry and four squadrons of sarissa bearers. The city of Priapos on the Propontis, not far from the mouth of the Granikos, surrendered at their approach. Precisely this position, which dominates the plain of Adrasteia, watered by the Granikos, was important to them, for Amyntas reported that the Persian army had advanced to the banks of the Granikos, and they expected to meet the enemy on this river.

Clearly Alexander wanted to join battle as soon as possible; the Persians would have done better to evade him. At the war council in Zeleia, Memnon had advised not to begin a battle that they could hardly hope to win, and if they won, could hardly hope to profit from. The Macedonians, he said, were far superior to the Persians in infantry and the more dangerous because they would fight under their king, whereas Dareios was absent from the Persian army. Even assuming that the Persians won, the Macedonian rear was covered, and their loss would be no more than a failed attack; in the event of defeat, the Persians, by contrast, would lose the land they had been appointed to defend. The only promising

course of action was to avoid any decisive encounter. Alexander had adequate provisions only for a short time; the Persians should retire slowly and leave a wasteland where the enemy would find no supplies, no cattle, and no shelter. Thus Alexander would be conquered without a battle, and by small losses an incalculable loss would be avoided. Memnon's opinion gained no hearing in the council of the Persian field commanders; they thought it unworthy of Persia's dignity. Arsites of Hellespontine Phrygia was particularly opposed: he did not intend to see one house in his satrapy put to the torch. The other Persians also favored battle, equally out of eagerness to fight and dislike of this Greek, who already enjoyed too much royal favor and wanted to prolong the war so that he could climb yet higher in the Great King's estimation. They marched out to meet the Macedonians on the Granikos. There they decided to use the sheer banks of the river to stop Alexander's advance and positioned themselves on the right bank in such a fashion that the river's edge was occupied by the Persian cavalry, the rising ground a little behind them by Greek mercenaries.

Alexander meanwhile was advancing across the plain of Adrasteia toward the Granikos, his heavy infantry divided into two columns on the right wing and the left, the Macedonian cavalry on the right flank, the Thessalian and Greek on the left; the pack animals and the greater part of the light infantry followed the columns; the van was composed of the sarissa bearers and about 500 light infantry under Hegelochos. The main body of the army was nearing the river when a group of scouts came galloping back to report that the enemy was standing just beyond, arrayed for battle, the horse in an extended line at the sheer clay riverbank, the infantry a distance behind. Alexander perceived the error of the enemy disposition, which would use the arm of rapid attack to defend a difficult terrain and make the crack Greek mercenaries into idle spectators at an engagement to which they alone were adequate. A daring opening attack with cavalry would suffice to gain the other bank and thus the battle, whose result the shieldbearers and phalanges would then secure and exploit. He let his troops march up from the columns right and left and arrange themselves in battle order.⁶⁶

Parmenion approached him to advise against battle. They should pitch camp on the riverbank, he said; the enemy, inferior in infantry, would not dare pass the night in the Macedonians' proximity but rather would retire; thus they could cross without danger next morning, before the Persians had moved out and taken up position. Crossing now was fraught

with danger: the day was declining, the river deep and swift in many places, the far bank steep. They would have to cross in columns, not in a line; enemy cavalry could take a column in the flank and destroy it before battle. This first incident would be no mere momentary setback, but rather an omen for the outcome of the war. The king replied: "I know these things perfectly well, but after crossing the Hellespont without difficulty, I would be ashamed to let this little stream stop us in our tracks. It would also be inconsistent with Macedonian glory and with my way of meeting danger. I believe the Persians would take heart and think themselves a match for Macedonians, if we do not make them feel right away what it is they fear." With these words, he sent Parmenion back to the left wing and himself rode over to the squadrons on the right.

By the brilliance of his weapons, the white plume of his helmet, and the deference of his entourage, the Persians recognized Alexander standing opposite their left wing, where they could expect the principal assault. They hurried to oppose him with the center of their cavalry, arranged in dense ranks hard by the river; Memnon was there with his sons and Arsames with his own riders. There followed in the battle line the Phrygian hyparch Arsites, the Lydian satrap Spithridates with the Hyrkanian riders and forty Persian noblemen in his escort, then the rest of the mounted troops of the center, and finally those of the right wing under Rheomitres.⁶⁷ The two armies faced each other briefly in tense, expectant silence, the Persians prepared to rush the enemy approaching through the river as it climbed the steep banks and before it could arrange itself, Alexander urgently searching out how and where attack was possible. Then he mounted his war horse, called to his troops to follow him and fight like men, and gave the signal to advance. In the van, Amyntas the Lynkestian with the sarissa bearers and Paionians and a regiment of shieldbearers;⁶⁸ also assigned to him was the Apollonian cavalry squadron under Ptolemy Philip's son, which had the most forward position in the cavalry on this particular day and thus the opening attack.⁶⁹ When they had entered the water,⁷⁰ the king followed at the head of the remaining squadrons of mounted companions, to the sound of the trumpet and the battle hymn. While Ptolemy kept the extreme left wing of the enemy occupied with his attack, Alexander, moving forward with his seven squadrons, bore right on the diagonal and, supported by Ptolemy on the right and on the left by the line of infantry advancing after him, aimed to break into the enemy's center and scatter it. Parmenion, following toward the river with the left wing on the diagonal, was to cripple the enemy's right.

Combat began as soon as Amyntas and Ptolemy closed on the far riverbank. The Persians, led here by Memnon and his sons, opposed the Macedonians full-force as they tried to climb out of the river, some by hurling their javelins from atop the high bank, others by pushing back the Macedonians at water's edge. The Macedonians, hampered further by the slippery clay of the riverbank, sustained heavy losses, particularly on their far right; those farther left had better support. For the king had emerged from the river with the agema of the cavalry⁷¹ and was charging the densest mass of enemy troops on the bank and the commanders who were concentrated there. The heaviest action promptly began around his person, joined steadily by the remaining cavalry squadrons as they followed up the bank—a cavalry engagement so sustained, unyielding, and furious in close combat that it resembled infantry. Pressed man-to-man and horse-to-horse, the Macedonians fought with their spears, the Persians with their lighter javelins, then with their curved scimitars, the ones to push the Persians back onto the plain, the others to knock the Macedonians back down into the stream. They saw the king's white aigrette in the very thickest tumult.

At the height of combat, his spear shattered; he called to his equerry for another, but the equerry, too, had snapped his spear and was fighting with the broken stump. Hardly had Demaratos of Corinth passed his own to the king when another swarm of chosen Persian riders came swooping down; Mithridates, their captain, leapt ahead upon Alexander, whom he wounded in the shoulder with his javelin; Alexander's riposte cost the Persian prince his life. The fallen man's brother Rhoisakes rushed Alexander at the same instant; his saber splintered Alexander's helmet and cut his forehead; Alexander pierced Rhoisakes's armor and ran him through. The Lydian satrap Spithridates loomed over unhelmeted Alexander with raised saber, about to deliver the final blow; with one stroke Black Kleitos severed his arm at the shoulder, then gave him the coup de grâce. The furor of the battle rose; the Persians fought with highest valor to avenge their fallen princes, while ever more Macedonian troops crossed the river, entered the fray, struck down the enemy. The field commanders Niphates, Petines, and Mithrobuzanes tried in vain to withstand the assault; in vain Pharnakes Dareios's brother-in-law and Arbupales Artaxerxes's grandson, to hold the wavering line; they, too, soon lay dead on the field of battle. The Macedonians had broken through the Persian center, and flight became general. About 1000 Persians (other sources say 2500) remained on the battlefield; the rest fled, completely routed.

Alexander did not pursue them far, because the mass of the enemy's infantry, under Omares, was standing on the high ground, bent on proving the mettle of Greek mercenaries against Macedonian arms. That was as much as they could do: otiose spectators at a bloody battle that their intervention might have won, without orders for an event that the proud Persian princes had thought out of the question, they stood astonished and helpless on an elevation that could have been used to cover an honorable retreat. The blind flight of the cavalry left them exposed and beyond rescue; thus abandoned, they awaited the attack of the victorious army and their own destruction, which they intended to make as costly as possible.⁷² Alexander had the phalanx move up toward them and simultaneously let the entire cavalry, including the Thessalians and Hellenes on the left wing, charge them from all sides. After brief and terrible combat, in which the king's battle mount was run through, the mercenaries were defeated; no one escaped except those who may have concealed themselves under corpses; 2000 were taken prisoner.

Alexander's losses were relatively small. In the opening assault, 25 riders of the Apollonian squadron had fallen, and some 60 cavalry and 30 infantry.⁷³ They were buried next day in full armor, with military honors; their parents and children at home were exempted from taxes.⁷⁴ Alexander concerned himself personally with the wounded, visited them, let them show him their wounds, each one tell how he had received his. He ordered that the fallen Persian captains and the Greek mercenaries who had died in enemy service also be buried. The Greeks taken prisoner, by contrast, were put in chains and sent to hard labor in Macedonia because they had fought for the Persians against Greece and in violation of the common Greek decree. Thebans alone were pardoned. The Persians' opulent camp fell into Alexander's hands; he divided the spoils of victory with his allies; to his mother Olympias he sent a share of the golden chalices, purple carpets, and other treasures found in the tents of the Persian princes. He ordered that the sculptor Lysippos cast twenty-five bronze statues and erect them in Dion in memory of the twenty-five riders lost at the outset of battle. To Athens he sent three hundred full sets of armor with the inscription: "Alexander Philip's son, and the Greeks, except the Spartans, from the barbarians in Asia."

With the victory on the Granikos, Persian power on the near side of the Tauros had been destroyed, and the military forces of the satrapies that formed the outer wall of the empire scattered, intimidated, and so reduced that they would probably never dare meet the Macedonians in

the field again. The Persian garrisons of various major cities, too small to withstand a victorious army, could also be considered defeated. In addition, many Persian captains, the Lydian satrap, in particular, had fallen; Arsites, hyparch of Hellespontine Phrygia, had taken his own life shortly after the battle, reportedly out of remorse and fear that he would be blamed for the defeat. Finally, the important coastlines were the more likely to fall to the Macedonians because democratically inclined men living in the Greek cities there would seize the opportunity to throw off the Persian yoke and rid themselves of Persian-minded oligarchs.

For Alexander there could be no doubt where he should turn now to exploit his victory and magnify its effect. A quick incursion into the interior of Asia Minor would have enabled him to win broad areas, much booty, land, and people; but his purpose was to destroy the power of the Great King. In the Aegean lay a Persian fleet that could operate in his rear if he penetrated into the interior, gain control of the coasts, and take up contact with Hellas. The successes of his land army would have to cut it off; before he could push farther eastward, he had to make his base of operations as broad and secure as possible. If he restricted it to the Hellespont, the satrapies on the Aegean would remain in the hands of an enemy who could use them as a base from which to harry his flank. He had to invest the entire coast of Asia Minor before he could move eastward. These stretches of coast, furthermore, could be acquired the more swiftly and surely for a victorious Greek cause, because they were settled by Greeks who were much impressed by the battle just won.

Alexander awarded the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia to Kalas Harpalos's son, who had lived in the region for two years and was widely known, and thus seemed suited to administer this strategically important area. He changed little else; even the contributions remained the same as had been sent the Great King. Many of the indigenous peoples came to offer their submission; they were sent home unmolested. The Zelites, present in the Persian army at the Granikos, were pardoned because they had been forced to join the battle. Parmenion was detached to Daskylion, seat of the Phrygian satrap; he took possession of the city, which he found already vacated by its Persian garrison. Daskylion provided sufficient cover for the march southward, and for the moment it was unnecessary to advance farther east.

Alexander now turned south toward Sardeis, seat of the Lydian satrapy. Sardeis was celebrated for its citadel, isolated atop a sheer crag that juts out from the Tmolos into the plain, defended by a triple wall, and

considered impregnable. The commandant of the city could use the treasure of this rich satrapy, deposited in the citadel, to supply and to strengthen his already important garrison, and a strong force in Sardeis would have provided optimal support for the Persian fleet.⁷⁵ The more welcome therefore was the appearance of the Persian commander of the garrison, Mithrines, two miles before the city, coming in a company of the most respected citizens to surrender the citadel with its treasure and their city. The king sent Amyntas Andromenes's son ahead to occupy the citadel and followed after a short rest. He took Mithrines onto his staff and distinguished him, as much to demonstrate how he rewarded submission as to reward Mithrines's in particular. He granted the citizens of Sardeis and all Lydians their freedom and restored the laws of their fathers, which they had forgone during two hundred years under Persian satraps. He decided to honor the city by building a temple to Olympian Zeus. As he searched for a suitable site on the acropolis, a thunderstorm blew up and drenched the spot where the royal palace of Lydia had once stood; the king chose this place for a temple to grace the citadel of Kroisos henceforth.⁷⁶

Sardeis, a center of commerce at the nearer edge of Asia, became the second important point in Alexander's line of operations and its great roads an entrance into the interior. Parmenion's brother Asandros was named governor of Lydia; a corps of riders and light infantry was put under his command as a garrison; the companions Pausanias and Nikias also remained in Sardeis, Pausanias as commandant of the citadel and its garrison, to which the contingent from Argos was assigned, Nikias to oversee the distribution and raising of tribute. Another corps was dispatched into Rhodian Memnon's territory;⁷⁷ it was composed of the Peloponnesian contingents and the other Hellenes, under Kalas and Lynkestian Alexander, who had succeeded Kalas as commander of the Thessalian cavalry. After the fall of Sardeis, it may have seemed necessary to extend the occupation on the left flank of the army in order to gain the remaining coast of the Propontis and, with it, the road up along the Sangarios into the interior. Finally, after the victory on the Granikos, the fleet, under Nikanor, will have received orders to sail for Lesbos and Miletos; it was probably upon seeing the fleet appear that Mytilene joined the Macedonian league.⁷⁸

The king took the main force of his army from Sardeis toward Ionia, where the cities had long borne the yoke of Persian garrisons or Persian-inclined oligarchs and, however dejected by long servitude, loudly remembered their ancient freedom, about to be restored to them now, as if by

a miracle. This sentiment was not universal: where the oligarchic side was strong enough, the demos had to keep silent. But one could be certain that longing for democracy would kindle as the liberating force approached and that unbridled joy and passionate hatred of the oppressors would mark the beginning of new freedom, in Hellenic fashion.

Ephesos, queen of Ionian cities, set an example for the others. The demos there had liberated itself in Philip's time, perhaps pursuant to the decrees of Corinth in 338. Autophradates had brought his army before the city and summoned the authorities to negotiations; while these were still in progress, his troops had leapt on the unsuspecting populace, taken many prisoner, and executed others.⁷⁹ Ever since, a Persian garrison had lain again at Ephesos and power rested in the hands of Syrphax and his house. Among those who had left the court at Pella after Philip's death and gone to Ephesos was Amyntas Antiochos's son, whose brother Herakleides commanded the cavalry squadron of Bottiaia.⁸⁰ Amyntas, whom Alexander had always treated well, may have fled out of bad conscience, or out of treachery; the oligarchy at Ephesos honored him greatly. Now the battle on the Granikos had been fought and won, and Memnon, routed, had taken a few remnants of defeated troops as far as the Ionian coast. News of the Persian defeat had aroused the highest excitement in Ephesos: the people hoped to recover their democracy; the oligarchy was in imminent danger. Then Memnon appeared. The party of Syrphax hastened to open the gates to him and, working with the Persian troops, began reprisals against the popular party. The grave of Heropythos, liberator of Ephesos, was dug up and desecrated, the sacred treasure of the temple of Artemis plundered, King Philip's statue in the temple thrown down—in brief, all those things happened that disgrace the end of despotism more often than they mark its beginning.⁸¹

Alexander's victorious army, meanwhile, was coming ever closer. Memnon had just left for Halikarnassos, where he intended to take all possible defensive measures. In the popular uproar, Amyntas may have feared for his own safety and doubted his ability to hold the city against the Macedonians; with the mercenaries of the garrison, he seized two triremes in the harbor and fled to the Persian fleet, which had appeared in the Aegean, four hundred strong. As soon as the people saw themselves rid of the military, they rose against the oligarchic party in a general rage. Many prominent citizens fled; Syrphax and his son and the sons of his brothers took refuge in the temples; the mob seized them on the altars and stoned them, then went in search of others to dispatch in like fashion. Alexander entered the city one day after Amyntas had left it and stopped

the slaughter; he ordered that those who had been banished on his account be restored and that a permanent democracy be set up. The contributions that had been paid to Persia he dedicated to Artemis, and he extended the temple's area of asylum to a stadium just beyond the temple steps. He may have enlarged the temple district also to prevent future strife between the temple and the political community; he intervened personally to put an end to the civic squabbling. "And if anything has brought him glory," wrote Arrian, "it is what he did at Ephesos."⁸²

While Alexander was in Ephesos, delegates from Tralleis and Magnesia on the Maiandros came to surrender their cities, the most important ones in northern Karia; Parmenion was sent with a corps of 5000 infantry and 200 riders to take possession of them.⁸³ At the same time, Alkimachos Lysimachos's brother⁸⁴ was detached with the same number of troops northward to the Aiolian and Ionian cities, with orders to dismantle oligarchy everywhere, restore democracy, reinstate the old laws, and abolish the tribute paid to Persia. It will have been in consequence of these expeditions that the oligarchy under Apollonides on Chios was overthrown, the tyranny in Antissa and Eresos on Lesbos broken, and Mytilene secured by a Macedonian garrison.⁸⁵

The king remained a while in lovely Ephesos, made the more agreeable to him by the company of Apelles, the foremost painter of his time; the picture of Alexander brandishing a thunderbolt, long an ornament of the great temple of Artemis, dates from this period.⁸⁶ He planned many projects to help the Greek cities of the coast: he ordered that Smyrna, reduced to scattered settlements after the Lydian kings destroyed it, be rebuilt; that Klazomenai be connected to its harbor island by a mole; that the isthmus between Klazomenai and Teos be pierced to spare shipping a long detour around the Black Hills.⁸⁷ This last project was never executed, but long into later times the Ionian League held games on the isthmus, on a field dedicated to the memory of King Alexander, their liberator.⁸⁸

Alexander sacrificed in the temple of Artemis and had his troops march up in full armor and in battle order. Next day he set out for Miletos with an army of four squadrons of Macedonian riders, the Thracian cavalry, the Agrianians and archers, and about 1200 hoplites and shieldbearers.⁸⁹ Miletos, with a spacious harbor, was indispensable to the Persian fleet, if it hoped to keep control of the Aegean as the end of the season approached. The commandant of the Persian garrison at Miletos, the Greek Hegesistratos, had written the king offering to surrender the city;

then he heard that the Persian fleet was approaching and decided to hold his strategic harbor city for the Persians. Alexander was the more determined to take it.

Miletos lies on a spit of land on the southern shore of the Latmic Gulf, three miles south of Mount Mykale, four from the island Samos, which one sees in silhouette on the horizon. Composed of an outer city and an inner city protected by strong walls and a deep trench, it opens toward the gulf in four harbors, of which the largest and most important lies on the island Lade, somewhat removed from the coast. Large enough to protect a fleet, that harbor more than once became occasion for a nearby sea war and decisive to its outcome when the harbor was taken. The harbors adjacent to the city are separated by steep little islands and very useful for trade, but rather small and controlled also by the roads off Lade. This wealthy commercial center had been little pressed by the Persians, and it had retained its democratic government. It may have hoped to remain neutral between the warring powers; it had sent to Athens for help.⁹⁰

Nikanor, captain of the "Hellenic fleet," and his 160 triremes arrived off Miletos ahead of the superior Persian fleet and dropped anchor near Lade. At the same time, Alexander appeared under the walls, took control of the outer city, and cordoned off the inner city by circumvallation. He sent the Thracians and upwards to 4000 mercenaries across to strengthen the strategically important position on Lade and instructed his fleet to blockade Miletos diligently from the seaward side. Three days later, the Persian fleet appeared; finding the bay occupied by Hellenic ships, it sailed northward and, four hundred strong, dropped anchor off Mount Mykale.

Two fleets anchored at such close range implied that a decisive sea battle impended; many of Alexander's commanders desired one; they were confident of victory, especially since even cautious Parmenion favored battle. For an eagle, Arrian has him announce, had been sighted on shore off the stern of Alexander's ship; the Greeks had always prevailed over the barbarians at sea, and the omen left no doubt that such was the will of the gods; to win a sea battle would be of extraordinary advantage to the whole undertaking; a battle lost would cost no more than what they did not have in the first place, for the Persians, with a fleet of four hundred, were masters of the sea; he himself was prepared to embark and take part in the engagement. Alexander rebuffed him: To risk a sea battle under current conditions was as dangerous as it was idle; it would

be foolhardy to take 160 ships against the enemy's superior number, inexperienced seamen against Cypriots and Phoenicians; the Macedonians, invincible on land, could not expose themselves to barbarians on a sea they did not know, where a thousand contingencies would also have to be considered; loss of an encounter would not merely greatly reduce expectations of his undertaking; it could also start a general defection among the Hellenes; the effect of a victory would be slight, since the course of his movements on land alone would destroy the Persian fleet. This, moreover, was the meaning of the omen: Just as the eagle had alighted on land, just so would he overcome Persian sea power from the land; it was not enough to lose nothing; not to win was itself a loss. The fleet remained in the roads off Lade.

Meanwhile, Glaukippos, a respected Milesian, came into the king's camp to declare, in the name of the people and of the mercenaries who held the city, that Miletos was prepared to open its gates and its harbors to Macedonians and Persians alike, if Alexander would raise his siege. The king replied that he had not come into Asia to content himself with what was freely granted him and that he would know how to enforce his will; the keepers of Miletos were at his mercy for pardon or for punishment of a breach of promise that had now led the city to a resistance as criminal as it was futile; Glaukippos would please return to the city at speed and tell his Milesians to prepare to be stormed.

Next day the battering rams and ballistae set to work and a part of the wall soon fell in breach. The Macedonians penetrated into the city, while the fleet, sighting the storm, rowed into the harbor and moored its triremes cheek by jowl, prows turned outward, to close the entrance, so that the Persian fleet could not come to the aid of Miletos and the Milesians could not flee to the Persians. Pressed from all sides and without prospect of rescue, the Milesians and the mercenaries in the city took flight; some used their shields to paddle to one of the rocky little islands in the harbors; others tried to escape the Macedonian–Hellenic triremes by boat. But most met death inside the walls. Having taken the city, Alexander led his Macedonians across to the island. They had already thrown ladders against the steep shoreline to force a landing, when the king, filled with compassion for the brave souls who were prepared to defend themselves even now and die gloriously, gave orders that they be spared and be offered pardon on condition that they take service in his army. Three hundred Greek mercenaries were saved by these terms. In

the same vein, Alexander granted all Milesians who had not perished in the assault their lives and their freedom.

The Persian fleet had watched the fall of Miletos from Mykale, unable to attempt the least rescue. Daily, it ran up to the Hellenic fleet, hoping to lure it into battle and, having failed, returned each evening to the roads off Mykale, a highly inconvenient mooring, since the crews had to fetch their drinking water nightly from the Maiandros, three miles distant. The king undertook to force the Persians out of their position without having to remove his fleet from its secure and securing anchorage. He sent Philotas with the cavalry and three regiments of infantry along the coast toward Mount Mykale, with orders to block any enemy attempt to come on shore; confined now entirely to the sea, the Persians were obliged by total want of water and provisions to sail for Samos and take on essentials. They returned and approached in battle order, as if to challenge the Greeks. When the Hellenic fleet, unmoved, continued to lie off Lade, the Persians sent five ships toward the harbor in hopes of surprising the ships there in the absence of a crew. For the harbor lay between the camp and the small islands and thus separated the army from the fleet, and it was known that the crews regularly fanned out from the ships to forage for wood and supplies. As soon as Alexander saw the five ships approaching, he had ten triremes manned with the crew on hand and put to sea to chase the enemy. Before they could close, the Persians hastily put about to return to their fleet; one ship, badly sailed, fell into Macedonian hands and was taken into port; it came from Iasos in Karia. Without making any further attempt against Miletos, the Persian fleet retired to Samos.

Recent events had persuaded the king that the Persian fleet could have little further effect on the movements of his land army, indeed that his advancing occupation of the coasts would soon bar the fleet from the mainland entirely, so that it would be obliged to abandon any further attempt to intervene in decisive actions and eventually to go before anchor off the islands. Now at the height of his land offensive, Alexander saw his navy, which could not withstand an enemy three times its strength, restricted to defensive operations. As important as it had been to him at the outset of the campaign and as cover for early operations of his land army, it was of little use now that Persian forces in Asia Minor were weakening, and a great expense. His 160 triremes required close to 30,000 seamen and ship's soldiers, almost as much as the army that was to topple

the Persian empire; they cost more than fifty talents a month in wages and perhaps as much again in maintenance, without producing the daily victories and return in booty of the land army, which cost little more. Alexander's coffers were empty and would not soon be replenished, since the liberated Greek cities of the coast had been released from contribution and the inland cities were to be neither laid under contribution nor plundered, but rather would continue to be taxed at their established very low rate. These considerations caused the king to disband his fleet in autumn 334; he kept a few ships for transport along the coast, among them the twenty that Athens had put up, perhaps to do honor to the Athenians, perhaps as a security against their defection, should the enemy fleet take up contact with Hellas, as expected.⁹¹

After he had disbanded the fleet, Alexander was the more constrained to invest every stretch of coast, every coastal city, every harbor, so as to enforce the land blockade with which he hoped to checkmate Persian sea power. On the coast of the Aegean Sea, Karia remained and in Karia, Halikarnassos, the more important for its situation at the entrance to this sea and because the last remnants of the Persian forces in Asia Minor had rallied to make a stand in this strongly fortified city.

Some fifty years earlier, in the days of the second Artaxerxes, Karia had come under domination of the dynast Hekatomnos of Halikarnassos (his name implies a Persian satrap), who was as good as independent and prepared at the least provocation to make his independence felt by force of arms.⁹² He had removed his residence to Mylasa in the interior and greatly extended the area he controlled. His son and successor, Maussolos, pursued his father's plans; in every respect he enlarged his influence and his wealth. When Lykia was also assigned to him,⁹³ he had control of two important maritime provinces of Asia Minor. The more interested, therefore, was he, whose father had served as Persian nauarch against Cyprus, to enlarge his naval power. He moved his residence back to Halikarnassos, which he expanded by incorporating six small settlements; he provoked the social war against Athens to weaken her sea power; he even had designs on Miletos.⁹⁴ When he died (351) and then his wife and sister, Artemisia, who had succeeded him, in keeping with Karian custom, the second brother Idrieus took over the regime (349); favored by the times, Idrieus seized Chios, Kos, and Rhodes. His wife and sister, Ada, succeeded him (343), only to be pushed out four years later by her younger brother Pixodaros, leaving her with nothing more than the mountain fastness Alinda. In preparation for a battle for independence,

Pixodaros intended to associate himself with the royal house of Macedonia, whose Asian ambitions were no secret. His minting gold in his own name, a privilege thought not to have been accorded satraps, shows how optimistic he was.⁹⁵ The squabbling at Philip's court defeated his plans, with the result that he acceded to the wishes of the Persian king and married his daughter to the Persian nobleman Othontopates;⁹⁶ after his death in 335, Othontopates rose to the top of the Karian dynasty.⁹⁷

Ada came out to meet Alexander as he entered Karia. She promised to support him in every way in his conquest of the land; her name itself would win him friends; wealthy Karians, displeased by renewed connection to Persia, would side with her, since she, like her brother, had always opposed Persia and favored Greece. She asked the king to permit her to adopt him, as a pledge of her sympathies. Alexander did not refuse. He let her keep Alinda; all Karia, particularly the Greek cities, hastened to surrender to him; he established democracy, gave them autonomy, and released them from tribute.

Only Halikarnassos remained, to which Othontopates had retired; there, too, Memnon had brought the last remnants of the army defeated on the Granikos. Having found neither a favorable opportunity nor sufficient time to organize a viable resistance in Ephesos or Miletos, he came now to combine with the Karian satrap and hold the last important Persian position on the coast of Asia Minor. He sent wife and child to the Great King, ostensibly to remove them from danger, in fact to give a sign and surety of his loyalty, which his Greek origin had often enough exposed to challenge. To honor this devotion and to give full latitude to Memnon's recognized, proven talents as a field commander, the Persian king had awarded him supreme command of total Persian sea power and of the coasts.⁹⁸ If anything could still be salvaged for Persia, he seemed the man to do it.

Memnon had set to work with extraordinary energy. He reinforced fortified Halikarnassos by new works, in particular by a broad, deep trench; he strengthened the garrison, which was composed of Persians and mercenaries, and brought his warships into the harbor⁹⁹ to support the defense of the city and to provision it in the event of a long siege. He fortified the island Arkonnesos, which dominated the harbor, laid garrisons in Myndos, Kaunos, Thera, and Kallipolis—¹⁰⁰ in short, he had done everything to make Halikarnassos the center of effective operations and a bastion against the advancing Macedonians. For just this reason, not a few from the losing side in Hellas had come to Halikarnassos, among

them the Athenians Ephialtes and Thrasybulos; of those who had fled after King Philip's murder, Lynkestian Neoptolemos; aforementioned Amyntas Antiochos's son seems to have fled here from Ephesos with his mercenaries. If they could hold this fortified position against Macedonian forces, the Macedonians would be cut off from home, for the Persian fleet controlled the sea, and Hellas could easily be brought again to insurrection by a cry of freedom.

Alexander had arrived in the meantime and pitched camp about a thousand paces from the walls, resolved on a protracted siege. While the Macedonians were still coming up, the Persians had opened hostilities by a sortie and quickly been rebuffed. A few days later the king took a significant portion of the army northwestward around the city,¹⁰¹ partly to inspect the walls, but mostly to move out from there to occupy the nearby city of Myndos, which could be of great importance to the course of the siege. The garrison there had promised to surrender if he should present himself before the gates in the night. He came and no one opened. Without storm ladders or siege engines, since the army had not moved out to storm, and furious to have been so deceived, the king brought his heavy infantry up to undermine the walls. One tower fell, without, however, opening a breach sufficient for successful assault. Daylight in Halikarnassos betrayed the departure of the Macedonians and support for Myndos was promptly dispatched by sea. Alexander was obliged to abandon his attempt and return to his position before Halikarnassos.

The siege of the city began. The trench before the walls, 45 feet wide and 22 deep, was filled under cover of so-called terrapin sheds, so that siege towers, from which the walls would be cleared of defenders, and siege engines could be rolled up.¹⁰² When the towers were quite close to the walls, the besieged troops sallied out one night to burn the machinery. The alarm spread through the camp, and the Macedonians, roused from sleep, rushed to the aid of their pickets. After a brief struggle by the light of watch fires, the besieged retreated, having failed in their attempt. Among 175 enemy dead, one found the corpse of Lynkestian Neoptolemos. The Macedonians lost only 10 dead, but 300 wounded, since they had not been able to protect themselves adequately in the dark. The engines set to work, and soon two towers on the northeast side of the city and the length of wall between them had been reduced to rubble. A third tower was heavily damaged and would yield to undermining.

Then one afternoon two Macedonians from Perdikkas's phalanx sat together in their tent over wine, boasting to one another of themselves and their great deeds. They swore to take all Halikarnassos on the tips of their pikes and the Persian sissies in the city to boot. Armed with spear and shield, they advanced on the walls, two-men strong, brandishing their weapons and shouting to the battlements. The men on the wall spotted them and answered with a sally; the Macedonians stood their ground, cut down all who approached and all who fell back equally. But enemy numbers were growing steadily and the two men, whose footing, furthermore, was lower, were nearly overcome. Their comrades in camp had observed this odd storm and now rushed to their aid; more enemy also appeared; a stubborn struggle developed under the walls. The Macedonians soon captured the advantage and threw the enemy back through the gates. Because the nearby walls were nearly stripped of defenders and had in fact collapsed at one place, nothing seemed lacking to take the city but the king's order for a general assault.¹⁰³ Alexander gave no order; he wanted to receive the city unharmed; he hoped it would capitulate.

Behind the breach, the foe had built a new wall that curved inward between the two towers. Alexander addressed his engines to this spot. Screens of woven willow, tall wooden towers, terrapin sheds and ballistae were rolled into the concavity, which had been cleared of rubble and graded for renewed storm. The enemy sallied again to set fire to the engines, under lively cover from the two towers and the wall. Several screens were already in flames and even a siege tower, and the pickets under Philotas were having difficulty protecting the others, when Alexander intervened. The enemy threw away torches and weapons and retreated behind the walls, from which they hurled their missiles effectively enough into the flanks and sometimes the rear of the attackers.

This obstinate resistance gave the king every reason to proceed more drastically. He started the engines again, himself participated, and led the work. Thereupon Memnon—urgently cautioned by Ephialtes, it is said, to act with restraint—¹⁰⁴ decided to launch a general sortie. Part of the garrison, under Ephialtes, broke out at the weakened spot in the wall; the rest went out the west gate, where the enemy least expected them, and attacked the camp. Ephialtes fought with great valor; his men threw torches and burning pitch into the engines. But a powerful attack by the king, supported by a hail of projectiles and large stones from the siege towers, forced them to give way after a long struggle. Many remained

on the field, among them Ephialtes; many more fell in the flight over the rubble of collapsed towers and back through the narrow gates. On the far side of the city, meanwhile, two regiments of shieldbearers and some light infantry under Ptolemy the bodyguard had thrown themselves at the enemy; in a protracted struggle Ptolemy himself, the chiliarch of the shieldbearers Addaios, the captain of the archers Klearchos, and other notable Macedonians had fallen, before the enemy was finally pushed back. Under the weight of retreating troops, the narrow bridge over the trench collapsed and many perished, crushed in part by those who fell after them, run through in part by Macedonian pikes. Those who had remained in the city quickly closed the gates against this general flight to keep the Macedonians from forcing their way in; those in retreat piled up before the gates. At the mercy of the Macedonians, they were struck down to a man. The troops inside the city saw to their consternation that the Macedonians, impelled by success and favored by nightfall, were about to break down the gates and enter. Instead, retreat was sounded. The king still wanted to save the city. After this engagement, which had cost him only forty dead and the enemy nearly a thousand, and which had shown clearly enough that another assault would bring the fall of the city, he hoped that the besieged would make overtures, all that he needed to put an end to this unnatural Greek assault on a Greek city.

Inside the city, the two commanders, Memnon and Othontopates, considered what measures they should take. One part of the wall had already collapsed and another was at the point of collapse, and the garrison was much reduced by dead and wounded. Under these circumstances, they would not be able to withstand the siege much longer. Why should they hold the city when the land itself had already been lost? The harbor, important to the fleet, could be sufficiently secured by occupying the harbor fortress¹⁰⁵ and holding the invested strongholds on the Karian Gulf. They decided to sacrifice the city. At midnight Macedonian sentries saw flames leap up over the walls; fleeing citizens told Macedonian pickets that the great tower erected against the Macedonian engines, the arsenal, and the neighborhoods adjacent to the walls were burning; all could see that a strong wind was carrying the flames into the center of the city, and they heard that the garrison was spreading the fire. Alexander had his men move out in the dark to occupy the burning city; anyone caught setting fires was to be cut down. The troops met no resistance; they spared residents who had kept to their homes. At daybreak the city was found

to have been vacated; the garrison had retired to the Salmakis and the harbor island, from which they controlled the harbor and, without exposing themselves, could harass their enemy among the ruins.

Seeing these things, the king decided not to lose time on a siege of the fortress that could produce no decisive result, given the circumstances. After burying the night's dead, he sent his siege train ahead toward Tralleis and razed what remained of a city that had stubbornly resisted the Hellenes' common cause and that now made the Persians nearby in the Salmakis and on Arkonnesos more dangerous. The citizenry was broken up again into the six hamlets that the dynast Mausolos had united forty years earlier to form his residence.¹⁰⁶ The satrapy of Karia was restored to Ada, and under her the Hellenic cities remained autonomous and exempted from tribute. The revenues of the land belonged to the princess; for her defense and that of her land, Alexander left 3000 mercenaries and about 200 riders under Ptolemy,¹⁰⁷ whom he ordered to combine forces with the commander in Lydia and drive the enemy from the various stretches of coast that it still held, then to begin the siege of the Salmakis by circumvallation.¹⁰⁸

The end of the season had arrived. With the fall of Halikarnassos, Alexander could consider his conquest of the west coast of Asia Minor complete. Newly established freedom in the Greek cities of the coast and Macedonian garrisons in Hellespontine Phrygia, Lydia, and Karia secured these areas against renewed attack by the Persian fleet. His next operations would aim to close the southern coast of Asia Minor to the fleet and to subjugate the districts of the interior. He expected no significant resistance, neither from the coastal cities, which could not easily be supported from the sea at this time of year, nor from the interior, long since as good as vacated by the Persians. It was therefore not necessary to take the entire army on this arduous campaign. For the huge operations that would open the next year's campaign, furthermore, he needed to add fresh troops from home. Many of his men were newly married; he sent them home on furlough to spend the winter with wife and child. They were led by three young bridegrooms among his commanders: Ptolemy Seleukos's son, one of his bodyguard, aged Parmenion's son-in-law Koinos and Meleagros, both generals in the phalanx. These were charged to meet the grand army in Gordion in the spring, bringing as many fresh recruits as they could with the troops returning from furlough. We can imagine how joyfully this leave was accepted, with what pleasure the

families of the returning troops received them and heard of their exploits and their king, of booty and lovely Asian countrysides; it was as if Macedonia and Asia were no longer remote from one another, no longer strange to one another.

Alexander formed his remaining mobile troops (several thousand had been detached to garrisons) into two marching columns. The smaller column, composed of the Macedonian and the Thessalian cavalry, the allied troops,¹⁰⁹ and the train of wagons and engines, and led by Parmenion, marched over Tralleis toward Sardeis to pass the winter on the Lydian plain and move out to Gordion in early spring. The larger column, of shieldbearers, the regiments of the phalanx, the Agrianians, archers, and Thracians, set out from Karia under the king himself,¹¹⁰ to pass through and take possession of the seaboard and the interior regions of Asia Minor. They proceeded over the fortified frontier post Hyparna, where the garrison of Greek mercenaries surrendered the citadel in return for unmolested withdrawal, and marched into Lykia.

Lykia had been part of the Persian empire since the time of Cyrus. But it had retained its system of federal laws and soon regained enough independence to pay Susa no more than a fixed tribute, until the satrap of Karia, as mentioned, was also given Lykia. In recent years the Persian king had attached the mountain region Milyas on the Phrygian frontier to Lykia; no Persian garrison was present here. Alexander met no resistance as he took possession of a province rich in cities and outstanding for its sea harbors. Telmessos and, beyond the Xanthos, Pinara, Xanthos, Patara, and nearly thirty smaller communities in upper Lykia surrendered to the Macedonians.

At mid-winter, Alexander marched up to the headwaters of the Xanthos into the countryside of Milyas.¹¹¹ Here he received an embassy of Phaselites, who sent him a gold wreath in Hellenic fashion, and ambassadors from a number of cities in lower Lykia, who all offered themselves to him in peace and friendship. He promised to visit the Phaselites and stay with them a while: his friend the poet Theodektes, who had recently died in Athens, was a native Phaselite and his father was still alive.¹¹² Of the Lykian ambassadors, whom he received equally well, he demanded that they surrender their cities to those whom he would send for that purpose. He installed one of his closest friends, Nearchos of Amphipolis, a native Cretan, as satrap of Lykia and the adjacent seaboard to the east.¹¹³ Subsequent events show that a contingent of Lykian ships was present in the Persian fleet at the time; we may assume that Alexander either predicated

the terms he offered on their eventual recall or that he made recall a condition of what he granted. For we know that the Lykians—the Termilai, as they called themselves—retained their ancient, well-ordered federal laws: twenty-three cities, each with council and popular assembly, and a “strategos” as head of government, who may have carried the Lykian title “king” of the city; for the federation, an assembly of cities in which the six most important each had three votes, the middling ones two each, and the smaller ones each a single vote. Federal taxes were assigned in keeping with that same scheme; the union was headed by a “lykiarch,” who may also have been called “king”; he and other federal bodies and federal judges were chosen by vote of the federal assembly.¹¹⁴

The king then proceeded to Phaselis. The city, Doric by origin and important enough to have maintained itself as a Hellenic city in Lykian surroundings, was extraordinarily favorably situated on the Pamphylian Bay and the three harbors that had made it rich. To the west, the mountains rise in terraced ranges to a height of 7000 feet, sweeping in a shallow arc around the Pamphylian Bay to Perge and so close to the sea that in many spots the road is above the surf only when a north wind drives the waters back. The alternative is a longer and far more arduous way through the mountains, blocked just then by a Pisidian tribe that had built itself a mountain fastness at the entrance to the hills, from which it descended on the city and its citizens. Working with the Phaselites, Alexander attacked this bandits’ roost and destroyed it. The deliverance of the much intimidated city and the Macedonian king’s victories were celebrated in banquets; this may have been the first time since Kimon’s victories on the Eurymedon that Phaselis had seen a Hellenic army. Alexander, too, seems to have been in high spirits in those days; he was seen after one of the banquets accompanied by his friends in a little procession to lay garlands at the foot of the statue of Theodektes that stood in the marketplace.¹¹⁵

At just this moment, an atrocious plot came to light, the more atrocious for being the work of an army commander of the highest nobility, whom Alexander had forgiven much and to whom he had entrusted more. The king had received warnings from many quarters; in a recent letter, Olympias had besought her son to proceed cautiously with former enemies whom he now considered friends.

The traitor was Alexander the Lynkestian, treacherous and unyielding proponent of his family’s ambiguous claims to the Macedonian throne. Suspected of the same part in the plot to murder King Philip as two of his

brothers, who paid with their lives, he had escaped punishment because he submitted promptly to the son of the murdered man and hailed him first as king. Alexander had kept him on his staff and entrusted him with important commandos, such as leading the Thessalian cavalry in the recent expedition into Memnon's territory and to Bithynia. But even the king's trust could not change the malicious man's sentiments. Memory of an unsuccessful, unregretted crime; impotent arrogance, exacerbated by the largesse of a boy who had known only success; reverence of two brothers who had given their lives for a common plan; his own ambition, which tormented him the more for being thwarted—in short, envy, hate, greed, fear—may have been the motives that led the Lynkestian to resume relations with the Persian court or perhaps never to have let them lapse. The Neoptolemos who had died fighting for the Persians at Halikarnassos was his nephew. By Amyntas Antiochos's son, a Macedonian fugitive who had probably fled Ephesos for Halikarnassos at the approach of the Macedonian army and then gone on to the Persian court, Lynkestian Alexander had sent oral and written disclosures to the Great King, and Sisines, one of Dareios's close advisors, had come into the anterior lands, ostensibly with orders for Atizyes satrap of Great Phrygia, in fact with secret commissions. There he undertook to insinuate himself into the cantonments of the Thessalian cavalry. Caught by Parmenion, he admitted the purpose of his presence, which, when he had been transported under cover before Alexander in Phaselis, he said was to offer the Lynkestian, in the name of the Great King, a thousand talents and the throne of Macedonia in return for Alexander's head.

The king immediately called the companions together to consider how to proceed against the accused. His friends had thought it inadvisable to entrust the heart of the cavalry to so tenebrous a figure in the first place; the more urgent was it now to pull his sting promptly, before he could win any more of the Thessalian riders for his treason. Accordingly, one of the most reliable officers, Amphoterios Krateros's brother, was sent to Parmenion; wearing native dress and accompanied by a few Pergaians, he reached his destination undetected. When he had pronounced his commissions—for the king did not want to commit such dangerous matters to a writing that could easily be intercepted and used improperly—the Lynkestian was secretly arrested and imprisoned. The king did not yet bring him to trial, partly in consideration of Antipater, whose son-in-law he was, but especially not to give rise to disquieting rumors among the army and in Greece.¹¹⁶

After this pause, the Macedonians moved out of Phaselis toward Pamphylia and Perge, the most important city in Pisidia. Alexander sent part of the army ahead by the long, difficult mountain route that his Thracians had made passable at least for the infantry, while he apparently took his cavalry and part of his heavy infantry along the coastal route, a truly daring venture, since the way was covered by surf in winter. They took an entire day to wade through the waters, often hip deep; but impelled by the proximity and the example of their king, who did not admit the word “impossible,” they vied with one another in endurance and high spirits. When they finally reached the end and looked back on their path through the foaming surf, it seemed a miracle that the gods had worked through Alexander, and they were amazed at what they could do under their heroic king. News of this feat, fabulously embellished, spread among the Hellenes: The king had taken his troops down to the shore despite a strong south wind that whipped up the waters all the way to the mountains, and suddenly the wind turned north and drove the water back; others claimed that his army had waded through the sea and never gotten wet. Kallisthenes the Peripatetic, who witnessed the campaign and wrote its first history, went further: In homage to the king, the sea had bowed down before him. The king himself wrote his mother—if the letter is authentic—simply that he had opened a way over the Pamphylian ladder, as the mountain slopes were called, and passed through, coming from Phaselis.¹¹⁷

Thus Alexander led his army onto the narrow water’s edge of Pisidia, called Pamphylia. This coastline, bordered on the north by the Tauros, extends to just beyond the city Side, where the mountains again come down to the sea and range back northeastward over Kilikia, the region immediately beyond the Tauros, in such fashion that Alexander could consider the seacoast on the near side of the Tauros conquered when he had occupied Pamphylia. Perge surrendered, opening the way over the mountains north and west into the interior. The city of Aspendos sent ambassadors to offer to surrender and to ask that no Macedonian garrison be laid there, a request that Alexander granted on condition that the Aspendans deliver a certain number of horses that they kept for the Persian king in lieu of tribute and pay fifty talents’ wages for his soldiers. He moved out to Side, Pamphylia’s frontier city, founded by emigrants from Kyme in Aiolis. These Hellenes had a language all their own: they had forgotten that of their homeland and never learned that of their host.¹¹⁸ Alexander left a garrison here, placed, like the entire

coast of the Pamphylian Bay, under Nearchos's command. He then doubled back toward Perge. He failed in an attempt to surprise and take the mountain fortress Syllion,¹¹⁹ held by a garrison of natives and foreign mercenaries, and left the task to his governor, having just heard that the Aspendans intended to deliver neither the promised horses nor the obligatory fifty talents, and instead had armed for serious resistance. Alexander advanced on Aspendos and took the lower city, abandoned by its inhabitants. Undeterred by the heavy fortification of the citadel, to which the Aspendans had fled, or by his own want of storm engines, he refused the ambassadors whom the frightened citizens sent to offer submission on the terms of their earlier agreement and sent them back with the demand that the city pay fifty talents beyond the fifty agreed upon and the horses, that it surrender its most respected citizens as hostages, that it accept judicial disposition over lands it was accused of having snatched from its neighbors,¹²⁰ and that it obey the king's local governor and pay yearly tribute.¹²¹ The Aspendans' audacity was at an end. They submitted.

The king continued to Perge, to march from there through the rugged mountain country of the Pisidians toward Phrygia. For the moment, he could not undertake to subdue valley by valley a mountain people broken up into many tribes, themselves taken up in local feuding; it was enough to have forced his way through and made them feel his strength. The job of securing the reopened way between the Pamphylian coast and Phrygia lastingly would have to be left to his future commanders in the areas on all sides of the mountains.

The way he chose leads from Perge westward over the coastal plain to the foot of the mountains, then into a very difficult defile controlled by the mountain fastness Termessos and so narrow that a small force could close it to a large army.¹²² The way goes up along a sheer mountain face, overshadowed by an equally sheer mountain opposite; behind, on the saddle between the two, lies the city. The king found both mountains so heavily invested by barbarians—all Termessos had come out to meet him—that he elected to pitch camp before the pass, persuaded that the foe, thinking the threat not imminent when it saw the Macedonians at rest, would secure the pass with pickets and return to the city. Thus it was: The horde retired, only isolated sentries showed themselves on the mountain top. The king advanced quickly with light infantry,¹²³ forced the sentries back, and occupied the heights; the army moved unmolested through the pass and pitched camp before the city. Ambassadors of the Selgians, a Pisidian tribe, like the Termessans, but in permanent feud

with them, came into camp to conclude an agreement and friendship with the enemy of their enemy, which they then faithfully preserved. Taking Termessos would have required a long stand; Alexander moved out without further delay.

He advanced on the city of Sagalassos,¹²⁴ home to the most bellicose of all Pisidians, at the foot of the highest terrace of the alpine landscape and the entrance to the high plain of Phrygia. The Sagalassans had combined with the Termessans to occupy the elevation to the south of the city and block the Macedonians' way. Alexander formed a line of attack; on the right wing the archers and Agrianians came up, the shieldbearers and regiments of the phalanx followed; Sitalkes's Thracians formed the tip of the left wing. Alexander gave command of the left wing, with typical large-mindedness, to Lynkestian Amyntas¹²⁵ and himself took the right. They had advanced to the steepest point of the incline when the barbarians flung themselves in packs on both wings, the more successfully as they came from above against troops that were mounting. The sharpest attack was directed against the archers of the right wing; their captain fell; they were obliged to fall back. The Agrianians stood their ground and the heavy infantry approached, Alexander in the lead. The barbarian attacks shattered on a closed rank of overlapping shields; in hand-to-hand combat the lightly armed Pisidians fell to the heavily armed Macedonians. Five hundred were killed, the rest fled; they knew the surrounding country and escaped. Alexander advanced along the main road and took the city.

After the fall of Sagalassos, some of the remaining Pisidian places were taken by force, others capitulated.¹²⁶ Thus the way was opened onto the high plain beyond the mountains of Sagalassos, where Phrygia begins. In a depression in the plain toward the east, lies the Sea of Egerdir, the size of Lake Constance, bordered by high mountains on the south and the east; about eight miles to the west lies a smaller sea, the Askanian, and about three miles from its northern tip extends a line of hills on whose northern slope the Maiandros rises. In the passes that lead to the valley of the Maiandros lies the ancient city of Kelainai, where Xerxes withdrew after defeat in Hellas and at sea and built a mighty fortress to hold back the Hellenes who were coming up from the newly liberated coast. Kelainai became the center of the Phrygian satrapy and the seat of its satrap.

Alexander came in five marches after Sagalassos, passing by way of the Askanian Sea.¹²⁷ He found the satrap Atizyes fled and the fortress in the hands of 1000 Karian and 100 Hellenic mercenaries. They offered to

surrender both city and citadel if their Persian relief did not arrive on the appointed day, which they named.¹²⁸ The king accepted their terms: taking the fortress would have cost him much time, and if he could move quickly on to Gordion, meet the rest of his army there as planned, and advance toward the Tauros, he could block the relief. He left a commando of about 1500 men in Kelainai, conferred the satrapy of Phrygia on Antigonos Philip's son, who had commanded the allied contingents, and made Balakros Amyntas's son strategos. The army rested at Kelainai for ten days and then set out for Gordion on the Sangarios, from which the great road leads over the Halys and through Kappadokia to Susa.

* * *

What Alexander had attained in this first year of war was not exactly vast with respect to size, and the statesmen and military men of Hellas may have sneered that the vaunted victory on the Granikos had produced nothing more than conquest of the west coast and half the south coast of Asia Minor, conquests that Memnon had shrewdly permitted, they perhaps added, in order meanwhile to make himself lord of the sea and the islands and cut Alexander's communications with Macedonia.

Why Alexander proceeded as he did is clear. The least of his intentions was to occupy ever more territory and penetrate ever deeper into the interior of Asia Minor while the Persian navy still controlled the sea and was in a position to cause unpredictable unrest in Hellas. It was enough that he could use the effects created by his first great battle to shut out the fleet entirely from the coast and the harbors, which it could have used to threaten his rear as he advanced in a second field campaign.

The manner of his advance differed radically from Hellenic tradition. In the days of Kimon and Perikles, Attic forces had hardly ever ventured inland from the coastal cities of Asia Minor, and when the Spartans did so in the days of Thibron and Agesilaos, certainly when Chares and Charidemos did so with the forces of the second Attic naval league, they turned around again after brief raiding and despoiling. Alexander's military measures aimed to take possession definitively and create lasting conditions.

Were the political arrangements that the king made consistent with this purpose? Those that we can discern from the first field campaign resemble existing forms, but with essential changes of substance that seem also to change significance. Satrapy remained in Hellespontine Phrygia and in Lydia and in Karia.¹²⁹ But in Lydia a special officer for distributing

and raising tribute was installed beside the satrap; in Karia, Princess Ada was awarded the satrapy, but a Macedonian strategos commanded the strong military force there; similarly, a designated chief of the military—no doubt also called strategos—was appointed beside the satrap in Lydia. Here and elsewhere, financial administration of the satrapy may have been placed directly under the treasury, which Harpalos Machatas's son had acquired, we do not know exactly when.¹³⁰

The writ of a satrap was now far more narrow than it had been under the Persians. Satraps were installed, not as lords of their territory, but as the king's functionaries. This we can conclude from the absence of any coins struck by satraps in Alexander's realm before 306, while from the time of Dareios I, who created the administrative system of the empire, Persian satraps had exercised a right to mint.¹³¹ From the time of the successors, we have a document distinguishing various competences of economic administration—those of kings, of satraps, of cities, of private persons—that would appear to go back to Alexander's order of governance. The principal competences of the king are: monetary policy, regulation of import and export, administration of the king's household;¹³² and of the satraps: real taxes, receipts from mines, from exchanges, from agriculture and commerce, from livestock, finally head tax and occupational taxes.¹³³

No less significant is how Alexander placed local populations politically. His intention, it seems, was to let an established or reestablished organized community preside freely over all communal matters. Hence, not only were the Hellenic cities of Asia granted autonomy protected by establishment of democracy, but also, we assumed, the traditional federation of the Lykians continued to function undiminished, doubtless on condition that the Lykian contingent of ten warships in the Persian fleet be recalled. The Lydians, too, our sources tell us, "were given back their laws and became free."¹³⁴ Whatever these laws were—about which we know nothing—their restoration proves that laws governed the land again, not a conqueror's caprice or raw power, as heretofore; it proves that the once plucky, enterprising, deeply cultivated people of Kroisos was to be freed of the yoke of foreign domination, under which it had decayed, and in native fashion and native unity could undertake to raise itself again.

Of the populations that had lived without local community, such as the "barbarians" in the mountains of Little Phrygia, only "the tribute that they had always rendered" was required if they surrendered voluntarily.¹³⁵ No less revealing is that the tribute the Ephesians had paid to the Great

King was to be rendered henceforth to the temple of Artemis, while Erythrai, an inscription proves,¹³⁶ Ilion, which Alexander rebuilt as city,¹³⁷ and surely other Greek coastal cities were released from tribute when they received autonomy. By contrast, the cities of Pamphylia, Greek in name only, and Aspendos in particular after its attempt to trick the king, were put under tribute and under the administration of a satrap. The fortress at Halikarnassos and several islands remained in Persian control for years to come. The community of Halikarnassos was broken up into the settlements from which the Karian dynasts had composed it. The islands—we shall yet see that the demos of many of them rose for Alexander—will have been treated like the Greek cities of the mainland.

We know from contemporary coins that these cities were not merely given communal freedom, but in fact again became free states, as they had been until the time of the peace of Antialkidas. These coins bear, not the stamp of the king, but the autonomous stamp of the city that minted them, bound, not by Alexander's new monetary system, but, many of them, by their own accustomed system.¹³⁸ And a century later, when the Seleukids describe cities in Aiolis as members of "our league," that is doubtless an institution that Alexander founded.¹³⁹

The question presents itself whether these liberated or recently established polities of the islands and the Asiatic coast joined the federation of the Greek states united in the synhedrion of Corinth. For the island Tenedos we have documentary proof that it did;¹⁴⁰ that the expression used for Tenedos is not repeated for Mytilene on Lesbos and other cities permits the conclusion that they did not. It could have been in Alexander's interest to make of these newly liberated Hellenic cities a counterweight to a league of states that had been mostly forced into alliance with Macedonia and were therefore something less than reliable allies. The "League of Hellenes within Thermopylai," furthermore, had been established not merely for war against Persia but also to maintain peace, justice, and order in the territory of the league. For the islands and the cities of Asia, the synhedrion in Corinth would have been too remote to serve this purpose and unsuited to their regular representation there. We may assume, in the absence of specific indications, that Alexander also obliged the Greeks outside the league to recognize his unconditional command and to make certain contributions to the great war.¹⁴¹ We cannot know from available evidence whether Alexander concluded treaties to this effect with each city, or whether he caused them to conclude their own analogous federation, for example, as Aiolians, Ionians, and so on, for

this purpose and to manage the common peace, as in the Hellenikon.¹⁴² We do have documentary evidence of one such association, from the time of Antigonos (about 306): a “commonwealth of cities” in the region of Mount Ida, united to serve Athena of Ilion, with a synhedrion that arrived at decisions in the name of the cities. The inscription mentions as members of the league Gargara on the Adramyttenic Gulf and Lampsakos on the Hellespont.¹⁴³

We have seen how Alexander endeavored to foster the rise of these very ancient Greek cities. If he gave to them so generously and without envy, he may have hoped to bind them fast to a new order of things that was far from firmly established in Hellas itself. He may have hoped that they would wean themselves from the villainous little advantages conferred by a master’s favor and ward politics, such as they had become given to during a long period of foreign domination, and turn instead to the immeasurable blessings of their new situation as free polities, imperial cities in the empire of their liberator.

The Hellenes of these Asiatic lands from the Propontis to the Sea of Cyprus must have experienced the contrast between their old circumstances and their new vividly enough. They must have felt as if they were emerging again into daylight and fresh air.

CHAPTER 2

On the Persian side, news of the battle on the Granikos had met with more displeasure than real misgiving. In all likelihood, the Persians underestimated the significance of the attack that had been launched and thus of the danger that threatened the realm. They probably attributed Alexander's military success to beginner's luck, thought it had been made possible by their own errors; once these were rectified, all further danger would be taken care of and the Macedonian's luck would run out. More than anything else, want of unity and orderly military leadership seemed to have led to the reversal on the Granikos. Memnon had been right, they admitted; he should have had command of the army from the outset. Now at last he became sole and unconditional commander of Persian land and sea power in the anterior satrapies.

And indeed they seemed to have found in this Hellene a formidable foe for the Macedonian king. His adamant defense of Halikarnassos had already demonstrated his character and his talent. Pushed back from the coast at all but a few places, then favored by the disbanding of the Macedonian fleet, he formulated a grand plan to cut Alexander off from Europe, take the war into Hellas, and combine there with Alexander's numerous enemies to strike at the root of his power. Memnon had a mighty fleet of Phoenician and Cypriot ships, plus ten from Lykia, ten from Rhodes, and three from Mallos and Soloi in Kilikia. The harbor fortress at Halikarnassos was still his; Rhodes, Kos, and surely all the Sporades were loyal to him, and the Attic cleruchs who held Samos; the oligarchs and tyrants on Chios and Lesbos were only waiting for him to help them put an end to democracy and the connection to Macedonia; the patriots in Hellas hoped he would restore Hellenic freedom.

From the roads off Halikarnassos, Memnon had taken his fleet to Chios; he captured the island by the treason of the oligarchs who had once ruled here, led by Apollonides, and restored oligarchy, assuring himself control.¹ He sailed to Lesbos, where Chares had arrived from Sigeion with

ships and mercenaries to drive out the tyrant Aristonikos of Methymna, the same Athenian Chares who had come to meet Alexander so devotedly after his landing in Sigeion. Chares asked Memnon not to interfere in his undertaking, but Memnon had come as the tyrant's "fatherly friend and guest friend" and chased out the one-time Attic strategos without further ado.² The other smaller cities on the island had already surrendered to him, but the most important one, Mytilene, refused, true to her alliance with Alexander and in reliance on the Macedonian garrison she had accepted. Memnon began a siege and pressed her hard. Cut off on the landward side by a mound and five camps, on the seaward side by a squadron that closed her harbor and another that kept the sea lanes to Hellas under surveillance, and deprived of all prospect of aid, Mytilene was approaching her limits. Emissaries were coming to Memnon from other islands; the cities in Euboea, sympathetic to Macedonia, expected to see him appear any moment; the Spartans were at the point of rising. Then Memnon fell sick. He transferred his command to Pharnabazos, his nephew, son of Artabazos, pending disposition by the Great King, and sank into the grave, to the defeat of Dareios's hopes of him but not of his own glory.

Upon hearing of Memnon's death, the story goes, Dareios convened his war council, undecided whether he should send the nearest satraps out to meet the steadily advancing foe or go in person at the head of the imperial army.³ The Persians recommended that he lead the army into the field: it had already mustered, and under the king of kings it would prevail; one battle would destroy Alexander. But Athenian Charidemus, in flight from Alexander, had arrived opportunely for the Great King. He advised caution and found a hearing: They should not risk everything on one encounter, should not lose Asia on the very threshold of Asia, should save the imperial levy and the presence of its supreme commander for the ultimate danger, which would never arrive if they met this mad Macedonian prudently and adroitly. If they would give him, Charidemus, command of 100,000 men, one-third of them Greeks, he guaranteed that he could destroy the enemy. The proud Persians objected sharply: Such a scheme was unworthy to be called Persian; it was an undeserved reproach to Persian valor; to accept it would be a sign of the sorriest sort of mistrust, a confession of weakness, and the Great King's presence instead would meet with nothing but enthusiasm and devotion. They implored their wavering king not to give the ultimate mission to a foreigner who wanted to acquire the army solely to betray the empire of Cyrus. Charidemus

leapt up in a rage, accused them of delusion, cowardice, and self-seeking: They had no idea of their own weakness and the terrible strength of the Greeks; they were going to send the empire of Cyrus to perdition if the Great King, in his wisdom, did not heed him. The Persian king, lacking self-confidence and therefore mistrustful, wounded, furthermore, in his vanity as a Persian, caught the foreigner by the girdle, and his bodyguards hauled the Hellene off to be garroted. Charidemos's last words to the king are supposed to have been: "Your remorse will prove my worth; my avenger is at hand."

The war council decided to meet the Macedonians with the imperial levy led by the Great King in person when they entered upper Asia and to add to the Persian forces as many hired Greeks as could be spared from the fleet, whom Pharnabazos should ship over from Tripolis on the Phoenician coast as soon as possible. Thymondas Mentor's son was sent to Tripolis to take charge of these troops and conduct them to the imperial army and to confer on Pharnabazos, in the Great King's name, all the powers that Memnon had retained.

Pharnabazos and Autophradates meanwhile had taken over the siege of Mytilene and brought it to the desired conclusion. The city surrendered, offering to accept restoration of its exiles and abandon its league with Alexander, if the Persians would let the Macedonian garrison withdraw unmolested and grant the city the terms of the peace of Antialkidas in making it once again a Persian ally. But as soon as the two Persians gained possession of the city, they abandoned these terms. They imposed a garrison under the Rhodian Lykomedes and installed Diogenes, one of the exiles, as tyrant. In heavy contributions, levied partly on individual citizens, partly on the city, they let Mytilene feel the full weight of the Persian yoke. Then Pharnabazos with his mercenaries hurried into Syria.⁴ There he received the supreme command that had been Memnon's, whose great plan, however, had been eviscerated by the transfer of hired troops to the imperial army: the rapid, break-through offensive that was to have enflamed Sparta, Athens, and the whole Hellenic mainland was no longer possible.

Nonetheless, Pharnabazos and Autophradates attempted something of the kind. They sent the Persian Datames with ten triremes to the Cyclades and themselves sailed with one hundred ships to Tenedos, which had joined the Hellenic cause.⁵ The two Persians forced her—such was the official formulation—to return to the terms of the peace of Antialkidas. Their true aim, obviously, was to invest the Hellespont. For Alexander,

in an attempt to create a fleet that would at least protect communications with Macedonia, had sent Hegelochos to the Propontis with instructions to stop every ship coming down from the Pontos and convert it for war service.⁶ At the same time, Antipater had Proteas bring together ships from Euboia and the Peloponnese to keep watch on Datames's squadron, at anchor off Siphnos. The measure was the more necessary because the Athenians had again sent ambassadors to the Persian king and had responded to reports that their corn ships coming down from the Pontos were being stopped and converted for battle by decreeing that a fleet of one hundred ships be put to sea under Menestheus Iphikrates's son.⁷ To remove any Athenian pretext for adding one hundred triremes to the Persian fleet, Hegelochos was obliged to release the Attic ships he had stopped.⁸ The Macedonians were therefore the more gratified when Proteas and his squadron of fifteen ships not merely detained the Persian ships off Siphnos, but in fact surprised them so adroitly that eight ships, with their crews, fell into his hands and the remaining two, under Datames, fled to the fleet, which was cruising in the vicinity of Chios and Miletos and raiding the coasts.⁹ Thus was the first—and greatest—threat posed by Memnon's plan removed: Proteas's swift attack had discouraged defection among the Greeks.

But did these results not show that Alexander was mistaken when he disbanded a fleet that he would have to reconstitute hardly six months later? Alexander had taken the measure of the Persians' perceptiveness and their capacity for action, and he appraised his Hellenic allies for what their record of success had shown them to be. If they were disposed to defect and combine their ships with Persia's, it would be up to Antipater on the mainland to keep them in line. Finally, it would not be in the least difficult to raise a new fleet quickly to protect the coasts against the enemy. Meanwhile, Alexander could pursue his war plan undistracted by a sea war. Every advance took more of the home coast of the enemy fleet and ultimately would threaten its very existence. This was the aim of the next field campaign.¹⁰

In spring 333, the various divisions of the Macedonian army met in Gordion. The troops that had made the winter campaign with Alexander approached from Kelainai in the south; Parmenion led the cavalry and the train of the main army up from Sardeis; the bridegrooms returned from leave in Macedonia, bringing an important new levy: 3000 Macedonian infantry and 300 cavalry, 200 Thessalian and 150 Elian riders, so that Alexander's numbers were not much lower now than at the Granikos,

despite the garrisons he had left along the way.¹¹ The mood of these troops can be gathered from their successes to date and from their prospects in further battles; proud of victories won and confident of victories to come, they saw Asia as their quarry. As guarantors of their success, they could look to themselves, their king, and the gods.

Ambassadors from Athens came to Gordion to ask the king to release the Athenians who had been taken prisoner on the Granikos and transported in chains to Macedonia: Did they appeal to the league oath sworn in Corinth and cite their own loyalty? They were told to apply again when the next field campaign had been brought to a successful conclusion.

On the citadel of Gordion, ancient seat of the Phrygian kings, stood the palaces of Gordios and Midas and the chariot by which Midas had once been recognized as the gods' own chosen ruler over Phrygia. The yoke of this chariot was attached by a knot of bast tied so artfully that neither end of the cord could be found. An oracle had said that the one who loosed the knot would come to rule Asia. At his request, Alexander was shown the citadel, the palace, and the chariot; he heard the oracle and determined to loose the knot. He searched for an end of the cord—in vain. His attendants followed his fruitless efforts with growing embarrassment. Finally he drew his sword and cut the knot through—and fulfilled the oracle.¹²

Next day the army broke camp and marched along the southern slope of the mountains on the Paphlagonian frontier toward Ankyra.¹³ There an embassy of Paphlagonians arrived to offer to submit on condition that no Macedonian troops enter Paphlagonia. The king granted their wish, and Paphlagonia remained under native dynasts, subject perhaps to the authority of the governor of Hellespontine Phrygia.¹⁴ They crossed the Halys and continued into Kappadokia, meeting no resistance as they marched through areas that extend to the Iris in this huge province.¹⁵ It was conferred on Sabiktas¹⁶ as a Macedonian satrapy, even though its extreme northern territories could not be occupied. The democratic party in the Greek cities on the Pontos, at least one instance proves,¹⁷ hoped that Alexander would come and liberate them. But the Persian party, as in Sinope, or tyranny remained in power for the moment. Alexander could not delay his more important undertakings to turn northward and invest the remote coast of the Pontos; he was headed for the Mediterranean coasts.¹⁸ The route he chose led along the northern slope of the Tauros to the Kilikian Gates above Tyana, through which the younger Cyrus had passed with his ten thousand Greeks seventy years earlier.¹⁹

Alexander found the high places there occupied by strong outposts. He ordered the army to pitch camp, and in the first watch of the night, he set out with the shieldbearers, the archers, and the Agrianians to fall upon the enemy in the dark. As soon as the sentries heard him approaching, they deserted their posts and fled the pass, which they could easily have closed if they had not despaired of their position. Arsames, the Kilikian satrap, seems to have interposed them solely to gain time to plunder and ravage the land in order to leave a desert behind him as he withdrew in safety to Dareios, who was approaching from the Euphrates. Alexander therefore took his cavalry and the lightest of his lightly armed very rapidly through the passes and down to Tarsos. Surprised by the enemy's swiftness and proximity, Arsames left both the city and its countryside intact and took flight, saving his life for a death soon to follow.

Fatigued by sleepless nights, forced marches, and the noonday sun of a late summer day, Alexander came with his troops to the banks of the Kydnos, a clear, cold mountain stream that flows through the city of Tarsos. Longing for relief, he discarded helmet, armor, and garments and leapt into the stream. There he was overcome by chills and fever and sank. Unconscious and half-dead, he was pulled out and carried to his tent. His cramps and high fever were the despair of his physicians, returning consciousness a torment to him; sleeplessness and gloom over his approaching death consumed his last strength. His companions were in mourning, the army desperate, the enemy approaching; there seemed no salvation. Finally the Akarnanian physician Philip, who had known the king from childhood, offered to prepare a potion that would help. Alexander wanted nothing more than a quick remedy; Philip promised one. Just then came a letter from Parmenion urging caution: Dareios had sent the physician Philip one thousand talents and promised him his daughter's hand in return for poisoning Alexander. Alexander passed the letter to his physician and, while Philip read, drank the potion. Knowing himself innocent, Philip read calmly; he asked the king to trust him and follow his instructions; he would soon be cured. He spoke to Alexander of his homeland, his mother and his sisters, his future victories, the marvelous countries of the East. The physician's loyal care was rewarded by Alexander's rapid recovery; he returned to the ranks of his Macedonians and resumed his military operations with renewed energy.²⁰

The countryside called Kilikia was the ring that joined the chain of Persian satrapies in nearer Asia to the chain of those in upper Asia. By taking the Tauros passes, Alexander had swiftly captured the empire's

strongest defensive position toward the west; now he had to make the entire southern slope of the passes as secure as possible in order to gain and hold a second set of passes, those in the Amanid Mountains toward Syria. While Parmenion took the mercenaries and allied contingents, the Thessalian cavalry, and Sitalkes's Thracians eastward to occupy the passes into upper Asia, the king went westward to secure the road to Laranda and Ikonion and so-called rugged Kilikia, inhabited by free mountain tribes, brigands like their Pisidian neighbors, who could easily disturb his communications with Asia Minor.

Alexander marched from Tarsos to Anchiale, founded by the Assyrian king Sardanapal, whose memory was preserved there by a statue with the remarkable inscription: "Sardanapalos founded Anchiale and Tarsos in a single day; but you, stranger, eat, drink, and make love, for all else is worthless." He then came to Soloi, "home of the solecism," a Greek city by origin and so Persian by persuasion that Alexander not only laid a garrison there but also imposed a fine of two hundred talents. From here, he took three phalanges, the archers, and the Agrianians on a raid into rugged Kilikia. Partly by force, partly by forbearance, he subdued these mountain dwellers in seven days and secured his communications with the western provinces. Back in Soloi, he heard from his commanders in Karia that Othontopates, who held the harbor fortress at Halikarnassos, had been defeated in a bitter contest and more than one thousand prisoners taken. The Macedonians celebrated this auspicious opening of the new campaign and the king's recovery in Soloi with a great sacrifice to Asklepios, full-dress review of all the army, a torch race, and athletic and artistic contests. These observances may have stirred the Solians' fading memory of their homeland and their ancestors: the barbarians' era was at an end; Hellenic life was spreading in lands long reduced to servitude; Hellenic origin, once despised and forgotten in the midst of Asiatic barbarism, was now a great privilege. Alexander granted the Solians a democratic constitution; a few weeks later, right after the decisive battle, he ordered that they be released from contribution and their hostages set free.²¹

On returning to Tarsos, the king sent his cavalry under Philotas over the Aleic plain to the banks of the Pyramos, while he took the rest of the army along the coast over Magarsos to Mallos, two cities whose memory of Hellenic descent he could appeal to. In Mallos the people had already risen against their oppressors, and Alexander's arrival decided a bloody struggle between Persian sympathizers and the popular party. Alexander

freed the city and released it from tribute. Mallos, like the royal house of Macedonia, traced its origins to Argos, and Alexander honored its founder Amphilochos of Argos with a hero's festival.²²

In Mallos, Alexander received a report that King Dareios had brought a huge army across the Euphrates and had been lying for some time encamped near the Syrian city Sochoi, two marches from the passes.²³ He convened his war council immediately. Everyone thought they should start as soon as possible, advance through the passes, and attack the Persians where they found them. The king ordered that they break camp the following morning. From Mallos they marched northeastward along the deeply indented coastline toward Issos.

Two routes lead from Issos into Syria. The more difficult one leads eastward through the gorges and over the heights of the Amanid Mountains. Alexander rejected it: the alternation of peak and valley and the pathless country would have left his soldiers too fatigued for combat, and he could not afford to remove them from the edge of the bay until he had secured it and closed it to enemy ships. He left his sick and wounded in the rear, where they were safer, and advanced from Issos southward along the coast by the usual road, known to the Greeks from Xenophon's description, then through the so-called shore passes to Myriandros on the sea, not far from the main passes into Syria. He intended to start next morning for the Syrian plain and Sochoi. But a storm blew up overnight in those first days of November,²⁴ and wind and rain kept the army in camp at Myriandros, about three miles south of the shore passes. They hoped to meet the enemy in a few days on the plain of Sochoi for a decisive battle.

And indeed the next encounter of the two armies would have to be decisive. The Persian army numbered in the hundreds of thousands and among them were hired Greeks, including 30,000 recently landed under the Akarnanian Bianor and the Thessalian Aristomedes; in the mass of Asiatic warriors were some 100,000 heavy infantry (kardakes) and the armored Persian riders. Dareios put his trust in these forces, in his righteous cause, in his glory in battle. He gladly believed the proud assurances of his grandees and, so it is said, a dream shortly before he marched out of Babylon, in his Chaldaeans' favorable interpretation: He had seen the Macedonian camp by the light of a huge conflagration, seen the Macedonian king ride through the streets of Babylon dressed like a Persian prince and disappear, horse and rider. Thus confident of the future, he had crossed the Euphrates. Surrounded by all the martial glory of a "king

of kings,” accompanied by his court and harem, by the harems of the Persian princes and satraps, by legions of eunuchs and mutes, in addition to the hundreds of thousands under arms—an endless caravan of brightly decorated wagons, opulent baldachins, noisy camp followers—he lay encamped near Sochoi. Here on the broad plain that gave him room to deploy the overwhelming superiority of his army and, especially, to use his massive cavalry effectively, he proposed to await the enemy and destroy it.

It is said to have been Arsames who, fleeing Kilikia, brought the first news of Alexander’s approach. From his report the Persians concluded that the enemy would come by the Amanid passes. Every day they expected to see a cloud of dust rise in the west. The days went by; they became indifferent toward a danger that did not materialize; they forgot what had already been lost; they made fun of an enemy who did not dare leave the narrow coastline, who surely already knew that the hooves of the Persian steeds were enough to trample its forces. Only too eagerly did Dareios listen to the arrogant pronouncements of his grandees: Intimidated by the proximity of the Persians, the Macedonian would not dare advance beyond Tarsos; they should attack; they would destroy him. The Macedonian Amyntas opposed them in vain: Alexander would advance on the Persians soon enough; this delay merely signaled greater danger; on no account should they venture into the narrow ravines of Kilikia; the plain of Sochoi was the ideal battlefield for Persian forces; here this host could prevail or, vanquished, escape.²⁵ But Dareios, mistrustful of a foreigner who had betrayed his king, seduced by the flattery of his grandees and by his own wishes, driven, finally, by the restlessness of the weak and by his fate, decided to give up his position at Sochoi and go in search of an enemy who was avoiding him. Unnecessary equipment, the harems, most of the treasury, everything that could hamper his movement was sent to Damaskos under Kophenes Pharnabazos’s brother, and the king, avoiding the detour over Myriandros, took his army through the Amanid passes and arrived in Issos. These things happened on the same day that Alexander took his army from Issos down to Myriandros. In Issos the Persians found the Macedonian invalids, whom they mutilated and murdered. The jubilant barbarians thought Alexander was fleeing from them; they believed he had been cut off, that his doom was certain. They immediately set out after their fugitive.

Alexander was indeed cut off. He has been accused of imprudence: not investing the Amanid Gates, leaving no garrison in Issos, abandoning his invalids to an atrocious enemy. He could have lost his whole army, it

has been argued, if the Persians had avoided battle, closed the sea with their fleet, and cut off Alexander's line of retreat with an adamant defensive, if they had harried every advance with their swarming cavalry and made it perilous by Memnon's scorched-earth tactic. Alexander knew the Persian military; he knew that in the long run these hundreds of thousands could not be provisioned along his lines of march and in exiguous Kilikia; that that army, anything but an organic whole, was incapable of the intricate maneuvers necessary to ensnare him; that, at the worst, a series of quick, bold marches on his part would force that unwieldy mass to pursue him, confused, broken up, and exposed to attack. He could not have anticipated that the Persians would give up a terrain so favorable to them, much less that they would move forward onto the narrow shoreline at the Pinaros.

Dareios had done so. Informed by fleeing natives that Alexander was standing on the other side of the shore passes, hardly a few hours distant and by no means in flight, he had to prepare for battle encamped here on the narrow level, for he could not pull his vast army back swiftly enough, nor did he dare send it forward toward Kilikia's Thermopylai. In so doing, he gave his enemy the advantage of attack. Indeed, had there been any stratagem by which the Great King could have been induced to move out of the plain of Sochoi and down into Kilikia, a maneuver pregnant with consequences, Alexander would have seized it eagerly, even at a greater cost than loss of the field hospital at Issos. He found the first rumors of Dareios's approach so incredible that he sent a handful of officers in a skiff back along the coast to see if the enemy was really there.

The same rumor had a different effect on Alexander's troops.²⁶ They had expected to meet the enemy in a few days and on an open battlefield; now, suddenly and unexpectedly, the enemy stood in their rear and battle was to be joined next day. Word had it that they would have to fight to retake what they had once held, would have to purchase every step backward with blood. If the passes were already occupied and closed, they might have to battle their way back through the Asian interior, like the Ten Thousand, and, instead of glory and plunder, would be lucky to escape with their lives. And all this because they had not advanced with caution. What did the officers care about the life of a common soldier? If he remained behind, wounded, they threw him to the hounds. These things and worse the men muttered as they cleaned their weapons and sharpened their spears, less because they had lost courage than because

they were up against the unexpected and had to cope with a sense of foreboding that comes over even the bravest troops in the run-up, finally, to a decisive battle.

Alexander understood the mood of his men; he remained untroubled by this license, which war creates and requires. When he had received his officers' report, namely, that the plain was covered with tents from the mouth of the Pinaros back to Issos, that it was Dareios, he convened his generals, ilarchs, and commanders of the allies and gave them the news. He pointed out that the enemy's present position was, among all imaginable possibilities, the most auspicious for them; they would not let themselves be deceived, Arrian has him say, by any apparent outflanking; they had fought with valor too often to lose courage before a phantom danger; perpetual victors, they were going against the perpetually vanquished; Macedonians against Medes and Persians, experienced warriors who had grown old under arms against effete Asians long unaccustomed to weapons, free men against slaves, Hellenes who fought willingly for god and country against corrupted Hellenes who for even slender wages betrayed their fatherland and their glorious ancestors, the most warlike and freest men ever sprung from European soil against the most contemptible tribes of the East: in short, strength against degeneracy, the highest force of will against the lowest incapacity, all the advantages of terrain, arts of war, and valor against Persian hordes. Could the outcome of such a battle be in doubt? The prize this time was no mere one or two satrapies but rather the Persian empire; not the bands of riders and hired Greeks at the Granikos, but the imperial army of Asia; not Persian satraps, but the Persian king himself would fall before them. After this victory nothing more remained but for them to take possession of Asia and indemnify themselves for all the hardships they had fought their way through. He reminded them of what they had accomplished together; he spoke of how each one had distinguished himself in action, mentioning them by name.²⁷ These things and many others with which a valiant field marshal inspires valiant men they heard from Alexander, characteristically noble and enthusiastic. None among them whom the young hero's words had not moved; they pressed around him, extended their hands, added their own brave remarks. They wanted to set out right away, to join battle.²⁸ Alexander dismissed them with orders to see that the men were given a good meal at the end of the day, to send a few horsemen and archers ahead to reconnoiter the route and hold the passes, to be prepared to start that very evening.

Late in the evening the army moved out, reached the passes about midnight, drew up under the cliff face to rest, while the necessary outposts were stationed. They started again at dawn,²⁹ moved through the passes and down onto the plain.

This plain extends from the shore passes about two miles northward to Issos; bordered by the sea on the west and on the east by mountains, some of them high, the plain broadens as it runs northward from the passes. In the middle, where it is more than a half-mile wide,³⁰ a mountain stream, the Pinaros, cuts through from northeast to southwest. The northern bank is sheer in some places; along the southern bank, a hill of some height juts into the plain parallel to the river, so that along this line the plain projects a bit back into the mountains. Some distance north of the Pinaros, the Persian camp began.

When Dareios received report that Alexander had returned to the shore passes, was prepared to offer battle, and was already advancing, the great Persian army formed up as quickly as possible and as best it could. Although the very narrow terrain was not favorable to superior Persian numbers, it seemed well suited to a sustained defensive: the Pinaros with its steep banks was like trench and mound, behind which the massed army could arrange itself. To be able to do so undisturbed, Dareios threw 30,000 riders and 20,000 light infantry across the river, with instructions eventually to drop back right and left toward the wings of the line. The infantry line was arranged in such fashion that the 30,000 hired Greeks under Thymondas formed the right wing, 60,000 kardakes the left.³¹ Another 20,000 kardakes were moved left toward the high ground, to threaten Alexander's right wing;³² when the Macedonians moved up to the Pinaros to attack, at least part of this corps would stand in the rear of the Macedonian right. The narrow space precluded all but the indicated troops from entering combat right away; most of the army, composed of light and heavy infantry, came up behind the line in columns, with the result that fresh troops could steadily be led into battle. When everything had been thus arranged, the cavalry squads that had been sent forward were signaled to retire; they distributed themselves right and left on the wings; on the left, however, the terrain seemed to exclude the use of cavalry, and those intended for the left were removed to the right wing, so that next to the sea the entire cavalry, Persia's forte, came together under Nabarzanes. Dareios in his battle chariot took up position at the center of the line, in Persian fashion, surrounded by mounted squads of the highest Persian nobility under the command of his brother Oxathres.

According to the Persian battle plan, the infantry was to maintain its position behind the Pinaros, to which end palisades had been erected where the banks were not steep. The Persian cavalry on the right wing was to throw itself full-force on the Macedonians' left wing, while the troops on the hillsides were to fall into the enemy's rear.³³

As the terrain opened, Alexander had brought up his heavy infantry from a marching column composed of heavy infantry, cavalry, and light troops and placed it right and left into a battle line sixteen men deep.³⁴ As he advanced farther and the terrain broadened again, the cavalry could move up: on the left wing the mounted Hellenic allies and the mounted recruits from Elis, on the right, which was to begin the attack as usual, the Thessalian and Macedonian horse. In the distance, the Macedonians could already make out the Persians' extended line; the slopes on the right were covered with enemy infantry; the officers noticed that great squads of riders were moving from the enemy's left wing along the battle line to come together again on the right, where the terrain was more open, apparently in preparation for a huge cavalry assault. Alexander ordered the Thessalian horse to move behind the front, where the enemy could not see them, cross to the left wing, and turn in beyond the Cretan archers and Sitalkes's Thracians, who were just coming up into the battle line to the left of the phalanges. He ordered Parmenion, who commanded the left wing, to keep the recruited riders from Elis, who stood to the left of the Thessalians in the battle line, as close to the sea as possible, so that the line could not be outflanked on the seaward side. On the right wing, he let the squadrons of sarissa bearers under Protomachos, the Paionians under Ariston, and the archers under Antiochos move up to the right of the Macedonian cavalry. Opposite the kardakes posted on the hillsides to his right, he formed a second front at an angle to the battle line³⁵ made up of the Agrianians under Attalos, part of the archers, and some riders.

The closer the Macedonians came to the Pinaros, the more clearly they saw how far the enemy line extended beyond their right wing. The king found it necessary to move two Macedonian cavalry squadrons, Peroidas's and Pantordanos's, behind the front to the far right wing; he could replace them in the battle line with the Agrianians, archers, and riders of the flank corps: that corps had attacked the barbarians opposite it so vehemently that it had thrown them back and scattered them onto the slopes, where 300 mounted companions seemed sufficient to hold them off and cover the movements of the battle line on that side.

Moving up thus, without haste and with short rest pauses, Alexander not only pushed the enemy flank corps that had been advanced against his right far to the side; he had also extended his line on the right beyond the enemy's left wing, using light troops, mounted and on foot, so that these could cover the thrust he intended to lead with the companion cavalry and keep the tip of the enemy's left busy until he had plunged into the Persian center with the shieldbearers to his left and the nearest phalanges following. Once he had broken through the center, he hoped to take the enemy's right wing of hired Greeks and massed cavalry, which was more than a match for Parmenion's wing, in the flanks with his cavalry, in front with his shieldbearers, and destroy it. He could anticipate that his first thrust would be the more decisive because the Great King had placed himself, not among the cavalry on the right wing, which could have led the Persians' main attack, but rather in the center of the defensive, which seemed unlikely to withstand a hard assault, even though it was protected by the natural rampart of the riverbank and by earthworks.

Alexander let his line move forward slowly so as to break into the enemy in greatest possible order and with altogether closed ranks. He rode along the front and spoke to the various divisions, calling his commanders by name and mentioning their exploits; the squads cheered, demanded no more delay, immediate attack. When the entire line, still in closed formation, had come within bowshot of the enemy, Alexander and his cavalry leapt into the Pinaros as the army raised the battle cry; without significant loss to the enemy's hail of arrows, they reached the far bank and plunged into the enemy line with such force that after brief resistance it began to break up and fall back. Alexander sighted the Great King's battle chariot and advanced on it; the bloodiest hand-to-hand combat broke out between the Persian nobles, who were defending their king, and the Macedonian horse, led by theirs. Arsames fell, and Rheomitres, Atizyes, and the Egyptian satrap Sabakes; Alexander took a wound in the thigh; the Macedonians fought the more bitterly. In the thick of battle, Dareios suddenly turned his chariot. The nearest ranks, those on the left posted forward toward the hills, followed him. Spreading from this point, flight soon became general. The Paionians, Agrianians, and the two mounted squadrons of the farthest Macedonian wing leapt upon the dissolving Persian ranks from the right and completed the victory on this side.

The heavy infantry of the center meanwhile had been unable to follow Alexander's rapid advance in a straight line; their ranks opened and these openings widened as they stumbled and scrambled up the steep banks

of the Pinaros. While Alexander fought in the enemy's center and its left wing wavered, the Hellenes of the Persian army, knowing themselves equal to the Macedonian hoplites in courage, arms, and arts of war, rushed into the largest gap. It was an attempt to take back a victory already forfeited. If they succeeded in pushing these Macedonians down the steep bank and back across the river, Alexander would be exposed on his flank and as good as lost. This danger caused the foot companions to redouble their efforts: if they yielded, they would sacrifice the victory Alexander had already won. The old enmity between Hellenes and Macedonians made this contest of equal courage and equal strength yet bloodier; the men raged the more because they could understand one another's curses and death cries. Ptolemy Seleukos's son, who led the second-last regiment, and many other officers had fallen.³⁶ Only by ultimate exertion could the Macedonians stand up to the contest here, and near the shore it seemed to be going to the Persians.

Nabarzanes had taken the Persian cavalry across the river and plunged into the Thessalian riders with such force that one squadron had been scattered and the others could hold their ground only because their well-trained horses enabled them to close up quickly again and again and to anticipate the enemy repeatedly with renewed shock; they could not have withstood the rage and superior numbers of the Persians indefinitely. But meanwhile the Persians' left wing had broken, and Dareios had sought safety, not in battle among his faithful, but in flight. Alexander saw his phalanges threatened and rushed to their aid before he went in pursuit of the king. He had his shieldbearers pivot left and attack the flank of the hired Greeks, while the hoplites of the phalanx charged again head-on; unable to withstand the double assault, the mercenaries were thrown back, scattered, and cut down. The troops massed at the Persian rear, which could have functioned as reserves and entered combat at this point, had followed the Great King in flight. Nabarzanes's horsemen, in the thick of battle and still advancing, heard the cry, "The king is fleeing"; they faltered, their ranks thinned, they turned and also fled, pursued by the Thessalians across the plain. They were all racing toward the mountains; the gullies filled with fallen riders. A press of weapons and of nations, flailing hooves as horses fell, cries of despair, raging fear of death by the swords and pikes of pursuing Macedonians, and the Macedonians' exultant victory cry—thus ended the glorious day of Issos.

Persian losses were immense. The battlefield was covered with the dead and the dying, the ravines in the mountains were overflowing with corpses, and behind this corpse mound, the king's flight was assured.

Dareios, who had turned his quadriga as soon as Alexander's first assault succeeded, flew over the plain as far as the mountains; when rising ground cut his speed, he sprang from his chariot, leaving mantle, bow, and shield behind, and leapt upon a mare, which raced home to her foal in the stable with all the speed that Dareios desired. Alexander pursued him as long as light lasted;³⁷ taking the Great King would have been the prize of the day. He found the chariot, shield, mantle, and bow in a ravine; with these trophies he returned to the Persian camp, which his men had taken without meeting resistance, and readied for the night.

Aside from the opulence of the camp and the Persian grandees' magnificent weapons, the booty they took was not important with respect to money or money-value,³⁸ since the treasury, the field kit, and the court furnishings of the king and the satraps had been dispatched to Dasmaskos. But the queen mother Sisygambis, Dareios's wife, and her children fell to the victor along with the camp, where they had been forgotten in the confusion. As Alexander, back from chasing Dareios, took his evening meal in the Great King's tent among his officers, he heard women wailing nearby and, having inquired, was told it was the royal women, who had seen Dareios's chariot, bow, and king's mantle being carried through the camp in triumph and thought that he was dead. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatos, one of the companions, to assure them that Dareios was alive, that they had nothing to fear, that he was neither their personal enemy nor Dareios's, that this was an honorable contest for possession of Asia and he would respect their rank and their misfortune.³⁹ He kept his word: not only were they spared, as becomes misfortune, but also respected as they had been accustomed in happier days; they were waited on as Persian protocol required. Alexander wanted to see them treated, not as prisoners of war, but as queens; he wanted to see the majesty of royal rank placed above the differences of Greek and barbarian.

We see here for the first time how he intended to fashion his relations with Persia. Under the same circumstances, Athenians and Spartans would have let their hatred or their greed determine the fate of enemy princesses. Alexander's conduct was as much a proof of freer, or at least more far-sighted politics as of his own noble sentiments. His contemporaries praised these sentiments because they did not understand his politics; virtually no deed of Alexander's did they admire as much as this leniency where he could have shown himself the proud victor, this respect where he could have shown that he was a Greek and a king. Most remarkable for them was that he disdained to exercise his right as victor over the

vanquished's wife, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia, and in this he was greater than his great example Achilles. He even forbade any mention of her beauty in his presence: not one word was to contribute to the lady's sorrow. Afterward it was told that the king went into the princesses' tent accompanied only by Hephaistion, his favorite. Uncertain which of the magnificently dressed young men was the king, the queen mother prostrated herself, in Persian fashion, before Hephaistion, who was taller. Perceiving her error when Hephaistion stepped back, and in fear of her life, she heard the king say with a smile: "You were not mistaken, for he, too, is Alexander." He then embraced Dareios's six-year-old son, caressed him, and kissed him.⁴⁰

Macedonian losses in this battle are given as 300 infantry and 150 riders.⁴¹ Alexander himself had been wounded in the thigh. Nonetheless he visited his wounded men on the day after battle; he had the dead buried with military honors, the entire army marching up in full battle dress, and three altars erected on the banks of the Pinaros as a monument;⁴² the city Alexandria situated at the entrance to the Syrian passes memorialized the battle of Issos, which had destroyed Persian power with one blow.

The Persians are said to have lost 100,000 men, 10,000 of them horsemen. The army had been defeated first on the left, then rolled up toward the sea, with the result that all remaining units were completely demolished. The great mass had fled over the mountains toward the Euphrates; other bands had gone northward into the mountains of Kilikia and from there into Kappadokia, Lykaonia, and Paphlagonia; they were mopped up partly by Antigonos of Phrygia, partly by Kalas of Little Phrygia.⁴³ Approximately 8000 hired Greeks fled over the Amanid Mountains into Syria,⁴⁴ then reached Tripolis in a fairly orderly retreat led by Amyntas the Macedonian fugitive. There they found the beached triremes on which they had arrived, manned as many as they needed, burned the rest so that they would not fall into enemy hands, and sailed for Cyprus.⁴⁵ Others may have reached the sea by other routes and gone to Tainaron in search of other service. Amyntas took those on Cyprus to Pelusion in an attempt to seize the satrapy once of Sabakes, fallen at Issos, now assigned to the Persian Mazakes. He had made himself master of the greater part of Egypt and advanced to the gates of Memphis, when Egyptians called up by the satrap, furious at the mercenaries' insolent plundering, attacked them as they fanned out on new forays and slew them to the last man, including Amyntas.

Dareios meanwhile had gathered the remnants of his Persians and approximately 4000 hired Greeks on his flight to Onchai and continued with these in unrelenting haste to Thapsakos, where he crossed the Euphrates and thought himself safe from further danger. He may have been shamed less by losing the battle and a few satrapies than by the loss of his family, less by the infamy of defeat and flight than by the infamy that he believed threatened his wife, most beautiful of Persian women, at the hands of his proud enemy. His domestic misfortunes and personal unhappiness may have caused him to forget the threat to his empire and its weakness, but not his exalted rank. He thought he was making a grand gesture when, with large-minded condescension, he offered the victor the first concession. Soon after the battle, he sent ambassadors to Alexander with a letter⁴⁶ that described how Philip and the Great King Artaxerxes had been friends and allies; after Artaxerxes died, however, Philip had opened hostilities against the Great King Arses, wholly unprovoked; when the Persian throne had again fallen vacant and again been occupied, Alexander himself had not seen fit to send a delegation to him, King Dareios, to seal an ancient friendship and alliance; instead, he had invaded Asia with an army and brought great misfortune on the Persians; that was why he, the Great King, had mustered his battalions and gone out to meet him; the outcome of that battle had not been in his favor; thus he, a king, asked Alexander, also a king,⁴⁷ to return to him his captured wife, mother, and children; he offered Alexander friendship and alliance; would he kindly let the bearers of this message, Meniskos and Arsimas, be accompanied home by plenipotentiaries competent to give and receive the necessary guarantees.

Alexander replied to these and oral representations of the royal ambassadors by a letter that his ambassador, Thersippos,⁴⁸ accompanying the Persians home to their court, was to convey to the king without entering into oral negotiations. It read:

Your ancestors came into Macedonia and the rest of Hellas and, in the absence of all provocation on the part of the Hellenes, brought many kinds of misfortune upon us. I, elected field commander of the Hellenes and determined to make the Persians pay for what they had done to us, crossed into Asia after you had given us renewed cause for war. For you gave aid and comfort to the Perinthians, who had insulted my father, and Ochos sent an armed force into Thrace, which is ours. My father perished at the hands of assassins whom you incited, as you yourselves have acknowledged in letters everywhere. In collusion with Bagoas, you murdered King Arses and presumptuously

seized the Persian throne, unlawfully, not in keeping with the Persians' tradition but in violation of their most sacred rights. You have sent the Hellenes letters not in the least friendly toward me, attempting to provoke them into war against me; to the Spartans and certain other Hellenes you have sent money, refused by all other states, but certainly not by the Spartans; through your agents you have tried to seduce my friends and to disturb the peace that I have given the Hellenes. For these reasons, I took the field against you, after you had opened hostilities. In just battle, I defeated first your field commanders and satraps and now you and the army that was with you; by grace of the immortal gods, I am now master also of the land that you call yours. Anyone who fought against me and did not fall in battle but instead came over to me and under my protection—him I will care for. No one joins me by constraint; rather, all who submit to my command do so freely and gladly. Thus am I lord of Asia, and I invite you to join me. Should you, however, believe that in doing so you have grounds for misgiving, send a delegation of your noblemen to receive pertinent guarantees. When you have joined me, your pleas for return of your mother, your wife, and your children and for anything else you may wish will receive a favorable hearing: what you desire of me shall be yours. When you write to me again, by the way, you are to address me as king of Asia; you are not to write to me as to your equal, but rather to present your wishes with becoming submission to me, lord over everything that was yours, else I shall proceed against you for insult to my kingly majesty. Should you, however, be of another opinion concerning possession of power, you may seek satisfaction of your claims on the field of battle, not in flight. I, for my part, shall seek you out wherever you may be.

If the letter was released in this form,⁴⁹ it was framed not merely for the man to whom it is addressed but also as a victor's manifesto promulgated at once to the tribes of Asia and to the Hellenes.

Also to the Hellenes. The Persian fleet was still in the Aegean, where its presence fed unrest in Hellas. A victory there, a daring landing on the Isthmos or in Euboia would have produced a Hellenic uprising of incalculable consequences and exposed Macedonia itself to the gravest kind of danger. That apparently is why Alexander was so long in setting out from Gordion: in an emergency he could have reached the Hellespont from Gordion in fifteen marches. News that the hired Greeks had been taken off to Tripolis may have prompted him finally to set out: he may have thought that without them the movements of the Persian fleet, reduced further by the ships that had been burned at Tripolis, were militarily nothing more than ostentation.

That is not the way the patriots in Hellas saw it. How it must have swelled their courage to see Hegelochos, startled by the Athenians' plucky

resolution to put one hundred triremes to sea, release the Attic ships he had detained; how indeed to see all Lesbos revert to the terms of the peace of Antialkidas when the Macedonian garrison in Mytilene was obliged to capitulate, to see Tenedos abandon her treaties with Alexander and the Corinthian League and also revert. For the Hellenic patriots thought the glorious peace of Antialkidas was the principle that would save them; under its banner they thought they could rid themselves of the abominable Corinthian League. In those days Attic orators openly endorsed a break with Alexander, sworn treaties notwithstanding. "These provide," said one, "'if we want to participate in the common peace'; therefore we are at liberty to want quite the opposite."⁵⁰

The Persian fleet still controlled the Aegean, despite the reversal that Datames had suffered. After taking Tenedos, the Persian admirals had sent a squadron under Aristomenes into the Hellespont to take those coasts;⁵¹ they themselves went to Chios, plundering the Ionian coast along the way. However, they neglected to cover their important position at Halikarnassos, where Othontopates still held the harbor fortress, and it fell to the Macedonians, as Alexander learned in Soloi. After heavy losses here, the Persians seem to have been obliged to give up points they held on the mainland: Myndos, Kaunos, Triopion. Only Kos, Rhodes, and Kalymna, and thus the entrance to the bay of Halikarnassos, remained Persian.⁵² They knew that Dareios had advanced over the Euphrates again, leading a force that in hired Greeks alone equaled the numbers of Alexander's full army and exceeded it immeasurably in number of riders.

It is not clear what motives determined the next move of the admirals, whether the advance of Hegelochos, who on Alexander's instructions had again gathered a fleet in the Hellespont, won an encounter from Aristomenes and his squadron, and retaken Tenedos,⁵³ or an intention to wait out Alexander's eventual defeat and then stir up a general insurrection in Hellas. In any case, they left a garrison on Chios and a few ships off Kos and Halikarnassos and took their one hundred swiftest ships to Siphnos. There King Agis approached them with a single trireme and a grand scheme: He asked them to send him to the Peloponnese with as many ships and troops as they could spare and money to recruit more. In Athens, too, the mood was highly excited, or at least the patriots were at pains to make it so. Three years later Aischines described it in an oration against Demosthenes: "When Alexander was cut off in Kilikia and suffering shortages of everything, as you said, and in the next days, in your words, would be trampled to dust by the Persian horsemen, the

people could not comprehend your urgings or the letters that you went about brandishing, for all your pointing to my face, how discouraged and disconcerted it looked, for all your calling me the sacrificial victim that would perish as soon as something happened to Alexander.” And nonetheless, says Aischines, Demosthenes recommended further delay;⁵⁴ the more eagerly may Hypereides, Moirokles, and Kallisthenes have pressed to combine with Agis and lead the Hellenic states, apparently ripe for defection, against Antipater and Macedonia. We do not know whether they took up contact with Harpalos, Alexander’s high treasurer, who had recently decamped, certainly not empty-handed, and was now in Megara.⁵⁵

But from Kilikia came, instead of the expected victory bulletin, one of the Great King’s total defeat and of the complete destruction of the Persian army. The Athenians could thank their lucky stars that they had not yet done anything that obliged them to go further. The Persian admirals rushed to salvage what was still salvageable. Pharnabazos sailed with twelve triremes and 1500 mercenaries for Chios, where defection threatened, and Autophradates with the greater part of the fleet—including the Tyrian ships under King Azemilkos—for Halikarnassos. Instead of the great land and sea forces he had demanded, King Agis received thirty talents and ten ships; he sent them to his brother Agesilaos in Tainaron with instructions to pay his seamen their full wages and make for Crete, which he was to secure. After a short stay in the Cyclades, he followed Autophradates to Halikarnassos. No more sea operations could be planned: it was now clear that Alexander would not march to the Euphrates, but the Phoenician squadrons were only awaiting the end of the season to return to their home ports, which in the meantime might have surrendered to the Macedonians. The Cypriot kings, too, feared for their island, should the Phoenician coast fall to Alexander.

It has recently been described as odd and as a sign of want of planning that Alexander did not continue to pursue the Persians after Issos, cross the Euphrates, and put an end to the Persian empire. This would have been foolish, a pointless exercise as long as his rear was not covered. The hired Greeks’ expedition to Pelusion could remind him that he had to have Egypt if he hoped to enjoy a secure base for his march into the interior. The prize for Issos was not Babylon and Susa but rather that the coast of the Mediterranean now stood open to him all the way to the desolate shores of the Syrtis; that very soon Phoenicia, an inexhaustible arsenal for the Persian empire, would have to withdraw its fleet from the

Greek seas, whether it intended to surrender or to defend itself; that thereupon the unrest Sparta had stirred up would be deprived of Persian support and could be suppressed; finally, that there would be no further obstacle to investing the Nile lands, giving the campaign into the East a basis of operations as broad and firm as possible. Alexander's undertakings would have to proceed accordingly.

Alexander sent Parmenion with the Thessalian riders and other troops up the Orontes valley to Damaskos, capital of Koile Syria, where the war chest, campaign apparatus, all the opulent state household of the Great King, and the wives, children, and treasure of the grandees had been dispatched from Sochoi. These and the city fell to Parmenion by the perfidy of the Syrian satrap, who staged an attempt to flee, in order, he said, to save the treasury and the caravan of so many Persian noblewomen and their children. The spoils were enormous. Among many thousands of prisoners⁵⁶ were ambassadors of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, who had come to Dareios before the battle of Issos. Upon receiving Parmenion's report of this expedition, Alexander ordered all captured persons and chattels brought back to Damaskos and put under guard and the Greek envoys brought before him immediately. He released the two Thebans without reprisal, partly in consideration of their person (one was Thessaliskos, noble Ismenias's son, the other Dionysidoros, an Olympian champion), partly out of compassion with their unhappy city and the Thebans' only too understandable hostility toward the Macedonians. He retained the Athenian Iphikrates, son of the field commander of the same name, in a high position on his personal staff, out of respect for the father and to give the Athenians proof of his forbearance. The Spartan Euthykles, whose native city had just proceeded to open warfare, was first held prisoner then released to home, when Macedonia's accumulating victories altered its relationship with Sparta.

During Parmenion's excursion to Damaskos, Alexander had ordered Kilikian affairs. We know little about this, but that little is telling. The area, of greater strategic importance than any other and situated in surroundings made precarious by bold independent tribes in the Tauros, had to be placed in reliable hands. The king gave it to one of his seven bodyguards, Balakros Nikanor's son, who seems to have been made both satrap and strategos: soon after, mention is made of Balakros's battles with the Isauri.⁵⁷ A significant number of Alexander coins of older type are believed to bear the stamp of Kilikia.⁵⁸ Menon was made satrap of Syria as occupied by Parmenion, that is to say, of Koile Syria. The king did not yet dispose over Phoenicia: No minor difficulties awaited him there.

The Phoenician cities occupied a position peculiar to them in the Persian empire, a consequence of geography and of their internal politics. Masters of the sea for centuries, they lacked the insularity virtually indispensable for sea powers and had become the prize of Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians by turn. But almost cut off from the interior by the high mountain chains of the Libanon and built partly on small offshore islands not altogether accessible to the immediate and sustained influence of the prevailing power on the mainland, they used their ancient constitution to maintain their traditional independence so effectively that the Persian kings contented themselves with suzerainty and warrant to call up the Phoenician fleet. Greek rivalry in merchant shipping, industry, and sea power, once very threatening, had abated as the old Attic naval league fell apart. Even in the days of full independence, the commerce and prosperity of these cities had perhaps not been as great as now under Persia, which furnished a boundless hinterland for their trade. While in other lands taken over by the Persians old traditional forms decayed and were forgotten, in Phoenicia ancient enterprise and the kind of freedom that trade requires lived on. The Phoenicians too had made attempts to escape the Great King's rule; their unsucccess despite slackening Persian power can be traced to internal politics and still more to the sharply defined special interests of cities in rivalry with one another. At the meeting of the league council in Tripolis in the days of King Ochus, Sidon had called on the two other capital cities, Tyre and Arados, to join her rising; they promised help but did nothing, awaiting the result; if it was favorable, they too would be liberated; if not, Sidon's losses would enlarge their power and their trade. Sidon went down to defeat, burned to the ground, and lost her constitution and her independence. Byblos, it seems, entered the league council of Tripolis in her stead or in any case rose after that time to a position of importance beside Arados and Tyre.

The nine cities of Cyprus had relations with Persia similar to the Phoenicians', except that their origin, Hellenic in part, and their more favorable geographical situation made them more impatient to be free. They rose at the same time as Sidon, led by King Pnytagoras of Salamis; soon after the fall of Sidon, they returned to fealty under Pnytagoras's brother Euagoras; a short time later, Pnytagoras again received Salamis, but perfect loyalty to Persia was the condition of his regained position as first among the minor princes of Cyprus.

When Alexander went to war against Persia, this rebellion lay twenty years in the past. The ships of the Phoenicians under their "kings," of Tyre under Azemilkos, of Arados under Gerostratos, of Byblos under

Enylos, to which those of Sidon were added,⁵⁹ and of Cyprus under Pnytagoras and the other princes, had answered the Great King's call up and entered Hellenic waters, where, soon badly led, they fought with poor success. Issos changed matters radically for the Phoenician cities. Had they made common cause and united their sea power to support every point the enemy wanted to attack, had the Great King's admirals left Hellenic waters and abandoned their offensive, now ineffectual, to defend the Phoenician harbors, it is not obvious how the purely continental forces of the conqueror could have prevailed over a maritime defense of these populous fortified cities. But the Phoenician cities were not the least united, their league notwithstanding, and even less so after what they had allowed to happen to Sidon. The Sidonians will have been overjoyed at the victory at Issos; now they could hope to receive from Alexander what they had forfeited in their struggle with the Persian despot. Byblos, elevated by the fall of Sidon, must have been afraid of losing everything because it was situated on the mainland and could not hope to withstand Alexander's army. Arados and Tyre, by contrast, were surrounded by water, but Arados, made powerful less by wide trade than by possessions on the mainland, had more to lose, while Tyre, with eighty ships still at home in its harbor, thought itself safe on its island.

As Alexander approached the territories of the Phoenician cities coming from the Orontes, Straton, son of Arados's prince Gerostratos, came out to meet him, present a gold wreath in his father's name, and submit his father's territory, which embraced the northern part of the Phoenician coast and extended one day's journey inland to the city Mariamne; the large city Marathos, where Alexander remained for a few days, also belonged to Arados. As he continued his march, he took Byblos by contractual surrender. The Sidonians hastened to submit to the victor over the hated Persians; at their formal invitation, Alexander took possession of the city, restored its earlier territory and its earlier constitution, and made Abdolonymos, an impoverished descendant of the Sidonian kings, its ruler.⁶⁰ Then he started for Tyre.

On the way, he was met by a delegation of Tyre's richest and most prominent citizens, led by the son of Prince Azemilkos; they declared the Tyrians prepared to do whatever Alexander desired. The king thanked them, complimented their city, and said he wished to make a solemn offering in the temple of Tyrian Herakles. This was exactly what the Tyrians did not want. Under current circumstances—on this the city fathers were agreed—Tyre should guard her independence by the strictest

neutrality, as she had done so successfully when Sidon rose, in order to have the advantage of any outcome of hostilities. And she was in a position to do so: Even in the absence of the squadron in the Aegean, the municipal fleet was substantial enough to make the city's decrees respected. The Persian fleet still had the upper hand on every sea, they reasoned, and Dareios was equipping a new army to halt the Macedonians' farther advance. If he should prevail, the loyalty of the Tyrians would be the more richly rewarded because the other Phoenician cities had already betrayed the Persian cause. If he should lose, Alexander, with no navy, would rage against the city in the sea in vain, and Tyre, relying on her fleet, her allies on Cyprus, in the Peloponnese, and in Libya, and on her own resources and her impregnable situation, would still have time to treat with him for favorable terms. Persuaded that they had found an expedient at once becoming, productive, and undangerous, the Tyrians announced their decision: They would be honored, should King Alexander present his offering to their tutelary deity in the temple of Old Tyre on the mainland; they would grant whatever else he might desire; their island city, however, would have to remain closed to Macedonians and Persians alike.

Alexander promptly broke off negotiations. He resolved to use force to obtain something indispensable to the further course of his undertaking. Tyre as a neutral sea power in his rear would have furnished a center and support for all the ill will and defection in the Hellenic countries, for the struggle already begun by King Agis, whose brother meanwhile had taken Crete. Alexander convened his generals, ilarchs, taxiarchs, and the captains of the allied troops, told them what had happened, and announced his intention to take Tyre at any price. They could not risk a campaign into Egypt as long as the Persians still had a navy, he told them, or pursue King Dareios as long as they had Tyre and her patently hostile inclinations in their rear, and Egypt and Cyprus to boot, which were still in the hands of the Persians. Current affairs in Greece made such a course of action even more unthinkable: With Tyrian help, the Persians could recover control of the coasts and, while the Macedonians were heading for Babylon, use an even bigger army to carry the war into Hellas, where the Spartans were in open rebellion and the Athenians were hesitating more out of fear than out of good will toward Macedonia. Conversely, if Tyre could be taken, they would control all Phoenicia, and the Phoenician fleet, the largest, finest part of Persian sea power, would have to come over to Macedonia, for neither the Phoenician seamen nor

any other crew would be inclined to prosecute a war at sea while their own cities were being occupied by an enemy. Cyprus would have to follow suit or find herself taken by the Macedonian–Phoenician fleet. And once they controlled the sea with a united navy, to which the ships of Cyprus would be added, Macedonia's sea power would be peerless and the Egyptian campaign secure, its success assured. Once Egypt was conquered, conditions in Hellas would be of no further concern to them. They could set out for Babylon untroubled by domestic affairs and with heightened expectations, since the Persians would be cut off both from the sea and from the territories on this side of the Euphrates.⁶¹ The council was persuaded that the proud city in the sea would have to be taken, but to do so without a fleet seemed impossible. Impossible at first glance, certainly; but what had been recognized as necessary had to be made possible. Accustomed to realizing bold plans by even bolder means, Alexander decided to connect the island city to the mainland and then to begin the siege.

New Tyre, built on an island one half-mile long and something less than a half-mile wide, was separated from the mainland by a strait about one thousand paces across and a channel about three fathoms deep near the island, but shallow and boggy near the mainland.⁶² Alexander determined to extend a mole from this point into the sea; for materials, his men quarried the stones of Old Tyre, now abandoned,⁶³ and cut cedars in the nearby Libanon. Pilings were easily driven into the soft sea bottom, and the mud flats cemented the pieces sunk into them. Work went forward quickly; the king was often present; praise and rewards lightened the soldiers' labor.⁶⁴

To this point, the Tyrians had looked on unconcerned, confident of their ships and of their strong high walls. Now it seemed time to show their arrogant enemy that he had dared too much and to let him feel their advantage as ancient masters of machines. The mole had reached the edge of the channel waters. The Tyrians brought up as much artillery as possible on the landward side of their high wall and began shooting arrows and hurling stones down on the unprotected Macedonians working below, while Tyrian triremes attacked from both sides of the mole. In response, Alexander had two towers erected at the end of the mole, draped in protective screens and animal skins, and outfitted with a catapult. The mole continued to grow, albeit more slowly in the deeper water. The Tyrians then built a fireship. They filled a freighter with dry tinder and other highly flammable materials, fitted it with two masts and a wide

gallery, in which they heaped up straw and kindling, and brought sulfur, pitch, and similar things on board. From the masts they hung a double yard, on which they hauled caldrons of fuel aloft, and ballasted the stern to lift the prow clear of the water. On the next favorable wind they put their fireship to sea, towed it up alongside the mole, set the materials in the hold and on the masts alight, and swam to their triremes, which they used to press the burning ship against the tip of the mole. Under a strong northwest wind, the fireship performed splendidly; the towers and screens, scaffolds and fascines on the mole burned apace, while from the triremes, which lay at anchor upwind, archers blocked any attempt to put out the fire. At the same time, the Tyrians sallied and rowed up in a number of skiffs to destroy the grates around the mole and set fire to any remaining machinery. Without the grates, the unfinished portions of the mole were exposed to the surf and soon broke up and washed away.

It has been said that after this unhappy experience, which not only cost Alexander many men and all his machinery, but also showed that Tyre could not be taken from the mainland, he should have abandoned the siege, accepted the treaty that Tyre offered, and continued into Egypt. Alexander's character and his intentions made that recourse even more impossible than taking the island. The more strongly and defiantly Tyre opposed his land army, the more necessary it became to humble her; the more doubtful victory became for timid souls, the more determined Alexander became to force it; one step backward, one plan abandoned, one half-measure, and all was lost.

It may have been at this time that ambassadors came again from Dareios to offer a ransom of ten thousand talents for his mother, wife, and children, and, further, possession of the territories on the near side of the Euphrates, and to offer the hand of his daughter in return for friendship and alliance.⁶⁵ Among Alexander's generals, consulted in council, opinion was divided; Parmenion, in particular, submitted that if he were Alexander, under present circumstances, he would accept these terms and no longer expose himself to the vicissitudes of war; if he were Parmenion, Alexander returned, he too would do so. But since he was Alexander, he would write Dareios that he neither needed money from him nor would he accept part of the realm instead of the whole; whatever Dareios possessed in land and subjects, in money and chattels was his, and if he should desire to marry Dareios's daughter, he did not have to seek Dareios's permission to do so; let Dareios come in person if he wished to receive favors from Alexander.

Siege preparations went forward with even greater determination. The mole was rebuilt and widened to make it more stable and better adapted to supporting towers and siege engines. The engineers received orders to construct new machinery for the continuing work on the mole and for the eventual storm of the walls. While this work was in progress, Alexander took the shieldbearers and the Agrianians to Sidon to gather a fleet with which he proposed to blockade Tyre from the seaward side while he besieged her from the landward. At just this moment—perhaps earliest spring—the ships of Arados, Byblos, and Sidon returned from Hellenic waters, where they had responded to news of Alexander's victory at Issos by leaving Autophradates's fleet and setting out for home as soon as the season permitted. There were about 80 triremes under Gerostratos of Arados and Enylos of Byblos; Rhodes, which had recently come over to Alexander, sent 10 ships; then the Cypriot kings' magnificent squadron of 120 vessels entered the harbor of Sidon.⁶⁶ There were also a few ships from Lykia and Kilikia and even one from Macedonia, skippered by Proteas, Black Kleitos's nephew, who had distinguished himself in the surprise attack off Siphnos. Alexander's sea power must have reached 250 ships, with quadriremes and penteremes among them.⁶⁷

While the fleet was being outfitted and the machinery finished, Alexander went off on a raiding party against the Arab tribes in the Antilibanon, who controlled the ways that led from the Orontes valley to the coast and could descend from their mountain redoubts to attack the caravans from Chalybon and Damaskos. Accompanied by several squadrons of riders, the shieldbearers, Agrianians, and archers, the king marched through the lovely valleys of the Libanon chains and stormed some of the Arabs' cliff castles, while others surrendered, and all admitted Macedonian dominion.⁶⁸ Eleven days later, he was back in Sidon, where 4000 hired Greeks recruited by Kleandros had arrived just when they were needed. Preparations for the actual siege of mighty Tyre were so far advanced that Alexander could reinforce his crews with shieldbearers, who would give him a decided advantage in combat on the open sea and in boarding maneuvers, leave the roads off Sidon, and put to sea. He made for Tyre arrayed for battle: Krateros and Pnytagoras on the left wing, Alexander on the right with the remaining Cypriot kings and the Phoenicians. He wanted to engage the Tyrian fleet immediately, if possible, and banish it from the seas, then to storm or blockade the city into surrender.

Tyre had two harbors, both on the landward side, the Sidonian harbor to the right of the mole, the Egyptian to the left, a bit farther removed from the open sea by the jutting southern portion of the island. Unaware that the Cypriot and Phoenician squadrons had just come over to Alexander, the Tyrians had intended to sail out and engage him in a sea battle. Now they saw the enemy fleet emerge in an extended line on the horizon and knew that they were vastly overmatched. They had perhaps one-third Alexander's power, reduced again by the number of vessels detached to defend the harbors. They contented themselves with blocking the narrow entrance to the north harbor, which would have to take the first assault, by a closed line of triremes, prows turned outward. Alexander brought his squadrons up off Tyre and dropped anchor to await the enemy. When none came, he had his fleet row full-speed toward the city, perhaps hoping to take the harbor by such a furious approach. The closed row of triremes in the narrow harbor entrance forced him to abandon this intention: he was able to sink only three ships, those farthest removed from the harbor; their crews swam to shore.

Alexander's ships went before anchor not far from the mole and close to shore, where they were shielded from the wind. Next day, the blockade began. The Cypriot ships, under Admiral Andromachos and their own kings, closed the north harbor, while the Phoenician fleet, with which Alexander remained, took up position before the Egyptian harbor to the south. The most challenging task of the siege was to bring towers and machinery close enough to the walls to breach them or to drop drawbridges onto the battlements. To this end, not only was the mole loaded with machinery, but also a great number of transport ships and all triremes that were not sailing separately were ingeniously fitted with ballistae, catapults, and other engines. But the walls of hewn rock withstood the machinery on the mole, and their height of 150 feet, raised yet again by wooden towers erected on the battlements, defeated all efforts from the Macedonian towers with their drawbridges. When the ships carrying machinery attempted to approach the walls on the two sides of the mole, they were met at a distance by a hail of missiles, stones, and flaming arrows; when they continued to row toward shore, they ran aground on rocks the Tyrians had sunk there. As the crews tried to lift the rocks, working from pitching decks, screened Tyrian vessels came alongside and cut their anchor cables, setting them adrift. Alexander responded by sending out his own screened vessels to guard the cables. Whereupon

Tyrian divers swam out and cut the cables under water. Alexander finally replaced his ropes with chains. After that the fleet made better progress clearing the bottom, and the ships fitted with machinery could reach the walls. The army was angry and eager to fight: They had seen the Tyrians kill Macedonian prisoners atop the walls and fling their corpses into the sea.

Knowing full well that they were lost if they lost control of the sea and that their city was more threatened with each passing day, the Tyrians had expected that the Cypriots at least would not enter the fray against them. They now hoped for help from Carthage; the sacred ship of the high embassy arrived from Carthage bringing a refusal to help the mother city.⁶⁹

Tyre was as good as locked in: the Cypriot fleet lay at anchor before her north harbor and the Phoenician before her south, so that she could not even bring her entire fleet together for a sortie, her sole remaining hope. The more cautiously therefore did the Tyrians outfit a squadron of three five-rowers, as many four-rowers, and seven triremes in their north harbor, working behind spread sails that fully concealed what they were doing, and man these ships with elite seamen. For their sortie they chose the midday hour, when Alexander was accustomed to rest in his tent and the crews of most of his ships to go on shore in search of fresh water and victuals. They rowed out of harbor unobserved. As they approached the almost entirely unguarded ships of the Cypriot princes on the north side, they raised their battle cry and sank the penteremes of Pnytagoras, Androkles of Amathos, and Pasikrates of Kurion on the first attempt; they chased the remaining ships onto shore, where they began to hack them to pieces. Alexander returned to his ships on the south side of the mole earlier than usual that day and promptly noticed the commotion before the harbor to the north. He ordered his crews immediately back on board and brought most of his ships up before the south harbor to block a sally on this side. He then took five triremes and all five-rowers of his fleet around the island to meet the triumphant Tyrians. Observers on the wall watched Alexander's approach and frantically signaled their ships to retire. In the heat of battle, these noticed nothing until Alexander was upon them; they put about in all haste and rowed for the harbor; few reached it; most were sunk or so damaged that they could not be used again. Hard by the harbor entrance, a five-rower and a four-rower fell into enemy hands and their crews swam ashore.

This outcome was of great consequence to the fate of the city. When the Tyrians lost control of the sea, they effectively lost the glacis of their fortress. In both harbors, closed by the Tyrians' harbor chains and sharply guarded by the enemy, the Tyrian fleet lay dead in the water. Thus began the final chapter of a siege that surpassed anything of the kind ever attempted by Hellenes or barbarians, a contest of invention, mechanics, and technology without parallel. The Tyrians, acknowledged to be the greatest technicians and mechanics of the ancient world, had produced the most unexpected things for their defense, and Alexander's engineers, among them Diades and Chairias of the school of Polyeides, had shown themselves to be no less resourceful in overcoming that defense.⁷⁰ Now that the king's mole had given him a solid point from which to attack and safe anchorage for his ships, now that he had cleared the bottom and could bring his machinery up to the wall, now that he had banished the Tyrians from the sea and nothing more remained but to overtop or breach the walls—now began the most laborious and most dangerous part of his offensive. The Tyrians' rage grew with the danger that threatened them, their fanaticism with the approach of their destruction.

The walls opposite the mole were too high and too massive to be weakened or scaled, and those on the north side no less resistant: the strength of hewn rock set in cement seemed to defy any assault. The more stubbornly did Alexander pursue his plan. He had his engines brought up on the south side of the city and put to work until the wall, heavily damaged and pierced, finally collapsed in a breach. Drawbridges were lowered, a storm attempted; fierce combat followed. Before the rage of the defenders, their missiles, the corrosives and flames they threw and dropped, the cutting and grappling devices they lowered, the Macedonians were obliged to retreat. The king abandoned the inadequate breach, which the Tyrians soon closed again.

Understandably, the confidence of the army faltered. The king was the more impatient to arrive at his end; that first breach had shown him how to get a purchase on the defiant city. He waited for a calm sea before he made a second attempt. Three days later—it was August⁷¹—the sea was still, the air clear, the horizon cloudless: everything as his plan required. He convened the captains of the attacking troops and instructed them. Then he had the most powerful of his engine-bearing ships approach the wall on the south and set to work, while two other ships, one with Admetos's shieldbearers and Alexander, the other with Koinos's

phalangites, stood ready to land wherever a storm became possible. Simultaneously, he had all other ships put to sea. Some of the triremes took up position before the harbors, where they would try to break the harbor chains during the storm and penetrate into the basins; the rest, carrying archers, slingers, ballistae, catapults, battering rams, and the like, distributed themselves around the island, under orders either to land where possible or to drop anchor under the walls and within range and bombard the Tyrians from all sides, so that they, not knowing where to defend themselves first, would fall before the storm.

The engines set to work; missiles and stones flew against the battlements from every side; the city seemed threatened at all points. Suddenly the part of the wall that Alexander had intended shuddered and collapsed into a considerable breach. The troop carriers replaced the machine carriers against the wall, drawbridges were lowered, the shieldbearers ran down them; Admetos was the first to mount the wall and the first to fall. Enraged, the shieldbearers pressed forward under the gaze of their king, who followed with the agema. The Tyrians were repulsed at the breach. First one tower, then another was taken, the wall was occupied, the passage toward the citadel was opened and ordered taken because it offered the easiest way of dropping down into the city.

The ships of Sidon, Byblos, and Arados meanwhile had broken the chains and penetrated into the south harbor, where they sank or beached the Tyrian ships lying at anchor; the Cypriot ships had entered the north harbor and occupied the bulwark and adjacent points. The Tyrians had retreated from every position; then they rallied before the Agenorion to make a stand. Against this last orderly band of Tyrians the king brought the shieldbearers from the direction of the citadel and Koinos brought the phalangites from the harbor. In a short, very bloody struggle it, too, was overcome and cut down. Eight thousand Tyrians met their death. The inhabitants who did not escape, about 30,000, were sold into slavery. Those who had taken refuge in the temple of Herakles—King Azemilkos, high state officials, Carthaginian ambassadors—were granted clemency.⁷²

The Sidonians and other Phoenicians may have concealed and saved thousands of their Tyrian compatriots on their ships; similarly, some part of the original population may have remained in the city or found its way back there.⁷³ Alexander had good reason to conserve and favor Tyre and its superb harbor, perhaps the best station for a fleet on the entire Syrian coast: in so doing, he assured himself the dominant position among the harbor cities in these waters, which retained their princes and their

fleets, albeit under Macedonian dominion. But this ancient commonwealth and, apparently, its monarchy were at an end.⁷⁴ Tyre became a Macedonian place of arms and, we may assume, one of the permanent stations of the fleet.⁷⁵

Alexander celebrated by bringing the offering in the Herakleion that the Tyrians had refused him; the army marched out in full battle dress, and the entire fleet, in festival rigging and formation, sailed by just off the island. To the accompaniment of contests and torch races, the machine that had broken the wall was drawn through the city and displayed in the Herakleion; the Tyrians' Herakles ship, which Alexander had captured earlier, was dedicated to the god.

News of events at Tyre must have galvanized the ancient world; as Issos had the East, and even more, Tyre must have made the coastal countries to the west as far as the Pillars of Herakles feel the overwhelming power of the Macedonian warlord. The mighty island city, its proud fleet, its sea trade, its great riches were a thing of the past, destroyed by the victor's Achillean wrath.⁷⁶

Alexander could expect renewed resistance in southern Syria. While he was in Tyre, he had called on the Jews and the Samaritans to submit; they protested that they were bound by oath to the Persian king and refused the provisions and other services that Alexander had demanded. The frontier fortress of Gaza was a cause of greater concern. This was the preeminent city in Palistinian Syria, situated on the trade route from the Red Sea to Tyre and from Damaskos to Egypt. As a frontier fortress against the often restive Egyptian satrapy, it was an object of the Persian kings' particular solicitude, and Dareios had entrusted it to one of his most loyal servants, the eunuch Batis,⁷⁷ who boldly intended to halt the advance of the victorious enemy. Batis had reinforced his city's already considerable Persian garrison with Arabs recruited from settlements that extended as far as the coast south of Gaza and laid in provisions sufficient for a long siege. He was persuaded that stopping the enemy would keep the Egyptian satrapy loyal in the first instance and would give Dareios time to complete his renewed preparations in upper Asia, bring his army down into the lower satrapies, and drive this foolhardy Macedonian back beyond the Tauros, the Halys, and the Hellespont. Tyre's long resistance raised the eunuch's courage, the more because the fleet, which had actually taken Tyre, would be useless off Gaza. For the city lay a half-mile inland from a coast made inhospitable to landing by sandbanks and shallows. A great expanse of sand extended from the coast to the foot

of the high mound on which Gaza had been built. The city's considerable circumference was defended by a high, strong wall that promised to withstand any ram and every missile.

Alexander moved out of Tyre about the beginning of September 332. He met no resistance in the fortified city Ake, which guards the entrance into Palistinian Syria, and entered Samaria, which escaped just punishment for its willfulness by submitting promptly. Jerusalem followed Samaria's example, and Alexander, it is reported, made a solemn offering in the temple of Jehova; he showed himself in every respect indulgent and considerate toward the descendants of Abraham, whose adherence could be very useful when he attacked Philistine Gaza.⁷⁸

The army arrived before Gaza and pitched camp on the south side, where the wall could be most readily attacked. Alexander immediately ordered the necessary machinery constructed and erected. His engineers declared that it could not be done; the mound on which the city stood was so high that no machine could reach the wall to attack it, they said. On no account could Alexander leave this fortress unsubdued; the more difficult the task seemed to his men, the more determined was he to see it done; here, too, the impossible was to be made possible. He ordered construction of a berm as high as the mound and the footing of the walls on the more accessible south side of the city. Work was expedited, and as soon as it was finished, machines were rolled up against the wall. They set to work at daybreak. Meanwhile, Alexander, wreathed and in battle dress, made an offering and looked for an omen. A bird of prey flew over the altar, it is recounted, and dropped a pebble on the king's head, but then became entangled in the ropes of one of the engines. Aristander, Alexander's diviner, interpreted the omen to mean that the king would surely conquer the city, but should exercise particular caution on that day. Alexander prudently took cover close to the machines, which made good progress against the wall. Suddenly the besieged troops sallied with great force, threw torches into the screens and catapults, bombarded the Macedonians from atop the wall, and forced them back from the machines, where they were trying to put out the fire. The army was at the point of retreating from the berm, and Alexander could restrain himself no longer. He entered the fray at the head of his shieldbearers, intervened at the most dangerous points, and rallied the Macedonians so that at least they were not entirely thrown back from their position on the berm. Then a bolt from a catapult penetrated his shield and his

armor and lodged in his shoulder. The king faltered; the enemy pushed forward with a shout; and the Macedonians retired from the berm.

Half the prophecy had been fulfilled; they now awaited the better half. The engines that had broken the walls of Tyre had just arrived in the harbor of Majuma. To accommodate them, the king ordered construction of berms 1200 feet wide and 250 feet high, concentric with the walls of the city.⁷⁹ At the same time, shafts were sunk under the walls, and these began to subside at certain places, whether under their own weight or battered by the rams on the berm. A storm against the damaged spots began, was repulsed and twice repeated. On the fourth attempt, as the phalanges closed in from all sides, as ever greater lengths of the wall collapsed and the engines did ever more damage, when the valiant Arabs counted too many dead and wounded to be able to resist adequately at all the necessary places, the shieldbearers could finally throw storm ladders into the breaches and force their way in over the rubble of the collapsed walls. They opened the gates and admitted the entire army into the city. An even more ferocious struggle began in the streets. The Gazans defended their posts to the death, and the hot day ended in a blood bath. Nearly 10,000 barbarians are said to have fallen; their women and children were sold into slavery. Rich booty fell to the victor, especially the Arabian spices warehoused in Gaza. Alexander resettled the city with surrounding Philistine and Arab populations; a permanent garrison made it a place of arms⁸⁰ of equal importance for Egypt and for Syria.⁸¹

Let us pause for a moment to consider the Syrian territories. The scant notices that have come down to us concerning the new order in these lands do not yield a picture even remotely clear; they do not even indicate whether the new order here proceeded in the same way and according to the same scheme as in the satrapies of Asia Minor. Coins yield a few clues. The silver currency of Asia Minor to the Tauros, struck, as we have seen, with the familiar stamp of Alexander, all belonged to the later classes of Alexander coins, those minted in the days of the successors and afterward. We can show that certain of these cities struck coins with their own stamp in Alexander's time and as long as his empire lasted at least in form (until 306). From this we were able to conclude that Alexander established the Greek cities of Asia Minor and those of the Lykian league as independent states allied with him and that in this capacity they exercised a right of coinage as autonomously as Athens, Argos, and the other states of the Corinthian League. Beyond the Tauros, a different

practice begins. The numerous silver coins with Alexander's stamp that survive from the Kilikian cities all belong to the older classes, as do those of Kommagene, Damaskos, Arados, Sidon, Ake, and Askalon.⁸² In the legend, Alexander is almost always called king, which is not usually the case for contemporaneous coins from Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly. In Kilikia, Syria, Koile Syria, and Phoenicia, therefore, Alexander let the municipal community stand, but these cities, unlike the Greek cities in Asia Minor, were not autonomous states. Their coins show that they minted either on behalf of the king and on their own responsibility or that they could mint only within the monetary system that Alexander introduced and with its types, that they could mint only the king's currency.

Another observation may be added. In 1863 a hoard of 3000 gold pieces was unearthed in the turning of a garden near Sidon and not dispersed, like the finds of 1829 and 1852, but instead largely examined and indexed by specialists. Among the 1531 staters thus described, those of Ake and Sidon and of Arados are particularly numerous; single pieces from Kilikia are present; fairly many of the cities of Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly are represented by one type or by several; a stamp from Hellas is rare; in Asia Minor, Chios, Klazomenai (?), Pergamon, and Rhodes appear with their own stamp, as does King Pnytagoras of Cypriot Salamis. "These coins," notes one report, "were almost consistently new; a great part, particularly those stamped in Sidon, still rough, as if fresh from the press." Among these coins was none from the successors, who assumed the title of king in 306; three from Ake bore the date 23 or 24: these data led to a confident conclusion that the hoard had been buried soon after 310 and before 306—at a time, therefore, when Alexander's monarchy still survived in form and, with it, his imperial administration.⁸³

It is notable that among all these many gold coins not one from Tyre is present. That can be chance, though we may assume that Tyre's political privilege immediately after conquest was inferior to that of other Phoenician cities. The dates on the coins of Ake are of particular interest and correspond to dates on coins otherwise known from Arados: 21 to 76. As will appear in my history of the successors, the Seleukids gave Arados full independence in 258, whereupon a new era began. Arados, like Ake, had opened an earlier era with its deliverance from the Persian yoke, whether upon the victory on the Granikos or that at Issos is unknown. Coins alone do not tell us whether other cities adopted this same calculation of the

year. For those two cities certainly Alexander's victory was a liberation and a new beginning.

Resistance at Tyre and then at Gaza, and a shoulder wound that was painful but not dangerous, had delayed the king's campaign into Egypt.⁸⁴ Exactly one year after Issos, toward the beginning of December 332, he set out from Gaza to take the Great King's last province on the Mediterranean. Its favorable geography would have enabled it to put up a lengthy resistance, had it been loyal or in loyal hands. But why should the Egyptian people have been prepared to fight to preserve a regime that they hated because it was foreign and despised because it was feeble? The Egyptians, furthermore, were by nature less disposed toward battle than toward peace and quiet; they were more patient and industrious than spirited and strong. Two centuries of servitude had seen many attempts to shake off foreign domination, but the Egyptians had had little part in these: since the emigration of their native warrior caste, they had become accustomed to seeing foreigners fight for Egypt, usually Hellenic hirelings, accompanied at best by thousands of natives in a ragtag battle pack or serving as porters. Egypt in general was in a state of complete stagnation. Internal conditions, remnants of a long-vanished pharaonic period, stood in patent contradiction to the many historical vicissitudes the land had endured since the fall of its priestly monarchy. The Saitic kings' attempts to rouse the people by means of trade and foreign contact had merely left them more obdurate and benighted than ever. The Persian rule that followed had to contend with a sullen, growing loathing of unclean aliens and with repeated risings by those who claimed pharaonic descent, but Egypt had never managed to mount a revolt unassisted or start a movement of her own. Sunk into themselves, into African indolence and dissoluteness, burdened by all the hindrances and superstitions of a caste system, which the passage of time had ossified and deadened, the Egyptians were, if anything, more oppressed than liberated by the excessive, self-sufficient fruitfulness of their land, which the advantage of free and lively contact with the rest of the world would have made valuable and charming. More than any other people, they needed the regeneration, the refreshing leavening that the Hellenes, intense by nature, and Hellenic rule could bring them.

As soon as Alexander drew near, Egypt was lost to the Persian king. Out of jealousy or misguided diligence, its satrap Mazakes, successor to Sabakes, who perished at Issos, had slaughtered the Greek mercenaries

who landed under Amyntas, instead of hiring them for the defense of the land. Now that Tyre and Gaza had fallen, Egypt was entirely cut off from upper Persia by an enemy occupation that reached all the way to the Arab tribes of the desert, and the fleet had come from Tyre and lay at anchor off Pelusion. The only course open to the satrap and the few Persians in his entourage was to surrender right away. Thus did Mazakes turn Egypt over to Alexander without protest, when seven days' march had brought the Macedonians from Gaza to Pelusion. The king sent his fleet upstream on the Pelusiac arm of the Nile and himself went over Heliopolis to Memphis to meet it. All the cities that he passed through surrendered without resistance; Memphis, the capital, presented not the least obstacle to his occupation, and with its surrender he had Egypt.

He wanted more than conquest. The peoples to whom he came should understand that he came as liberator and restorer, that he honored what they held sacred and recognized what was according to their custom. Nothing had shaken the Egyptians more deeply than King Ochus's impaling of their sacred bull. In the temple of Ptah in Memphis, Alexander sacrificed to Apis and other Egyptian deities;⁸⁵ he held athletic and artistic contests of Hellenes as a sign that henceforth foreign things would be at home here and home things would be honored by foreigners. The respect that he paid Egyptian priests won him the loyalty of a caste toward whom the Persian foreigners had often shown fanatical contempt.

When Alexander took possession of Egypt, he completed his conquest of the Mediterranean coasts that had stood under Persian rule. The boldest objective of Periklean policy—liberating Egypt to make Athenian supremacy at sea and control of trade stable, lasting, and secure—had now been not merely attained but far surpassed. The eastern basin of the Mediterranean had been won for the Hellenic world and, with subjection of Egypt, the gulf toward Arabia, where sea routes led southward to Ethiopia and ultimately eastward to the marvels of India. Possession of Egypt opened boundless prospects. Alexander's next undertaking after Memphis shows how he seized on these prospects and proposed to realize them.

He left a strong garrison in Pelusion at the eastern corner of the delta: the march into the interior of Asia would set out from there the following spring. From Memphis he sailed with the shieldbearers, the agema of the Macedonian cavalry, the Agrianians, and the archers down the western arm of the Nile to Kanopos and from there along the coast to Rhakotis, an old frontier post toward Libya. This spot lay on a spit of land eight

miles long that separates the lagoon Mareotis from the sea; seven stades off the coast lay Pharos, the Homeric isle of seals. The king saw how suited the shoreline between the Mareotis and the sea was to the founding of a city and the arm of the sea to construction of a large harbor in the lee of virtually all winds.

He wanted to indicate his plan to his master builder Deinokrates right away, with streets and markets, temples to the Hellenic gods and Egyptian Isis. Finding no writing materials at hand, the story goes, he had his troops outline the plan with strewn flour, which attracted countless birds from all points, an omen that wise Aristander interpreted to mean that the city would prosper and its trade would run in all directions. The extraordinary degree to which the sign and the king's vision were to be realized is known. The population of the city grew apace, its trade connected the western world with newly opened India, it became the heart of Hellenic life in the following centuries: the point where the letters and culture of all the world streamed together from East and West and found a home, the grandest, most enduring monument to its great founder.

CHAPTER 3

By enduring law proud victory is the victory of a higher law, the law that produces the heightened resilience, sovereign development, and driving energy of a new intention rich in future possibility. Such victories perform a critique of what once was and was accepted but could lead no further, of what seemed powerful and confident but was in fact decayed and crumbling. Neither high birth nor hereditary privilege, neither peaceableness nor virtue nor any other personal merit can offer protection from the overwhelming force of the man who has been fated with historical greatness. Victorious as long as he is able to venture forth, do battle, and overthrow, he builds even as he destroys; he creates a new world, precisely out of the rubble and on the ruins of the destruction he has wrought. Thus what he has conquered and put an end to lives on after him in his works.

The historical tradition tends to lay great weight on the contrast between Alexander and Dareios, between a hero of action and a hero of suffering. It depicts Dareios as mild, noble, true, as a model of filial piety toward his mother, of love and affection toward his wife and children, as revered by the Persians for his fairness, his chivalric valor, his kingly high-mindedness. In more peaceful times he might have been a king such as Asia had rarely seen; but caught in a current of events that a Kambyzes or an Ochos could perhaps have withstood, he lent his hand to unworthy and criminal schemes in an attempt to save himself and his realm and attained nothing more than an oppressive awareness that he was no longer blameless before the man against whom he was contending in vain. As the danger grew, so did the confusion, want of principle, and wrongness in all that he did or attempted. The future of the Persian empire and its just cause was growing ever darker; the gates of Asia had been broken open, the rich satrapies of the coast had fallen, the foundations of the ruling dynasty had been shaken. The Great King personally, in his sweet-tempered way, might willingly have forfeited what

he had lost and made even greater sacrifices for the sake of peace. Attached, as he seems to have been, more to wife and child than to throne and realm, he was destined to feel in the measure of his private pain the dimensions of his coming fall.

This is the motif that the historical tradition depicts most vividly. It stresses that the Great King's mother Sisygambis, his children, his consort Stateira, most beautiful of Asiatic women and the more cherished because she was with child, are Alexander's prisoners. As ransom Dareios offers half his realm and immeasurable treasure; his proud foe demands submission or renewed battle. Then the eunuch Tireus, a servant of the captive queen, escapes and brings Dareios news that she has died in childbirth. Dareios mourns her passing, laments that the queen of the Persians has been denied a proper burial. The eunuch consoles him: Neither in life nor in death did the Macedonian king forget that she was a king's consort, to this day he has held her and Sisygambis and the children in highest honor; he buried the deceased queen in solemn pomp, according to Persian custom, and honored her memory with tears. Startled, Dareios inquires whether she remained chaste and faithful, whether Alexander subjected her, against her will, to his. The eunuch falls to his knees and beseeches the king not to sully the memory of so noble a mistress, not to deny himself in his boundless misfortune the ultimate consolation, that of knowing that he has been defeated by an enemy who seems to be no mere mortal; he swears the most solemn oath that Stateira died faithful and chaste, that Alexander is as virtuous as he is brave. Dareios raises his hands to heaven and implores the gods: "Grant that I may conserve my realm and restore it, so that as victor I may make good to Alexander what he has done for those I love. If, however, I must lose Asia, give the tiara of Cyrus the Great to none other than Alexander."¹

The Great King's levy had been carried into all the satrapies of the realm, of which great tracts, but only a small proportion, had fallen to the enemy. All Iran and Turan, all the land to the headwaters of the Euphrates was still untouched; these were the bravest and most loyal peoples of Asia, who only awaited the king's order to take the field; what were Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor against the immense expanses from the Tauros to the Indus, from the Euphrates to the Jaxartes; what the loss of ever unreliable coastal peoples against the faithful Medes and Persians, against the swarming horsemen of the Baktrian plain and the valiant hill peoples of the Caspian and Kurdish mountains? Since the days of the first Dareios, had it not been just these lost coastal countries and the

exertions of sea power required to keep them that alone endangered and undermined the empire of Cyrus, that entangled Persia, to her destruction, in eternal Hellenic quarreling? What mattered now was to save the interior of the East, to defend the high fortress of Iran, ruler of Asia. The king of kings summoned the noblemen of his clan, the grandsons of the seven princes, and the loyal satraps to lead their peoples into battle for Persian glory and Persian dominion; he put his fate in their hands; no Hellenic hirelings, Hellenic field commanders, or Macedonian fugitives should stir the jealousy and mistrust of his followers; the few thousand foreigners who had fled Issos with him were now united by common misfortune with the sons of Asia; a genuinely Asiatic army would meet the army of Europe before the ramparts of Iran.

The plain of Babylon had been designated the rallying point of the great army of the peoples. From farthest Asia, Bessos, satrap of Baktria, led up Baktrians, their northern neighbors the Sogdians, and the bellicose Indic peoples from the slopes of the Indian Kaukasos; they were joined by the Turkestani horsemen the Sakai under Manakes and the Dahae from the steppes of the Aral Sea. The peoples of Arachosia and Drangiana and the Indic hill tribes of the Paraveti Mountains came under their satrap Barsaentes; their western neighbors from Areia, under the satrap Satibarzanes; Persian, Hyrkanian, and Tapurian riders from Khorasan, land of Iranian warriors, under Phrataphernes and his sons. Then the Medes, once masters of Asia, whose satrap Atropates also led up the Kadousians, Sakasenioi, and Albanians from the valleys of the Kur, the Araxes, and the Sea of Urmea. From the south, from the shores of the Persian Gulf, came the peoples of Gedrosia and Karmania under Orontobates and Ariobarzanes son of Artabazos, the Persians under Orxines of the house of the seven princes. Oxathres son of Abulites, the Susianan satrap, led up the Susianans and the Uxians; the battalions of Babylon gathered under Bupares, those of Armenia under Orontes and Mithraustes, those of the two Syrias under Mazaïos; from Kappadokia, too, whose western edge Alexander had passed through, came mounted warriors under their dynast Ariarathes.² Thus did the Persian king's imperial army muster at Babylon in spring 331: nearly 40,000 horses and hundreds of thousands of men, 200 scythed chariots, and 15 elephants from the Indus. Contrary to custom, it is said, the king armed them himself, especially the riders.³

The first order of business was to devise a plan of action that would enable the Persian army to exploit the sheer weight of its masses and the

speed and force of its immense numbers of horsemen. Two rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris, cut diagonally across the Syrian low country, which runs southward along the foot of the Iranian mountains; the routes from the Mediterranean coasts into upper Asia lead across them. A plan to meet the enemy at one of these crossings was obvious enough, and it was sensible to concentrate the Great King's troops behind the Tigris, which was the more difficult to cross. A lost battle on the Euphrates, furthermore, would have thrown the Great King back into Armenia and exposed Babylon and the main roads into Persis and Media, whereas a position behind the Tigris shielded Babylon, and a battle won would expose the enemy to unhindered pursuit across the wide arid plains of Mesopotamia, one lost would leave open a retreat into the eastern satrapies. Dareios sent no more than a few thousand men under Mazaïos forward to the Euphrates to keep the crossings under surveillance. He himself went from Babylon toward Arbela, a principal town on the great military road that leads across the Lykos onto the great plain of Nineveh, which extends westward to the left bank of the rapid Tigris and northward to the foothills of the Zagros Mountains. There he may have intended to move forward to the banks of the river at Alexander's approach and block his crossing.

While King Dareios stood on the threshold of the eastern half of his empire, prepared to defend it with all the troops it could muster, the last of Persian power in the far west went down to defeat.

What could the Persian fleet not have accomplished in the Hellenic Sea, had it acted in the right way at the right time, had it given its full support to the Peloponnesian rising that King Agis had started! But hesitant, undecided, without a plan, it had let the moment for a decisive offensive pass in summer 333. And still it remained in its western, purely offensive stations, weakened though it was by detachment of the many ships that took the mercenaries to Tripolis, even after Issos, when the Phoenician coast was under imminent threat—a moment when it might have rushed to support Tyre's resistance and stopped its own wavering contingents from defecting and heading home. In spring 332, the Phoenician and Cypriot ships left the fleet and sailed away, and Pharnabazos and Autophradates kept to the Aegean with what was left of their fleet, so reduced now that they were able to hold Tenedos, Lesbos, Chios, and Kos only by the support of tyrants they favored or had installed.⁴ Antipater's watchfulness and steady control had deprived them of all influence in the rest of Hellas, and they had direct contact only with King Agis.

But the movement that Agis had hoped to start in the Peloponnese with their contrivance had stalled as the fleet slowly dispersed; only Crete had been garrisoned, by Agis's brother. During 332 the Macedonian fleet under the nauarchs Hegelochos and Amphoterios had developed such superiority in Greek waters that the Tenedians, who had left Alexander's league and become Persian only under duress, opened their harbor to the Macedonians and returned to the league. The Chians followed: As soon as the Macedonian fleet appeared in their roads, they rose against their tyrants and their Persian garrison and opened their gates. The Persian admiral Pharnabazos, moored with fifteen triremes in the harbor of Chios, and the tyrants of the island surrendered to the Macedonians. Then Aristonikos tyrant of Methymna on Lesbos, sailing by night, brought a few raiders before the harbor, which he thought still in Persian hands, and requested permission to enter; the Macedonian harbor watch admitted him, then cut down his crews and took the tyrant himself in chains to the citadel.

The prestige of Persia and her partisans sank steadily. Rhodes had already sent ten triremes to the Macedonian fleet off Tyre; now the Koans deserted the Persian cause, and while Amphoterios sailed for Kos with sixty ships, Hegelochos took the rest of the fleet to Lesbos, the only island still kept in servitude by tyrants and Persian garrisons. Chares, whose attempt on Methymna had gone awry one year earlier, had now turned up at Mytilene with 2000 mercenaries, occupied the city, and taken on lordly airs in the name of the Persian king. But this old Athenian warrior was not one to play for high stakes; he capitulated in return for safe passage and sailed with his hirelings for the Attic island Imbros, then for Tainaron, the great hiring hall of mercenaries.⁵ Surrender at Mytilene encouraged the other cities on the island: they delivered their tyrants to the Macedonians and adopted democratic constitutions. Then Hegelochos sailed southward to Kos, which Amphoterios had already taken. Only Crete was still garrisoned by Lakedaimon. Amphoterios sailed out to conquer her,⁶ while Hegelochos took his part of the fleet to Egypt to report personally the outcome of the struggle with Persian sea power and deliver the prisoners he and Amphoterios had taken—all except Pharnabazos, who had escaped on Kos. Alexander ordered that the tyrants be returned for trial by the communities they had oppressed; those who had betrayed Chios to Memnon were taken under sharp escort into captivity on the Nile island Elephantine, the southern frontier post of the realm.⁷ By the end of 332, the last of the Persian sea power that could

have threatened the Macedonian rear and hobbled the movements of the army had been destroyed. A series of strongholds that ran from the Thracian Bosporos along the coasts of Asia Minor and Syria to newly founded Alexandria served both to keep control of the subjugated territories and as a broad basis for operations into the East.

The new campaign would lead into an entirely new, strange world, among peoples who would find Hellenic ways foreign and the Macedonians' easy relations with their prince incomprehensible, who thought a king a higher order of being. It cannot have been lost on Alexander that the peoples whom he intended to unite into a single empire would find and acknowledge their unity at first only in him. The sacred shield of Iliion had marked him as hero of Hellas; in the man who loosed the Gordian knot the peoples of Asia Minor had recognized the promised conqueror of Asia; by the sacrifice to Herakles in Tyre and the ceremony in the temple of Ptah in Memphis, the victorious foreigner had made his peace with the conquered peoples and their most sacred customs. Now came a more mystic consecration, a higher dedication that would accompany him into the interior of the East and cause the tribes to recognize him as anointed king of kings, as chosen lord from dawn to darkness.

In the vast Libyan desert, its entrance guarded by a sphinx carved in weather-beaten rock and by the pyramids of the pharaohs half lost in sand, in this solitary, silent desert, which stretches endlessly westward from the edge of the Nile valley and whose sandstorms on a fiery midday wind obliterate the laborious track of camels, lies a green isle, as if in the sea. It is shaded by tall palms, watered by springs and brooks and morning dew, which make it the last setting of life for nature perishing all about, the last rest station for the traveler in the desert. Under the palms of this oasis stands the temple of a mysterious god whom a sacred ship carried long ago from the land of the Ethiopians to hundred-gated Thebes. From Thebes he was drawn across the desert, to dwell at the oasis and manifest himself in mystic form to a questing son. A devout priestly clan lived near the temple, removed from the world in a holy solitude where Ammon Zeus, the god of life, was immanent. The priests lived to serve the god and to pronounce his oracles, which nations near and far sent sacred envoys to hear. The Macedonian king determined to travel to the temple in the desert to ask the great god questions about great things.

What did he want to ask? The Macedonians who accompanied him told one another wonderful tales from earlier times; believed then by

few, derided by many, known to all, they had been revived by this pilgrimage. The men recalled the nocturnal orgies Olympias had celebrated in her native mountains; they knew about her magical arts, for which King Philip had put her aside;⁸ they had heard that he had once secretly observed her in her bed chamber and seen a dragon in her womb. Trusted envoys whom he had sent to Delphi were said to have brought him the god's response: He should sacrifice to great Ammon Zeus and honor him above all other gods. They remembered that Herakles, too, had been born of a mortal mother; they claimed to know that Olympias had told her son the secret of his birth as he was starting for the Hellespont.⁹ Others thought the king might want to ask the god's counsel for his further campaign, as Herakles had done before he set out in quest of the giant Antaios, and Perseus before his voyage to the Gorgons. Both were ancestors of the king and he would gladly follow their example. What he really wanted no one learned; only a handful of troops were to accompany him.

They started at Alexandria and traveled along the coast toward Paraitonion, the first settlement of the Cyrenians, who sent ambassadors and gifts—three hundred war horses and five quadrigas—and requested a league with the king, which he granted them.¹⁰ From that point the way led southward through barren sands, hardly broken by a tree or a hill: all day long heat and dust, the sand so shifting that every step was uncertain; there was no grassy spot for rest, no fountain or spring to slake a traveler's thirst, only the occasional rain shower, like a blessing from the god. They had no track to help them find their way, and the low dunes in this sea of sand, changing shape and changing place with every wind, bewildered their guides, who themselves no longer knew which way the oasis lay. Then a pair of ravens¹¹ appeared ahead of the party, like messengers of the god, and Alexander gave orders to trust the god and follow them. They flew ahead, rested when the men stopped, flew ahead again. Finally the crowns of palms appeared and Ammon's lovely oasis received the king and his train.

Alexander was surprised by the charm of the sacred spot, rich in dates and olives, crystal salt and healing springs, destined by nature to serve the god and shelter his priests. When the king asked to hear the oracle, it is related, the eldest priest received him in the forecourt of the temple, bade his retinue remain outside, and led him into the chamber of the god. After a little while, Alexander returned smiling serenely and assured them that the response had turned out entirely in keeping with his wishes.

He is supposed to have written the same thing to his mother: When he saw her again on his return, he said, he would recount to her the secret oracles he had received.¹² Then he made rich presents to the temple and the hospitable colony at the oasis and returned to Memphis.¹³

Alexander disclosed nothing of the god's response. The more lively therefore was the curiosity and interest of his Macedonians. Wonderful things were related by those who had accompanied him to the Ammonion: The high priest's initial greeting, which they had all heard, was, "Hail, o son," and the king replied, "O father, so be it; I will be your son, make me master of the world." Others made fun of such tales: The priest had merely wanted to greet the king in Greek as "paidion," but in error had said "paidios," which one really could construe as "son of Zeus." The account accepted ultimately as reliable ran: Alexander asked the god if all persons guilty of his father's murder had been punished; the answer came that he should choose his words more carefully; no mortal would ever harm the one who had begotten him; but the murderers of Philip the Macedonian king had all been punished. Then Alexander asked whether he would conquer his enemies, and the god replied that mastery of the world was destined to be his, he would prevail until he returned home to the gods.¹⁴ These and similar stories, which Alexander neither confirmed nor disavowed, served to imbue his person with an air of mystery that stimulated and strengthened popular belief in him and his mission. To educated Hellenes they would need seem no more strange than Herakleitos's remark that the gods are immortal men and men mortal gods, no more strange than the heroic cult of the founders in the newer and older colonies, or the altars and festivals that had been dedicated to Spartan Lysander two generations earlier.

Here it would be appropriate to raise another question, one that will reach the heart of the matter: What did Alexander think was the purpose of this trip to the Ammonion and the mysterious events in the temple there? Did he want to deceive the world? Did he himself believe what he wanted the world to believe? Did he, so clear-headed and free thinking, so certain of what he wanted and what he was able to do, have moments of inner uncertainty in which his mind looked for support and steadiness in the supernal? The question, obviously, goes to the religious and moral predicates of this passionate man's desires and deeds, to the innermost nature of his personality—one could say, to his conscience. Only from this center of his being would we be able to understand him entirely, for

his deeds and actions are a mere periphery, mere segments of a periphery, of which the tradition has brought only fragments down to us.

It is a poet's prerogative to compose characters whose very nature explains what they do and endure in the action that the poet represents. Historical scholarship stands under a different law. It too tries to gain a clear and well-founded picture of the figures whose historical significance it traces. It observes their deeds, gifts, and leanings to the extent that evidence permits; but it cannot penetrate to the place where these things have their origin, their impulse, and their norm. It has no method and no competence to reach the innermost secret of the soul and to determine and judge the moral worth, that is to say, the entire worth of a person. It is enough that historical inquiry is able to produce a kind of substitute for the blanks it cannot fill. It interprets personalities, not in the context of their moral worth, but of their relationship to great historical developments, in the context of their part in lasting achievements or creations; it interprets personalities in their strength or weakness, their plans and arrangements, their gifts and energy to realize these things, and then orders these personalities according to their importance. In so doing, historical inquiry exercises its own proper justice and provides an understanding, not deeper, but broader and more free than purely psychological understanding.

Here we may at least touch upon a point where important strands seem to intersect.

After that remarkable pronouncement by Herakleitos, after Aischylos's "in many names a single form," poets and philosophers of the Hellenic world never ceased to look for deeper meaning in the many divinities and the myths that constituted the religion of the people and to find in this deeper meaning a justification of their own beliefs. To what point Aristotle took this inquiry is well known. Alexander probably read not only the popular dialogue in which Aristotle describes how a glimpse of the splendor of the world and the eternal movement of the stars would persuade the man who first saw these things "that gods really do exist and things so astounding are their workings and their works." The great thinker's lectures may have persuaded Alexander, too, that the earliest epochs saw the heavens and the eternal spheres that turn there as deities and described their activity and effect "in mythic form"; that these myths had been preserved, developed, and wonderfully elaborated "to persuade the many and for the sake of law and custom"; that, however, the true

godhead, the “unmoved mover,” that which had “come into being through no cause but itself,” was immaterial, undivided, and one: pure form, pure spirit, thinking itself, moving without acting, without making, toward which all things are drawn “out of longing” as to the eternally good, the highest purpose.

What then if Alexander encountered at the Ammonion a theology, a symbolism that, by elaborating itself in similar speculation, could bind together into a great, closed system: certainty of a beyond, of its judgment and illumination, of the duties and order of earthly life as a preparation for these things, and of the nature of priesthood and of kingship? Monuments of the ancient pharaonic period speak of “the god who made himself god, who consists in himself, the sole unbegotten begetter in heaven and on earth, the lord of beings that are and are not.” From the evidence of a remarkable inscription at the time of Dareios II and in his honor¹⁵ we know that these reflections were preserved in full vigor and perhaps extended. Here Ammon-Ra is the god who begot himself, who manifests himself in everything that is, who exists from the beginning and endures in all that exists; all other gods are as predicates for him, as expressions of him: “The gods are in your hands and mankind at your feet; you are heaven, you are the abyss; all men praise you as indefatigable in caring for them; their works are made holy for your sake.” The prayer for the king follows: “Bless your son, who sits upon your throne, make him like you, let him rule as king in your high honor; as your figure radiates blessings when you rise as Ra, thus are the works of your son according to your wishes, of Dareios, may he live forever; fear of him, respect for him, the glory of his name, may they be present in the hearts of all men in every land, as fear of you, respect for you are present in the hearts of gods and men.”

If the priests of the Ammonion greeted Alexander as the son of Ammon-Ra, as Zeus-Helios, they did so in the full truthfulness of their religious conviction and of the deeper symbolism in which they understood their theology. Alexander, it is said, listened attentively to the representations of the priest Psammon the “philosopher,” in particular to the effect that every man is ruled by a god (*βασιλεύονται ὑπὸ θεοῦ*), for what is prevalent and powerful in each one is godly; to which Alexander responded: The common father of mankind was indeed god (*τὸν θεόν*), but he chooses the best among them as his special children.

Let us now return to historical events and an important new sequence about to begin in spring 331.

On his return to Memphis, Alexander found many envoys from the Hellenic lands, whom he heard willingly and whose wishes he granted to the extent possible. Fresh troops had also arrived: 400 Hellenic mercenaries under Menidas and 500 Thracian riders under Asklepiodoros;¹⁶ all were integrated into the army as it made preparations for departure. Then Alexander organized the Egyptian administration, making a particular effort to spread authority in this large satrapy of great strategic importance and many influential constituencies. Peukestas Makartatos's son and Balakros Amyntas's son were made strategoi, with civilian authority and command of the troops that were to remain in Egypt, including the garrisons in Pelusion and Memphis, about 4000 men in toto. The nauarch Polemon was made commander of a fleet of 30 triremes; Greek residents and Greek immigrants were placed under a particular authority; Egyptian districts or nomoi retained their nomarchs, to whom they continued to pay contribution at the established rate. Superintendence of all purely Egyptian districts was entrusted first to two Egyptians, then to one; supervision of Libyan districts was given to a Greek; Arab districts came under Kleomenes, a Greek from Egyptian Naukratis who knew the language and customs of the land; he was also to receive the tribute collected by all nomarchs and was charged with responsibility for the construction of Alexandria.¹⁷

Having made these arrangements and a number of promotions in the army, having held a festival in Memphis and made a solemn offering to Zeus the King, Alexander started for Phoenicia in spring 331.¹⁸ As he entered Tyre, his fleet entered Tyre's harbor. His brief time there was passed in magnificent festivals in Hellenic fashion: sacrifices in the temple of Herakles; contests of all kinds by the army; dramas played by the most celebrated actors in Hellas, their choruses composed of Cypriot kings, as was customary, in rivalry with one another for splendor and good taste.¹⁹ The Attic quadrireme Paralia,²⁰ reserved for sacred or state occasions, entered the harbor, bringing ambassadors who congratulated the king and assured him of their city's unbreachable loyalty, a distinction that Alexander acknowledged by releasing the Athenians taken prisoner on the Granikos.

Alexander made provision for a long absence from the western lands. Hellas was quiet, save Sparta and Crete, except for the many pirates who made the seas unsafe, an effect of Persian operations. Amphoteros was ordered to speed the expulsion of the Spartan and Persian garrisons on Crete, then to pursue the pirates and to offer aid and protection to the

Peloponnesians, whom Sparta might press; the Cypriots and the Phoenicians were directed to support him with one hundred ships sent to the Peloponnese. Certain changes of administration were made in the subjected lands. Magnesians Menandros of the companions replaced the Lydian satrap Asandros, who went to recruit in Greece, and Klearchos replaced Menandros as commander of the foreign contingents; the Syrian satrapy was transferred from Menon,²¹ who had not given sufficient attention to the requirements of the army as it passed through, to newly arrived Asklepiodoros; he also received Jordan, where the commander Andromachos had been murdered by the Samaritans, whom Asklepiodoros was charged with punishing.²² Finally, in financial administration, the general treasury was separated from the war chest, and separate central treasuries were set up in Syria and in Asia Minor as far as the Tauros, as already in Egypt. Philoxenos became treasurer for the satrapies west of the Tauros, Koiranos for the Syrian lands and the Phoenician cities, and the war chest went to remorseful Harpalos, whose misdeeds the king had pardoned, whether out of friendship or political considerations.

Then the army broke camp in Tyre and marched down the great military road along the Orontes toward the Euphrates, perhaps taking on reinforcements from the garrisons in Asia Minor. Toward the beginning of August it reached Thapsakos,²³ the usual crossing point; it numbered about 40,000 infantry and 7000 riders. A division of Macedonians had been sent ahead to throw two bridges over the river, but these could not be completed. Persian Mazaios, sent to cover the river, already stood on the far bank with 10,000 men,²⁴ and the much smaller Macedonian advance unit could not extend the bridges to the other side. Mazaios withdrew hastily before the grand army's advance: he could do no more than delay Alexander, and that was of no particular advantage to Dareios, who had finished his preparations.

Alexander ordered the bridges completed and his army crossed. Even if he assumed that the Persian army was awaiting battle on the plain of Babylon, where it had mustered, he could not take the route down along the Euphrates, like the Ten Thousand seventy years earlier. The deserts through which it runs would have been too arduous at the height of summer and the provisioning of so large an army immensely difficult. He chose instead the great northern route, which runs northeastward over Nisibis through the cooler hill country rich in willows that the Macedonians later called Mygdonia and down the right bank of the Tigris onto the plain of Babylon.

A handful of enemy riders prowling the area were captured one day and brought before the king. They stated under questioning that Dareios had marched out of Babylon and was standing on the left bank of the Tigris, determined to oppose his enemy's crossing with all his might; his numbers were now much larger than in the passes at Issos; they themselves had been sent out to reconnoiter, so that the Persians could array themselves against the Macedonians on the Tigris at the right time and the right place.

Alexander probably expected Dareios to invest and hold the area around Nineveh, where the usual military road crosses the river. He wanted to find himself on the same side of the river as the enemy as soon as possible, but he could not risk crossing a river as wide and rapid as the Tigris under a Persian barrage; he would have to cross where he would not be noticed. Alexander changed his route and went in forced marches northeast toward Bedzabde,²⁵ while Dareios awaited him on the great plain of ruined Nineveh. Far from the enemy, the troops began to wade across the racing Tigris; they reached the east bank exhausted but without losses. Alexander gave them a day of rest, and they pitched camp along the hilly riverbank. It was September 20.²⁶

At evening, as the first night watches took up position along the river and in the hills, the full moon lighted a landscape that many thought resembled the Macedonian hill country. Then the light of the moon dimmed, and soon the entire disc was obscured. That seemed to be a sign. Worried soldiers came out of their tents. Some feared the anger of the gods; others recalled that Xerxes on his march toward Greece had seen an eclipse of the sun at Sardeis of which his magi had said that the sun was the star of the Hellenes, the moon the star of the Persians; now the gods were shrouding the Persians' star as a portent of their approaching end. Aristander, reader of signs, told Alexander that the omen was favorable and that he would join battle within the month. Alexander sacrificed to Moon, Sun, and Earth, and these omens, too, promised victory. They set out at daybreak to meet the Persians.

The Macedonian army moved southward, keeping the foothills of the Gordyaian mountains on its left, the swift Tigris on its right, and saw no trace of the enemy. On September 24, at last, scouts reported enemy cavalry on the plain, in unknown numbers. The army formed up rapidly and advanced in battle order. A second report came: The enemy numbered about 1000 horse. Alexander had the king's cavalry squadron, another squadron of companions, and the Paionian skirmishers mount

and took them rapidly forward, while the rest of the army followed more slowly. When the Persians spotted the Macedonians galloping toward them, they raced away. Alexander pursued; most escaped, some fell and were either killed or taken prisoner.²⁷ Those brought before Alexander told him that Dareios stood not much farther south, on a great level plain²⁸ near Gaugamela on the Bumodos,²⁹ that his army probably numbered one million men and more than forty thousand horses, that they themselves had been sent out under Mazaios to reconnoiter. Alexander had the army halt immediately and pitch camp, which it fortified with care:³⁰ near such overwhelming numbers, the greatest caution was in order. The men were given four days' rest, which they used to prepare for battle.

When no further enemy troops were sighted, the Macedonian officers concluded that Dareios had occupied an area favorable to his fighting forces and was not going to let delay by the enemy or his own impatience lure him onto awkward terrain, as at Issos. Alexander decided to advance toward him. Leaving its baggage and its invalids in camp, the army moved out about the second watch of the night from 29 to 30 September; toward morning it had come within sixty stades of the enemy, still concealed by a last line of hills.³¹ Thirty stades farther on, the army came over the hills, and Alexander saw the dark outline of the enemy line about an hour away on the great plain. He halted his columns and convened companions, generals, ilarchs, and captains of allied and hired troops to consider whether they should attack immediately or encamp and fortify themselves and scout out the battlefield. Most favored immediate battle, for the army was eager to fight. Parmenion, however, advised caution: The troops were fatigued by the march; the Persians would have used their protracted time here to arrange this already favorable position to their every advantage; it was impossible to tell whether they had not protected their lines by driving stakes and digging pitfalls; the rules of war obliged the arriving army to pitch camp and take its bearings. The old field marshal's opinion prevailed. Alexander ordered his army to encamp on the hills in full view of the enemy in the order in which they would enter combat. It was the morning of September 30.

Dareios had long expected the Macedonians and had cleared the great plain of all obstacles that could interfere with charges by his cavalry and his scythed chariots; he had even removed brambles and leveled the odd sand dune.³² Nonetheless, he learned of Alexander's approach and of his own outposts' hasty withdrawal under Mazaios with misgiving. But the

proud confidence of his satraps, undisturbed now by any unbidden naysayer; the endless ranks of his army, to whom no Charidemus or Amyntas could presume to prefer, with reason, the little serried ranks of Macedonians; finally, wishful thinking, which so easily mistakes illusion for well-weighed strength and would rather hear the reassuring words of flatterers than the earnest warnings of experience, soon enabled him to recover calm and confidence. His grandees had no difficulty persuading him that he had been defeated at Issos, not by the enemy, but by the narrow battlefield; now he had room for the battle lust of his hundreds of thousands, for the scythes on his war chariots, for his Indian elephants. The time had come for the Macedonian to learn what an imperial Persian army was.

On the morning of September 30, the Persians saw the Macedonian army emerge on the line of hills to the north, arranged in order and grouped for battle. They expected immediate attack, and the army of the peoples also arranged itself for battle over the great plain. No attack came. They watched the enemy pitch camp; calm descended; only a band of riders, mixed with a few light infantry, advanced down the slope to the plain and, without approaching the Persian lines, returned to camp. Evening came. Did the enemy intend to attack in the night? The Persian camp, without trench or mound, would have offered no protection, so the tribes were ordered to pass the night under arms and in battle order and to keep their horses in harness and at hand near the watch fires. Dareios rode along the lines in the night to inspire his peoples by showing himself and speaking to them. On the extreme left wing stood Bessos's tribes: Baktrians, Dahae, Sogdians, with one hundred scythed chariots arranged in front of them; pushed forward on the left to cover them were one thousand Baktrian riders and the Massagete Scyths, armored man and horse. To Bessos's right, the Arachosians and mountain Indians;³³ then a mass of Persians, mixed cavalry and infantry; then the Susians and Kadousians, who adjoined the center. In the center, the noblest Persian divisions, the so-called kinsmen of the king and bodyguard of apple-bearers; on their two sides, the remaining Greek mercenaries in Persian service; also in the center, the Indians with their elephants, the so-called Karians, descendants of exiles to the upper satrapies; finally, the Mardaite archers, with fifty scythed chariots before them. To strengthen the center, which had broken so quickly on the Pinaros, the Uxians, the Babylonians, the coastal tribes of the Persian Gulf, and the

Sitakenians were ranged behind it. These double and triple battle lines seemed tight enough and firm enough to receive the king in their center. On the right wing, next to the Mardaites, stood the Albanians and the Sakasenioi; then Phrataphernes with his Parthyaiaians, Hyrkanians, Tapuri-ans, and Sakai; then Atropates with the Median tribes; next to them the tribes of the two Syrias; and at the tip of the right wing the Kappadokian and Armenian riders, with fifty scythed chariots before them.

The night passed peacefully. When Alexander returned from reconnoitering the battlefield with the Macedonian riders and light infantry, he convened his officers and indicated that he intended to attack next day. He knew their courage and that of their troops, proven in more than one victory, he told them; it might be more necessary to restrain that courage than to urge it on; above all, they should remind their men to advance in silence, so that they could raise the battle hymn the more terrifyingly at the moment of storm; they themselves should be at pains to mark his signals quickly and obey them instantly, so that all movements would proceed rapidly and precisely; they should bear in mind that the outcome of the day depended on each one of them; they were fighting now, not for Syria or Egypt, but for possession of the East; this engagement would decide who should rule. The officers responded with a loud cheer; the king dismissed them and ordered the troops to take their evening meal and get some rest. A few intimates were still present when Parmenion came into Alexander's tent, it is told, and spoke with some trepidation of the endless number of Persian watch fires and the muffled roar carried over on the night air; the enemy's superiority was such that they could not be taken on in daylight and on an open battlefield; he would advise a night attack; the effect of surprise would be heightened by darkness. Alexander is said to have replied that he did not steal his victories.³⁴ Legend also has it that Alexander retired shortly thereafter and slept soundly the rest of the night. It was already full day, everything was ready for moving out, and there was still no sign of the king. Aged Parmenion finally had to go into Alexander's tent and call his name three times before he awoke and armed himself quickly.

On the morning of October 1,³⁵ the Macedonian army moved out of its camp on the high ground, leaving Thracian infantry to guard the baggage. It arranged itself in battle order on the plain: in the center, the six regiments of the phalanx; to their right, the shieldbearers and the eight squadrons of the Macedonian cavalry; left of the phalanx and of Krateros's regiment, the allied cavalry, then the Thessalian; the Pharsalian

squadron, the strongest of the Thessalian cavalry, formed the tip of the left wing, which Parmenion commanded. At the tip of the right wing, with which Alexander would make the opening assault, and adjacent to the king's squadron, stood part of the Agrianians and the archers, and Balakros with the javelin throwers. They would necessarily be outflanked by superior enemy numbers; yet Alexander could risk removing from the offensive line, whose initial shock would be decisive, only the forces absolutely necessary to cover the rear and the flanks of the attack line. He therefore formed a second battle line on left and right, behind the wings; if the enemy threatened the rear of the battle line, these troops were to face about and form a second front; if the enemy attacked on a flank, they were to make a quarter turn to form a line at right angles to the battle line. The reserve troops of the left wing consisted of: the Thracian infantry, part of the allied horse under Koiranos, the Odrysian horse under Agathon, and at the far left, the hired horsemen under Andromachos. On the right wing: Kleandros with the veteran mercenaries, half the archers under Brison, half the Agrianians under Attalos, then Aretes with the sarissa bearers, Ariston with the Paionian riders, and on the far right, the newly recruited Hellenic riders under Menidas, who would make their first trial of arms in the most dangerous position.

The two armies begin to advance on one another. Alexander with the Macedonian riders and the rest of the right wing is opposite the enemy center, the elephants of the Indians, the heart of the enemy army, the double battle line; the entire left wing of the enemy extends beyond his line. From his right flank he orders to advance to the right on the diagonal.³⁶ Kleitos's squadron and the light infantry to its right, then the second squadron, the third, and so on, the shieldbearers, and so forth, one division after another in echelons—movements that his troops execute in deep silence and in perfect order, while the great masses of the enemy fall into some confusion as they attempt to launch a countermovement out of their left flank. Their line still extends far beyond the Macedonian, and the Scythian riders of the outermost wing trot forward to attack the light troops on Alexander's flank. Undistracted, Alexander continues to move right on the diagonal; he will soon have moved out beyond the ground leveled for scythed chariots. The Persian king has set great store by their annihilating break through enemy lines, and one hundred stand here at the ready. Dareios orders the Scythian riders and the one thousand Baktrian riders to box in the enemy wing and stop its advance. Alexander sends the Hellenic riders under Menidas against them; their numbers

are too small and they are repulsed. The movement of the Macedonian front line requires unyielding resistance at this spot, and the Paionian riders under Ariston are sent forward to support Menidas. The two cavalries combine³⁷ and charge with such force that the Scyths and one thousand Baktrians are thrown back. At just this moment the main mass of Baktrian riders rushes past Alexander's wing, the scattered riders rally to them, and the entire number descends on Menidas and Ariston; heavy combat follows; the Scyths, armored man and horse, press the Paionians and veterans hard; many fall but they give no ground; squadron after squadron, they counterattack and drive the enemy's superior numbers back momentarily.

The Macedonian front meanwhile has advanced farther and farther right on the diagonal; the Macedonian cavalry and the shieldbearers have moved up opposite the hundred scythed chariots of the Persian left and these break loose. But the Agrianians and the archers receive them with a great shout and a hail of arrows, stones, and spears; many are stopped here, their rearing horses caught by the reins and impaled, the harness cut, the charioteers pulled off their platforms; the rest, racing toward the shieldbearers, are met by battalions standing shield-on-shield with pikes extended and stopped as their horses fall, or they plunge through openings that the battalions create as they double up left and right, unharmed and doing no harm until they fall into the hands of the grooms in the rear.

The massive Persian line, which has been moving left, begins to advance as if to attack, while Menidas and Ariston can hardly hold their own in the cavalry engagement on Alexander's flank. Now perhaps within bowshot of the enemy, Alexander orders a more rapid advance and at the same time sends Aretas with the sarissa bearers and the last remaining cavalry of the second battle line to the aid of Menidas's and Ariston's hard-pressed riders. When the Persians see this movement, the adjacent riders of their wing trot after the Baktrians, creating a gap. This is the moment Alexander has been waiting for. He gives the signal to charge³⁸ and gallops forward at the head of Kleitos's squadron; the other squadrons and the shieldbearers raise the battle cry and follow at a dead run. This wedge attack shatters the enemy line; the next phalanges, Koinos's and Perdikkas's, have already come up; with pikes extended they storm into the battle packs of Susianans and Kadousians, into the squads that cover King Dareios's chariot. There is no more stopping them; no further resistance is possible. Face to face with a raging enemy, in the midst of the most sudden, the wildest, noisiest confusion, helpless before a personal danger that grows every moment,

Dareios despairs and turns his chariot. After a brave defense, the Persians follow to protect their king's flight. The second battle line is swept up in the flight and the confusion. The center has been annihilated.

At the same time, the vehemence of Aretas's attack has decided the cavalry engagement behind the line; the Scythian, Baktrian, and Persian riders flee, hotly pursued by sarissa bearers and Hellenic and Paionian riders. The Persians' left wing is also annihilated.

Not so the Persian right. Alexander's heavy troops were not able to follow the rapid movements of the attack with their ranks closed. A gap opened between the last regiment, Krateros's, and the nearest on the right, under Simmias: upon seeing Krateros and indeed Parmenion's entire wing in grave danger, Simmias had halted. Some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry in the enemy's center entered that gap, plunged through the second battle line, and reached the camp, where the few Thracians, lightly armed and expecting no attack, are scarcely able to hold them at the gates. Then the prisoners erupt, fall upon them from behind. The Thracians are overcome; the jubilant barbarians rush through the camp, looting and killing. The captains on the left of the second line, Sitalkes, Koiranos, Odrysian Agathon, Andromachos, see what has happened, face about, and bring their troops into the camp, where they set upon the looters and defeat them in a short struggle; those who survive rush back to the battlefield in disorder, and onto the pikes of the Macedonian cavalry.

Meanwhile, the rest of the Indians and Persians and the Parthyaian riders had fallen into the flank of the Thessalian cavalry. Parmenion appealed to Alexander for help. The king is supposed to have responded that Parmenion must be mad to call for help at such a moment; with sword in hand, he would have to prevail or die.³⁹ Nonetheless, Alexander abandons his pursuit of Dareios to bring all available troops⁴⁰ against the Persian right wing, which is still standing. He encounters first the Persians, Indians, and Parthyaiaians retreating from the camp, who quickly form up into squads of some depth. The cavalry engagement that follows is ferocious and long in doubt; the Persians are fighting for their lives, every man for himself; nearly sixty companions fall; many are badly wounded, including Hephaistion and Menidas. The Persians who finally cut their way out take flight.

Before Alexander fought his way through to the Persian right wing, the Thessalian riders had stood up to Mazaios and beaten back the massed Kappadokian, Median, and Syrian cavalry; they were already in pursuit

when Alexander reached them. Seeing that here, too, the job was done, Alexander galloped back and in the direction Dareios seemed to have taken across the battlefield, and pursued as long as there was light. He reached the Lykos, four hours beyond the battlefield, and found a terrible tangle of fleeing barbarians, made the more horrible by gathering darkness, renewed carnage, and the collapse of the bridge over the river. They gave way to Alexander and his horsemen, but both horses and riders were exhausted and he was obliged to let them rest for a few hours. About midnight, as the moon rose, they started again for Arbela, where they hoped to take Dareios, his field kit, and his treasure. They arrived in daylight; Dareios was already gone; his treasure, his chariot, his bow and shield, his field kit and that of his grandees—enormous booty—fell into Alexander's hands. Parmenion meanwhile had taken possession of the enemy camp back on the Bumodos, of elephants and camels, wagons and pack animals for the immense baggage.

According to Arrian, the great victory on the plain of Gaugamela cost the Macedonian cavalry alone 60 dead;⁴¹ more than 1000 horses had fallen or been killed, and half of these belonged to the Macedonian cavalry. The highest reported figure for Macedonian dead is 500, which seems to stand in no relationship to the Persian dead, reported at 30,000, even 90,000 troops, unless one considers how superbly the Macedonians were armed for close combat and thus protected from mortal wounds and that, typically, real slaughter began only with pursuit after battle. All battles, not just those of ancient times, prove that losses among troops in flight are unbelievably greater than losses among troops in combat.⁴²

After this battle, Dareios's power was broken.⁴³ From his shattered forces, a few thousand Baktrian riders, a few remnants of the Greek mercenaries, about 2000 men under Aitolian Glaukias and Phokian Patron, and the apple-bearers and kinsmen reassembled: in toto, an army of about 3000 cavalry and 6000 infantry. Dareios took these with him in unbroken flight northeastward over the passes of Media toward Ecbatana.⁴⁴ He hoped that there he would be safe from this terrible foe, at least for the moment, and could wait to see whether Alexander would content himself with the riches of Susa and Babylon and leave him with Old Persia, separated from the Aramaic low country by the ramparts of powerful mountains. Should the insatiable conqueror nonetheless scale the high fortress of Iran, the Great King planned to flee, laying waste as he went, over the northern slopes of the highlands toward Baktria, last refuge of his diminishing realm.

Among the great mass of routed troops that fled south toward Susa and Persia, about 25,000, others say 40,000, reassembled.⁴⁵ Under the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes Artabazos's son, they invested the Persian passes and carefully dug themselves in behind. If the empire could still be saved anywhere, it was here. It might have been saved, if Dareios had not bolted, had not fled to the northern slope of Iran and left the southern satrapies to their own devices and those of their satraps. These men were not all of Ariobarzanes's turn of mind. Now in a position as attractive as it was difficult, they might consider themselves well rid of their fugitive lord and pursue hopes of long desired independence, or gain more from voluntary submission to a generous victor than they had lost by their king's flight. If Dareios had dared to make a stand for his kingdom at the gates of Persia, the tribes would have come together again to fight in their own fashion and might have succeeded in defending their land's natural frontiers, which had withstood attack so often and so well historically. By Dareios's flight, these bellicose horsemen and highwaymen, whom Alexander subdued late and with difficulty, when he dared attack them at all, were left to themselves and to a lost cause that had not had the least benefit of their excellences. In the deepening muddle into which Dareios now sank, prepared to try anything to salvage something, the results of Alexander's victory at Gaugamela gathered into an avalanche and swept away the Persian empire.

Alexander pursued neither the Great King up the mountain passes nor the fugitives down the road to Susa. He proceeded instead along the foothills of the mountains on the Iranian frontier⁴⁶ toward Babylon, queen of the broad Aramaic low country and center of the Persian empire since the days of Dareios Hystaspes; possession of this great city was the foremost prize of Gaugamela. Alexander expected to meet resistance; he knew how immense the "walls of Semiramis" were, how a network of canals encircled them, how long the city had withstood siege by Cyrus and by Dareios. He learned that Mazaios, who had held the field longest and most successfully at Arbela, had then moved quickly into Babylon; he had reason to fear that he would have to repeat scenes from Halikarnassos and Tyre. Therefore he approached Babylon with an army prepared for combat. But the gates were thrown open, and Babylonians bearing garlands and gifts, led by Chaldaeans, the elders of the city, and Persian officials, came out to meet him. Mazaios surrendered the city, the citadel, and the treasury, and the victorious king marched into the immense city of Semiramis.

The troops were given a long rest. This was the first truly eastern great city they saw. Enormous, full of astonishing structures—the huge wall, the hanging gardens of Semiramis, the ziggurat of Belos, which Xerxes's wild rage over disgrace at Salamis had attacked in vain—of endless masses of people who streamed together here from Arabia and Armenia, from Persia and Syria, of extravagant luxury and the sensuousness of life, offering an endless variety of exquisite pleasures and choicest indulgence, the whole fabulous enchantment of eastern pleasure-seeking, it fell to the sons of the West as prize for so many hardships endured and victories won. Well might the tough Macedonian, the wild Thracian, the hot-blooded Greek drink the joy of life and of victory in full drafts here and revel on fragrant carpets, with golden chalices, in the loud rejoicings of Babylonian banquets, well might he heighten enjoyment with desire even more wild, and burning longing with new enjoyment, and with both, his thirst for new deeds and new victories. Thus Alexander's army began to accustom itself to Asiatic life and to reconcile itself with and meld with those whom centuries of prejudice had hated, despised, and called barbarian; a ferment of East and West began, preparing a future in which each would lose itself in the other.

It may have been clear thinking or pure luck or necessity—in any case, Alexander took the right measures and the only possible ones. Here in Babylon as nowhere else, local custom prevailed, unquestioned and complete. Asia Minor stood close to Hellenic life; Egypt and Syria were accessible to it and in contact with it on a shared sea; Greek customs had long since been introduced into Phoenicia by the households of rich merchants and many princes; they were known and at home on the Nile delta by the effect of Greek settlements, of Cyrene's proximity, and of manifold relations with Hellenic states since pharaonic times. Babylon, by contrast, lay removed from all contact with the West, far downstream between the rivers, in Aramaic country, which had looked more to India and Arabia than to Europe for reasons of situation, trade, custom, religion, and hundreds of years of history. The Babylonians were possessed of an ancient culture; down through the centuries they wrote a cuneiform script on clay tablets, observed and calculated the course of the stars, counted and measured by a perfected metric system, and made themselves unchallenged masters of all technical matters. Into this strange, multifarious popular life, sufficient unto itself, now came the first Hellenic elements, insignificant among the mass of local ones, superior only in a capacity to adapt to them.

One further point: Persian power had been defeated in the field, but it had not been conquered or destroyed. If Alexander wanted to supplant the Great King and rule as a Macedonian and a Hellene, he had already gone too far when he crossed the frontiers of western lands and carried his conquests beyond the Syrian desert. If he wanted the peoples of Asia to change nothing more than the name of their servitude, if indeed he wanted to make them feel the harsher and more humiliating oppression of a higher and bolder stage of intellectual development, their obedience was not assured even in a moment of victory, and a burst of popular rage, a plague, a doubtful success would have sufficed to sweep away any self-indulgent illusion of conquest.

With respect to volume, Alexander's control was far slighter than the land mass of Asia and the masses of population; his control would have to find its justification in the benefits it brought the conquered peoples, and its foundation and future in their assent. It would have to establish itself by recognizing native customs, law, and religion as far as was consistent with preserving the realm. What the Persians had suppressed and gladly would have stamped out, what only their weakness or unconcern had allowed to persist *de facto*, but not *de jure*, these things would have to be allowed to reconstitute themselves and come into immediate contact with Hellenic life, and eventually to blend with it. Had the marvelous colonial development of the Hellenes not taken just this course over the centuries? Had their gift for comprehending, recognizing, reaching terms with and then blending with foreign things not created a wealth of vital new structures? By hellenizing had it not heightened Hellenism in quantity and quality, among the Scyths of Tauris as among the Africans on the Syrtis, in Kilikia as at the Celtic mouth of the Rhone? As proof that Alexander's thinking took this direction we have the festivals he celebrated in local fashion in Memphis and Tyre, and Jerusalem, too, his renovation of the temples Xerxes had plundered in Babylon, his restoration of the tower of Belos, and his reinstatement of the cult of Babylonian deities as free and as opulent as in Nebuchadnezzar's time. Thus he won over the peoples by returning them to themselves and their native way of life; he enabled them to participate actively and immediately in the fabric of the rule he intended to establish, where the differences between the lands of the setting sun and those of the rising sun, between Hellenes and barbarians, that had dominated history would give way to the unity of a universal monarchy.

How then was this empire to be organized and administered, in what political and military form should the intention that would give the norm

for civil and ecclesiastic entities be carried out? If the satraps, the king's entourage, the grandees of the empire, and the army were henceforth to be only Macedonians and Hellenes, then the intended unification was but a pretext or an illusion, local ways were not recognized but merely tolerated, the past was connected to the future only by misfortune and painful memories, and in the place of Asiatic domination, which at least had arisen in the same part of the world, a foreign yoke had been imposed, unnatural and far heavier. The answer to these questions points to the catastrophe in Alexander's epic, the worm in the root of his greatness, the fatality of his conquests, which will conquer him.

While the king of Persia flees into the distance, Alexander begins to deck himself in the splendor of the Persian kingdom, to gather the grandees of Persia about himself, to make terms with the name he fought and humbled, to add an eastern nobility to the Macedonian nobility. Since autumn 334, Mithrines of Sardeis, and since the fall of Tyre and Gaza, Mazakes and Amminapes of Egypt enjoy office under Alexander. Gaugamela broke the pride and the self-confidence of the Persian grandees; now they begin to see things with new eyes; they change sides and sympathies when they see Mithrines awarded the prized satrapy of Armenia, Mazaios, who had fought Alexander as bravely as any, awarded the rich Babylonian satrapy. Much of the Persian nobility abandons the cause of the fugitive Achaimenid and gathers around the victor.

It was only natural that Alexander should accommodate them to the extent possible. But it was equally natural that he should station an armed force made up of Macedonian troops and placed under a Macedonian commander beside a newly installed or retained Persian satrap; just as natural that the finances of the satrapies should be removed from the competence of the satrap and the raising of tribute awarded to Macedonians. Thus it was in the Babylonian satrapy. For the raising of tribute, Asklepíodoros was installed beside Mazaios; a strong garrison under Agathon Parmenion's brother⁴⁷ took up quarters in the citadel in Babylon; and Apollodoros of Amphipolis became strategos of the troops assigned the satrap. Menes, one of the seven bodyguards, furthermore, was made hyparch of Syria, Phoenicia, and Kilikia and assigned troops sufficient to secure the great road from Babylon to the coast and transport between Europe and the East, a necessary defense also against marauding Bedouin tribes in the desert. The initial transport was a sum of about 3000 silver talents, a part of it to make Antipater more effective in the war that was just beginning against Sparta, the rest for widest possible recruitment for the grand army.

During the approximately thirty days that Alexander passed in Babylon, Susa, home to the Persian ceremonial court and the royal treasury, had been acquired without hostilities. From Arbela, Alexander had detached Macedonian Philoxenos,⁴⁸ apparently with a corps of light troops, to secure the city and the treasury. Philoxenos now reported that Susa had surrendered voluntarily, that the treasury was safe, and that the satrap Abulites had thrown himself on Alexander's mercy.⁴⁹ Twenty days after leaving Babylon, Alexander arrived in Susa;⁵⁰ he promptly took possession of the immense treasure, heaped up since the days of the first Persian kings in the high citadel, the Kissian Memnonion of Greek poets. It consisted of 50,000 talents in gold and silver alone⁵¹ and huge stores of royal purple, incense, and precious stones, the entire household apparatus of the most opulent of all courts, and booty taken repeatedly from Greece in Xerxes's time, notably the bronze statues of the tyrannicides Harmodios and Aristogeiton, which Alexander returned to the Athenians.

While the army was still in Susa and on the banks of the Choaspes, the strategos Amyntas, who had been sent home from Gaza twelve months earlier to fetch reinforcements, arrived with fresh troops.⁵² Their integration into the various divisions of the army⁵³ marked the beginning of a reorganization that would continue into the following year and profit from lessons learned as the war was carried into the upper satrapies. As a first step, the squadrons of the Macedonian cavalry were formed into two *lochoi*, effectively doubling their tactical value. We shall return to this reorganization. It introduces the great transformation that proceeded logically from the task Alexander had set himself and the conditions necessary for its realization, however one judges Alexander in this context.

About the middle of December, Alexander started for the royal cities of Persis, whose possession popular thinking equated with mastery of Asia. On the throne of the Great Kings, in the palaces of Cyrus, Dareios, and Xerxes, Alexander wanted to proclaim the fall of the Achaimenid dynasty. He settled matters in Susiana: confirmed the satrap Abulites, entrusted the citadel of Susa to Mazaros,⁵⁴ appointed Archelaos field captain of the satrapy with a corps of 3000 men. He made the palaces of Susa the official residence of Dareios's mother and his children, whom he had kept with him, and gave them a royal court; he is said to have placed learned Greeks at this court in hopes that the princesses would learn Greek.⁵⁵ Then he set out for Persia.

Not the least of the tactical difficulties that make Alexander's campaigns remarkable was topography in unknown territory. He would now proceed

from the lowlands into upper Iran, into countrysides of whose configuration, dimensions, strategic aids, roads, and climate the entire Greek world knew next to nothing. We may assume that Alexander had formed an approximate notion of the geography of the areas he was entering from informants among the Persians now in his suite. Detailed information had to be gathered from immediate circumstances and local inquiry.

The first great task was negotiating the very difficult passes between the plains of Susiana and the royal cities of upper Persis. The road that Alexander took, or rather opened, was the one that had been built for the court's processions between Susa and Persepolis. It led through the very fertile Susianan plain over the Kopratas (Dezful) and the Eulaios (Kuran at Shushtar), which join to form the Pasitigris and flow into the "Erythraian Sea," then over two rivers whose ancient names can no longer be established, the Jerahi near Ram Hormoz and the Tab (Arosis?).⁵⁶ Between them a pass leads from the plain into the mountains, apparently the pass that the ancients called the Pass of the Uxians.⁵⁷ For the Uxians lived partly on the plain and partly in the mountains to the northeast. Only those on the plain had submitted to the Great King; those in the mountains controlled the road and let the Persian court pass only in return for rich gifts.

The same frontier mountains of upper Iran that reach down close to the Tigris near Niniveh continue southeastward along the edge of the plain of the Susianans and the Uxians, climbing in numerous terraces to the snowline; farther southeast, where the Erythraian Sea cuts inland, replacing the plain, the terraces mounting from the coast multiply into eight or nine mountain chains, above which one sees the snowy peaks of Kuh-i-Baena rise at the center, twenty miles from the sea. The "highway" that crosses the Uxian passes leads into this labyrinth of mountain chains, cascading mountain streams, small plateaus and connecting passes toward Behbahan, then southeastward over the plain of Lasther, farther east to the plain of Basht, then onto the plain of Fahijan, enclosed by mountains so high that the village lies in sunlight only in the morning, in shadow for the rest of the day. This valley runs eastward until the cone-shaped rock Kelah-i-Sefid, a fastness on its pinnacle, blocks the way entirely. These are the Persian passes on the road over Shiraz to Persepolis.⁵⁸ To avoid them, one turns south at Fahijan and reaches Shiraz over Kazerun, "bad cliff road up and down." Alexander's march shows that one can go north around the pass, that from the Tab one can take a shorter way than the highway. At Behbahan a way leads left toward the northeast, mounts the

next higher terrace at Tang-i-tekab, and seems then to lead into the main road at Basht; at Fahijan again a way is indicated that runs due north into the mountains and descends beyond Kelah-i-Sefid onto a little plateau behind the fastness. Thus the roads that Alexander could take to reach Persepolis and Pasargadai.⁵⁹

The season was anything but favorable. The mountains must have been deep in snow; the many bivouacs between distant settlements and the cold nights must have made a difficult march even more so. In addition, Alexander could expect resistance from the Uxians and more resistance yet from Ariobarzanes, who had dug himself in on the higher passes with an important force. He pressed on toward Persia nonetheless, not merely to assure himself of the land, the treasures of Persepolis and Pasargadai, and the way into the interior, but also and especially so that the Persian king would not have time to make elaborate preparations and come down from Media to defend the cradle of the Persian kingdom and the high portal of the Achaimenids behind the difficult Persian passes.

Alexander marched over the plain of Susiana, crossed the Pasitigris,⁶⁰ and entered the territory of the valley Uxians, conquered by the Persian king and governed by the Susianan satrap, who surrendered without resistance. The mountain Uxians, by contrast, sent delegates to announce that Alexander could pass into Persis only if he paid them the same consideration they had received from the Persian kings. Alexander had no intention of leaving anything as important as free passage into the high country in the hands of a defiant mountain tribe. He replied that they should come into the passes and fetch their portion there.

With the agema and other shieldbearers and about 8000 mostly light troops, and conducted by Susianan guides, he turned by night onto a very difficult uninvested mountain track⁶¹ and reached the settlements of the foe at daybreak. Most of those whom the Macedonians found at home they murdered in their beds; they plundered the houses and put them to the torch, then moved quickly into the passes, which Uxians coming from all sides had closed. Alexander sent Krateros with part of the army up onto the slopes behind the invested way into the passes while he advanced on the passes very swiftly with ranks closed. Taken by surprise, cut off and deprived of all the advantages of their position, the barbarians scattered and fled. Many plunged into the chasms, many were slain by pursuing Macedonians and even more by Krateros's men, whom they met when they tried to flee up the slopes. Alexander first intended to remove all the mountain Uxians from these parts, but Sisygambis the

queen mother interceded, prompted, it is said, by Madates, husband to her niece. At her request, Alexander left these sheep-herding tribes in their hill country, under an annual tribute of 1000 horses, 500 draft animals, and 30,000 sheep; they had neither coined money nor land under cultivation.⁶²

Thus was a way opened into the high mountains. And while Parmenion led half the army—the more heavily armed infantry,⁶³ the Thessalian riders, and the baggage train—along the military road, Alexander took the Macedonian infantry, the cavalry, the sarissa bearers, the Agrianians, and the archers at speed up the nearest, very difficult mountain track toward the Persian passes.⁶⁴ Five days of forced marches brought him to their entrance, which he found barricaded by mighty walls,⁶⁵ the satrap Ariobarzanes, word had it, was standing on the other side with 40,000 infantry and 700 riders, holding a fortified position and intent on blocking the entrance at all costs. Alexander pitched camp. Next morning he ventured between high cliffs onto the pass, intending to attack the wall. He was received by a hail of sling stones and arrows and an avalanche of boulders rolled down from above by an enemy on three sides. A few Macedonians tried to scale the cliff face and failed: the enemy's position was impregnable. Alexander withdrew to camp, an hour before the pass.⁶⁶

He had arrived at a difficult juncture: Only this pass led to Persepolis; it would have to be taken to spare him a dangerous delay; but these cliff faces seemed to defeat the ultimate exertions of art and courage; yet everything depended on taking the passes. From prisoners Alexander learned that the mountains were densely forested, that the tracks leading across were few and dangerous and even more dangerous under the snow now on the mountains, and finally that these tracks were the only way to go around the passes and reach the terrain that Ariobarzanes had invested. Alexander decided to undertake what may have been the most dangerous expedition of his career.

Krateros remained in camp with his phalanx and Meleagros's, part of the archers, and 500 cavalry: by watch fires and other means he was to conceal Alexander's division of his forces; then, when Macedonian trumpets signaled him from the other side of the mountains, he was to storm the wall full-force. Alexander set out in the night with the divisions Amyntas, Perdikkas, and Koinos,⁶⁷ with the shieldbearers and the Agrianians, part of the archers, and most of the cavalry under Philotas, climbed more than two very difficult miles, marching in deep snow, and crossed the mountains. Next morning he was on the other side; to his right stood

the chain of mountains that ended at the passes and above the enemy camp; before him lay the valley that broadens to form the plain of the Araxes, over which the way leads to Persepolis; behind him rose the great mountains, surmounted with difficulty, that could yet block his line of retreat and possibility of rescue. After a short rest, Alexander divided his forces again: He had Amyntas, Koinos, and Philotas and their corps descend onto the plain, both to throw a bridge to Persepolis over the river⁶⁸ and to receive any Persians who might eventually try to fall back to Persepolis; he himself took his shieldbearers, Perdikkas's regiment, the cavalry escort and a tetrarchy⁶⁹ of riders, the archers, and the Agrianians to the right and advanced against the passes. They moved again by night, through forest, and in a violent storm. Before daybreak they met the first Persian outposts and cut them down; they approached the second, from which few escaped to the third, to flee, not into camp, but up the mountainside.

The Persians in camp suspected nothing, thought the Macedonians still down in the valley; they kept to their tents in a winter storm that would surely ground the enemy, too. The camp therefore was perfectly quiet when the early morning stillness was broken by Macedonian trumpet blasts on the slopes to the right; from the heights above and from the valley below, the storm signal sounded. Alexander had fallen into the Persian rear as Krateros began his storm from below and easily broke through the badly guarded gates; those who turned to flee ran onto the weapons of the advancing king; when they turned back, they ran into a third force, for Ptolemy had been left back with 3000 men to move in from the side. Thus the Macedonians converged from all sides into the enemy camp. Ariobarzanes was one of the few to escape the carnage that followed; he took a few riders into the mountains and along secret ways northward into Media.

After a short rest, Alexander set out for Persepolis. On the way he is supposed to have received a letter from Tiridates, steward of the royal treasure, urging haste, lest the treasury be plundered.⁷⁰ Alexander left the infantry behind and galloped ahead with the cavalry. By daybreak he was at the bridge that his advance detail had built. His swift arrival in Persepolis—almost ahead of news of the surprise attack on the Persian passes—obviated all resistance and any disorder. He took possession of the city, the palaces, the treasury. Pasargadai with even greater treasure fell just as quickly to the victor.⁷¹ Many thousands of talents in gold and silver, countless tapestries and carpets and other treasure were found

piled up there. Ten thousand pairs of mules and three thousand camels are said to have been required to carry it all away.⁷²

More important than these riches, by which Alexander deprived the enemy of the most important means of its power and which his largesse moved from dead treasure houses back into commerce, returning it to the people from whom it had been taken, was possession of the place itself, the cradle of the Persian monarchy. In the valley of Pasargadai, Cyrus had overthrown the ruling Medes; as a memorial, he built his ceremonial court there, his palaces, and his tomb. Standing amid monuments of ultimate secular splendor, it was a simple stone house where pious magi sacrificed and prayed daily. The plain of Persepolis, stretching westward and eastward along the valleys of the Araxes and the Medos, was richer yet in magnificent structures. Here Dareios, son of Hystaspes, who first demanded earth and water of the Hellenes and who had made the Macedonian king Alexander the Philhellene a Persian satrap, had been enthroned as Great King after the reign of perfidious Smerdis; here he had erected his palace, his colonnade, and his tomb; and his successors had filled the steep valley of the Bend-emir with superb buildings, game preserves, and paradises, with palaces and royal tombs. The royal portal of a thousand pillars, the proud triple-terraced cliff building, where colossal statues of horses and bulls flanked the entrance, an enormous layout of edifices of greatest size and splendor marked this holy ground that the tribes of Asia revered as the site where kings were consecrated and received homage, the hearth and center of a mighty empire.

That empire had fallen; Alexander sat on the throne of the same Xerxes who had once pitched his royal tent on the heights above the Bay of Salamis, whose profane hand had burned the acropolis of Athens, destroyed the temples of the gods and the graves of the dead. Now the Macedonian king, the field commander of the Hellenes was master in these royal cities and their palaces. It seemed that the time had come to avenge old injustices and propitiate the gods and the dead in Hades. Here on this focal point of Persian glory, the right of retribution was to be exercised and an ancient guilt atoned; the peoples of Asia should have a visible sign that the power that had enslaved them was dead and gone, destroyed forever. Proof enough is present that no momentary arousal but rather calm deliberation prompted Alexander to order the cedar panels of the royal palace fired.⁷³ Parmenion had been opposed, had urged the king to spare the lovely building, now his property, not to offend the Persians in the monuments to their sometime greatness.⁷⁴ The

king thought the measures he intended useful and necessary. And part of the palace of Persepolis burned down. Then the king ordered the fire put out.⁷⁵

Perhaps the burning of the palace took place in connection with some kind of enthronement that Alexander seems to have celebrated. Seeing Alexander on the throne of the Great Kings under the golden baldachin, Demaratos the Corinthian is said to have remarked on the joy denied those who had not lived to see the day.

A second “perhaps” may be mentioned here, one of some consequence for a full interpretation of Alexander and how he proceeded.

If by the events of Persepolis the power of the Achaimenids was solemnly pronounced dead and a vacant empire formally taken into possession, we may ask whether the moment to pronounce an irrevocable end attained and execute that judgment with such drastic symbolism had arrived late or early. If Gaugamela broke Persian power definitively, why did Alexander wait half a year to take a step to which great Babylon or the royal palace at Susa would have lent itself equally well? And if he delayed because that victory and Babylon and Susa did not yet suffice, did the occupation of Persis make that much of a difference, militarily or politically, while Media, and Ecbatana, still belonged to Dareios and with them the great north and east of the realm, the shorter route to the Tigris and to the royal road from Susa to Sardeis, raising the possibility that the legions of horsemen of the East, organized into an army gathering even now in Media, might yet break the long, thinly defended line of communication that connected Alexander to the western satrapy and Europe?

The record that has reached us is not such that we could expect to find everything of importance mentioned there. It is expansive enough in its moral evaluation of Alexander; concerning his military actions it offers about enough to let us discern the outlines of a narrative; about his political acts, the motives that prompted him, the ends he envisaged, it says little or nothing, with the result that the information it provides could also seem to justify the notion that Alexander crossed the Hellespont with a simple plan to march to the unknown Ganges and the equally unknown sea in the east into which it flows.

Alexander’s response to the Great King’s arrogant and paltry proposals after the battle of Issos shows that he thought a peace could be concluded, in whatever form, on whatever basis. The demand he made there proceeded logically from the current state of affairs and the totality of pertinent historical events. Dareios’s ancestors had forced the Macedonian

king to submit to their sovereignty and become their satrap; they had demanded earth and water of the Hellenic states; they had never ceased to think of themselves as born masters also of the Hellenes and the barbarians of Europe. In the terms of the peace of Antialkidas and on that basis they had promulgated “commands” to be observed by the Hellenic states; when King Philip went to war against Perinthos and Byzantium, they had not hesitated to send troops to oppose him, as if it were their good right to control the Greek world and to intervene when and how they pleased. If this claim to sovereignty also over the Hellenic world lay in the nature of Persia, that “monarchy of Asia,” then the purpose of the war for which Alexander had made himself commander of the Macedonians and the Hellenes could be none other than to put a definitive end to this claim by the Great King. Alexander had responded to Dareios’s proposals after Issos with a sole demand: recognition that he, not Dareios, was henceforth king and master in Asia.⁷⁶ In return, he was prepared to make concessions to his vanquished foe, to grant, as he put it, everything that Dareios could persuade him was appropriate.⁷⁷ If Dareios should refuse recognition, then he should be prepared for further battle. Offered this alternative, Dareios had chosen battle; he had lost the second great contest and with it vast stretches of territory from the seacoasts to the mountains of the Iranian frontier. Was Dareios not obliged to realize at last that he was no match for Alexander? Did Alexander’s every advance not show him to be that for which he demanded to be recognized: master of Asia, whom no power could stay from doing what he wished? Could Dareios doubt that he would have to concede and submit to Alexander, if he hoped to salvage anything at all, to ransom the cherished hostages that his enemy held?

After Gaugamela, Alexander may have expected that Dareios would send to him with more accommodating proposals than after Issos, that he would yield to a *fait accompli*. Because it was not seemly for the victor to take the initiative directly, he may have indicated to the queen mother, on whose intercession he had pardoned the Uxians, that he would be receptive to peace proposals from her son. He might still have been inclined to grant his vanquished foe a peace that gave him land and subjects and restored his family, if that foe would recognize that power had changed hands. What Alexander now possessed—territory from the sea to the mountains that enclose Iran—formed a great coherent whole, fairly uniform also with respect to tribe, extensive enough and rich enough to become the ruling power of Asia when joined to Macedonia and Hellas

to form an empire, its coasts close enough to the West to afford control also of the Mediterranean, for which Egyptian Alexandria was already the cornerstone. Such a peace would have guaranteed the work of victorious arms, had it been recognized by the foe whom these arms had vanquished.

Thus the hypothetical line of argument that it seemed appropriate to sketch in order to describe a gap in the record. Filling the gap this way gives events in Persepolis a further nuance. If Alexander had wanted peace proposals, if he had expected them for months, when they failed to come even after Susa had fallen, after he had forced the passes up into Persia, after he had taken possession of the ancient royal monuments, then it was time to abandon any hope of concluding hostilities by treaty and to commit the act that would pronounce the Achaimenid power dead and proclaim that the monarchy over Asia had been seized.

Thus was judgment pronounced. The next task of the military was to execute that judgment.

CHAPTER 4

Alexander passed four months in the royal cities of Persis. Not just to rest his army: As the less reliable sources report, he probably used these winter months to campaign against marauding tribes in the nearby mountains and secure the land against their raids forever. In the southern mountains were Mardaites, who, like the Uxians, had always lived in almost perfect independence. In very laborious excursions into their snow-covered mountain valleys, Alexander forced them into submission.¹ The satrapy of Karmania, which Alexander may have approached in these maneuvers, submitted, and its satrap Astaspes was confirmed in office.² The satrapy of Persis had already been entrusted to noble Phrasaortes, son of the Rheomitres who had fallen at Issos. A garrison of 3000 men for Persepolis is not sufficiently documented, nor are reinforcements—5000 infantry and 1000 riders—that are supposed to have reached the army in Persepolis or on the march.³ About the end of April, Alexander started for Media, where Dareios had fled from Arbela with the remnants of his army.

Dareios had taken his defeated troops across the Median mountains to Ecbatana, where he would await Alexander's next move. If Alexander pursued, he intended to flee to the north of his empire, laying waste as he went, so that Alexander could not follow. He had already sent the caravans of his harem and his treasure ahead to Rhagai, near the entrance to the Caspian Gates, so that they would not impede him should rapid flight be necessary. But one month passed after another and not even a scouting party of the enemy appeared in the Zagros passes or on the inner frontier of Media. Then Ariobarzanes, heroic defender of the Persian Gates, appeared in Ecbatana, and the Macedonians may now have been expected to approach from the southeast. Still no enemy appeared. Were the treasures of Persepolis and Pasargadai perhaps more to the victor's taste than renewed battle? Had he and his arrogant army been captivated by the novel and intoxicating pleasures of the East?

Dareios still found himself in the midst of loyal troops and valiant Persian princes, and the flower of the Persian nobility was still with him: the chiliarchy under Nabarzanes; Atropates of Media; Autophradates of Tapuria; Phrataphernes of Hyrkania and Parthyaia; Satibarzanes of Areia; Barsaentes of Arachosia and Drangiana; the bold Baktrian Bessos, the Great King's relative, with 3000 Baktrian riders who had survived the last battle; the Great King's brother Oxathres; and above all, venerable Artabazos, Dareios's proven friend, perhaps the most honorable name in all Persia, with his sons. The Great King Ochos's son Bisthanes and Antibelos, son of the renegade Mazaïos of Babylon, were also in Ecbatana. Dareios still had a remnant of his band of Greek mercenaries under Phokian Patron; he was expecting the arrival of several thousand Kadousians and Scyths. The peoples of Turan and Ariana with their satraps could also be summoned under arms to Ecbatana to defend the person of the king and the eastern part of the realm. The landscape of Media offered defensible positions in plenty; the Caspian passes, especially, which formed the entrance to the eastern and northern satrapies, could easily be defended against a superior enemy and held at length.

Dareios decided to put his hope once more in armed resistance and to block the enemy's further advance with the army he would have assembled by the time Alexander arrived. From ambassadors of Sparta and Athens present in the royal camp he may have learned how deeply the outcome of Gaugamela had impressed Hellas and that the anti-Macedonian party there was active and alert; many states either had combined with Sparta openly or were only waiting for King Agis's first success to defect from the Corinthian League. He may have concluded that circumstances in Greece were poised for radical change and would soon force the Macedonians to withdraw from Asia.⁴ And so he may have hoped that the end of his misfortunes would not be long in coming.

Alexander was closing the distance between them. He crossed Paraitakene, the territory between Persis and Media, which submitted and received as satrap Oxathres, son of the Susianan satrap Abulites. Then he heard that Dareios had gathered an important army of Baktrians, Greeks, Scyths, and Kadousians and was awaiting his attack under the walls of Ecbatana. He left his baggage train behind with troops to cover it and crossed into Media in twelve days.⁵ There he learned that neither the Kadousians nor the Scyths whom Dareios had been expecting had arrived and that Dareios, wanting to put off a decisive encounter, was preparing to retire to the Caspian passes, where he had already sent his

women, wagons, and field kit. Alexander moved yet faster: he wanted to capture Dareios and put an end to the contest for the Persian throne. Three days short of Ecbatana, Bisthanes son of King Ochus, who had been with Dareios, came into the Macedonian camp. He confirmed the rumor that Dareios had fled on: He had left Ecbatana five days earlier, taking with him the Median treasure, about 7000 talents, and an army of 6000 infantry and 3000 horse.⁶

Alexander proceeded to Ecbatana⁷ and quickly ordered affairs there. The Thessalian and other allied troops that wished to serve no longer were released and escorted out with full pay and a premium of 2000 talents;⁸ many others remained in service. The Persian Oxydates, whom Dareios had condemned to perpetual prison in Susa and whom Alexander had freed and who therefore seemed the more reliable, was installed as satrap of Media in place of Atropates, who was with Dareios. Parmenion was charged to bring the treasure taken out of Persis to the citadel of Ecbatana and transfer it to Harpalos, who was appointed to administer it and kept 6000 Macedonians, with the necessary riders and light troops, as preliminary guard. Parmenion was then to take the mercenaries, Thracians, and others past Kadousian country to Hyrkania. Kleitos, whom illness had kept behind in Susa, received orders to follow and lead the 6000 men who had been temporarily detached to Harpalos into Parthyaian territory, where they would join the grand army.

Alexander took the remaining phalanges, the Macedonian cavalry, Erigyios's mercenary riders, the sarissa bearers, Agrianians, and archers and hurried after fleeing Dareios. He reached Rhagai in eleven immensely strenuous marches in which many men and horses fell to exhaustion. One hard march of eight miles still lay between him and the entrance to the Caspian Gates. But a report that Dareios was beyond the passes and well advanced toward Baktria and the general exhaustion of his troops prompted him to rest for a few days at Rhagai.⁹

At that moment, Dareios and those with him lay encamped only a few marches east of the Caspian passes, separated from Alexander by scarcely twenty miles. He must have seen that the enemy was pursuing so rapidly that he would never reach Turanian country. Therefore, he ought prudently to reduce his speed and renew the strength of troops he would have to lead against what he hoped would be fatigued pursuers. Some of his following, furthermore, had already deserted to Alexander, and he knew that their numbers would grow as he continued to flee. Dareios convened the grandees of his suite and announced his intention to avoid

an encounter no longer. They were much affected. Most had been discouraged by their persistent misfortune and dreaded renewed battle; a few were prepared to make every sacrifice, among them venerable Artabazos. The chiliarch Nabarzanes rose to speak against him: The urgency of their present situation obliged him to speak bluntly, he said; to join battle here was the surest way to perdition; they should flee to Turan and equip new armies there. But the tribes no longer trusted the king's luck, he continued, and there was but one way to victory: the king should pass the tiara to Bessos, a relative of the royal house whom the Turanian peoples respected and with whom the Scyths and the Indians had allied themselves. Dareios drew his dagger and Nabarzanes scarcely escaped with his life.

He set about removing his Persian divisions from camp; Bessos followed with his Baktrians; they were acting in concert and following a premeditated plan. Barsaentes of Drangiana and Arachosia was quickly won over; the eastern satraps who did not join them openly were nonetheless more inclined to follow their advantage than to do their duty. Loyal Artabazos therefore entreated the king not to give in to his rage: The greater part of the army was with the mutineers, he cautioned; without them Dareios was lost; for these reasons, he should show them a mercy they had not deserved and recall them to at least ostensible loyalty. Bessos meanwhile had tried to induce the Persian troops to start for Baktria, but they had balked at the notion of open treason and desertion. Bessos persisted, described the dangers to which Dareios was exposing them, accustomed them to thinking in terms of a crime that alone could save them. Then Artabazos came to announce that Dareios had pardoned Nabarzanes's ill-considered outburst and Bessos's willful breach. They hurried off to prostrate themselves before the king and attest their remorse by hypocritical admissions.

Next day the march toward Thara resumed. The gloomy silence of the troops and their wariness pointed more toward impending danger than to a threat surmounted. The captain of the Greeks tried to approach the king, whose wagon was surrounded by Bessos's riders. When he finally reached him, he warned that his life was safe only among his Greek troops. Bessos, who knew no Greek, could understand the Greek's gestures and concluded that he should delay no longer. They camped at Thara, the Baktrians next to the royal tent. In the night, Bessos, Nabarzanes, and Barsaentes and a few others entered the king's tent, laid him in chains, and brought him to a wagon in which they would carry him as a prisoner toward Baktria. They intended to deliver him to Alexander as

the price of peace. News of their deed spread through the camp and created an uproar. The Baktrians continued eastward; most of the Persians followed them reluctantly; Artabazos and his sons forsook the hapless king, whom they could no longer help in any case, and withdrew northward into the Tapurians' mountains, accompanied by the Greek mercenaries and the ambassadors from Hellas; other Persians, Mazaios's son Antibelos and Bagisthanes of Babylon, in particular, turned back to throw themselves on Alexander's mercy.¹⁰

Alexander had rested his troops at Rhagai and started again on the morning of the sixth day. A hard march brought him to the western entrance of the passes (Aiwan-i-Keif), which consumed nearly three hours of the next day's march. He then crossed the well-cultivated plain of Choarene (Khar) and reached the edge of the steppe over which the way runs eastward to the Parthyaian capital Hekatompylos, midpoint of the military roads that lead into Hyrkania, Baktria, and Ariana. While the army was encamped here and troops spread out to forage for the march over the steppe, Bagisthanes and Antibelos came into camp and threw themselves on Alexander's mercy. They reported that Bessos and Nabarzanes had seized the king and were moving rapidly toward Baktria; they knew nothing further.

Alexander decided to set out instantly in pursuit. He left the greater part of his army to follow slowly under Krateros and rushed ahead with the cavalry, the skirmishers, and the lightest and strongest infantry. They galloped through the night to the following noon, rested during the heat of the day, and galloped through a second night. At daybreak they reached Thara, where Dareios had been seized four days earlier.¹¹ From the Great King's interpreter Melon, whom illness had detained,¹² Alexander learned that Artabazos and the Greeks had gone northward into the Tapurian mountains and that Bessos had taken command in Dareios's stead and been recognized by the Persians and the Baktrians; the conspirators planned to withdraw into the eastern provinces and to offer to surrender Dareios in return for undisturbed and independent possession of the Persian east; if Alexander continued to pursue, they would gather the largest possible army for the common defense of their respective possessions; for the moment, they remained under Bessos's general command, because, they said, he was related to the royal house and the rightful successor to the throne.¹³

Driven by the greatest urgency, Alexander hardly rested at midday, then set out again at evening and rode through a third night; the following

midday he reached a village (perhaps Bakshabad) where the conspirators had camped the previous day and then set out at evening to move, they said, henceforth by night; they could not be more than a few miles ahead. But the horses were exhausted, the riders more than fatigued, the day hot. Alexander asked if there was a shorter way to reach the fugitives and learned that such a way was arid, entirely without springs. For this route Alexander picked five hundred cavalry horses, and as many officers, and the best of his infantry, whom he had mount fully armed. He ordered the Agrianians under Attalos to proceed as quickly as possible along the military road, the remaining troops under Nikanor to follow in good order. At dusk he took his hybrid fighters down the waterless track over the heath; he lost many to exhaustion during the night. At first light they caught sight of the straggling, unarmed caravan of the traitors. Alexander's furious approach scattered them; only a few resisted and were cut down; the rest fled, taking Dareios's wagon in their midst. As Alexander overtook them, Bessos and Barsaentes stabbed the bound king and fled in different directions. The Macedonians found the corpse and Alexander, legend has it, covered it with his own mantle.¹⁴

Thus ended the last Great King from the house of the Achaimenids. He did not fall to the man against whom he had tried to defend his realm. His lost battles had cost him more than territory and royal power; they had cost him the faith and loyalty of his Persian people and his grandees. A fugitive among traitors, a king in chains, he fell to the daggers of his satraps and his blood kin. To his credit, he did not purchase his life at the price of his tiara or concede to a crime any right over the kingship of his house; he died a king. Alexander honored him as a king: He returned the body to Persepolis to be entombed among kings; Sisygambis buried her son.

Alexander had attained more than he could have expected. After each of two pitched battles, he had let the defeated king escape. But now that he was master of the royal cities of the realm and had received the grandees' sworn allegiance on the throne of Cyrus, in Persian fashion, now that the peoples of Asia considered him their king and ruler, he could not afford to let the fugitive king carry the title of his lost rule, a banner for perpetual insurrection, across the steppes of Iran and Turan. The need to capture his foe and the will to do so became for Alexander's heroic nature a personal passion, an Achillean wrath. Alexander pursued Dareios with a haste that bordered on the monstrous and that cost him many men. That haste would have exposed him to a justified reproach

of despotic mercilessness, had he not shared the pain and fatigue, the heat and thirst his troops suffered, had he not personally led the wild chase through four nights and endured to the point of exhaustion. The story is told that he was brought water in a helmet and accepted it; but when he met the gaze of his thirsty riders, he refused it, saying: "If I drank alone, my men would lose heart." His Macedonians cheered: "Lead us where you will. We are not tired or thirsty, we are not mortal as long as you are our king." They spurred their horses and plunged ahead with their king until they saw the enemy and found the Great King dead.¹⁵

Some have cited Alexander's taking his enemy dead, not alive, as another instance of his famous luck, noting that Dareios would have been a perpetual cause of concern, a stimulus to dangerous wishes and plans among the Persians, and that, in the last analysis, the way to secure possession of Asia led over his dead body; it was Alexander's good fortune to have the benefit of this murder but not the guilt, to be able to please the Persians by seeming to mourn their dead king. But perhaps the criminal end of his foe made Alexander, like the great Roman after him, unmindful of the advantages he gained from the murder of a king. A great mind is bound to an enemy by a special bond, a fatality, one might say, as the force of a blow is determined by the object it will strike. When one considers how Alexander received the queen mother and the wife and children of the Great King, how he honored their sorrow and tried to assuage it, there can be no doubt of the lot he would have accorded the captured king. That life would have been more secure in the hands of its enemy than among Persians and the king's blood kin.

We can discern Alexander's luck elsewhere in these events—his luck or his misfortune. If Dareios had been taken alive, he might have renounced the lands that he had lost, might have recognized a new basis of power in Asia. Alexander might have been able to purchase these concessions by letting him keep the eastern satrapies. Then here, as later with King Poros in India, he could have left in place on the frontier of his empire a kingdom in relaxed dependency, constrained only to recognize his suzerainty. The murder of Dareios removed the possibility of such an outcome. If Alexander ever contemplated stopping at this point, the crime committed against his enemy now forced him forward into the unknown. The murderers claimed the power and the title that the legitimate king had not been able to defend; they were usurpers toward Alexander as they were traitors to their king. The natural legacy of the murdered king appointed the man who had conquered him avenger of

his murder; the majesty of the Persian monarchy, won by the law of the sword, became in Alexander's hand a sword of law and revenge; the monarchy now had no foe other than its last representatives and no representative other than the erstwhile foe of that same kingdom.

The position of the Persian grandees had been radically altered by these dreadful events. Those who had not forsaken their king after Gaugamela, mostly satraps of the eastern provinces, had been protecting their own interests when they banded together around his person. Few participated in the touching loyalty and sacrifice of Artabazos, who had been a guest at Philip's court and could expect that Alexander would receive him in honor. The eastern satraps saw little profit in such qualities and much danger. As soon as the Great King's reversals put their advantage and indeed their political fortunes at risk, they undertook to defend themselves and their prerogatives at the expense of this king, whose delusion and weakness alone, they believed, had brought about the destruction of the Persian empire. After the loss of so many precious lands, Dareios's endless flight now exposed their satrapies, too; they thought it reasonable to prefer gaining something to losing everything, thought conserving some remnant of the Persian empire preferable to sacrificing even that remnant to the pursuit of a lost cause. If Dareios could be king only with their consent, they believed, no less could they perpetuate themselves in power without Dareios.

They had taken Dareios prisoner; Alexander's sudden attack forced them to murder him to save themselves; to make pursuit more difficult, they fled in two bands: Bessos to the route from Khorasan to Baktria, Nabarzanes, accompanied by what remained of his chiliarchy and by the Parthyaian satrap, toward Hyrkania, to go from there to Baktria and combine with Bessos. Their plan was to preserve the Persian monarchy at least in the east and then to choose one among their number as king of kings, as after the murder of Smerdis. It was clear, however, that if Phrataphernes left Parthyaia, Satibarzanes Areia, and Barsaentes Drangiana to go to Baktria and fight under Bessos, as they had agreed, their satrapies would fall into the hands of the enemy at all events and thus that they were risking their lands for a remote hope. Therefore Phrataphernes went no farther than Hyrkania and Nabarzanes with him; Satibarzanes returned to Areia, Barsaentes to Drangiana, to see how Alexander would proceed before they took their measures. The same self-seeking that had brought them together as regicides pulled apart the last remaining forces that could have gone out to meet the enemy, and

because each intended only himself and his own advantage, the more surely did they fall singly to the sword of the terrible Macedonian.

Alexander, for his part, could not take his exhausted men in pursuit of Dareios's murderers, who had fled in all directions. He rested on the plain of Hekatompylos, let the troops he had left behind catch up with him, and arranged affairs in Parthyaia. As satrap he appointed Parthyaian Amminapes, who had submitted with Mazakes in Egypt,¹⁶ and installed Tlepolemos, one of the companions, beside him.¹⁷

To the north of Hekatompylos, the foothills of the Elburz Mountains rise, inhabited by Tapurians. Notched by isolated passes, these mountains run between the Parthyaian frontier to the south and the Hyrkanian on the north, which meet farther east in the cliffs of Khorasan. Control of the passes, which connect the Caspian Sea to the interior and Turan to Iran, was particularly urgent, because the Greek mercenaries had retired from Thara into the Tapurian mountains, and Nabarzanes and Phrartaphernes were standing beyond the mountains in Hyrkania. Accordingly, Alexander turned off the road from Khorasan, along which Bessos had fled, to secure the passes. He divided the army into three forces and designated Zadrakarta, a principal city of Hyrkania¹⁸ on the north slope of the mountains, as the point where they would meet again. Erigyios took the baggage train, protected by riders, by the longest, easiest route; Krateros, with his phalanx and Amyntas's, six hundred archers and as many riders, crossed the Tapurians' mountains to take on these tribes and any of the Greek mercenaries he might meet; Alexander took the rest of the army by the shortest route, which enters the mountains northwest of Hekatompylos.¹⁹ His columns moved forward with the greatest caution, preceded at times by the king with the shieldbearers, the lightest of the phalangites, and part of the archers, and left pickets at the high places on both sides of the route to protect the troops following against the depredations of the tribes in these wild mountains. Attacking them would have caused delay and might not have succeeded at all. Alexander moved ahead with the archers and stopped by a small river on the plain north of the mountains to await the rest of his army. They came down out of the mountains over four days, the Agrianians of the rear guard last, having skirmished with the barbarians in the hills. Alexander continued to Zadrakarta, where Krateros and Erigyios joined him. Krateros reported that he had not met any of the Greeks and that the Tapurians had submitted, some under duress, others freely.

In the camp by the river Alexander had already received emissaries from the chiliarch Nabarzanes, who was prepared to forsake Bessos and

throw himself on Alexander's mercy; farther along the route, the satrap Phrataphernes and other highly respected Persians²⁰ in the Great King's following had come to Alexander to submit. The chiliarch had been among those who seized the king; he may have been offered nothing more than immunity from punishment, for his name, once preeminent in the empire, is never mentioned again. Phrataphernes, by contrast, and his sons Phradasmanes and Sisines soon gained Alexander's trust and proved themselves worthy of it in more than one dangerous incident. The satrapies of Parthyaia and Hyrkania were restored to Phrataphernes. Artabazos came, with three of his sons, Arsames, Kophen, and Ariobarzanes, defender of the Persian passes.²¹ Alexander received them as their loyalty to ill-fated Dareios merited. Artabazos was known to Alexander from the days when he and his brother-in-law Rhodian Memnon had lived as exiles at the court at Pella; he was at ease with western ways; he and his sons took a place in Alexander's entourage beside the highest ranking Macedonians. Autophradates, satrap of the Tapurians, had accompanied them. He too was received in honor and confirmed in office as satrap. With Artabazos, the Greek mercenaries had sent an embassy authorized to negotiate a surrender for their entire band. Alexander replied that he would not negotiate with Greeks guilty of so great a crime as fighting for barbarians in violation of the will of all Hellas; they would have to surrender unconditionally or save themselves as best they could. The ambassadors declared that they would submit; the king should send someone to conduct them safely into camp. Alexander chose Artabazos, who had led them on the retreat from Thara, and Andronikos, a highly respected Macedonian and brother-in-law of Black Kleitos.²²

Alexander recognized the extraordinary importance of the Hyrkanian satrapy, with its narrow passes, coasts rich in harbors, and forests of timber for shipbuilding. He may already have been planning a Caspian fleet, trade between these coasts and eastern Asia, and a voyage of discovery on this sea. More pertinently, communications between previously conquered territory and the continuing campaign required full control of these mountains and their passes, which overlook the south shore of the Caspian Sea. Alexander had just secured the passes of the Tapurian districts; he charged Parmenion to take the corps that was standing in Media northward through Media to the western passes of the Caspian in Kadousian country and down to the shore to open the road that connects Armenia and Media with the Kur valley and the Caspian Sea;²³ from there he was to move along the shoreline to Hyrkania and follow the grand army.

The Mardaites, whose settlements seem to take their name from the river Amardos,²⁴ had not yet submitted, and the king decided to proceed against them. He left most of the army in camp and took the shieldbearers, the phalanges of Koinos and Amyntas, half the cavalry, and the newly formed mounted javelin throwers along the shore toward the west. No foe had ever penetrated into these forests, and the Mardaites thought themselves perfectly safe; the conqueror from the west, they believed, was marching on toward Baktria. Alexander came up from the plain and took the nearest villages; the inhabitants fled into the forested mountains. With enormous difficulty, the Macedonians pursued through dense, pathless, unnerving forests; they often had to hack their way forward with their swords, harassed all the while by Mardaites.²⁵ Alexander continued to climb and cut off the heights ever more narrowly by troop movements and pickets; the Mardaites sent envoys and submitted; Alexander demanded hostages and left them otherwise unmolested, putting them under satrap Autophradates of Tapuria.²⁶

On his return to camp at Zadrakarta, he found the Greek mercenaries, 1500 in number, and the ambassadors of Sparta, Athens, Kalchedon, and Sinope:²⁷ they had been sent to Dareios and had withdrawn with the Greeks after Bessos's treason. Alexander ordered that the Greek mercenaries who had taken Persian pay before the conclusion of the Corinthian treaty be released immediately; to the rest he granted amnesty on condition that they join the Macedonian army; Andronikos, who had interceded for them, was made their commander. He also released the ambassadors from Sinope, which did not belong to the Hellenic League and had properly sent an embassy to the Persian court; similarly, the ambassador from Kalchedon.²⁸ Sparta and Athens, by contrast, had obviously entertained traitorous relations with the common enemy of all Hellenes; he ordered their ambassadors seized and held until further notice.

Alexander then broke camp and entered Zadrakarta, seat of the Hyrkanian satrap, where he would rest briefly before beginning further operations.

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In Europe, too, Macedonia's military fortunes were being tested meanwhile—the more crucially because Sparta, the preeminent state in Hellas after the defeat of Athens and the fall of Thebes, was leading the unrest.

King Agis, as we have seen, acting in collusion with the Persian fleet, moored off Siphnos, had begun military movements at the end of 333,

despite recent news of the battle of Issos; he had sent his brother Agisilaos to occupy Crete. Had Athens summoned the resolve to join the movement at the time, that movement might have accomplished something, for a hundred triremes could have been put to sea from Peiraieus without difficulty. When Athens did not summon the resolve, other members of the Hellenic League did not dare break the sworn treaties, and support by a few tyrants and oligarchs on the islands would not have made Persian sea power sufficient to resist Amphoteros and Hegelochos. At the siege of Tyre in spring 332, the Persian fleet disbanded, and by the end of the year all the islands of the Aegean, including Crete, had been liberated.

And still there was no peace in Hellas. Neither Alexander's successes nor the considerable army that the Macedonian viceroy was keeping under arms nearby deterred the patriots in their hoping and planning. Dissatisfied with everything that had happened and was now happening, still foolish enough to believe a separate policy that aimed to restore the ancient independence of their states both justified and possible, despite the sworn league and Macedonian supremacy, they took every opportunity to foster envy, anxiety, and bitterness among the frivolous, credulous masses. Thebes' unhappy end was an inexhaustible quarry for declamation; they denounced the Corinthian council as an ill-conceived fiction; they made anything that came out of Macedonia suspect, even honors and gifts, or called it a disgrace to free Hellenes. All Alexander wanted, they said, was to make the synhedrion itself and every individual member a tool of Macedonian despotism;²⁹ hatred of Macedonia would unite the Hellenes more effectively than any struggle with Persia; indeed, victory over Persia was but another Macedonian means to destroy the freedom of the Hellenic states. The Athenian speaker's platform was the ideal place to parade all this discontent; the parties had never been more sharply at odds; the demos, swayed first by Demosthenes, Lykurgos, and Hypereides, then by Phokion, Demades, and Aischines, contradicted itself again and again in its sovereign decrees. Even while they vied with the synhedrion of the league in congratulating Alexander and sending him gold wreaths, the Athenians kept an ambassador at the Great King's camp and court, also after Gaugamela. Even while Athens entertained relations openly treasonous by the terms of the league treaty, Attic orators waxed indignant over Macedonia's latest treaty violations. But they took no chances, contenting themselves with sinister thoughts and weighty words.

Agis, however, proceeded to action and did not abandon it even after Amphoteros and the Macedonian fleet had forced his brother out of

Crete.³⁰ He gathered a significant number of the mercenaries routed at Issos—at the recruiting station of Tainaron he could acquire as many as he could pay for. He had taken up promising contacts with the patriots in the Peloponnesian cities. He enlarged his power and his following so circumspectly and so boldly that Macedonia's foes near and far became confident that deliverance was at hand.

Just then an undertaking begun with high hopes came to a bad end. Whether Epeirote Alexander had made his expedition into Italy in consultation with the Macedonian king or in rivalry with him, there came a moment when Epeirote successes raised a specter of Greek ascendancy in Italy. In the Epeirote, the Tarentines had wanted no more than a condottiere against Italic tribes in the hills. His high-flying plans made them uneasy, and the Hellenic cities agreed that he would have to be stopped before he became a threat to their freedom. His campaign stalled; he was murdered by a Lucanian fugitive and his army destroyed by the Sabelli at Pandosia.³¹ After his death, unrest over the question of a successor arose in Molossia. The heir was a minor boy whom Alexander's sister Kleopatra had borne; but Olympias, who seems to have been living in Epeiros, tried to wrest power from the widow, her daughter. The land of the Molossians was hers, she wrote the Athenians,³² who had wanted to honor an image of Dione in Dodona, as if such a deed required her consent. A feud in the royal house of Macedonia could only raise the hopes of the patriots in Hellas.

In Tyre, en route to the Euphrates in spring 331, Alexander knew of Agis's continuing machination. He responded merely by raising one hundred Phoenician and Cypriot ships, which were to join with Amphoterios and protect the Peloponnesian cities that were loyal to him. He honored the Athenian ambassadors who brought good wishes and gold wreaths to Tyre and released the Athenians captured on the Granikos to obligate the Attic demos. He seemed eager to avoid an armed confrontation with Sparta, which could have turned out badly, given the prevalent mood in Hellas, where even Thessaly had become less than entirely reliable. He was about to strike yet another, decisive blow against Dareios, which, he hoped, would quiet the restiveness in Hellas.

Antipater, therefore, had to stand aside while the Spartan king made preparations and gained influence in the Peloponnese during the year 331 and content himself with exercising Macedonian authority in the allied cities to the extent possible, even while he observed the maneuverings of the enemy faction narrowly, always prepared for war. He could

not use the unrest that followed the death of the Molossian king to restore an apparently diminishing Epeirote dependency on Macedonia, and he had to endure the displeasure and bitter reproach of Queen Olympias, who wanted to see her claim to the Molossian succession enforced by the Macedonian military.

The movement in Hellas, meanwhile, had taken a turn for the worse. News of Gaugamela, which could have reached Athens at the end of 331, was about to prompt Macedonia's foes either to desist or to make a final effort. Alexander's absence, bickering in Epeiros, and growing discontent in Thrace, now public knowledge, suggested and favored speedy action. Word would soon come back, by way of Sinope, that the Great King had fled to Media, that he had summoned the peoples of the eastern satrapies to Ecbatana the following spring, and that he was determined to persevere against the Macedonian. The Hellenes could expect his subsidies to continue for the moment. They may also have heard that Alexander had gone from Susa into upper Persia. Was there any likelihood that he would dare to weaken an army that hardly sufficed to invest the endlessly long way back to the Hellespont by detaching troops to Macedonia and for battle against Hellas? If they continued to dither, what was left of Persian power might collapse altogether, and then they should expect to see Alexander overrun Hellas at the head of an enormous army and turn it into a satrapy of his empire, like a second Xerxes. A volatile people, enthusiastic declamation by patriotic orators, the era's own taste for exaggeration and fabrication, and, not least, the old nimbus of Spartan power rising again gloriously—all these things combined to produce an eruption that could be fateful for Macedonia.

Remarkable events follow, of which only fragmentary notice has come down to us, so that their logic and even their sequence can no longer be established.

The upper half of an Attic inscription stone has been discovered recently, ornamented by a relief on which one can make out parts of two horses, a man wearing a himation who holds an alms cup in his right hand, and an Athena who seems to extend her hand toward him; the inscription reads, "Rhebulas Seuthes's son, Kotys's brother. . . ." There follows a popular decree of which only the date survives, effectively 10 June 330.³³ What brought the son of Seuthes to Athens and caused the Athenians to distinguish him by a popular decree sculpted in his honor?

Of the events of this year in Hellas, Macedonia, and Thrace, Arrian reports nothing, but historians in the tradition of Kleitarchos offer something. Diodoros says: "Memnon, Macedonian strategos in Thrace, who

kept troops and was ambitious, stirred up the barbarians and himself took up arms when he thought himself strong enough, which things caused Antipater to raise an army, take it into Thrace, and oppose him.” Justin adds information. After describing Dareios’s end, he continues: “During these events, Alexander received letters from Antipater in Macedonia that reported the Spartan king Agis’s war in Greece, the Molossian king’s war in Italy, the war of the strategos Zopyrion in Scythia,” and further: “Zopyrion, whom Alexander had installed as strategos on the Pontos, thinking himself shiftless if he too did not attempt something, took a force of 30,000 men against the Scyths and perished with his entire army.”³⁴

Curtius’s report, which derives essentially from the same source, seems to place the events, unmistakably the same, fully four years later: “Alexander, upon returning from India to Persia, received reports of events in Asia and Europe during his absence: that Zopyrion, having gone to war against the Getai, had perished with all his army in a sudden storm; that Seuthes, hearing of this reversal, had caused the Odrysians, his countrymen, to defect; that Thrace being as good as lost, not even Greece . . .”; here begins a long lacuna.³⁵

In Curtius’s interpretation, therefore, Zopyrion’s heavy defeat prompted the Thracian prince Seuthes to insurrection; according to Diodoros, Memnon, strategos in Macedonian Thrace, is author of the defection; according to another report, which seems to trace back to the same Kleitarchan tradition, a rumor of Alexander’s death spread at the same time;³⁶ according to yet another of the same origin, Antipater had to march against the Tetrachoritai of the Haimos and as far as the Rhodope and tricked them into returning home.³⁷

We can see approximately how these things are connected. In late autumn 331, Alexander sent Menes from Susa to the coast with 3000 talents and instructions to give Antipater as much as he needed for the war against Agis. If Zopyrion, strategos on the Pontos, surely acting without instructions from Alexander or approval from Antipater, began his operation against the Scyths in autumn 331 approximately, the loss of his army weakened Macedonian power so significantly that Memnon, strategos in Thrace, could risk an attempt to make himself independent;³⁸ the Odrysian prince Seuthes was pleased to defect; the Thracian hill tribes, the notorious Bessi, those robbers infamous even among robbers, took the field; rebellion overspread the entire area north and south of the Haimos.

This will have been the great news that Rhebulas Seuthes’s son brought to Athens in spring 330, in conjunction, no doubt, with a proposal that

Athens return to the alliances that she had made with so many of his forebears—with Ketriporis and with Kersobleptes against King Philip—by concluding an alliance now against Alexander.

Hostilities had already opened in the Peloponnese. King Agis had attacked Macedonian mercenaries under Korrhagos and utterly destroyed them. A call went out from Sparta to the Hellenes to join the city of Lykurgos in the common cause of freedom.³⁹ Elis, all Arkadia except Megalopolis, all Achaia except Pellene rose. Agis rushed to lay siege to Megalopolis, which blocked his way northward. “Daily one expected the fall of the city; Alexander was beyond the confines of the world; Antipater was still mustering his army; the outcome was uncertain”: thus Aischines a few weeks later.⁴⁰

The uproar had leapt over into central Hellas and crossed Thermopylai. The Aitolians attacked the Akarnanian city Oiniadai and destroyed it;⁴¹ the Thessalians and the Perrhaibians rose. Should Athens now bring a significant armed force into the movement, everything seemed possible.

Even the meager traces that have come down to us show how passionately the Athenians must have debated. An inscription tells us that a Plataian contributed an important sum “for the war” and that honorable Lykurgos himself proposed a decree to thank him.⁴² When Leokrates, one of the rich Athenians who had fled after Chaironeia and had prospered greatly first on Rhodes, then in Megara, made the mistake of returning to Athens, that same Lykurgos took him into court to be tried for treason; but the accused was defended by rich and respectable men and the vote of the court was a tie. As if in retribution, Aischines revived a complaint against Ktesiphon, dormant since 337; the court was asked to punish his erstwhile proposal of a wreath for Demosthenes as unlawful; the verdict arrived several weeks later, when everything had already been decided. Aischines, in his oration, observes that Demosthenes made great claims to the effect that the city was being “emasculated, eviscerated, its sinews cut” by certain persons, and had said on the speaker’s platform: “I avow that I supported Sparta’s policy, that I caused the Thessalians and the Perrhaibians to defect.” In about spring 330, therefore, Demosthenes could boast publicly of his merits in fanning the insurrection. However much opposed by Aischines, Demades, and Phokion, the mood of the city was tending more and more toward war. It was proposed that the fleet be equipped and sent to the aid of those who had defected from Alexander.⁴³ Demades, who administered funds for festivals, resorted to the ultimate weapon: Means for the proposed expedition were certainly

on hand, he said; he had seen to it that the theorika treasury was sufficient to pay each citizen half a mine for the next festival of Choes; the Athenians should themselves decide whether they would rather use these monies for armaments and war. The Athenians disposed over the matter in predictable fashion.⁴⁴

Agis meanwhile still lay before Megalopolis. The city had mounted a strong defense and could not be taken as quickly as had been expected. That may have cooled the ardor of those who gladly would have risen if Agis had reached the Isthmos, advanced beyond it, and offered them cover. Then a report arrived that Antipater was approaching with an army.

We learn nothing of how he brought matters in Thrace to a conclusion.⁴⁵ He had started for the south as soon as he possibly could and suppressed the unrest in Thessaly during a quick transit; on his continuing march he integrated contingents put up at least by his most reliable allies and brought an important force across the Isthmos: 40,000 men, by one reckoning—⁴⁶ enough to enable him to decline the proffered support of those who now suddenly protested that they had merely been arming for the king's cause.⁴⁷ Agis, with an army reportedly of only 20,000 infantry and 2000 riders, abandoned his siege of Megalopolis and moved back toward Sparta in search of more favorable terrain, where he awaited attack. It was a bloody battle in which the Spartans and their allies performed wonders of valor, according to surviving reports, until King Agis, covered with wounds and surrounded on all sides, at last fell before the offensive, taken by the death he had sought.⁴⁸ Antipater prevailed decisively, albeit with significant losses.


With this defeat, the attempt to renew Sparta's hegemony collapsed and, with it, the hopes of the Hellenic patriots. Eudamidas, younger brother and successor to the childless fallen king, had been opposed to this war from its outset and now recommended abandoning further resistance, even though the allied troops had retired to Sparta along with the Spartans.⁴⁹ They sent to Antipater and sued for peace. Antipater demanded fifty Spartan boys as hostages; the Spartans offered as many men, and Antipater accepted.⁵⁰ He referred the question of breach of the peace to the synhedrion of the league, which was convened at Corinth;⁵¹ after long deliberation, it referred the matter to Alexander, whereupon Spartan envoys departed for the far east.⁵² The king's decision was as clement as possible: He pardoned what had happened; the Elians and the Achaians, members of the Hellenic League while Sparta was not, should pay 120 talents' damages to Megalopolis. We may assume that

Sparta was now obliged to join the league; nothing was altered in the constitution of the ancient Herakleidean state; its territory was not further diminished.

In Athens, too, the tension will have broken, though the grumbling never stopped. Soon after Agis's defeat, the case against Ktesiphon was heard. "Be mindful of the season in which you pronounce judgment," Aischines told the judges. "The Pythian festival will be celebrated in a few days and the synhedrion of the Hellenes is about to convene; at this juncture, the city can expect a rebuke for Demosthenes's politics; if you let him have the wreath, as Ktesiphon requests, you will be thought to be of one mind with those who break the common peace." The Athenians will have credited themselves with a great political act when they gave Aischines less than one-fifth of the vote. Aischines thereupon incurred a fine of a thousand drachmas; he did not pay it; he left Athens and went to Ephesos, and at the Dionysia, Demosthenes received the gold wreath, which, intended for him after Chaironeia, approved his policies, then and now.

Such demonstrations could do nothing more to change general conditions in Hellas; after the collapse of the Spartan insurrection, they faded into the background.

BOOK THREE



CHAPTER 1

At the time of the Spartan defeat, Alexander was standing in Hyrkania, on the northern slope of the mountain rampart that separates Iran and Turan. Before him lay the ways into Baktria and India, to the unknown sea that he may have expected to find beyond these lands as the frontier of his realm; behind him lay half the Persian empire and, hundreds of miles back, his Hellenic homeland. He knew of Agis's insurrection, of Sparta's growing influence in the Peloponnese, of the uncertain mood in the rest of Greece, which made the vicissitudes of his military fortunes the more perilous; he recognized the importance of this foe and respected his foresight and his energy. Nonetheless, he went farther and farther toward the east, without detaching troops to Antipater or waiting to receive a favorable report. What if Agis had prevailed? Was Alexander relying on his luck? Did he disdain a danger he could do nothing about? Did he send no detachments to save Greece because he did not dare pursue the regicides with half the number of troops that he had required to prevail at Gaugamela and at Issos?

His power and his victories had once depended on tranquility among the Greeks and their recognition of Macedonian hegemony. Now his victories guaranteed tranquility in Greece, and his possession of Asia assured the continuing validity of his hegemony, which it would have been more foolish than threatening to challenge. If Antipater met defeat, the satraps in Lydia and Phrygia, in Syria and Egypt were prepared to demand in the name of their king, not earth and water, but rather satisfaction for perfidy and treason; and this passion for freedom among malcontents, these ambiguous heroics of the well-turned phrase, of intrigue and bribery would have enjoyed no Marathon. Unconcerned about the unrest in his rear, the king could pursue the course of action that the crime of Bessos and his comrades had forced upon him or made possible. A double rampart of mountains notwithstanding, control of the Caspian passes, garrisons left behind in Ecbatana at the entrance to the

Median passes, and a mobile column on the Euphrates secured communications with the Syrian low country and the western provinces of the realm sufficiently for Alexander to make the great geographic and ethnic frontier of the Hyrkanian mountains his point of departure for new operations.

When he had rested his army, sponsored athletic contests and literary festivals in keeping with Hellenic custom, and sacrificed to the gods, he set out from the Hyrkanian capital. At that moment he had with him about 20,000 infantry and 3000 riders:¹ the shieldbearers, whose proven captain Nikanor Parmenion's son would soon die of illness; the greater part of the phalangites;² the entire Macedonian cavalry under Philotas, whose father Parmenion commanded the important post at Ecbatana; and, in light troops, the archers and the Agrianians. Other corps were to join the main army during the march: Kleitos was to lead 6000 phalangites detached to Ecbatana on to Parthyaia; Parmenion himself was to follow into Hyrkania with the riders and light troops that had stayed behind with him at Ecbatana.³

Alexander's explicitly attested intention was to march to Baktra, capital of the great Baktrian satrapy.⁴ Bessos, he knew, had retired there with his partisans; he had summoned adherents of his projected Old Persia, and they intended to resist the Macedonian conqueror, should he dare proceed beyond Hyrkania. Alexander may have hoped to reach the Oxos by rapid marches and to meet there and defeat the last opposing military force of any importance, before it could be reinforced by troops arriving from Arianan country. If his march took no account of these Arianan satrapies on his right for the moment, it may have been because he expected them to submit before the blow that would strike down the regicides.

He followed the highroad that leads from Hyrkania on the north slope of the mountains through the parts of Parthyaia and Areia adjacent to the Turanian desert into Baktriana. When he crossed into Areia, the satrap Satibarzanes came out to meet him in Susia,⁵ the nearest city, and submitted, bringing important news of Bessos. Satibarzanes remained in possession of his satrapy, and Anaxippos of the companions and sixty mounted javelin throwers were left behind to guard the spot and to receive the columns that were following—a measure that shows clearly enough that Alexander intended to give an important appointment little real significance, to keep a powerful satrap whose territory lay on the flank of his march idle for the moment and assure his army's rapid

progress. For Satibarzanes had disclosed, and a number of Persians coming from Bactria to Susia confirmed, that Bessos had assumed the tiara, the title King of Asia, and the name Artaxerxes. He had gathered bands of fugitive Persians and many Bactrians and was expecting to be joined by horsemen from nearby Scythian country. Alexander continued toward Baktra with his army, reinforced now by the allied riders Philip had brought from Ecbatana and the mercenary riders and Thessalians who had taken service again.⁶ Thus strengthened and moving with his usual speed, he could hope to come upon the usurper shortly and defeat him.

Then deeply disquieting news from Areia overtook the march: Satibarzanes had turned traitor and attacked the Macedonian post, killing all the Macedonians and their leader Anaxippos. He had then called the people of his satrapy to arms; the rebels were rallying at Artakoana, the royal city of the satrapy. The renegade satrap would wait until Alexander emerged from the Areian mountains, then combine with Bessos-Artaxerxes and attack the Macedonians wherever he might find them. It cannot have been lost on Alexander that such a movement on the flank of his route represented an imminent threat. A rising in Areia could cut him off completely and give various support to Bessos's usurpation; the satrap of adjacent Drangiana and Arachosia, furthermore, was Barsaentes, one of the regicides, and it was already clear that he would join the Areian movement. To continue to march toward Bactria under these circumstances was out of the question. Even at the risk of giving the usurper more time for preparations, Alexander would have to move quickly and decisively to make good his operational error in entrusting the entire flank of his march to a suspect ally. He would have to undertake to subject the whole area on that flank. He abandoned his pursuit of Bessos and conquest of Bactrian country for the moment and turned instead to ensuring his possession of Areia and the other lands of Ariana, so that he could resume his action against the usurper the more surely.

The king took two phalanges, the archers and Agrianians, the Macedonian cavalry and the mounted javelin throwers and started immediately against the rebellious Areian satrap, while the rest of the army under Krateros pitched camp. A strenuous two-day march brought him before the royal city Artakoana,⁷ where he found the countryside in uproar. Satibarzanes, caught by surprise and deserted by the warriors he had gathered, had taken a few riders and fled over the mountains to Bessos; the Areians had abandoned their settlements to seek refuge in the hills. Alexander pursued and attacked, and cut off 13,000 men under arms,

whom the Macedonians either killed outright or enslaved. Such swift, stern justice promptly subdued the Areians; the satrapy was awarded to the Persian Arsames.

Areia forms a passage between Iran and Ariana and is therefore one of the most important areas of Iran. The great military roads from Hyrkania and Parthyaia, from Margiana and Baktria, the oases of Seistan and the terraces of the Kabul basin intersect at the point where the river Areios turns abruptly northward. Alexander founded Alexandria in Areia on this important intersection, and among the people of Herat the memory of their founder lives on until this day.⁸ From inquiries made when he changed his marching route, Alexander no doubt acquired an approximate notion of the topography of the Arianan satrapies toward Baktria and India, of the mountains and rivers that determine the configuration of these territories, and of the roads and passes that connect them. He probably concluded that he should occupy the entire southern flank of Baktrian country before taking on the usurper. Then he should move to deprive him of any support he might attract from Arianan and Indian territory, close on him in a wide loop, and finally attack the extreme wing of his battle line, in keeping with the strategy that had worked on the Granikos, at Issos, and at Gaugamela. This troop movement, which led first toward Drangiana and Arachosia, had commenced on the march up into Areia. As soon as Krateros arrived with his troops, Alexander went southward to subject the various districts of these lands, which were still rich and well populated at the time. Barsaentes did not await his arrival; he fled instead over the eastern frontier of his satrapy to the Indians, who would eventually hand him over. Alexander advanced along the valley of the river Ardakan into the land of the Zarangians, or Drangians, whose capital Prophthasia⁹ surrendered without resistance.

South of the Zarangians, in the fertile plains of southern Seistan, now desert, lived the Ariaspans, whom the Greeks called Euergetes, a tribe of peaceful farmers.¹⁰ Settled in this "land of eternal spring" since time out of mind, they led a quiet, hard-working, well-ordered life extolled in the teachings of Zarathustra. Alexander honored their hospitality in many ways; it was doubtless of great value to him to know that this prosperous, oasis-like patch of land in the middle of the high Arianan mountains and desert was well-disposed toward him. He left no colony and never resorted to force. Instead, he won the Ariaspans for his new order by pausing among these tribes, slightly enlarging their territory, as they had long wished, preserving their constitution and laws, which seem to have been

in no way inferior to those of the Greek cities, and by offering more independent relations with the empire than other satrapies enjoyed.¹¹

The Gedrosian tribes, whose territory he entered next, were no less friendly.¹² Their neighbors to the north, the Arachosians, whose settlements extended into the passes¹³ that lead into the Indus basin, also submitted. Alexander gave this strategically important satrapy to Macedonian Menon, placed 4000 infantry and 600 cavalry under his command,¹⁴ and ordered the founding of Alexandria in Arachosia at the entrance to the passes. It became one of the most prosperous cities in the region and preserves the memory of its founder also in its modern name.¹⁵ The Macedonian army marched from Arachosia into the land of the Paropamisadai, the first Indian tribe on its route, moving now under growing hardship, for winter had come and the mountains lay deep in snow.¹⁶ Just to the north, rose the Indian Kaukasos, over which the way led into Bessos's territory.

Thus the marches by which Alexander brought his army from the northern edge of Khorasan to the foot of the Kaukasos in the final months of the year 330. It was a laborious period and poor in military glory, and it was to become notorious because of a crime. A plan was hatched to murder Alexander as Dareios had been murdered; the scheme turned on the mood of the army, which seemed to have had more than enough of marching on and on. Things the king had done and ordered done necessarily had disappointed expectations, given rise to misgivings, and bred discontent as conquest followed smoldering conquest and hasty subsequent reform was attended by inevitable prejudice in favor of one interest or another.

One scholar has concluded recently that Alexander's "all-devouring passion was conquest—conquest to the east, the west, the north, the south," a declaration that acquits him of any obligation to advance understanding of his subject. Alexander was prevailing in victory after victory, sweeping away power structures that had held the peoples of Asia together, and creating in the destruction of the old the beginnings of something new. He therefore had to be sure in advance of a plan for constructing his new work, of an idea that would give these first beginnings of his work direction and scale. The most profound thinker of antiquity, the king's tutor Aristotle, advised him in this matter repeatedly. He recommended that he be a leader to the Hellenes and a ruler to the barbarians, that he treat the Hellenes as friends and members of the same tribe, the barbarians as if they were beasts and plants.¹⁷ Aristotle was persuaded

that this distinction was grounded in nature. "The peoples of the cold regions of Europe," he writes, "are courageous but little suited to intellectual or artistic endeavor. Thus they are independent but incapable of political life and of ruling others. The peoples of Asia are intelligent and artistic, but lack courage. Thus they are slaves to rulers. The Hellenic people, living between the two, has characteristics of both: it is courageous and thoughtful, enjoys freedom and the best of political life; it could rule over them all if it could but unite into a single state."¹⁸

The observation is correct if the life of a people had to be and remain as nature originally ordained. But even if history, to which Aristotle gives little space, did not create new forces and new conditions, the great thinker's counsel was doctrinaire, inapplicable to the urgent, instant, practical requirements of the tasks that arose for the conqueror in Asia, and wholly unsuited to establishing workable conditions, to say nothing of morally justifiable ones. The philosopher intended only to preserve and perpetuate the summa of what had always been. The king saw in this measureless transformation, in this revolution, which was both the result of and a critique of what had gone before, the building blocks of a new construct that would go beyond anything so schematic, in which the cited natural necessity would be superseded by the power of history as it progresses.

The collapse of Persian power may have been proof of its spent vitality and of its exhaustion. But was the Hellenic world, with its freedom and its illusion of an optimal constitution, any better off? Had it been strong enough to fend off an unseemly dependency on Persian policy or menacing invasions by barbarians in the north, as long as each city cared only for its own independence and its pleasure in lording it over others? Had the Macedonians themselves had any importance or even security within their own boundaries before the monarchy rose, strong and determined, and taught them and forced them to be something other than what they had always been? Alexander, reading his tutor's *Politics*, could find there a pertinent passage, concerning the equal rights and duties of the citizenry, on which the soundest political system must rest: "But if one of them is so superior in ability that the ability and political powers of others cannot compare with his, then he can no longer be considered a part of them. One would do someone so superior in ability and power an injustice if one tried to treat him as an equal. Such a one is like a god among men."¹⁹ It follows that legislation, too, is possible only among those of like birth and like power. But to those others it does not apply; anyone who

tried to legislate for them would be ridiculous; they might reply as did Antisthenes's lions when the hares addressed the animals' assembly to demand that all receive an equal portion." Thus Aristotle's views, surely without reference to persons. But could any reader refrain from thinking of Alexander? "All agree," says Polybios, "that this king's intellect was great beyond human scale."²⁰

Alexander's deeds and the ironclad logic that relates them to one another prove his forceful will, broad foresight, and intellectual superiority. What he wanted, how he conceived his work (and fair judgment will apply only this criterion) can be glimpsed only indirectly, gathered from what he was able to realize. He stood at the pinnacle of contemporary knowledge and culture, and doubtless thought no less highly of the vocation of a king than did "the master of knowledgeable men." But unlike his great tutor, he probably did not find implicit in the idea of monarchy and the guardian's function of the monarch a need to treat barbarians like plants and animals. Nor will he have believed that his Macedonians had been trained in arms since his father's day to become, as the philosopher pronounced, "masters of those who ought to be slaves";²¹ even less that first his father, then he had forced the Hellenes into the Corinthian League to enable them to use their sly self-seeking and adroit effrontery to exploit a defenseless Asia.

He had wounded Asia terribly. But he will have seen his king's spear, like the spear of his ancestor Achilles, as endowed with a special gift to heal the wound it had inflicted. Having destroyed the old realm and defeated its Great King, he inherited power over countless peoples who had been ruled as slaves. It was truly the work of a king to liberate them to the extent that they knew or could learn to live in freedom, to preserve and promote them in their laudable, sound qualities, and to honor and spare them in what they held sacred and thought inviolable. He would have to reconcile them and win them over, so that they, too, would help maintain the empire that was to unite them with the Hellenic world. Once victory had been won and a new monarchy established, one would no longer speak of victor and vanquished, and the difference between Hellenes and barbarians would be forgotten. If he could meld the inhabitants of this wide kingdom of East and West into one people, so that their gifts and resources complemented and completed each other, if he could procure internal peace for them and create institutions that made them secure, if he could teach them the "art of leisure" without blunting their keenness,²² then he would have bestowed a great benefit, such as Aristotle

considered necessary to the true founding of a kingdom.²³ If it was his ambition, his prize, his inspiration to create a Hellenistic realm of East and West, to “transfer the monarchy from the Persians to the Hellenes,” as later ages described it in terms of the vision of the Prophet, then every passing day showed him more clearly and compellingly the paths he would have to take to complete the work he had begun.

Enormous difficulties lay in his way, instances of willfulness, violence, unnatural acts that seemed to block what he had begun. They only reinforced his will and the steadfast self-confidence of his course of action. The work he had set out on in youthful enthusiasm ruled him still and, growing like an avalanche, swept him forward, through destruction, devastation, battlefields littered with corpses. The world he conquered was transformed and no less so, his army, his entourage, himself. He stormed forward, his eye on his goal, in which he also saw his justification.

He may have believed that the necessity of what he wanted was self-evident, that events would prove it, even to the reluctant. What distinguished his Hellenic empire from the Achaimenid, which it resembled in form at the outset, was, with boundless consequence, the new energy that he brought to Asiatic life. What began by arms could be completed by the calm workings of the thoroughly cultivated, enlightened, endlessly mobile and productive spirit of Greekness. What mattered for the moment was to bring the elements that were to mix and leaven one another into contact and bind them to one another. The nature of the Asiatics was more passive, more wary, in its massiveness more sluggish and slow. Here at the beginning, the new empire depended on treating them with forbearance, on understanding their peculiarity and bias, and on their not resisting. They, too, would have to see in Alexander their king; for the moment, he was the sole unity in this wide realm, the center around which new things would crystallize. He had sacrificed to their gods and observed their festivals; among his entourage and in his own court festivals, he wanted to show that he belonged also to the Asiatics. After Dareios’s death, he began to receive Asiatics dressed in Asiatic fashion and attended by Asiatic ceremonial; he alternated the sober everydayness of Macedonian camp life with the dazzling display of eastern court life. The next day found him again leading his Macedonians into battle, tireless under hardship, caring and mindful of his troops, accessible to all and accommodating toward everyone.²⁴

The Macedonians had never been particularly pliant or adaptable, and this war and its immeasurable successes had made them more proud and

uncompromising than ever. Only a few had Hephaistion's understanding of the king's policy and intentions or Krateros's selfless, dutiful dedication to supporting them; most misconstrued and disapproved what the king did or declined to do. Although Alexander made every effort to win over those whom he had defeated and to persuade them that the Macedonians were not just conquerors, many others were arrogant and vain enough to consider complete submission the only basis for further relations and to think it their prerogative to add to the absolute power of earlier satraps a conqueror's right to use force. Although Alexander received the genuflection of the Persian grandees and the adoration that his eastern subjects thought they owed him as graciously as he received the solemn embassies of the Greeks and the cheering of his phalanges, these Macedonians wanted to see themselves as their king's equal and all others as beneath them. To the extent that camp conditions and the explicit disapproval of their king permitted, they abandoned themselves to the unbridled luxury of Asiatic life solely for the sake of the most savage pleasures and all the while resented their king's Median dress and Persian pomp, emblematic for Asia's millions of his status as their god-king. Thus many of the Macedonian overlords had become Asiatics in the pejorative sense; in them the Asiatic penchant toward despotism, intrigue, and excess combined with the impetuosity and self-confidence that made glory-loving Macedonians brave in battle and daring in all things.

When Alexander's court took on eastern ways and acquired Persian noblemen, when Alexander secured these men's loyalty by means of the same graciousness and generosity, honored them with the same trust and important commissions and award of satrapies that he extended to his Macedonians, the Macedonian grandees, as is natural, felt themselves insulted and diminished. They responded to these unacceptable Asiatics whom their king favored with revulsion and styled themselves authentic Macedonians of the old school. Especially the generals who had served under Philip, now advanced in years, made no secret of their resentment of the Persians and their mistrust of Alexander. They reinforced one another in their anger at feeling themselves passed over and treated ungratefully by the man who owed them everything: Had they not fought for years on end, only to see the fruits of their victories now handed over to the vanquished? Soon enough, the king, who treated the Persian grandees as their equals, would treat them like these erstwhile slaves of the Persian king. Alexander was drifting away from the Macedonians; they should be on their guard.

The king knew of this muttering among his generals. His mother, it is reported, had warned him repeatedly to be prudent in his relations with the *grandees*, had reproached him for familiarity and indulgence in his relations with the old Macedonian nobility, saying that his largesse was making kings of subjects and would enable them to recruit friends and followers, while it deprived him of his own friends.²⁵ Alexander could not fail to see that many of his measures were regarded with disapproval and mistrust even among his closest advisors. He was long accustomed to Parmenion's persistent warnings; he knew that Parmenion's son Philotas took noisy exception to his arrangements and had even spoken disparagingly of his person—conduct that he attributed to the somber, violent nature of a *hipparch* who was also bold and tireless. He was more affronted that brave, unassuming Krateros, whom he respected above all others, did not always approve of what he did and that even Kleitos, who commanded the *agema* of the cavalry, was becoming ever more distant. Among the Macedonian generals a breach was opening, of no great consequence for the time being, although it depressed morale and erupted in an unseemly touchiness in the war council. The more impetuous officers wanted to see the war concluded, the spoils divided, and the army disbanded. Not coincidentally, the rank and file longed more and more loudly to return home.

Dissatisfaction grew. The king's gifts, consideration, and trust could not contain it. The situation was becoming untenable, for military discipline and the officers' respect for orders were the foremost predicates not only of military success but also for preserving their gains and for the very security of the army. Even if Alexander did not expect Krateros, Kleitos, Philotas, or Parmenion, or any of the companions to resort to action, the uncertain mood of the army and the need for an example must have made him wish for a crisis that would bring dissent into the open and permit him to proceed against it.

In the autumn of 330, Alexander rested his army in the capital of Drangiana. With him were Krateros with the forces he had brought from Bactria, Koinos, Perdikkas, and Amyntas with their phalanges, Philotas with the Macedonian cavalry, and the shieldbearers. The commander of the shieldbearers, Philotas's brother Nikanor, had died recently, a painful loss for Alexander, and been buried with military honors by his brother. Their father Parmenion was standing with most of the remaining troops in far-away Media, guarding the Persian treasury and the way back to Macedonia; he was to join the grand army in the following spring. "Thereupon," writes Arrian, "Philotas's treason was denounced to Alexander."

He then reports summarily how Philotas was proceeded against. The source that Diodoros, Curtius, and Plutarch follow gives a fuller account, though it may be no closer to the truth. Essentially, these historians report as follows.

Among the malcontents in the king's entourage was a certain Dimnos, from Chalaistra in Macedonia. He confided to his lover Nikomachos that the king had attacked his honor and that he intended to avenge the insult. Prominent men were of his same mind, he said; there was a general wish to change things; everyone hated the king, who stood in their way and would have to be gotten rid of; in three days he would be dead.

Nikomachos fears for the king's life but, too shy to bring him news of this gravity, tells his brother Kebalinos what he knows and urges him to lose no time. Kebalinos goes to the king's palace. In order not to make a stir, he waits at the entrance, hoping to meet one of the commanders, to whom he can expose the plot. This is Philotas. Kebalinos charges him with a speedy denunciation to the king. Philotas returns to Alexander, but says nothing of what he has just heard. Questioned by Kebalinos at evening, Philotas replies that he did not have the opportunity; the next day will be time enough. The next day, too, Philotas says nothing, though he is repeatedly alone with the king.

Kebalinos becomes suspicious. He turns to Metron, one of the royal pages, and asks to speak privately with the king. Metron brings Kebalinos into the king's armory, tells the king, in the bath, what he has learned, and admits Kebalinos, who adds details, protests his innocence in the delay, and explains that Philotas's odd behavior and the risks of any further delay have obliged him to come himself. Alexander hears him, deeply troubled, and orders Dimnos arrested.

Seeing the plot betrayed and his plans thwarted, Dimnos kills himself.²⁶ Philotas, summoned before the king, submits that he thought Dimnos was merely bragging, that Dimnos's suicide comes as a great surprise to him and the king knows his heart. Alexander dismisses him without casting doubt on his loyalty, having invited him to table that evening. Alexander convenes a secret war council and recounts what has happened. His friends' misgivings heighten his suspicion of a wider conspiracy and his uneasiness at Philotas's baffling behavior. He imposes strictest secrecy. Hephaistion and Krateros, Koinos and Erigyios, Perdikkas and Leonnatos are to come at midnight to receive further orders.

Philotas is present at the evening meal, which passes uneventfully. At midnight the king meets with his generals, protected by a few armed men. He orders the palace guard reinforced and the gates manned,

particularly the gate toward Ecbatana. He sends out commandos to pick up other accused conspirators and a detail of three hundred troops to Philotas's quarters, with orders to surround the house, enter, and bring the hipparch before him.²⁷

Next morning the army is assembled.²⁸ Nothing is known of these events. The king appears and announces that he has called them together to sit in judgment, in keeping with Macedonian custom: a treasonous plot against his life has come to light. Nikomachos, Kebalinos, and Metron give testimony; Dimnos's corpse corroborates their statements. Then Alexander names the conspirators: the plan to murder the king within three days was first denounced to Philotas; admitted to the king's presence twice a day, he had let two days pass and said nothing; Alexander produces letters in which Parmenion instructs his sons Philotas and Nikanor, "Provide first for yourselves, then for those who are with you, and we will attain our ends."

The king adds that these intentions are confirmed by a succession of things done and said and prove the most heinous crime. At the time of Philip's murder, he recounts, Philotas declared for the pretender Amyntas; his sister was married to Attalos, who long harried Alexander and his mother, tried to exclude Alexander from the succession, and, having been sent ahead with Parmenion into Asia, ultimately rebelled. Nonetheless, he distinguished this family and kept it in his confidence. As long ago as Egypt, Alexander recalls, he was aware of Philotas's insolent and threatening remarks in conversation with the courtesan Antigone; he attributed such talk to Philotas's hot-headedness, an indulgence that only made Philotas more imperious and more arrogant. Even Parmenion was worried about his son's suspect openhandedness, unbridled extravagance, and insane conceit, and warned him repeatedly not to give himself away prematurely. This house ceased long ago to serve its king loyally, Alexander concludes, and at Gaugamela, Parmenion nearly lost the battle. Their treasonous plot ripened after Dareios's death; even while he continued to trust them, they named the day for his murder, suborned the assassins, and prepared a general overthrow.

The Macedonians are reported to have listened to their king in growing dismay. The sight of Philotas, brought before them in chains, affects them no less, stirs their pity. The strategos Amyntas speaks against the accused, who would have destroyed both their king and their hope of ever returning home. Koinos, also a strategos and Philotas's brother-in-law, speaks even more passionately and picks up a stone, about to proceed to a Macedonian

judgment. The king restrains him so that Philotas can defend himself, then withdraws, lest his presence hamper the defense. Philotas denies the accusations and points to his father's, his brothers', and his own loyal service. He admits suppressing Kebalinos's denunciation, says he did not want to burden Alexander with useless warnings, such as Parmenion's warning against the Akarnanian physician at Tarsos. What they are complaining of, he says, is the fear and hatred that have always been the lot of the despot. Now in uproar, the Macedonians condemn Philotas and the other conspirators to death. Alexander adjourns the proceeding to the following day.

A confession would inculpate Parmenion and the other conspirators, and Philotas has made none. The king convenes a secret council; most of those present want to proceed immediately to execution. Hephaistion, Krateros, and Koinos favor forcing a confession, and their proposal carries. The three commanders are charged to be present when Philotas is put under torture. Philotas confesses that he and his father spoke of murdering Alexander; that they did not dare do so while Dareios still lived, since the Persians would have had the benefit of that crime; that he went ahead in order to act during the lifetime of his aged father; and that his father knows nothing of the present conspiracy. The king presents these statements to the assembled army next morning; Philotas is brought in and impaled on the Macedonians' pikes.

The most reliable sources, Ptolemy and Aristoboulos, whom Arrian follows, confirm that treasonous plotting by Philotas was denounced to Alexander in Egypt²⁹ and that Alexander could not bring himself to believe these reports, which conflicted with his friendship with Philotas and his respect for Parmenion. Ptolemy reports that the king himself pronounced the indictment before the assembled army, that Philotas defended himself, and that his suppression of the denunciation, in particular, was counted against him as a crime. He makes no mention of torture.

Parmenion, too, was condemned to death.³⁰ It was thought necessary to proceed to execution as quickly as possible. Parmenion had troops in significant numbers under his command; with his high prestige in the military and the treasury of many thousands of talents under his guard, he could easily induce these men to take extreme measures. Even if he had no direct part in his son's treason, the worst was possible after Philotas's execution. He was standing in Ecbatana, thirty or forty marches away, and if he should mutiny, no one knew what might happen during such an interval. Under the circumstances, the king could not afford to exercise

his right to pardon, nor could he risk having the field commander publicly arrested in the midst of troops who were loyal to him. Polydamas, one of the companions, was sent to Sitalkes, Menidas, and Kleandros in Ecbatana, carrying the king's written order to dispose of Parmenion in all secrecy. Mounted on racing camels and guided by two Arabs, Polydamas reached Ecbatana in the twelfth night. The Thracian prince and the two Macedonian commanders carried out their orders immediately.

In Prophthasia meanwhile the inquiry continued. Demetrios, one of the seven bodyguards, was arrested on suspicion of collusion with Philotas; Ptolemy Lagos's son replaced him. The sons of Tymphiot Andromenes had been among Philotas's closest friends, and the youngest, Polemon, who belonged to a cavalry squadron under Philotas's hipparchy, had panicked when he heard of the hipparch's arrest and taken flight, arousing suspicion, also of his three older brothers. These, Amyntas, Simmias, and Attalos, all commanders of phalangites, were brought in and Amyntas, in particular, put under indictment. But Amyntas defended himself and his brothers so effectively that the Macedonians acquitted him. He then asked leave to go and bring back his fugitive brother, which the king granted. Amyntas set out that very day and eventually returned, bringing Polemon with him. These things, and Amyntas's heroic death in battle shortly afterward, removed the king's suspicion of the brothers, whom he subsequently distinguished in many ways.

It is notable that the case of Alexander the Lynkestian, who had made an attempt on the king's life four years earlier in Asia Minor and had been held on the king's orders but never tried, came to be discussed again at the time of these inquiries. Although it may be true that the army demanded his execution, at this point the king, too, may have found it necessary to produce a man whom he had spared because he was related by marriage to the Macedonian viceroy. It is not unlikely that further reasons for putting him on trial emerged just now, about which our sources say nothing more precise. In any case, when Philotas admitted that the conspiracy intended to murder Alexander, the immediate question became who should receive the diadem after him. The next claimant was King Philip's son Arrhidaios. Even if he was present in the army, no one would have considered letting the monarchy pass to an heir who was as good as feeble-minded. Nor to someone who had no claim to the kingdom, such as Parmenion or his son or another of the generals. That left the Lynkestian, whom the conspirators might have found the more eligible because Antipater, whose interests had to be considered, could be won

over to the new order of things by the elevation of his son-in-law. Perhaps one may mention here that Antipater, having learned of events in Prothasia and Ecbatana, apparently took steps that are comprehensible only in such a context. He is said to have taken up secret contact with the Aitolians,³¹ whom Alexander had ordered harshly disciplined for destroying Oiniadai, a city loyal to him. This was a precautionary measure that had no further effect for the moment, but it was known to the king³² and, as is believed, aroused his suspicion in a way that found expression only years later.

Thus the whole wretched business ended, wretched even if Philotas was justly condemned, even if Parmenion's murder was politically necessary. That the tradition depicts Philotas, for all his personal valor and his effectiveness in battle, as violent, self-seeking, and treacherous, that his father may have warned him to be more cautious and less arrogant makes these events no more endurable; even less so does Parmenion's having often earned the king's reproach. Although it is true that Alexander believed he had to demand his ranking officers' strictest obedience to orders and to impose the sternest discipline in wartime, nonetheless, the fact that he discovered misdoing within his highest command and felt obliged to punish it thus was an ominous indicator for the state of his army and the first grave fissure in what had been the steady, tightly joined instrument of his power, his only guarantee of effectiveness and success. His resilience and his commanding presence will have enabled him to contain the destabilizing effects of these events and to regain control of his alarmed troops quickly and completely.³³ But the loss of Philotas and Parmenion did the army irreparable harm and remained an indelible stain.

We do not know whether these events had bearing on the continuing reorganization of the army while in winter quarters or whether changes in the military's task conditioned that reform.

Organized military force vanished from Persian territory with the death of Dareios. Levies could still be raised here and there and led into the field, but no longer in the firm formations of the imperial army—the Great Kings' own troops and the kardakes and the core of tactically skilled Hellenic mercenaries—that Alexander had composed his army to meet at the outset of the campaign. Henceforth, Alexander would have to wage war against loosely organized masses; he would have to scatter them, pursue rapidly, and use other guerilla tactics. His troops therefore would have to be organized in such a fashion that they could be converted

quickly into miniature armies; they would have to be made more mobile and tactically more aggressive, and more light units were needed. Finally, one would have to prepare to use Asiatic levies to good purpose, not merely to enlarge the army or as convenient substitutes for Macedonian replacements, who now had to be brought up over ever greater distances from the receding homeland.

The previous winter, the *iles* of the cavalry had each been broken into two *lochoi*, every *lochos* under a *lochagos*. Now eight *lochoi* were combined to form a *hipparchy*, so that henceforth the heavy cavalry was organized, to use modern expression, into two regiments, of eight diminished squadrons each. Kleitos Dropides's son, called Black Kleitos, who had commanded the royal *ile* of cavalry, was given one *hipparchy*, Hephaistion the other. During the field campaign of the following year, the number of *hipparchies* was raised again.³⁴ Similarly, the mercenary cavalry, four hundred riders who had joined the army under Menidas in 331, was enlarged to form more than one *hipparchy*.³⁵ An arm of mounted javelin throwers had already been added, of unknown number.³⁶

No less important changes in the organization of the infantry that emerge in the Indian campaign seem to have been introduced after the important enlargement of the army in Baktria. From Persepolis, Alexander had ordered the satrapies to raise young troops, 30,000 men in toto, who were to be trained in Macedonian fashion and integrated into the army as "epigones."³⁷ Then, during the two years he spent in Baktrian country, he took Baktrians, Sogdians, and Paropamisadai, and other tribesmen into service, especially as riders. Effectively, the king's army, once composed of Macedonians, Hellenes, and European barbarians, now began to take on the Hellenistic character that Alexander wanted to give his empire. Thus, although on the one hand larger and smaller garrisons of Macedonians and Hellenes were left behind at important places in the satrapies and eventually developed from military installations into politically organized civil communities, or *polities*, in Hellenic fashion, on the other, military society and discipline must have begun to hellenize the Asiatics integrated into the field army.

This field army was no mere military entity. It combined other elements and other functions to form a very peculiar microcosm. The field camp was at the same time a field court, the central administration of a vast empire, and its highest civil service, treasury, and management. It oversaw supplies for arming and clothing the army, for provisioning men and

feeding animals, and for providing medical services. Merchants, technicians, vendors, speculators of all kinds, not a few men of letters, in addition to the usual tutors of young noblemen, all accompanied the army, to say nothing of special guests, both Hellenes and Asiatics, both lay and priestly, and the inevitable female camp followers. Both Alexander the Lynkestian, a prisoner since events in Pisidia, and feeble-minded Arrhidaios, Philip's bastard, were present in the army. In a word, this field camp and court was the mobile seat of the empire, its mighty, throbbing center, proceeding from one region to another and making its power felt, whether encamped or on the march.

One may mention another matter in this connection. Alexander's troops had set out clothed as the climate and custom of Macedonia required. Were they clothed appropriately for the very different conditions of Iran, Turan, and India? For the hardships of endless marches and abrupt changes of diet, for desert sun and winter weather at high altitudes, for the rainy season of the tropics? Did the very health of the troops not require heavy clothing for warmth, head protection against sunstroke, leg coverings, and stouter footwear than sandals or low shoes?³⁸ Perhaps after the fashion of local tribes? Might this be the introduction of Asiatic dress for which the king is so bitterly reproached? Our sources give no answer to this question and to many others.

CHAPTER 2

The next field campaign led into Oxiana. There Bessos, having assumed the Great King's tiara and the name Artaxerxes, was busily preparing to block the Macedonians' further advance. Aside from the troops that had followed him since the Great King's murder, he had gathered about seven thousand cavalry from Baktria and Sogdiana, and several thousand Dahae had joined his forces. Many grandees of these parts were with him: Dataphernes and Oxyartes from Baktria, Spitamenes from Sogdiana, Katanes from Paraitakene. Satibarzanes, too, had fled to Baktria when his rising in Alexander's rear failed—a reversal that seemed to give Bessos a great advantage. For Alexander, once he had been diverted from the main road toward Baktria, probably would not attempt the difficult passes over the Kaukasos and would either abandon the Baktrian campaign altogether or at least pause to make further preparations; perhaps he would even make a foray into nearby India. Then it would not be difficult to organize a general rebellion in the newly subjected lands in his rear.

To preclude any incursion by the enemy, Bessos ordered the territory on the northern slope of the mountains ravaged in a radius of several days' journey. He gave Satibarzanes, who could count on the loyalty of his former subjects, about two thousand riders for a diversionary tactic in Alexander's rear that would cut him off if it succeeded. The Areians rose at the approach of their erstwhile satrap; even Arsames, the satrap Alexander had installed, seemed to favor the rising. Bessos sent his loyalist Barzanes into Parthyaia, too, to start an insurrection in the name of Old Persia.¹

News of the Areians' new revolt reached Alexander in Arachosia. He immediately sent the 600 allied riders, under their captains Erigyios and Karanos, and the 6000 Greek mercenaries under Artabazos, including those of Andronikos,² who had come over to him in the Caspian passes, into Areia and ordered Phrataphernes, satrap in Hyrkania and Parthyaia,

to take his mounted squads and join them. Simultaneously, the king set out from Arachosia³ and marched in harshest winter cold over the exposed passes that separate the Arachosians and the Paropamisadai. He found this upland densely populated and the many villages, which received him well, able to furnish ample provisions even in the dead of winter.⁴ He descended rapidly into the more open country of the upper river Kabul, which he crossed, and reached the foot of the high Hindu Kush, the "Kaukasos," beyond which lies Baktria. There he rested for the winter.⁵

Seven passes lead from Kabul country over the Hindu Kush into the Oxos valley. Three lead up along the headwaters of the Panjsher; the easternmost is the Khawak pass toward Andarab, which reaches an altitude of 13,200 feet.⁶ It and the three adjacent passes, which lead down to the springs of the Surkab, are blocked by snow during four or five months of the year. Instead, one must take the westernmost pass, of Dundan Shikan, where a sixty-mile journey brings the traveler from Kabul to Balkh. The way leads across several mountain chains on the two sides of the highest peaks, and the valleys in between, rich in springs, grazing, and flocks, are settled by peaceable sheep-herding tribes.⁷

Alexander pitched camp with the high mountains "to his left," on a spot closer to the difficult eastern passes, particularly that toward Andarab, than to the western pass. Would Bessos not expect to see him come over this last and take his measures accordingly? It was appropriate to prefer the nearer passes and rest the army longer, especially the horses, which had suffered greatly in the winter marches. Furthermore, what the king heard and saw in Kabul country must have told him that the army was standing at the entrance to a new world, composed of many separate states, great and small, of warlike tribes, which, excited by news of the conqueror's approach, might move to block his return through the passes before him if he moved farther north. To secure this position, he founded Alexandria in the Kaukasos on the site of his camp⁸ and left a strong garrison under Persian Proexes as satrap and Niloxenos of the companions as overseer.⁹

Once the worst of the winter had passed, Alexander broke camp for a crossing of a boldness that bears comparison to Hannibal's. The mountains were still under snow; even the days were cold, and the roads were difficult. The inhabitants of the many settlements they entered were peaceful and willing to give of what they had, but they had only flocks. The treeless mountains offered only sparse creosote bushes and no firewood, and the army ate its meat raw, seasoned with native silphium, and

without bread. Thus they marched fourteen days over the mountains, and as they approached the northern slope, the shortness of supplies became oppressive. For the territory had been laid waste and emptied, the settlements razed, and the flocks scattered. In the end, they lived on roots and slaughtered their pack animals for meat. On the fifteenth day, after unspeakable hardships, the army reached the Baktrian city Drapsaka, or Adrapsa, still high in the mountains.¹⁰

Alexander stood at the entrance to an area very different from the ones he had been subjecting easily enough. Baktria and Sogdiana were lands of ancient culture, once an empire, perhaps the homeland of Zarathustra and the teachings that had spread over all Iran. This empire had been conquered by the Assyrians, the Medes, and, finally, the Persians. Surrounded by Turanian tribes to the north and the west and always threatened by their raids, the area had become an important buffer region organized for the defense of Iran. At the battle of Arbela, Bessos, "satrap of the land of the Baktrians," had also led the Sogdians and the Indians who bordered Baktria, and the Scythian Sakai, not as his subjects, but rather as "allies of the Great King," a competence that implied a unity of military command and level of cooperation among Scythian tribes that could make conquest here difficult indeed. Perhaps matters could be made easier if the Macedonians appeared suddenly and from an unexpected quarter. After resting his army briefly in Drapsaka, Alexander moved rapidly through the passes of the northernmost foothills down to Aornos and from there across the cultivated plain to Baktra, the capital. He met no resistance.

In the mistaken belief that the mountains and the scorched earth on their northern slope would make Turan safe, Bessos remained confident as long as the enemy was far away. But when he heard of Alexander's approach, he moved hastily out of Baktra, fled over the Oxos, burned the boats with which he had crossed, and withdrew to Nautaka in Sogdian country. He still had a few thousand Sogdians under Spitamenes and Oxyartes with him and the Dahae from the Tanais. When the Baktrian riders saw their countryside being vacated and abandoned to the enemy, they deserted and returned to their respective homelands,¹¹ with the result that Alexander had no trouble subjecting all the territory to the Oxos. Artabazos and Erigyios returned from Areia and reported that the rebellion there had been put down quickly and that Erigyios himself had slain Satibarzanes; the Areians had laid down their arms and submitted. Alexander sent the Solian Stasanor into the area with orders to arrest

the satrap Arsames, who had played an ambiguous role in the revolt, and take over the government. Baktria was awarded to venerable Artabazos, a reassurance, no doubt, to those there who had resigned themselves to their fate. Aornos at the northern entrance to the passes was designated a place of arms.¹² Veterans unsuited to further service and the Thessalian volunteers who had finished their tour of duty were allowed to return home.¹³

In the spring of 329,¹⁴ preparations for the conquest of Transoxiana were complete. The topography of the land, put to good use, might have enabled sustained, possibly successful, resistance. The productive, densely populated valley of Marakanda, protected to the west by vast deserts, to the south, east, and north by mountains and very difficult passes, was not hard to defend and well situated, furthermore, to stir up unrest in Areia, Parthyaia, and Hyrkania. Significant forces could easily be gathered there. The Dahae and Massagete hordes in the western deserts and the Scyths beyond the Jaxartes were practiced raiders; even Indian princes had declared themselves prepared to join a war against Alexander. And if the Macedonians prevailed, the deserts to the west and fastnesses in the highlands offered refuge and staging areas for renewed revolt. It was therefore imperative that Alexander seize Bessos before his usurpation could lead to a general rising.

Alexander moved out of Baktra and, with some difficulty, across the more barren territory that lies between the cultivated region around Baktra and the Oxos.¹⁵ The army found no boats on the riverbank, and the river was both too deep to be crossed by wading and too wide to be crossed by swimming. Timber for a bridge would have to be brought from a distance, and the sandy riverbed and swift current discouraged any attempt to drive pilings. Alexander resorted to the means that had served him so well on the Danube: he had his men stuff their tent skins with straw, sew them shut, and bind them together, then lay them on the water as pontoons to support the beams and planks of a bridge over which the army crossed the river in five days. It continued toward Nautaka.¹⁶

Bessos's fate, meanwhile, had taken a turn worthy of his crime and his incompetence. In unrelenting flight from Alexander, incapable of planning or of action, he seemed to the grandees in his following to betray and defeat their last hope. Even at this depth of humiliation, they were tempted to seize power and considered a crime against a regicide permissible. Hearing of Alexander's approach, Sogdian Spitamenes thought it timely to acquire Alexander's favor by betraying the traitor.

He told the princes Dataphernes, Katanes, and Oxyartes of his plan, and they soon reached an understanding. They seized “King Artaxerxes” and notified Alexander that they held him and would hand him over if Alexander sent a small detachment to receive him. Alexander rested his army briefly and, while he followed more slowly, sent his bodyguard Lagid Ptolemy forward with 6000 men, sufficient, he thought, to obtain delivery even if the barbarians should resist. The detachment made a ten-day journey in four¹⁷ and reached the site of Spitamenes’s last camp. There they heard that the Persians’ offer was no longer reliable. Ptolemy took his cavalry rapidly forward, while the infantry followed, and arrived under the walls of a hamlet where Spitamenes and the other conspirators had abandoned Bessos with a handful of his troops; they had scrupled to hand him over themselves. Ptolemy surrounded the village and sent a herald to tell the villagers that he would spare them if they surrendered Bessos. They opened their gates; the Macedonians entered, seized Bessos, and withdrew in a closed column.

Ptolemy sent to ask how Alexander wanted the captured regicide brought before him. Alexander ordered that he be placed, naked and in an iron collar, to the right of the road on which the army would pass. Thus it was. As Alexander drew abreast, he halted and asked Bessos why he had seized, transported, and finally murdered Dareios, his king and lord, his relative and benefactor. Bessos replied that it had not been his decision alone but rather that of all Dareios’s attendants at the time, in the hope of winning Alexander’s favor. The king had him scourged and sent a herald to report the regicide’s words to the army. Bessos was taken off to Baktra to be tried.¹⁸

Such is Ptolemy’s version of these events. Aristoboulos has Spitamenes and Dataphernes personally deliver Bessos in chains. This indicates what the Kleitarchan tradition says more explicitly: that Alexander received Spitamenes, Dataphernes, Katanes, and Oxyartes in good standing and may even have confirmed them in their possessions. Perhaps he believed that he would thus assure himself of Sogdiana. Then he proceeded from Nautaka to Marakanda,¹⁹ the Sogdian capital, where he left a garrison, and continued to the Jaxartes. But our sources say nothing of the installation of a satrap in Sogdiana or of any other means of subjection; they mention only a substantial contribution of horses to replace the many mounts lost in the high mountains and in other hardships of the march.

The more curious then is their incidental mention that Alexander summoned the “hyparchs of the Baktrian country” to Zariaspa to an

assembly, for which they use the customary Greek word for the annual military review of the *karanies* under the Persian empire.²⁰ Although Alexander may have summoned the Baktrian hyparchs to a review simply to raise a levy, he had never done anything similar in another part of the kingdom. Did he contemplate a different relationship to the empire and a different organization for the lands along the Oxos? As we shall see, in Sogdiana he installed a local grandee as “king”; wed the daughter of another; forced a third, expressly called “hyparch,” to surrender his mountain fastness, then left him in possession of both his castle and his country;²¹ and, having released a fourth from similar difficulties, gave him reason to hope that his territories would be enlarged. The numerous noblemen mentioned in this countryside, with their castles and their holdings, these “hyparchs,” as our sources call them, resemble enfeoffed princes, territorial lords under the sovereignty of the empire, like the Pehlewanes of the *Shahnameh*.²² Elements were present for an arrangement in keeping with the peculiar features of these territories. Artabazos’s appointment may be a case in point. We shall return to this question later.

During his march to Samarkand, Alexander could have gained an approximate notion of transoxianan topography. If he marched to Nautaka (Karshi) by way of Keleft, he had the great desert on his left and on his right foothills up to 3000 feet of high mountains whose peak (Hazreti-Sultan) he saw ten miles to the east as he crossed the pass of Qoratepa on the way up from Nautaka on the River Kashka to Shakrisyabz. He then descended into the valley of the River Sogd (Polytimetos) to Samarkand, 2150 English feet above sea level, on the same meridian as Balkh; as the confluence of the Derbent and the Oxos, 300 feet above sea level; as Shakrisyabz in the Kashka valley; and as the Qoratepa pass, at 3000 feet. The high Sogd basin is flanked on the north by mountain chains running from east to west, through which passes lead northeastward to the Jaxartes, which, flowing westward, bends abruptly northward at Khujand. At this point, the mountains to the south and the higher ones to the north approach closer to the mighty river and separate the fertile valley of the middle Jaxartes, the Ferghana, from the lower Jaxartes with the great desert on its left bank. As the crow flies, Khujand lies 30 miles from Samarkand, Balkh 42 miles from Samarkand and 60 miles from Khujand, twice the distance of Milan from Basel.

Andarab, or Adrapsa, where Alexander had rested after crossing the high passes of the Kaukasos at the beginning of the year, lies on approximately the same meridian as the bend northward of the Jaxartes at Khujand, 65 miles away by air. As Alexander descended from Andarab, toward

Kondoz apparently, he was within a few miles of the spot where the great rivers Kowkchek, from the high Indian mountain ranges, and Abi-Panj, from the vast Pamir plateau, the “roof of the world,” join to form the Oxos. Downstream, a number of tributaries flow into the river from the high mountains to the north. These mountains, parallel to the Jaxartes and as close as 15 to 20 miles, put out several spurs to the south. Between them lie more or less narrow river valleys that open toward the Oxos and communicate with one another by difficult passes. Where the fourth, westernmost tributary, the Derbent, joins the Oxos 10 miles north of Balkh, the landscape changes. The massive snow-capped mountains between the springs of the Derbent and the Sogd at Samarkand send out a fan of spurs toward the west, southwest, and south; the streams between them unite to form the Kashka, which flows past Karshi (Nautaka) and expires in the desert. The Sogd as well, sweeping in a broad arc from westward to southward, flows past Bukhara and ends in a pond on the steppe before it reaches the Oxos.

Four features of this landscape are pertinent to political arrangements here: (1) the sprawling depression that runs down toward the Oxos effectively turns its back on the Jaxartes; (2) the valley of the Sogd, cut off from the rest of the Oxos watershed by high mountains, forms a buffer, a barrier, between the Oxos basin and the Jaxartes, with deserts to its west; (3) the mountain chain over which the pass of the Iron Gate leads furnishes a natural boundary between this buffer and the valleys of Baktria; and (4) the Pamir plateau abuts this countryside and furnishes a bulwark against the upper interior of Asia. Alexander’s further military operations in the area become more perspicuous in the light of this topography.

From Marakanda he moved northeastward to reach the Tanais, which the riparian tribes called the Jaxartes, the “great river.” The military road from Marakanda to Kyropolis, the farthest outpost of the realm, near the south bank of the Tanais, leads across the passes of the Oxian mountains, home to marauding tribes, and through the countryside called Uroteppa. Here a few bands of Macedonians, having lost their way while out foraging in the mountains, were ambushed and captured or killed. Alexander took his lighter troops against the tribesmen. They had retired, 30,000 strong, into their steep mountains full of strongholds, from which their slingers and archers repulsed repeated Macedonian attacks. Alexander was among the many wounded, his shinbone shattered by an arrow. His enraged troops riposted by taking the enemy fastness. No more than 8000 barbarians survived the encounter; they submitted to the king.²³

Alexander marched northward from the mountains without meeting resistance. Throughout the ages, the particular quality of this region, the Ferghana, has made it an important tribal frontier and the outer wall of eastern culture against the hordes of the Turanian steppes. It is protected by high mountains to the south and the east, to the north by the river and the mountains with their cascades, and exposed to attack only from the west and the northwest. Precisely there nomadic bands of bellicose tribesmen, the Scyths of antiquity, lurk on the broad steppe that opens on the two sides of the lower Jaxartes. These are the Turanians of Parsi saga, against whom a remarkable line of frontier fortresses surely was erected in earliest times and, under ever changing circumstances among the tribes, remained important down into the modern era. Alexander found seven such towns, little distant from one another and bordering the steppe. The most important was Cyrus's city, larger and better fortified than the rest and the principal stronghold of the region.²⁴

Alexander sent Macedonian garrisons into the passes, while he took the army a few hours northeastward and encamped at the point where the Tanais bends abruptly northward into the last narrows before it broadens on the sandy steppe. He saw the spot as a natural frontier fortress against the marauding tribes of the desert, useful defensively to stop Scythian incursions from north and west, offensively as a staging area for expeditions into Scythian territory. He also hoped to make the new town a tribal trading post. For the Kashgar road, the sole mountain road for exchanges doubtless already being made between the low country and the interior of upper Asia, led from the land of the Seres down the 25,000-foot rampart of Tian Shan over Osh directly here.²⁵

Relations with the neighboring Scyths began peacefully enough. Embassies from the remarkable tribe of the Abians and from the "European Scyths"²⁶ appeared, offering friendship and seeking alliance. Alexander had some of the companions accompany these Scyths home, ostensibly to return their king's offer of friendship, in fact to inform themselves about Scythian territory, the size of the population, its mode of life, and Scythian prowess and military arts.²⁷

Meanwhile a movement started in Alexander's rear and grew rapidly. Hatred of foreign conquerors combined with the volatility that had always marked the ruling class of these lands and that required only a provocation and a leader to explode in wild rebellion. Spitamenes, whose vaulting hopes may have been disappointed, rushed to make good use of this mood, the trust that Alexander had placed in him, and Alexander's

absence. The Sogdians, who had participated with him in Bessos's flight and then his capture, were at the center of this insurrection,²⁸ for which the inhabitants of the seven outposts provided the impetus and perhaps gave the agreed signal when they murdered the garrisons that Alexander had left behind.

Unrest broke out also in the valley of the Sogd; the modest garrison in Marakanda seemed insufficient to resist and to have met the same fate as the garrisons in the seven outposts. The Massagetai, Dahae, and Sakai of the desert, Spitamenes's old comrades in arms, were no less threatened by the Macedonians and joined the movement, attracted by a prospect of murder and plunder. In the Baktrian lands, rumor spread that Alexander would use the assembly of hyparchs that he had called in Zariaspa to dispatch all the local barons at one blow.²⁹ They should take measures and protect themselves before matters became worse. Oxyartes, Katanes, Chorienes, Haustanes, and many others followed the example set on the Sogd. News of these events crossed the Jaxartes and reached the Asiatic Scyths on the steppes, who then massed on the banks of the river; at the Sogdians' first victory, they would swim their horses across and fall upon the Macedonians. Alexander was suddenly surrounded by endless danger, and the least inadvertence or delay could be the end of him and his army. He would need all his energy and daring to find a way out quickly.

He moved rapidly to Gaza, the nearest of the seven walled towns, and sent Krateros ahead to Kyropolis, where most of the barbarians of the area had converged, with orders to cordon off the town by trench and mound and build machinery for a siege. He attacked Gaza's not very imposing mud walls straight away. His slingers, archers, and machines swept them clean of defenders; the heavy infantry, attacking from all sides, laid on ladders and overtopped them, and the Macedonians soon made themselves masters of the town. On Alexander's express orders, all local men were put to the sword; women, children, and all possessions were delivered over to the soldiers, and the town put to the torch. On that same day, the Macedonians attacked and entered another town and prepared the same fate for its inhabitants. Next day, the phalanges attacked a third town, with the same result. From the walls of the two nearest towns, the barbarians watched the smoke columns rise; they heard the reports brought by refugees, decided that all was lost, and erupted through their gates to take cover in the mountains. Alexander had anticipated them: He had sent out his cavalry in the night to watch the roads, and the fleeing barbarians ran upon Macedonian pikes. Their towns were

taken and razed. Thus were five towns subdued in two days. Alexander now turned to Kyropolis, where Krateros and his troops had arrived in the meantime.

Kyropolis was the largest of the towns and the strongest, protected also by a castle within the walls and defended by about 15,000 of the best fighters in the area. Alexander brought up his siege engines right away and set to work. While the enemy's attention was fixed on the walls, he noticed that a dry streambed offered a way to slip under the wall and penetrate into the town. He sent his shieldbearers, Agrianians, and archers against the nearest gate, while he and a few others crept in by the streambed, opened the gate, and let in the army. The barbarians, though lost, threw themselves furiously upon the Macedonians. In the massacre that followed, Alexander, Krateros, and many other officers were wounded. The Macedonians scaled the walls on all sides and took the market; the barbarians, surrounded, retreated to the castle, having lost 8000 dead. Alexander cordoned off the castle and in due course want of water forced a surrender.

After these events, according to Ptolemy, the seventh and last town surrendered unconditionally without waiting to be attacked. Other sources report a storm and a massacre.³⁰ In any event, the more important any given area, the more drastically did Alexander proceed against its restless inhabitants. He had to have full control of these passes if he was to have any hope of subduing Sogdian country. The blood of the defiant enemy and the obliteration of all previous conditions were to mark the beginning of a new age, an age that would transform Transoxiana for centuries to come.

By crushing the seven towns and removing their surviving populations, sometimes by force, to settle the newly founded Alexandria on the Tanais, Alexander opened his way back into Sogdiana. It was high time to relieve the garrison that Spitamenes was besieging at Marakanda. But the Scythian hordes drawn by the rising of the seven towns were standing on the north bank of the river, waiting to attack the army as it withdrew. If Alexander hoped to salvage anything on the Tanais and lay a foundation for future conquest, he would have to fortify his position on the river very carefully and cure the Scyths' taste for raiding before moving out. For the moment, a detachment of a few thousand men sent to the relief of Marakanda seemed sufficient. In the next twenty days, the army built defenses to meet the new Alexandria's immediate needs and houses for the first settlers. These were Macedonian veterans, some of the Greek mercenaries, local barbarians who came voluntarily, and the families forced out of the

towns the Macedonians had destroyed. With the usual offerings, contests, and festivals Alexander formally named the new town.

Meanwhile, the Scythian hordes encamped on the far side of the river had grown noisier. As a provocation, they shot volleys of arrows across the stream and boasted loudly that these foreigners would never dare to take on Scyths; if they should, they would soon learn the difference between the sons of the desert and mollycoddled Persians. Alexander decided to cross the river and attack them. But an offering yielded no good omen. The wound he had received in the attack on Kyropolis may also have meant that he could not lead this raid himself. The Scyths were becoming more and more impertinent, and ominous news was arriving from Sogdiana. Alexander had his prophet Aristander sacrifice again, and again the omens promised no good; they even foretold personal danger for the king. Whereupon Alexander said that he would rather expose himself to imminent danger than endure the jeering of these Scyths any longer.

He ordered the troops to advance to the riverbank, draw up the catapults, and prepare their tent skins to make pontoons. When the Macedonian machines all began hurling stones and arrows across the Jaxartes at once, the Scyths, who had never seen catapults in the field, were so startled that they broke up and fled back. The Macedonians crossed to the sound of the trumpet, moving behind the archers and slingers, who provided cover for the cavalry. The sarissa bearers and the heavy Greek cavalry, together about 1200 horse, opened combat. The Scyths, wheeling to attack, encircled the outnumbered Macedonians, loosed their arrows, and turned to ride away. The light infantry, just landed, entered the fray with the archers and Agrianians and stopped the Scyths at some points for standing combat. To decide these encounters, Alexander ordered a charge by three hipparchies of the companions and the mounted javelin throwers. He himself led a charge by the remaining squadrons, moving in deep columns, into the enemy's flank. Attacked on all sides and unable to scatter for flying combat, the Scyths galloped away. The Macedonians pursued hotly. They moved at great speed in oppressive heat, tormented by thirst. Alexander, at the point of exhaustion, drank the bad water of the salt steppe without dismounting and immediately felt its effects. He continued the chase until his strength gave out³¹ and he had to be carried back to camp.³²

His attack on the Scyths had the desired effect: Ambassadors came from the Scythian king to apologize and attribute the provocation to an isolated pack of independent-minded raiders. Their king, they said,

regretted the confusion and was entirely at Alexander's disposal.³³ Alexander responded by returning the approximately 150 prisoners he had taken, without ransom, a largesse that impressed the barbarians and, combined with Alexander's feats at arms, gave his name a nimbus of more than human glory, which primitive peoples, in their simplicity, are more inclined to credit than to doubt. As on the Danube seven years earlier, an unconquered tribe, the Sakaïen Scyths, sent an embassy to offer peace and friendship.³⁴ All the tribes in the neighborhood of Alexandria had now been pacified and took up relations with the empire, a resolution with which Alexander had to content himself, for his presence was now urgently required in Sogdiana.

Matters there were grave indeed. Even the quiet and industrious part of the local population, perhaps more frightened than truly willing, had joined the insurrection begun by Spitamenes and his partisans.³⁵ The Macedonian garrison at Marakanda was under siege and hard pressed. Then it sallied, threw back the enemy, and retired to the fortress without losses. These things had taken place at about the time when Alexander, having taken the seven walled towns, sent a relief force. Spitamenes responded by raising his siege and withdrawing to the west.³⁶ The Macedonian relief arrived in Marakanda: 66 Macedonian cavalry, 800 mounted Greek mercenaries, and 1500 heavy mercenaries on foot, led by Andromachos, Karanos, and Menedemos.³⁷ Alexander had also sent the Lykian Pharnuches, who knew the local language. He had reckoned that the arrival of the relief corps would put the rebels to flight and that negotiations with the normally peaceable Sogdian population would begin immediately.

When the Macedonians learned that Spitamenes had vacated Marakanda, they set out in pursuit. Spitamenes fled into the desert on the Sogdian frontier; the Macedonians followed, also to punish the Scyths, who seemed to be offering refuge to the rebels. This ill-considered incursion caused the Scyths to go over to Spitamenes, adding 600 bold riders of the steppe to his fighting force. Spitamenes met the Macedonians at the edge of the steppe. He made no regular attack and awaited none, but rather set about encircling the closed ranks of Macedonian infantry and shooting from a distance. When the Macedonian cavalry closed on him, he fled; when they pursued, he led them on until they tired, then returned to renew his attack, moving swiftly from one point to another. The Macedonian horses were exhausted from long marches and a shortage of fodder, and the men suffered many casualties.

Then the Macedonian officers began to quarrel among themselves. Pharnuches demanded that the three commanders assume leadership of the expedition, since he was no soldier and had come merely to conduct negotiations. They refused to take responsibility for a mission that had clearly failed. The commanders began pulling their troops back from open country toward the river, where they intended to take cover under a wood and mount a defense. Dissension in the command aborted the maneuver. Without notifying Andromachos, Karanos took his riders back across the river; the infantry, thinking all was lost, rushed after. The barbarians saw their chance: they galloped up from all sides, and some crossed upstream and downstream from the Macedonians, encircling them. They pushed their enemy from the rear, crowded it on its flanks, and shoved it back when it tried to land on the far bank. The Macedonians, who offered no resistance, found themselves forced onto an island at midstream, where the barbarians, shooting from both banks, slew them to the last man. The few who had been taken prisoner were murdered; the commanders died in action; 40 cavalry and 300 infantry escaped.³⁸ Spitamenes immediately took his Scyths against Marakanda, where, supported by the population, he renewed his siege on the garrison.

Reports of these events obliged the king to arrange himself with the Scyths on the Tanais as quickly as he could. Confident that his new Alexandria would guard the frontier and become an important base for future operations, he took the light infantry, the shieldbearers, and half the hipparchies rapidly into the Sogd valley, leaving Krateros to follow with the greater part of the army. Doubled daily marches brought him before Marakanda on the fourth day.³⁹ Hearing of Alexander's approach, Spitamenes again took flight.⁴⁰ The king pursued. On his route he passed the corpses of the Macedonian soldiers who had fallen in the encounter on the riverbank and stopped to bury them as solemnly as his haste permitted. He followed his fleeing enemy, until the desert, which extends endlessly westward and northward, obliged him to abandon the chase. Thus did Alexander rid the land of Spitamenes and his band.

The Sogdians, aware of their guilt and in fear of the king's righteous anger, had retreated behind the mud walls of their towns. Bent upon pursuing Spitamenes, Alexander had rushed past, but he did not intend to leave them unpunished. Repeated insurrection here was dangerous, secure possession of the territory was important, and the population was proving recalcitrant. Harsh measures were necessary. Alexander returned from the edge of the desert to ravage their productive land, raze their

villages, and destroy their towns. Some 12,000 men, women, and children are said to have been massacred in this atrocious reprisal.⁴¹

When Sogdiana had been pacified, Alexander left a detachment of 3000 troops under Peukolaos⁴² and set out for Zariaspa in Baktrian country, where he had convened the hyparchs of the land. He took no military measures against the Baktrians, whether because they submitted at news of the judgment pronounced over Sogdiana or because they had had little part in the insurrection from its outset. Our sources yield only one fleeting mention of punishment of possibly intentional disloyalty in Baktria.⁴³ The grandees implicated in the Sogdian rebellion had fled into the mountains and thought themselves safe in their fastnesses.

Alexander spent a remarkable winter (329–28) in Zariaspa.⁴⁴ The assembly of the Baktrian hyparchs, the arrival of new warriors from the West, numerous embassies from European and Asiatic tribes, and the robust ways of this seasoned and victorious army—a checkered mix of Macedonian soldiery, Persian pomp, and Hellenic culture—all yield a picture, both odd and characteristic, of the young king's court. Alexander understood full well that he would have to glorify his victories and his foundations by adopting the ceremonial splendor of the East and assuming the full majesty of unexceeded earthly happiness, if the newly conquered peoples were not to misconstrue a grandeur that they were accustomed to honoring as celestial. Bessos's trial, conducted with all the high seriousness that regicide deserves, shows how he honored the conventions of the East. The accused was brought before the assembly at Zariaspa in chains.⁴⁵ The king himself pronounced the complaint against him. He then ordered that Bessos be punished as Persian custom required. He was scourged before the assembled hyparchs and his nose and ears cut off; then he was taken off to Ecbatana to be crucified before the congress of the Medes and the Persians.⁴⁶

About this time, Phrataphernes, the Parthyaian satrap, and Stasanor of Areia arrived in Zariaspa, bringing Arsames, who as satrap of Areia had favored Satibarzanes's invasion, Persian Barzanes, on whom Bessos had conferred the Parthyaian satrapy, and other grandees who had supported Bessos's usurpation, all in chains. With them, the last resistance was broken, which, better led, could have seriously compromised a conqueror's right to rule by force. Any further opposition to Alexander now seemed a lost cause and a foolish delusion.

Among the embassies that came to the king's court in the course of the winter, those of the European Scyths are particularly noteworthy. The

previous summer, Alexander had let a few of his companions accompany the Scythian ambassadors home. The companions now returned, accompanied in their turn by a second Scythian embassy, which presented the homage of its people once again and gifts that the Scyths considered the most valuable. Their king had died in the meantime, the ambassadors said, and the late king's brother and successor hastened to assure King Alexander of his submission and loyalty. As a token, he offered his daughter in marriage. Should Alexander reject her, would he please permit the daughters of the Scythian king's *grande*es and chieftains to wed the *grande*es of Alexander's court and army. Their king was prepared to appear personally and receive orders, if Alexander wished; he and his Scyths intended to submit to the Macedonian king in all things. Alexander replied as his power and present circumstances warranted: without responding to the offer of a bride, he sent the ambassadors home laden with gifts and assured of his friendship for the Scyths.

At about the same time, Pharasmanes, the Chorasmanian king, came to Zariaspa with a train of 1500 horsemen to pay homage in person, since the friendly reception accorded Spitamenes among his neighbors the Massagetai could cast doubt on his own loyalty. He ruled the land of the lower Oxos and claimed to be a neighbor of the Kolchians and of the Amazons. He offered to show Alexander the way and provision his army, if Alexander wished to campaign against these peoples and undertake to conquer the territory up to the Pontos Euxinos.⁴⁷ Alexander's reply permits a glimpse into his further planning and is our clearest evidence of his remarkable grasp of the geography of the various regions whose very existence his campaigns first disclosed.

By his own witness and that of his ambassadors and of the natives, he was now persuaded that the ocean into which he still thought the Caspian Sea flowed⁴⁸ did not lie close to the northern edge of the Persian empire, that the Scythian hordes controlled boundless expanses toward the north, and that the Great Sea would offer no natural frontier on this side of his new empire. On the other hand, he understood perfectly that possession of the adjacent lowlands was a necessary condition for full conquest of the Iranian uplands, his next objective. Events were to demonstrate how well he used Tigris and Euphrates, Oxos and Jaxartes, and Indus and Hydaspes to support his control of Persia and Ariana. He told Pharasmanes that he could not contemplate penetrating into Pontic territory at the moment; his next task would be the conquest of India. Then, having made himself lord of Asia, he intended to return to Hellas and

take all his forces through the Hellespont and the Bosporos into the Pontos. Pharasmanes should reserve his current offer for that moment. The king concluded friendship and alliance with Pharasmanes, commended him to the satraps of Baktria, Parthyaia, and Areia, and dismissed him with all indications of good will.

Circumstances did not yet permit opening an Indian campaign. Sogdiana had been subdued and laid waste, but the stern punishment Alexander had imposed on the land had done nothing to quiet the Sogdians. Quite the contrary: After a brief period of numbness, the entire countryside erupted in a burst of rage. The inhabitants fled by the thousands into walled strongholds, into the hills, and into the cliff castles of the chiefs in the uplands and the mountains on the Oxianan frontier.⁴⁹ Fugitive bands gathered wherever nature offered cover, and they were the more dangerous the more hopeless their cause. Peukolaos, with 3000 men, could not keep order and protect the flatland. Masses of warriors were coming together from all directions; only a leader who could take advantage of Alexander's absence seemed wanting. Spitamenes, whose raid on the Polytimetos had shown no small military skill, was still among the Massagetai and seems to have been unconnected to the second Sogdian rebellion. This alone can explain why he did not rush in sooner with his Scyths. Alexander's delay in suppressing the rising indicates that for the moment he did not have the forces necessary to seek out this bold and numerous enemy in its mountains. After leaving garrisons in Alexandria in Arachosia, in the Paropamisos, and on the Tanais, he probably had no more than 10,000 troops at his disposal. Significant reinforcements from the West did not arrive until winter. These consisted of a column of infantry and riders that Nearchos satrap of Lydia and Asandros of Karia had recruited, a second column that Asklepiodoros satrap of Syria and Menes the hyparch led, a third under Epokillos, Menidas, and Ptolemy, captain of the Thracians: 17,000 infantry and 2600 cavalry in toto, finally giving the king sufficient forces to pursue the Sogdian rebellion into its last redoubts.⁵⁰

He moved out of Zariaspa in spring 328, leaving the invalids of the Macedonian cavalry in field hospitals with a cover of eighty mercenary cavalry and several pages. The army advanced to the Oxos, where oil bubbling up next to the king's tent foretold, said Aristander, that Alexander would prevail, but with difficulty. And indeed, meeting this enemy, which menaced from all sides, required prudence. The king divided his army: Meleagros, Polyperchon, Attalos, and Gorgias remained in Baktra

with their phalanges, to protect the land;⁵¹ the rest of the army advanced into Sogdiana in five columns, led by the king, Hephaistion the hipparch, Ptolemy the bodyguard, Perdikkas the strategos, and Artabazos the Baktrian satrap, whom the strategos Koinos seconded, and fanned out in different directions.

We know no details of this operation, only generally that some of the many strongholds of the land were taken by storm and others surrendered voluntarily. The most important part of Transoxiana, the valley of the Polytimetos, was soon returned to the king's control, and the victorious columns came together again in Marakanda. The mountains in the east and in the north remained in enemy hands, and there was reason to believe that Spitamenes would rouse the marauding Massagetai, to whom he had fled, to new incursions. At the same time, a major effort was urgently needed to restore the devastated countryside, in particular, to provide for and pacify a destitute and homeless population. Accordingly, Hephaistion was charged with founding new towns, settling them with refugees from razed villages, and provisioning them,⁵² while Koinos and Artabazos campaigned against the Scyths with the intention of capturing Spitamenes, and Alexander led the greater part of the army against the mountain fastnesses to complete the conquest. He took them without great trouble and returned to Marakanda to rest his troops—a rest that would be marked by terrible events.

Aged Artabazos had asked to be relieved of duty, and the king had designated the hipparch Kleitos, called Black Kleitos, to succeed him as satrap of Baktria. Hunting parties and banqueting filled the days, among them a feast of Dionysos at which the king is said to have celebrated the Dioskouroi instead. The god was offended, according to that report, and in consequence Alexander brought grave guilt upon himself. Not unwarned: He had received a shipment of fruit from the coast and invited Kleitos to enjoy it with him, and when Kleitos broke off in the midst of a sacrifice and hurried to the king, three sheep that he had already dedicated ran after him—in Aristander's interpretation, a poor augury. The king, already troubled by a dream the previous night in which he had seen Kleitos dressed in black sitting between Parmenion's blood-stained sons, ordered a sacrifice for him.

In the evening, the story continues, Kleitos came to table. Deep into the night the company sat eating and drinking and extolling Alexander's exploits: His deeds exceeded those of the Dioskouroi; Herakles himself was not his equal; envy alone denied him in his lifetime the same honors

as those heroes. Kleitos had long been irritated by the king's Persian attendance, the younger courtiers' extravagant admiration, and the insolent flattery of the Hellenic sophists and rhetors with whom the king kept company. Warmed by the wine, he was angered now to hear the great heroes invoked so frivolously. This was no way to celebrate the king's glory, he remarked. Alexander's deeds were not all that great, not like what these men thought; the Macedonians in general were owed much of the credit.

Alexander was displeased to hear such talk from a man he had distinguished beyond all others, but said nothing. The dispute grew louder; King Philip's deeds were mentioned. At the assertion that Philip had done nothing particularly remarkable, that his real desert was to be called Alexander's father, Kleitos leapt to the old king's defense, diminished Alexander's achievements, praised himself and the older generals, and recalled dead Parmenion and his sons. Happy were those, he said, who had fallen in battle or been executed before they saw Macedonians scourged with Median lashes and entreating admission to the king's presence from Persians. Some of the older generals rose to caution Kleitos and dampen the rising excitement. Alexander turned to his neighbor, a Hellene, and asked, "Isn't it true that in the company of Macedonians you Hellenes fancy yourselves demigods wandering among beasts?" Kleitos, who would not be restrained, called loudly to Alexander: "With my own hands I saved your life on the Granikos. But a lot you care. So go ahead and say what you please and invite to your table whoever you like—not free men, but barbarians and slaves who kiss the hem of your garment and worship your Persian girdle."

Alexander could stand no more. He sprang up and reached for his weapons, which his friends had prudently removed. He shouted to his shieldbearers in Macedonian, demanding that they avenge their king; no one moved. He ordered a blast of the trumpet and struck his trumpeter in the face when the man did not comply. He proclaimed loudly that he had now reached the same pass as Dareios, manacled and carried off by Bessos and his henchmen: He found himself betrayed by a man who owed him everything, this wretch Kleitos. Kleitos, who had been rushed out of the hall by his friends, came in at the far end of the room just in time to hear his name pronounced. "Kleitos is here, Alexander," he called, and recited Euripides's verses on the arrogant and contemptible field marshal who usurps the glory that is owed his troops.⁵³ Alexander seized

the lance of one of his guards, hurled it at Kleitos, and killed him on the spot.

The entire hall was thunderstruck, and the king's rage broke. As he realized what he had done, he despaired. He is said to have pulled the lance from Kleitos's breast with the intention of falling upon it himself. His friends restrained him and brought him to his bed. There he lay for three days alone with Kleitos's corpse, sleepless and fasting, grieving loudly, recalling his nurse Lanike, Kleitos's sister, Lanike's sons, who had fallen for him in battle, and Parmenion and his sons, calling himself the murderer of his friends. Then he fell silent. Only the occasional groan emerged from the tent. Anxious for their king, his troops came together in judgment against Kleitos and called for their king. The king did not appear. His generals finally came into his tent and prevailed upon him to consider the fortunes of his army and of his realm; according to divine omens, the fatal deed had been the work of Dionysos. Consoled at last, the king ordered a sacrifice to appease the angry god.

Such essentially is the account of our sources. It does not suffice to establish the actual course of events, much less to apportion guilt between the murdered man and his murderer. However dreadful the deed to which the rage of a moment impelled the king, in Kleitos he saw for the first time how his intentions and his deeds had scandalized and outraged those on whose physical strength and loyalty he had to depend; he experienced for the first time the divide that separated him from Macedonian and Hellenic sensibilities. He repented of the murder; he sacrificed to the gods; the moralists who condemn him do not tell us what else he might have done.

During these events in Marakanda, Spitamenes had made another attempt to penetrate into Baktrian country. He had recruited a pack of 600 to 800 riders among the Massagetai, to whom he had fled with the remnant of his Sogdians, and brought them before one of the frontier fortresses, where he lured the garrison into the open and ambushed it. Most of the men were killed in the fray, and the commanding officer was captured by the Scyths and taken away. Thus emboldened, Spitamenes appeared before Zariaspa a few days later. That garrison, which included recovered invalids from the field hospitals, mostly companions of the cavalry, seemed too important to be attacked, and the Massagetai withdrew, plundering and burning as they went. When Peithon, the local governor,⁵⁴ and Aristonikos the kitharist learned of these events, they

called the eighty riders of the garrison, the recovered invalids, and the pages to arms and went out the gates to punish the plundering barbarians. Spitamenes's warriors abandoned their booty and barely escaped, taking losses, and the garrison turned, heartened by this outcome. But before it could reach town again, Spitamenes ambushed it with such force that he routed the Macedonians and almost cut them off. Seven companions and sixty mercenaries were killed, the kitharist among them. Peithon, gravely wounded, was captured, and the town nearly fell. Krateros was informed immediately.⁵⁵ The Scyths did not wait for his arrival, but withdrew toward the desert, gathering new bands all the while. Krateros overtook them at the edge of the desert; a stubborn struggle followed, in which the Macedonians finally prevailed. Having lost 150 men, Spitamenes fled across the desert, barring any further pursuit.

Reports of such events as these may have done more to recall the king to his duties than the pleas of his friends or the assurances of insolent flatterers. He marched out of Marakanda, having given Amyntas the satrapy of Baktria, which had been intended for Kleitos. Koinos remained to cover Sogdiana, with his regiment and Meleagros's and 400 cavalry, all mounted javelin throwers, and the troops that had belonged to Amyntas.⁵⁶ Hephaistion took a corps into Baktria to forage and provision the army for the winter.⁵⁷ Alexander moved out to Xenippa, where many of the Baktrian insurgents had fled.⁵⁸ Local inhabitants, hearing of his approach, feared they would be punished for untimely hospitality and expelled the rebels, who now tried to weaken the Macedonians by ambush. With a strength of about 2000 horses, they fell upon part of the Macedonian army, which repulsed them after a long-vacillating contest that cost them nearly 800 men, dead and captured. Thus reduced, leaderless and short of provisions, the Baktrian insurgents elected to submit. The king then addressed Sisimithres's mountain fastness "in Baktrian country,"⁵⁹ difficult to approach, even more difficult to storm. Before the attack began, Sisimithres surrendered.

Spitamenes meanwhile made one final attempt on Sogdian country before his foes closed the entire borderland to him. He appeared suddenly before Bagai on the Sogdian frontier toward the Massagete desert⁶⁰ with the fighting force he had salvaged and 3000 Scythian riders, attracted by booty. Alerted, Koinos quickly took the army against him, cost the Scyths 800 men in a bloody encounter, and forced them to retreat. After the failure of this last attempt, the Sogdians and Baktrians under Dataphernes deserted Spitamenes in flight and surrendered to Koinos. The Massagetai,

cheated of their expected booty in Sogdiana, plundered the tents and wagons of the deserters and followed Spitamenes into the desert. When they heard that Alexander was advancing on them, they cut off Spitamenes's head and sent it to the king.⁶¹ The death of this enemy, as bold as he was lawless, removed the last cause for concern. Calm descended at last on the "garden of the East," which began to recover its old prosperity.

Winter had come, the last that Alexander intended to pass in these lands; the various divisions of the army gathered around Nautaka to go into winter quarters. The satraps of the adjacent regions, Phrataphernes of Parthyaia and Stasanor of Areia, also came; during the previous winter in Zariaspa, they had received various commissions, probably concerning military matters. Phrataphernes was sent back with orders to arrest Autophradates, satrap of the Mardaites and the Tapurians, who was showing a dangerous disregard of Alexander's orders. Stasanor returned home. Atropates was sent into Media to remove the satrap Oxydates for negligence and take his place. Babylon, too, received a new satrap, Stamenes, after the death of Mazaios. Sopolis, Menidas, and Epokillos returned to Macedonia to bring fresh troops.⁶²

Alexander seems to have used the winter rest at Nautaka to prepare the Indian campaign, which he planned to begin toward summer, when the high mountains became more accessible. A few strongholds, to which the last resistance had withdrawn, still stood in the mountains on the near side of the divide.

In early spring,⁶³ the king set out to take the "Sogdian Rock," to which Baktrian Oxyartes had withdrawn with his followers, thinking the fastness impregnable.⁶⁴ Oxyartes had provisions adequate to a long siege; deep snow assured enough water and made the rock even more difficult to scale. Alexander drew up before the rock and offered the enemy safe passage in return for surrender. He heard in reply that he should go out and find winged soldiers. Undaunted, he had a herald announce to the camp that the sheer rock face overhanging the high stronghold had to be scaled; twelve prizes were offered those to arrive first at the top: twelve talents for the first man, one talent for the twelfth; the exploit would bring glory to all who attempted it. Three hundred seasoned Macedonian mountain climbers stepped forward and received instructions. They equipped themselves with tent pegs as pitons and stout cords. At midnight they approached the steepest side of the rock, which was unguarded.

The ascent was difficult from the outset and became more so as the mountaineers met rock slides, ice fields, and unstable snow fields. Thirty

men fell to their death; the rest reached the summit at daybreak and unfurled their white standards, as agreed. When Alexander saw the signal, he sent another herald, who shouted to the enemy's forward pickets that winged soldiers had indeed been found; they should look up and see them. Any further resistance was pointless; the deeply startled barbarians surrendered promptly. Alexander entered the fortress, where he found rich booty, including many wives and daughters of Sogdian and Bactrian noblemen, among them Oxyartes's beautiful daughter Roxane. For the first time in his life, Alexander fell in love. He disdained to exercise any conqueror's right to his enemy's daughter; their marriage was to seal his peace with the region. Roxane's father accepted gratefully and was granted clemency in return.

There remained Choriene's castle in the land of the Paraitakenoi,⁶⁵ where many renegades had taken refuge. Deep snow still lay in the pathless thickets of the deep ravines the Macedonians would have to cross. Bursts of rain, icy footing, and fierce thunderstorms made the march even more difficult. The army lacked even necessities, and many troops froze to death. Only the example of the king, who shared all difficulties and deprivation, kept up their morale. Sitting before the bivouac fire one evening, legend has it, the king saw an old soldier stagger up, numbed by the cold in mind and body. He took the old man's weapon and gave him his camp stool. When the old soldier had warmed himself and recovered, he saw that he had taken the king's seat and leapt to his feet. Amused, Alexander remarked, "You see, comrade, to sit in the king's seat is death for the Persians and life for you." When the Macedonians arrived before Choriene's castle, they saw that it stood on a high, sheer cliff accessible only by a steep, narrow track. The track, furthermore, was cut by a deep gully in which a swift mountain stream plunged down. Accustomed to consider no obstacle insurmountable, Alexander ordered his men to fell enough fir trees in the surrounding woods to build ladders for the gully. Working day and night, the troops made the descent, threw a frame of timber across the stream, piled earth on top, and bridged the gap. The machinery crossed and attacked the stronghold from below.

Choriene, who had watched the Macedonians' work with indifference, saw with dismay how he had deceived himself. The topography of the site precluded a sortie against the enemy, and the Macedonians' terrapin sheds protected them from missiles launched from above. Choriene's final consideration may have been earlier examples, which showed that the prudent course was to reach terms with Alexander. He sent a herald

to ask the king's permission to confer with Oxyartes. Alexander consented, and Oxyartes removed the last doubts of his old comrade in arms. Chorienes, accompanied by a few men, appeared before Alexander, who received him graciously and congratulated him for entrusting his deliverance to a just man and not to a rock. He retained Chorienes in camp and asked him to send a few from his suite to announce that he had surrendered his castle by agreement and that all had been pardoned. Next day the king, accompanied by five hundred shieldbearers, went up to inspect the fortress. He admired the strength of the emplacement and did full justice to the preparations and arrangements for a long siege. Chorienes undertook to provision the army for two months. From his stores he distributed bread, wine, and salt meat to the Macedonians, who had suffered greatly from exposure and short supplies in recent days. Alexander restored the castle and its surroundings to Chorienes.⁶⁶

He then took the greater part of the army to Baktra, having sent Krateros with 600 cavalry, his own regiment, and three other regiments into Paraitakene against Katanes and Haustanes, the last remaining rebels. The barbarians were defeated in a bloody battle, Katanes killed, and Haustanes brought before Alexander in chains. The land was compelled into surrender, and Krateros followed the king to Baktra.⁶⁷

Let us return here to an earlier observation that, while speculative, goes merely to context. A late historian Dexippos, who used good sources, records that at the distribution of satrapies in summer 323, the kingdom of Sogdiana was held by Oropios, not by inheritance, but as an award by Alexander. In a subsequent insurrection, however, Oropios fled, and Sogdiana was given to the satrap of Baktria.⁶⁸ Absence of corroboration is, by the nature of our sources, no reason to doubt this notice. We do not know what name lies behind the doubtlessly erroneous Oropios, perhaps the name of one of the grandees who surrendered after brave resistance and showed themselves loyal, such as Chorienes⁶⁹ or Sisimithres, of whom Curtius says that the king restored his kingdom and gave him a prospect of wider rule.⁷⁰

If these observations are correct, we may conclude that Alexander attempted in Oxiana the same system for the marches of the empire that he would apply more widely in the Indian region, as we shall see. Sogdiana became the transoxianan border district under a dependent king. Together with the series of newly founded Hellenistic free cities reaching to the Tanais and with the great Baktrian satrapy behind, which included the densely populated Margiana, Sogdiana shielded the side of the empire

exposed to the marauding hordes of the desert and protected the highways to Hekatompylos, Alexandria in Areia, and over the Kaukasos into India and the trade route across the Ferghana into upper Asia. We now see why Alexander did not annex the Ferghana. It was enough to use Khujand to control the pass into the Ferghana. Adding yet another frontier region would have weakened the northern marches of the empire and diminished their defensive value.

* * *

Two years had passed since Alexander entered these countrysides and embarked on an undertaking whose success is the more impressive for the difficulties it surmounted. The effort had required enormous exertions, bloody measures, and repeated battles with rebellious masses⁷¹ and defiantly resisting barons in their cliff castles. The tribes had now been tamed, the chieftains punished, their strongholds destroyed, and those who submitted had been pardoned. A considerable number of new cities provided a basis for and an example of the Hellenistic way of life that Alexander wanted to persuade this countryside to accept. A form of rule had been established that seemed appropriate to these lands and their strategic importance. The effort culminated in the marriage of the king to the lovely daughter of one of the Sogdian barons.⁷² Even though it was a love match, this union was a political measure, an outer sign and model of the melding of Asia and Europe that Alexander intended as a consequence of his victories and as a condition for the longevity of what he wanted to create and tried to introduce gradually and disseminate.

To be realized, this intention had to admit certain truths. The nature of the elements to be melded required that the less adaptable, more resistant Asiatic side, which was also greater with respect to mass, should preponderate at first. If the Asiatics were to be won over and reconciled, not simply subjected and ruled, then necessarily the views, prejudices, and mores of the eastern peoples would determine how they were to be made accustomed to western power and gradually to learn to take part in the infinitely rich and developed ways of the victors. Hence the Asiatic court with which Alexander surrounded himself, the adaptation of Median dress in which he appeared in times of truce, the ceremonial and magnificence of his court, which the eastern peoples required of their sovereign and saw as his "robes of state." And hence the myth of the king's divine descent, which even he made light of among his most trusted friends.

Amid the riches of Asia, the marvels of Asiatic life, rising like a tide, the unrelenting hardships of military service, and the endless whirl of victory, glory, and rule, the Macedonians, for their part, had long since laid aside the simplicity and meagerness that had made them the butt of Attic orators ten years earlier. Their passionate attachment to their king, who had never ceased to fight among them; the glorious brilliance of his heroism, in which they basked; and the thrill of finding themselves the ruling power, which heightened their self-esteem and their desire for new exploits, led them to forget that at home they had been peaceful farmers and shepherds. And at home, the shepherds and farmers and townsmen, overtaken by their small country's rapid rise to the heights of glory and historical greatness, listened to the tales of returning soldiers, saw the riches of Asia pouring into their fatherland, and quickly learned to think of themselves as the world's preeminent people. The majesty of the monarchy, which had once shared their same little patch of cultivated land, grew beyond measure, like the distance to Babylon, Ecbatana, Bactria, and India.

Finally, the Hellenic people, living in scattered settlements removed from any geographic center and, where it lived closer together, still split and divided politically, hardly counted with respect to numbers of persons directly affected when compared with the masses of Asia. The more important therefore was what one might call the summa of Greek historical development: Greek education and Greek culture. The elements of this formative process or, more accurately, its result for the individual and the community were enlightenment and democratic autonomy. Enlightenment, with its blessings and its afflictions—absence of belief here, false belief there, often both together—had undermined a primitive piety, a belief in eternal powers and awe before these powers. There remained only a certain leavening by ceremonies, sacrifices, omens, and magic, which had become customary and conventional. Being clever mattered more now than being pious. Practical morality was impelled more and more by frivolity, love of taking risks and winning, ambition to distinguish oneself, and resourcefulness at making the most of one's own particular talents.

Democracy was the given form for community on such a basis. As Solon had said of his Athenians, "Every man for himself, they are as sly as foxes, and stupid when they gather together." As democracy spread—a combination of freedom and slave labor, in which slaves were the working class—this individualism became bolder and keener, making the rivalries

of Hellenic political life more unforgiving, making the weak more defiant in their powerlessness and the strong more self-seeking in their exercise of power. It had driven division, disablement, and paralysis of one and all past the limit of the endurable, when Alexander's conquests opened new avenues and boundless territory for productive work to all this potential, desire, talent, recklessness, and daring.

While Sparta, Athens, and other cities indulged their sorrow, resentment, and ill will, while the Hellenes in Tauris fought and made peace with their Scyths as best they could, and the Hellenes in Sicily and Greater Greece with their Punic and their Italic neighbors, others by the thousands looked to the newly opened world of the faraway East. They followed Alexander's recruiters or followed him independently, serving in the army or trading in camp, and settling in the new cities. They accepted and became accustomed to Asiatic ways and doubtless also to Asiatic subservience before the king and the barons, even while they never gave up their habits of unbridled talk and their other Hellenic ways.

Those members of the educated classes who did not set themselves up in opposition to Alexander's new order became the great king's most enthusiastic admirers. Rhetors, poets, and wags that they were, they excelled at applying to him turns of phrase customarily used for the champions of Marathon and Salamis, for heroes such as Perseus and Herakles, for the triumphs of Bacchos and Achilles. Even the honors paid the ancient heroes and the Olympians were used to laud the mighty ruler. The Sophists had long taught that all those to whom one prayed as to gods were actually distinguished military heroes, good legislators, or deified men. And just as many a house claimed descent from Zeus or Apollo, just so could a mortal man enter Olympos by great deeds, like Herakles, or win a hero's honors, like Harmodios and Aristogeiton. Had Hellenic cities not dedicated altars, brought sacrifices, and sung paians to Lysander, who destroyed Attic power? Had Thasos not sent a solemn embassy to propose apotheosis and erection of a temple to "Agesilaos the Great," as they called him? How much greater were Alexander's deeds! In his history, Kallisthenes had no reservations about recounting the oracle of Ammon, which pronounced Alexander a son of Zeus, and the oracle of the Branchidai, at Miletos, which did the same.⁷³ Later, when proposals to accord Alexander divine honors met with opposition in the Hellenic states, the objection was political in nature, not religious.

All these indications help us form an approximate picture of Alexander's immediate surroundings. The ever changing interplay of the most various interests, the concealed jousting of rivalries and intrigues, the

unending alternation of banquets and battles, of festivities and exertions, of excess and want, of stern duty in the field and unrestrained indulgence in the cantonments, during a steady advance into one strange land after another, without care of the future, with assurance only of the present: all these things combined to give Alexander's milieu an adventurous, fantastic aura in keeping with the marvelous brilliance of his triumphs. Eclipsed by his overwhelming personality, his courtiers rarely emerge as individuals; they can be seen only in their relationship to the king.⁷⁴ Thus noble Krateros, who loved his king, and gentle Hephaistion, who loved Alexander; thus the ever reliable and dutiful Lagid Ptolemy, the quiet, utterly faithful Koinos, and Lysimachos the warrior. General types are more readily recognizable than individual character: the Macedonian noblemen, soldierly, defiant, domineering, self-confident to the point of insufferability; the Asiatic princes, ceremonious, splendid, masters of every art of luxury, subservience, and intrigue; the Hellenes, some in the king's secretariat, such as Kardian Eumenes, or engaged as technicians, others retained as poets, artists, and philosophers in the suite of a king who did not neglect the muses even under arms and spared no gift, favor, or act of graciousness to gain the loyalty of those whom he envied for their learning.

Among the Hellenes in Alexander's suite were two men of letters whom circumstance had accorded a certain importance in court affairs. One was Olynthian Kallisthenes, mentioned above, nephew and acolyte of Aristotle, who had sent him to his royal pupil. Kallisthenes accompanied the king to the East in order to see with his own eyes the great deeds he would record for posterity. He is reported to have said that he came to Alexander, not to acquire fame, but rather to make Alexander famous; in future, Alexander's god-like quality would be ascribed, not to Olympias's confabulations about his birth, but rather to what Kallisthenes's own historical work would tell the world. The fragments of this history show how it exalted the king. Of the march down the Pamphylian shore it says that the waves of the sea prostrated themselves before the king as if in proskynesis; before the battle of Gaugamela it has the king raise his hand to the gods and proclaim that they must stand by him, if he is the son of Zeus, and let the Hellenic cause prevail. Kallisthenes's deep cultivation, his talent for oratory, and his dignified manner made him respected and influential also in military circles.

Anaxarchos of Abdera was very different. He followed an old-fashioned philosophical school whose materialistic tendencies matched his personality. He was a man of the world, deeply respectful toward the king, often

irritating. During a thunderstorm he asked, "Is that you thundering, son of Zeus?" To which Alexander replied, laughing, "Why should I make myself as terrible to my friends as you would wish, you who disdain my table because I have fish served there instead of heads of satraps," referring to a remark by Anaxarchos upon seeing Alexander's delight in a dish made from little fishes that Hephaistion had sent. The intention of his book on the monarchy emerges in the grounds he adduced to console the king after Kleitos's murder: "Do you not know, my lord, that Justice is seated beside Zeus the King, because everything that Zeus does is just and good? Just so must what a king does in this world be considered just, first by himself, then by all others."

It can no longer be determined when and on what occasion the king's relations with Kallisthenes began to cool. At table once, the story goes, the king asked Kallisthenes to toast the Macedonians with a panegyric, which Kallisthenes delivered with characteristic skill, to loud applause. The king then observed that there was no art to praising what was praiseworthy and asked Kallisthenes to prove his prowess by speaking against the Macedonians and improving them by righteous reproach. With some trenchancy, the Sophist argued that Philip and Alexander owed their power to the fatal quarrelsomeness of the Greeks; in periods of unrest even wretches could gain honor. The Macedonians sprang to their feet, incensed, and Alexander remarked, "The Olynthian has proved, not how skilled he is, but how he hates us." Kallisthenes left the hall, muttering three times, "Even Patroklos had to die and was a greater man than you."⁷⁵

It was natural for the king to receive Asiatic grandees according to the ceremonial of the Persian court. The Asiatics saw a painful discrimination in the Hellenes' and the Macedonians' privilege to approach their sovereign without these formalities of devotion. The king's position and his thinking being what they were, he may have wished to remove this distinction and make the eastern proskynesis the custom of his court. But equally he may have hesitated to issue an order, lest it offend sensibilities, give rise to misinterpretation, and create dissatisfaction. In any event, Hephaistion and a few others undertook to introduce the innovation at the next banquet. Anaxarchos is supposed to have spoken in favor of it there, Kallisthenes to have opposed it earnestly and thoroughly and so curtly in direct address to the king that Alexander, visibly offended, forbade any further discussion. Another account relates that the king at table drank to each man who had consented to the proskynesis, who then rose, each in turn, prostrated himself, and received the king's kiss. When

Kallisthenes's turn came, the king drank to him and then resumed his conversation with Hephaistion, who was seated beside him. Kallisthenes emptied his wine cup and rose to approach Alexander and receive the kiss. Alexander chose not to notice that Kallisthenes had omitted the proskynesis, but one of the companions denounced him, and Alexander withheld the kiss. Turning to withdraw, Kallisthenes remarked, "And so I go away the poorer by a kiss."⁷⁶

Many other things are reported concerning these events.⁷⁷ Especially remarkable is the notice that, according to Hephaistion, Kallisthenes, too, had consented to a proskynesis during discussions before the banquet; no less so, the notice that Lysimachos the bodyguard and two others had called the king's attention to the Sophist's arrogant attitude and passed on remarks he had made about tyrannicide. These were the more ominous because a number of Alexander's pages were devoted to Kallisthenes, treated his words as oracles, and thought him the only free man among the thousands in the army.

King Philip had begun a practice of inducting the sons of the Macedonian nobility as they reached puberty, so that they began their careers as "royal pages" around the person of the king and as his "bodyguards" in the military.⁷⁸ They were the king's immediate attendants in the field and his night watches in quarters; they led up his horse and helped him to mount; they sat with him at table and accompanied him on the hunt; they stood immediately under his protection and he alone could punish them. He saw to their education by the philosophers, rhetors, and poets whom he retained in his suite. One of these young noblemen was Hermolaos, whose father Sopolis had been sent from Nautaka back to Macedonia to recruit.⁷⁹ Hermolaos was an eager admirer of Kallisthenes and his philosophy and seems to have adopted his teacher's opinions and leanings with enthusiasm. He watched with youthful loathing as Hellenic and Persian ways were mixed, as Macedonian provenance fell out of favor. Out hunting with Alexander one day, he presumed to cast the first lance at a wild boar that had been driven from cover, a privilege reserved for the king, and felled the quarry, a transgression that Alexander might have ignored under other circumstances. In Hermolaos, however, he saw it as deliberate and punished it accordingly: he had Hermolaos flogged and took away his horse.

Hermolaos, unremorseful, felt keenly the outrageous insult that had been done him. His most intimate friend was Sostratos son of Tymphiot Amyntas, who had come under suspicion in the Philotas plot, along

with his three brothers, and had sought death in battle as proof of his innocence. Hermolaos confided to Sostratos that his life was ruined if he could not avenge himself. Sostratos was easily brought around: Alexander, after all, had cost him his father and had now disgraced his friend. The two youths took four other pages into their confidence: Antipater son of Asklepiodoros, erstwhile governor of Syria, Epimenes son of Arseas, Antikles son of Theokritos, and Thracian Philotas son of Karsis.⁸⁰ They plotted to murder Alexander in his sleep, when Antipater had the night watch. The king, it is said, passed this particular evening among his friends and remained longer than usual. When he rose to leave after midnight, a Syrian soothsayer, who had followed Alexander for years, unheeded at first, and gained credence when her advice and warnings repeatedly proved correct, stood before him. She advised him to pass the entire night over wine, and Alexander followed her council. Thus the conspirators' plan was thwarted.

The rest of the story seems more reliable. The unfortunate young people did not abandon their plan; they resolved to execute it the next time the night watch fell to one of them. Next day, Epimenes told his intimate friend Charikles son of Menandros what had happened and what was being planned. Charikles, alarmed, went to his friend's brother Eurylochos and begged him to save the king by a quick denunciation. Eurylochos went to the king's tent and told Lagid Ptolemy, who told Alexander.⁸¹ Alexander ordered the conspirators immediately arrested. They were interrogated, confessed under torture, named their accomplices, and implicated Kallisthenes, who was also arrested.⁸² The army, convened in court martial, condemned the conspirators and executed judgment in Macedonian fashion.⁸³ Kallisthenes, a Hellene and no soldier, was laid in chains to be tried later. Alexander is supposed to have written Antipater: "The pages were stoned by the Macedonians, but I intend to punish the Sophist myself and those who sent him to me and who harbor traitors in their cities." According to Aristoboulos, Kallisthenes died in captivity during the Indian campaign; according to Ptolemy, he was tortured and hanged.

CHAPTER 3

India is a world unto itself. Complete and closed off with respect to natural surroundings, population, religion, and culture, for centuries it was known to the West of ancient times by name only and as a wonderland situated far to the east, at the ends of the earth. In the oceans that border it on two sides and provide most ready access, channels for commercial and cultural contact were opened only tardily. On its two other sides, it is enclosed within double and triple ramparts by some of the highest mountains in the world; snowy passes in the north and burning canyons in the west afford difficult passage restricted to pilgrims, merchants, and brigands of the desert and unsuited to contact between peoples or trade between countries. The Indian people's own memory of its origins has faded into fantasies without definite time or place since it ceased to belong to itself. But in India's great and various past, religious, hierarchical, and political structures evolved and matured and brought the special quality of the Indian world to full development. The Macedonian conqueror, the first European to find his way into India, seems to have come upon this world when it was at its meridian, before its long decline began.

At the place where Alexander entered, the Kopan breaks through the mountain rampart that separates India from the West, as if to form a gateway. The river rises in the high mountains, where the rivers of Bactria and Ariana also rise, and takes on numerous tributaries from the north as it plunges eastward toward the mighty Indus. Wild cliffs open to admit this swift stream into a narrow valley that drops down to the smiling plain of Peshawar and the abundantly fruitful Indian tropics beyond. This, however, is not yet India proper. The five rivers of the Punjab, summer floods, and a wide band of desert to the east and the south make India's west a second protective barrier that guards the sacred Ganges country, as if nature had decided to protect her favorite, after all, from dangers to which she herself had opened a way. For the Hindu,

everything great and sacred is connected to the Ganges country: the ancient religion and the strict separation of caste according to Brahma, the holiest destinations of pilgrimage, and the sacred river. The tribes to the west of the desert, although of related provenance and belief, have deviated from the strict purity of divine law. They did not shun contact with the outside world, did not preserve dignified rule by kings, purity of caste, or seclusion from unclean, abhorrent strangers, which are the condition, assurance, and proof of a holy way of life. They fell instead into decadence and foreign ways.

Thus it was in Alexander's time. The highly developed Brahman peoples of Areian descent in the Ganges country had forgotten that they too had once been settled in the land of the "seven rivers," that in prehistoric times they had passed through that same western gateway, as proven by the names of their most celebrated clans, attached still to their early settlements on the Oxos and the Jaxartes. Other Areian peoples followed this same route of migration,¹ but, not given to great daring, whether out of weakness or of want of desire, they remained with their flocks in the mountain pastures of the Kophen and its tributaries down to the Indus.

Then Assyria rose and went out from the Tigris on conquests that extended from the Syrian low country to the Areian highlands. But Semiramis, legend has it, standing on a bridge over the Indus, saw the camels from the western steppes fleeing before the elephants of India's east.² Then came the Medes and the Persians, and from Cyrus's time, Gandara is listed among the satrapies of the empire, and Gandarites and other Indians appear in the registers of Xerxes's Persian armies.³ Dareios sent a Hellene from his city Kaspatyros—probably Kabul—to the Indus to voyage down to the sea. The Hellene returned by the Arabian Sea, completing a mission that implies the Great King's ultimate ambitions, thwarted by Persia's struggles with the West and the empire's abrupt decline.

Achaimenid control never extended beyond the Indus. The plain at the foot of the Paropamisos, settled by western branches of the Indian tribes, was the farthest territory that the Great Kings possessed. The elephants of the last Persian king, the first ever seen in the West, came from here. They and the Indians "who bordered on Baktria" appeared under Bessos at the battle of Gaugamela, where they fought beside mountain Indians under Barsaentes, satrap of Arachosia. Beyond the Indus, a multitude of independent states that extended eastward across the five

rivers of the Punjab to the desert and southward to the mouth of the Indus created a patchwork of tribes large and small, principalities, and republics, a varied confusion of fragmented politics and religious turmoil, having in common only reciprocated jealousies, perfidious and ever-changing alliances, and self-serving feuds.

With the conquest of Sogdiana, Alexander had gained full possession of the Persian empire. He chose the satrapy of Paropamisos, which he had garrisoned in 329 and where he had founded Alexandria in the Kaukasos, as the point of departure for his campaign into India. Our sources say nothing of the military or political intention of the campaign, but these can be gathered from subsequent events.

Alexander already had a number of contacts beyond the Indus; those with the prince of Taxila (Takshaçila) were of great importance. That kingdom lay on the eastern bank of the Indus, opposite the mouth of the Kophen, and extended eastward toward the Hydaspes (Vitasta), embracing an area deemed equal to that of occupied Egypt. The prince, on hostile terms with many of his neighbors, particularly with the Paurava prince Poros on the Hydaspes, and eager to enlarge his territory, had proposed an Indian campaign to the king while he was in Sogdiana and offered to join it against any Indians who would dare to resist.⁴ A prince from the near side of the Indus, Sisikottos, was already present in Alexander's entourage. As the Macedonians were approaching from Arachosia, Sisikottos had joined Bessos in Bactria, and when Bessos's undertaking collapsed, he went over to the victor and served him loyally ever after.⁵ Through these contacts Alexander could learn enough about Indian conditions, topography, and populations to plan his campaign, make preparations, and gather forces with some confidence.

Preparations made during the year just past had taken proper account of difficulties to come. Once Persian power had been destroyed, no large deployable force was needed to conquer the satrapies one by one. Troop strength in Bactria therefore had been allowed to fall during the last two years and was not adequate to the densely populated, well-armed Indian states. Many thousands, attracted by glory and booty, had continued to come to Alexander in Asia: Macedonians after the expiration of their obligatory service⁶ and Thracian, Agrianian, and Hellenic mercenaries.⁷ The force of 35,000 combatants with which Alexander had begun 334 perhaps doubled over the course of the next six years, despite losses to unending exertion, marches across deserts and over snow-covered mountains, hardships of climate, and a life that alternated between excess

and want. But the king had let Hellenic and Thessalian mercenaries return home, and he left significant numbers of troops behind as garrisons in occupied lands and important places of arms. The Baktrian area alone was assigned a corps of 10,000 infantry and 3500 cavalry,⁸ and substantial forces had to be maintained in Arachosian Alexandria, Ecbatana, Babylon, Egypt, and elsewhere, while the western satrapies probably bolstered their garrisons by receiving troops, not from the grand army, but rather from Europe. For the Indian campaign the king strengthened his army with bellicose tribesmen of Ariana and Oxiana,⁹ and the equipping of the Indus fleet points to the presence of large numbers of Phoenicians, Cypriots, and Egyptians in the army.¹⁰ Reliably, at the moment of the Indus voyage, the army counted 120,000 combatants.¹¹

With respect to personnel, this army was clearly no longer Hellenic-Macedonian, but with respect to organization it remained so.¹² The very fact that it could be used to carry out the next field campaigns proves its firm discipline, good military governance and administration, the authority of its commanding officers, and, above all, the martial spirit and perfect competence of its officer corps—matters that are indispensable to a military history of Alexander and about which our sources say nearly nothing. By integrating such a large number of foreign elements into the established framework of Macedonian military training and forming them for its purposes, this army became the center of and, one might say, a school for hellenization, both a result of the new empire and a condition for its creation. In Egypt and Syria, in Iran and Baktria, and now in India, Alexander left thousands of his soldiers in the new towns as garrisons and as citizens and replaced them in the ranks with ever more Asiatics. In so doing, he pursued the bold logic of his intention and showed his confidence in it; he proved the rightness of that intention and its power. The protests of Macedonian pride and Hellenic liberalism did not cause him to waver: his commanding personality would ensure that he was heeded in spite of sporadic eruptions of arrogance or pusillanimity.

In late spring 327, Alexander set out from Baktria. The mountain roads that had been so laborious two years earlier were now free of snow and provisions were ample. The army took a shorter route and reached Alexandria on the southern slope of the mountains in ten days.¹³ The king found conditions there unsatisfactory and relieved Niloxenos of his command, which he had not exercised prudently or forcefully enough,

and Persian Proexes of his office as satrap of the Paropamisadai. Tribesmen from the countryside were brought in to enlarge the town, supplemented by veterans unfit for further service. Nikanor of the companions¹⁴ was put in command of town and garrison and charged with enlarging the outpost still further. Tyriespis was made satrap of the land, which was to reach henceforth to the river Kophen to the south.¹⁵ Alexander continued through the fertile countryside to Nikaia.¹⁶ With a sacrifice to Athena, he opened the new campaign.

The army approached the frontier of the Paropamisadai, probably situated at the edge of the high plain of the Kophen, where the already considerable river falls into the steep valley that forms a gateway into India. The foothills of the high Safed-Koh run along the southern side of the river; from the north, spurs of several chains of high mountains branching from the western Himalaya project almost to the left bank. The Choaspes or Choes (Kameh or Konar) and, farther east, the Guraios (Panjkora) and their numerous tributaries and lateral valleys form the many mountain cantons of the country "this side of the Indus," whose inhabitants are grouped together under the name Açvaka, whereas the individual districts, under their own princes, have particular names. In the Kophen valley itself lived Astakenoi, so called, no doubt, because they lived to the west (*asta*) of the Indus.

From Nikaia, Alexander had sent heralds to summon the Indian princes on the lower Kophen and the bank of the Indus to come and pay him homage. The prince of Taxila came and several rajas of the nearer Indus bank, mounted on caparisoned elephants and attended by an opulent suite, in keeping with the magnificence of Hindu princes, and bearing costly gifts. They offered the king their elephants—twenty-five in toto—for whatever purpose he might wish. Alexander told them that he intended to pacify the area as far as the Indus in the course of the summer; he would reward the princes who stood before him now; those who refused to submit he would compel to do so. He would pass the winter on the Indus, and in spring he would punish the enemies of the prince of Taxila, his ally. He then divided his full fighting force into two armies. Perdikkas and Hephaistion were to lead one down the right bank of the Kophen to the Indus. Alexander would take the other through the difficult territory of bellicose peoples to the north of the river.

Hephaistion and Perdikkas received the phalanges of Gorgias, Kleitos, and Meleagros, half the Macedonian cavalry, and all mercenary riders.

They proceeded through the territory of the Gandarites, accompanied by the Indian princes on their way home and carrying orders to garrison all important places or take them by force if they resisted, and to begin a bridge over the Indus by which Alexander could penetrate into the interior of India.¹⁷ Alexander took the shieldbearers, the remaining half of the cavalry, the greater portion of the phalanges,¹⁸ and the archers, Agrianians, and mounted javelin throwers across the Kophen and eastward through the pass of Jalalabad. Here the Choaspes or Choes,¹⁹ which originates in the glaciers of the Pushti-Kur in the high mountains, drops down to the plain, first into a wild valley between the mighty cliffs of the Khond on one side and, on the other, the formidable mountain range that separates this valley from the valley of the Guraios—an extremely difficult terrain for military operations. On these slopes the Aspasioi²⁰ had their settlements, their mountain fortresses, and their many flocks.

Their prince's city²¹ stood a few marches northward on the Choaspes and was the more important because the mountain route over the summits to the headwaters of the Oxos ran through it.²² Alexander crossed the Choaspes and followed the narrowing valley to the southern frontier of the Aspasioi. At his approach, the tribesmen fled into the mountains and into their fortified towns, bent on resistance. Alexander, moving rapidly, led a van composed of all the cavalry and 800 shieldbearers, now mounted, before the first town, which was surrounded by a double wall and defended by an important force standing before the walls. The king attacked directly from the march. A fierce contest followed in which Alexander was wounded, in the shoulder, and, among his closest attendants, the bodyguards Ptolemy and Leonnatos. The barbarians withdrew behind their walls, and the Macedonians pitched camp before them. Early next morning the storm began. The Macedonians scaled and occupied the first wall and caught sight of the second, which was stronger and now very carefully invested. The main mass of the army had come up in the meantime, and a second assault began. The archers cleared the wall of pickets, storm ladders were laid, and the Macedonians reached the battlements. Many townspeople, emptying through the gates to take refuge in the mountains, were slain. The town was leveled. The Macedonians, enraged by the king's wound, spared no one.

This quick success did not fail of its intended effect. Andaka, another town, surrendered, and Krateros remained there with the heavy infantry to force all nearby towns into submission and then cross the mountains to Arigaion in the valley of the Guraios (Panjkora).²³ Alexander led the

rest of the army northeastward toward the Euaspla, hurrying to reach a town where he hoped to take the local prince.²⁴ On the second day, as he came closer, he saw that news of his approach had preceded him: the city was in flames, the paths into the mountains thick with fleeing tribesmen. A terrible slaughter began, but the prince and his large and well-armed bodyguard had already reached the pathless heights. Ptolemy had picked out the prince's train in the confusion and pursued hotly, dismounting and leading his small corps of shieldbearers on foot when the rising ground became too steep for horses. Suddenly the prince and his warriors faced about and stormed into the Macedonians. The prince hurled his lance at Ptolemy, whose breastplate saved him and who then ran his enemy through at the hip. That blow decided the encounter. While the Macedonians continued to pursue and strike down, Ptolemy began stripping armor from the corpse of the prince. Seeing this, the infuriated Aspasioi plunged back down the slope and attacked. Alexander had arrived in the meantime. A fierce fight over the corpse followed, after which the barbarians, defeated at last, fled high into the mountains.

Unwilling to move even higher, Alexander turned eastward instead and went up the Euaspla to reach Arigaion by way of the mountain passes into the Guraios valley.²⁵ He found the town deserted and torched, its population fled into the hills. The spot was important because it controlled the road to the Choaspes, and Alexander ordered Krateros, who had arrived from the south, to rebuild the town, which would be settled by invalided Macedonians and willing local tribesmen. Garrisoning Andaka and now Arigaion gave Alexander control of both passes to the Choaspes.

A bold alpine people to the north of the town had taken up a threatening position in the mountains and would have to be taught to respect Macedonian arms. Alexander advanced on them and encamped at evening at the foot of the mountains. Ptolemy returned from a scouting party to say that he had seen an immense number of watch fires on the hillsides, implying superior enemy numbers. Alexander decided to attack immediately. Part of the army held the position at the foot of the hill, while the king took the rest up the slope. When he could see the enemy fires, he sent Leonnatos and Ptolemy out right and left around the enemy for a three-sided attack that would split it. He took his own men up toward the largest concentration of enemy. When the barbarians saw the Macedonians advancing on them, they swooped down from above, relying on their numbers, and a stubborn struggle followed. The enemy on Ptolemy's side refused to yield its high ground, obliging him to fight his

way uphill. He did so with great difficulty, pushing the enemy back to a side of the heights he had left open specifically to avoid the desperate resistance that encirclement would cause. Leonnatos had forced back the enemy on his side, and Alexander was pursuing the already beaten main mass of the center. The Macedonians took 40,000 prisoners and discovered enormous herds of cattle, the treasure of the tribe. Ptolemy puts the number at 230,000 head. Alexander picked the best examples to be sent back to work the fields of Macedonia.²⁶

Meanwhile, reports had come in saying that the Assakenoi of the next river valley, the Suastos, were arming busily and had brought in mercenaries from beyond the Indus to create a fighting force of 30,000 infantry, 20,000 horse, and 30 elephants. Alexander moved down the valley of the deep, swift Guraios, whose upper slopes he had conquered, and took part of his army ahead, while Krateros followed more slowly with the rest and with the machinery. From hard marches on steep mountain tracks and cold nights, they came down into a rich, inviting valley of vineyards, laurel and almond groves, peaceful villages on the hillsides, and countless herds pasturing on the alps. As legend has it, the highest nobility of the land, led by Akuphis, came into the king's tent, where they found him fully armed and helmeted, leaning on his lance, and, astonished, knelt before him. The king invited them to stand and speak. They told him that they called their fastness Nysa, that they had come from the west and lived here ever after, independent and prosperous, under an aristocracy of thirty noblemen. Alexander replied that they would keep their freedom and independence, that Akuphis should preside among the nobles, and that they should contribute several hundred riders to the king's army. These are probably the reliable facts of a tale that was wonderfully embroidered, perhaps also by Alexander. For ever after, the Nysai were said to be directly descended from the attendants of Dionysos, whose processions Greek myth had already extended to India. Among this people, the brave Macedonians felt at home, however far from Macedonia.²⁷

From Nysa, Alexander went eastward across the swift Guraios into the land of the Assakenoi, who retreated into their fortified towns. The most important of these was Massaga, where the local prince hoped to hold out.²⁸ When the Macedonians pitched camp under the walls, the enemy, confident of its strength, immediately sallied. The Macedonians used a feinted withdrawal to lure the noisily pursuing Indians a half-hour away from their gates, then faced about and rushed them, the light infantry in the front line, followed by the king leading the phalanges. After a

brief engagement, the Indians fled back, taking heavy losses. Alexander followed on their heels, but failed in his intention to press through the gates with the retreating tribesmen. As he was circling the walls to identify points of attack for the following day, he was wounded in the foot by an arrow shot from the battlements.

Next morning the machinery set to work and soon opened a breach, but Macedonians trying to penetrate into the town were beaten back at evening by a strong, well-led defense. The assault resumed next morning, covered now by a wooden tower from which Macedonian archers swept part of the wall of defenders. Still the town held. The Macedonians passed the second night in renewed preparations and then brought newly constructed battering rams, terrapin sheds, and now a mobile tower with drawbridges up to the wall. The phalanges moved out at morning, and the king himself led the shieldbearers into the tower, reminding them how Tyre had been taken. But the bridge collapsed under the weight of the troops, who plunged into the depths. The gleeful Indians rained stones, beams, and missiles down on them from the battlements, then erupted through the gates to take advantage of the confusion. The Macedonians withdrew on all sides; Alketas's phalanx could hardly carry out its orders to shield the dying from enemy fury and carry them back into camp.

On the third day, the tower was again brought to the wall and the bridge lowered. Still the Indians held out, though by now their numbers were reduced. But their prince was killed by a bolt hurled from a catapult, and the besieged offered to negotiate a surrender. Cognizant of his enemy's valor and of the costliness of continuing combat, Alexander demanded that the town surrender, that the enemy's Indian mercenaries join his force, and that the prince's family be delivered to him—conditions that the Assakenoi accepted. The prince's mother and his daughter came into camp; the Indian mercenaries marched out under arms and encamped at some distance from the Macedonians, whom they abhorred as foreigners and with whom they had no wish to fight against their own countrymen. They therefore decided, to their misfortune, to withdraw to the Indus in the night. Alexander got wind of this scheme; skeptical of negotiation and fearing delay, he ordered these mercenaries encircled and massacred. Thus he became master of the most important position in Assaken territory.²⁹

After Massaga, presumably, it would be easy to complete the occupation of a land now leaderless. Alexander sent a few troops under Koinos

southward to the fortress Bazira, expecting it to surrender now that Massaga had fallen. Another division under Alketas went northward against the fortress Ora, with orders to cordon off the town until the rest of the army could reach it.³⁰ Bad news soon arrived from both destinations. Alketas had sustained losses repulsing a sortie at Ora, and Koinos, far from receiving Bazira's surrender, was having difficulty holding his position before the walls. Alexander was about to start for Bazira when he learned that Ora had taken up contact with Prince Abisares of Kashmir, who had arranged for the town to receive a significant number of warriors from the mountain tribes to the north.³¹ He ordered Koinos to cut off Bazira by fortifying a point that could be held and bring the rest of his troops to Ora, where he would find the king. That town, though strongly defended, fell to a storm. The Macedonians took rich booty, including elephants. Koinos, meanwhile, had begun to withdraw before Bazira, as ordered. Seeing this, the Indians came through their gates and threw themselves upon the Macedonians, who beat them back in heavy fighting. When word spread that even Ora had fallen to the Macedonians, the Bazirites lost all hope of holding out in their fortress. In the middle of the night they abandoned the town and withdrew to the cliff castle Aornos on the Indus at the southern edge of Assaken territory.

Possession of the three strongholds Massaga, Ora, and Bazira made Alexander master of the mountain country north of the Kophen. To the south lay the territory of Prince Astes of Peukela.³² Astes, it seems, had enlarged his holdings at the expense of his neighbors and even gained a foothold south of the Kophen. Sangaios had lost his barony to Astes and fled to Taxiles. Neither Astes nor Assakenos had complied with Alexander's summons to Nikaia. But now Macedonia had enjoyed a string of victories, the Macedonian king was approaching, and Assakenos was dead. The prince of Peukela therefore thought it prudent not to meet the great Macedonian king and his terrible army but instead to vacate his tribal land and take refuge in a fortified cliff castle in his new holding south of the Kophen, where he hoped to hold out against the Macedonians' southern army. Hephaestion during his advance had taken up a position before that fortress, besieged it for thirty days, and taken it by storm. Astes was killed in that attack, and Sangaios, who was still with Taxiles, was given possession of the town with Alexander's consent. Peukela, leaderless and undefended, surrendered voluntarily as Alexander came down out of neighboring Assaken country, and received a Macedonian garrison. Other, less important towns followed suit, down to the

Indus, which Alexander reached at Embolima, a few miles above the mouth of the Kophen.³³

Thus in the course of the summer, a series of important and difficult battles had brought the territory from the Paropamisados to the Indus under Alexander's control. On the south side of the Kophen, where barren mountains converge on the river valley, Hephaistion had taken possession of the countryside. Astes's mountain fastness and Orabatis, which Hephaistion had taken and garrisoned, became the military bases for control of the south bank.³⁴ On the north, the Macedonians had marched through the valleys of the Choaspes, the Guraios, and the Suastos and the territory of the Aspasioi, the Guraioi, the Assakenoi, and the Peukelaots. They had scattered the barbarians of the upper Choaspes and along the Guraios far into the mountains, and had secured the valley of the Guraioi by means of the fortresses Andaka and Arigaion, the territory of the Assakenoi by control of Massaga, Ora, and Bazira, and the west bank of the Indus by control of Peukela. The land became a Macedonian dependency, mostly under native princes,³⁵ was called Hither India, and received its own satrap.

Only one mountain fastness near the Indus was still held by Indians. The Macedonians called it Aornos, as if it were beyond the flight of birds. About five miles above the confluence of the Kophen and the Indus, a final spur of the northwestern mountains juts out, a single knob measuring, according to ancient reckoning, about four miles in circumference at the base and five thousand feet in altitude.³⁶ On its flat summit stood a legendary fortress whose walls enclosed gardens, springs, and woods, with the result that thousands of men could maintain themselves here indefinitely. Many Indians from the plain had fled to this fortress, confident of an impregnability celebrated even in myth.³⁷ The more did Alexander intend to take the rock. He must have calculated the moral effect that such a conquest would have both on his own troops and on the Indians. More pertinent yet, this important point in enemy territory could become an occasion for and lend support to extremely dangerous movements in his rear. Now that he had conquered the surrounding territory and now that his fortified positions on the Indus enabled him to maintain a siege of any length, he embarked on this daring and dangerous undertaking. Only his determination to take the strong point made a good outcome even thinkable.

He left Krateros in Embolima on the Indus and took with him only the Agrianians, the archers, Koinos's regiment augmented by a picked

corps of the lightest troops from other companies, 200 companion cavalry, and 100 mounted archers. They encamped at the foot of the rock. A sole way led upward, so artfully laid out that it could be defended at every point. Then local tribesmen came to him, surrendered, and offered to guide him to a spot from which the fortress could be attacked and taken. Ptolemy Lagos's son, the bodyguard, was ordered to take the Agrianians, the other light troops, and chosen shieldbearers, and follow the Indians up the rock. By rough and difficult footpaths he arrived unobserved at the designated spot, erected a stockade, and lit the agreed signal. Alexander set a storm for the next day, in the hope that Ptolemy would attack simultaneously from his high position.³⁸ In the event, it proved impossible to attempt anything from below. The Indians, fully protected on the near side, attacked the high places that Ptolemy held, and Ptolemy had difficulty holding his fortified position, though he inflicted many casualties before the Indians withdrew at nightfall.

Seeing that he could do nothing from below, Alexander sent an Indian messenger carrying written orders to Ptolemy in the night: Alexander would attempt a storm next day not far from Ptolemy's position; when the enemy sallied, Ptolemy was to come from above and fall into its rear, then to do whatever was necessary to combine his forces with Alexander's. At daybreak next day, Alexander stood at the foot of the knoll that Ptolemy had climbed; the Indians rushed out to defend the narrow path; adamant combat continued until midday, then the enemy began to fall back. At evening, Alexander had made the ascent, Ptolemy had done his part, and the two armies were united. Seeing that the enemy was withdrawing more quickly after every subsequent sortie and that Macedonian spirits were high, Alexander decided to pursue and attempt to force his way into the fortress in the confusion. The attempt failed, and the terrain was too narrow for a storm.

Alexander withdrew to the knoll that Ptolemy had fortified. It was lower than the fortress³⁹ and separated from it by a wide, deep ravine. The only way out of this disadvantageous position was to heap up a berm to narrow the gorge and bring the Macedonians within bowshot of the stronghold. Work began next morning. Under the superintendence of the king, who encouraged his troops and worked with them, trees were felled, pilings driven, boulders heaped up, earth spread. At the end of the first day, the mound measured three hundred paces. The Indians, scornful of the improbable undertaking at first, tried next day to interfere with it. Soon the berm had advanced so far that slingers and machinery atop it could

fend off attack. On the sixth day, the berm extended close to the knob that the enemy occupied, at the same height as the fortress. Whether that knob could be held or taken would decide the outcome of this contest.

A band of picked Macedonians was sent against it, and a terrible struggle began; Alexander himself led the corps of bodyguards that followed; the height was taken. That loss and the steady progress of the berm, which now could no longer be stopped, destroyed the Indians' hopes of holding out long against an enemy unhampered by either cliff or gorge, an enemy who had proved that human will and human effort could overcome the ultimate bulwark that nature had erected and make of that obstacle a means to its own ends. They sent a herald to Alexander with an offer to surrender the fortress on favorable conditions; they hoped to gain time to steal away under cover of darkness and scatter on the plain. Alexander saw their ruse. He called in his pickets and let the enemy's withdrawal begin undisturbed. Then he chose 700 shieldbearers, climbed the rock in dead of night, and set about scaling the wall, now undefended. He was the first to reach the top. When his squad had followed at various points, it gave a great shout and swooped down on the enemy, who were prepared only for flight. Many were cut down, others fell to their death, and next morning the army triumphantly entered the fortress.

Joyful sacrifices celebrated the happy end of an undertaking made possible only by Alexander's daring and the valor of his troops. The fortification of the castle was strengthened and a Macedonian garrison was laid there under the command of Prince Sisikottos, who had gained Alexander's trust. Possession of this fortress was of great importance to control of Hither India: It dominated and gave a commanding view of the plain between Suastos and Indus and south to the confluence with the Kophen.⁴⁰

In Assaken territory meanwhile dangerous unrest had broken out. The brother of the Assaken prince who had fallen at Massaga⁴¹ had gathered an army of 20,000 men and 15 elephants and taken it into the mountains, where he held the fortress Dyrta.⁴² His calculation was that he could wait, protected by impenetrable wilderness, until the king marched on and then move to enlarge his domain. The more necessary was it to destroy him. Immediately after Aornos fell, the king took a few thousand light troops to Dyrta in the highlands. News of his approach sufficed to put the pretender to flight, and the local tribesmen fled with him. The king promptly sent out scouting parties to track the prince and, particularly, his elephants. Upon hearing that everyone had fled into the mountain

wilderness to the east, he pursued. The troops had to open a way through dense primeval forest. They picked up the occasional Indian, from whom they learned that the people had fled across the Indus into the realm of Abisares and that the elephants, fifteen in number, had been turned loose in the meadows by the river. Then a pack of Indian soldiers from the fleeing army appeared: Annoyed at the clumsiness of its prince, the army had rebelled and murdered him and these men now brought his head to the Macedonian king. Alexander had no interest in pursuing a leaderless army through a pathless wilderness; he proceeded instead into the Indus meadows, where he enlisted Indian elephant hunters to help him capture the elephants. Two animals fell to their death during the chase; the rest were taken. The king had his army cut trees and build ships. On a river fleet such as the Indus had never seen, he and his army traveled downstream between towns and villages on both banks and landed at the bridge that Hephaistion and Perdikkas had just thrown across the river.⁴³

Surviving sources describe vividly the powerful impressions that this western army received on a march through India begun in spring 327. Enormous natural formations, luxuriant vegetation, wild and domesticated animals, the people, their religion and their customs, how they were governed, how they made war: all these things were new and strange—a reality that exceeded the marvels reported by Herodotos and Ktesias. The Macedonians were soon to learn that they had penetrated no farther than the forecourts of this new world.

The army rested on the Indus to recover from the winter campaign in the mountains that most of the men had made.⁴⁴ Toward spring it prepared to cross the river, strengthened by contingents from the princes of the hither satrapy. At this point, ambassadors from the prince of Taxila came before the king, bringing renewed assurances of their lord's devotion and lavish gifts: 3000 sacrificial animals, 10,000 sheep, 30 war elephants, 200 talents of silver, and 700 Indian riders, their prince's promised contingent. They also offered Alexander the seat of their prince, the grandest city between Indus and Hydaspes.

Alexander ordered games and sacrificed on the riverbank; the auguries were favorable and the crossing began. The troops crossed by the pontoon bridge and by boat, the king and his suite on two thirty-rowers that stood ready. On the far bank they sacrificed again. The grand army continued toward Taxila, passing through densely populated regions at the height

of spring. To their north lay great snow-covered mountains and the frontier to Kashmir, to the south the magnificent wide plain between Indus and Hydaspes. An hour before they reached the princely seat, the Macedonians caught sight of Indian penitents, naked, solitary, and perfectly still under the midday sun and the torrents of the rainy season, as they honored their sacred vows.⁴⁵

As Alexander approached Taxila,⁴⁶ the prince came out to meet him in highest pomp, with caparisoned elephants and troops in full regalia marching to the sound of military music. The king halted his army and ordered it to form up, while the prince hastened ahead of his procession, greeted Alexander with deep respect, and surrendered both his realm and himself. At the head of his army, the prince at his side, Alexander proceeded into the splendid city. A series of observances in honor of the king followed, gloriously heightened by the presence of many local princes, who had come, bringing gifts, to pay homage to Alexander. The king confirmed them all in their possessions and enlarged the territory of some, in keeping with their wishes and their deserts, in particular of Taxiles, who had provisioned the southern army and obliged Alexander repeatedly by great attentiveness.⁴⁷ The "district prince" Doxaris also sent ambassadors and gifts.⁴⁸ Abisares of Kashmir sent his brother, accompanied by his highest nobility and bearing gifts of precious stones, ivory, and tapestry, who assured Alexander of the prince's devotion and denied any secret aid to the Assakenoi.

How affairs were arranged in the duab can no longer be determined with certainty. Territorial enlargement, in any case, was confined to the hither satrapy, while all the princes accepted Alexander's suzerainty. Taxiles may have been named *primus* among the *rajās* on the near side of the Hydaspes, for henceforth only he is mentioned in relationship to Alexander. A Macedonian garrison was laid in his seat and the invalided veterans settled there. The so-called Indian satrapy was entrusted to Philip son of Machatas, whose high birth and proven loyalty justified the appointment; his province comprised the entire right bank of the Indus and extended to oversight of the troops who remained in the realms of Taxiles and the other princes.⁴⁹

Prince Taxiles's eagerness to ally himself with Alexander sprang no doubt from his hostile relations with his more powerful neighbor, Prince Poros, probably of the ancient house of Paurava, who ruled over a kingdom of "more than one hundred cities" beyond the next river, the

Hydaspes, disposed over an important armed force, and had allied himself with a number of neighboring princes, not least with the ruler of Kashmir. His enemies and theirs were the prince of Taxila on the Indus and, on their other side, the independent tribes in the foothills of the Himalaya, the duabs beyond the Akesines, and the lower Punjab. The deep enmity of these “kingless” peoples (*arattas*) toward the princes, among whom the most powerful was the Paurava between Hydaspes and Akesines, disabled any attempt the rich and densely populated Punjab might have made to resist the invasion from the West.

From Taxila, Alexander had called on Poros to meet him at the frontier of his principality and offer homage. Poros replied that Alexander would indeed find him at the frontier, but with an armed force. Poros rallied his allies, requested immediate aid that Abisares had promised, for all his recent assurances to Alexander, advanced to the river at his frontier, and pitched camp on the left bank, bent on blocking his enemy’s crossing. On hearing these things, Alexander sent Koinos the strategos back to the Indus with orders to saw up the vessels of the river fleet and transport them overland to the Hydaspes. After the usual sacrifices and games, the army moved out of Taxila, joined now by 5000 Indian troops from Taxiles and other princes. The elephants, taken as booty or received as gifts, were left behind, because the Macedonian horses were not accustomed to them and because they would have been a hindrance to Macedonian methods of attack.⁵⁰

The first showers of the rainy season began during the march; the rains grew heavier and the roads became difficult. Thunderstorms accompanied by high winds caused repeated delays. At the southern frontier of the principality of Taxila, a long, rather narrow pass led into the territory of Spitakes, a relative of Poros and his ally. Spitakes’s troops had invested the heights on both sides of the pass and closed it. Alexander himself led a bold cavalry maneuver that surprised the enemy, dislodged it, and cornered it so effectively that it could break out only after important losses. With no further thought of defending his principality, Spitakes took his remaining troops rapidly to join Poros.⁵¹

Approximately two days later, the Macedonians reached the Hydaspes, now nearly 1200 paces wide.⁵² On the far bank they could see Prince Poros’s sprawling camp and his entire army drawn up in battle order behind three hundred towering war elephants, like castle keeps. They observed large bands being sent out on both sides to reinforce picket

lines along the riverbank and especially to keep watch at the few fords that the high waters still left passable. Seeing that an attempt to cross under enemy observation could not even be entertained, Alexander pitched camp on the right bank, opposite the Indians. He began by using troop movements up and down the bank to confuse the enemy about the place of his intended crossing and to wear out enemy vigilance. Other detachments reconnoitered all parts of the land along the river, and yet others laid Spitakes's undefended territory under contribution and gathered provisions as if for a long stalemate. Alexander contrived to send a rumor into the enemy camp to the effect that he considered a crossing impossible in this season, that he would await the end of the rains and attack across the stream when the waters had fallen. Meanwhile, ceaseless cavalry movement, fully manned boats plying the river, phalanges marching out repeatedly and standing for hours in the pouring rain, armed and apparently ready for combat, must have kept Prince Poros in a state of permanent apprehension and expectation of sudden attack. A few islands in the river became an occasion for skirmishes, creating an appearance that they would be decisive when it finally came to serious battle.

Then Alexander learned that Abisares of Kashmir, repeated assurances of devotion notwithstanding, was not only in secret contact with Poros but was also approaching to unite his entire force with Poros's.⁵³ The king had never intended to stand idle on the right bank throughout the rainy season, and this report spurred him to plan for prompt attack, since a battle against the combined forces of Abisares and Poros could be difficult if not downright dangerous. It was impossible to cross the river here, in full view of the enemy: the rising waters and the current had made the riverbed treacherous, and slick shoals lay before the low riverbank opposite. To try to land the phalanges under the volleys of an enemy standing in closed ranks and on sure footing opposite was out of the question. Finally, it was clear that the Macedonian horses would shy as they caught the scent and heard the trumpeting of the many elephants standing on the other bank, that they would bolt, leap from their ferries, and create the most dangerous confusion.

And yet the river had to be crossed.

Around midnight, Alexander ordered that alarm be sounded in camp. The cavalry advanced to the river in various places and prepared for crossing, to the sound of trumpets and the battle cry. Boats cast off from

shore; lit by watch fires, the phalanges moved up to the fords. The enemy camp opposite came to life immediately; the elephants were driven forward; troops moved up to water's edge. Through the rest of the night, the Indians waited to receive an attack that never came. The same thing happened in the following nights, and Poros saw himself deceived again and again. Weary of keeping his army on high alert in wind and rain, to no good purpose, he reverted to merely posting pickets.

A row of rugged hills runs along the right bank of the Hydaspes and extends three miles upstream, where it rises to high, heavily forested mountains on whose northern slope a small stream plunges down into the river. At the mouth of this stream, the river changes direction from southward out of Kashmir to westward, turning almost ninety degrees. On its right bank lies the rugged row of hills, on its left a wide, fertile savannah. At the bend, just below the mouth of the stream, a high, wooded island called Jamad rises in the river; above it the customary road from Kashmir leads down across the Hydaspes. This was the spot that Alexander had chosen for a crossing.⁵⁴ Near camp, a row of pickets had been posted along the bank, close enough to see one another and call to one another. Their calls and nightly watch fires and new troop movements close to camp would have deceived the enemy about the place of the impending crossing, if the enemy had not grown accustomed to ignoring all these signals in any event.

At news that Abisares was now only three marches out, Alexander prepared the decisive blow. Krateros remained near camp with his hipparchy, the Arachosian and Paropamisad riders, the phalanges of Alketas and Polyperchon, and 5000 troops from the Indian district princes. He was instructed to keep still until he saw the enemy opposite either move out of camp or suffer a defeat near camp. If he saw the enemy forces divided and the elephants taken upstream against the Macedonians as they crossed, he, too, should cross with his entire corps, since the elephants were the sole obstacle to a cavalry attack.⁵⁵ If the elephants remained in camp, he should make no attempt to cross. A second corps, composed of the phalanges of Meleagros, Gorgias, and Attalos, and the mercenary infantry and cavalry, moved one and one-half miles upstream under Lagid Ptolemy, who had been ordered to send his divisions across one by one as soon as he saw that battle had been joined opposite.⁵⁶ The king moved out of camp at morning, leading the hipparchies of Hephaistion, Perdikkas, and Demetrios; the agema of the cavalry under Koinos; the Scythian, Baktrian, and Sogdian riders; the Dahaeans horse archers; the chiliarchies

of the shieldbearers; the phalanges of Kleitos and Koinos; and the Agrianians and archers. All these movements were hindered, but also concealed, by teeming rain.

The king passed behind the great heights along the river to the place of crossing and arrived late in the evening. He found the river fleet that Koinos had brought from the Indus reassembled and concealed in the dense forest, and skins and beams made ready for rafts and ferries. The Macedonians passed the night in preparations for crossing: lowering boats into the river, stuffing skins with straw and oakum, hammering rafts together. Torrential windswept rain, sometimes in the form of thunderstorms, covered the sound of the hammers; the dense forest on the headland and on the island concealed the Macedonian watch fires.

Toward morning, the storm abated; the rain stopped; the river, in flood, rushed past the high banks of the island. The army would cross above this point. The king crossed on the lead ship, accompanied by the bodyguards Ptolemy, Perdikkas, and Lysimachos, by Seleukos, who led the "royal shieldbearers," and by a picked corps of other shieldbearers. The remaining shieldbearers crossed on other ships, and cavalry and infantry on boats, river lighters, rafts, and ferries: 4000 cavalry, 1000 horse archers, nearly 6000 shieldbearers, and finally the light infantry, Agrianians, javelin throwers, and archers, numbering perhaps 4000 men.⁵⁷ The two phalanges remained on the right bank to cover and keep watch on the road down from Kashmir.⁵⁸ As the ships rounded the northern corner of the island, the Macedonians caught sight of the enemy's mounted forward pickets, who galloped back across the meadows when they saw the army crossing. The far bank therefore was stripped of defenders and no one was present to interfere with the landing. Alexander was the first ashore, the other boats put in, the cavalry and the rest of the army followed, and all formed up into marching columns.

Then they saw that they had landed on an island. At the bend in the river, the current had broken through at a low place on the bank, creating a new arm of the river. At the risk of their lives, the riders searched for a ford, but the water on all sides was too wide and too deep. There seemed to be no choice but to recall the boats and ferries to take them around the island. An imminent danger was that this delay would give the enemy time to dispatch a significant corps to block a landing. Then they found a ford. Men and horses alike could hardly withstand the current; the water rose chest-deep on the men on foot, and the horses had only their heads above water. They reached the far shore in their various divisions

and formed up in a closed line, the Turanian riders on the right, then the Macedonian squadrons, the shieldbearers next, and finally the light infantry on the left wing.

They pivoted right and started downstream toward the enemy camp. To spare the infantry, Alexander let it follow more slowly. He himself moved a half-hour in advance of the main army, taking with him the entire cavalry and the archers under Tauron. With his crack cavalry, superior to Poros's, Alexander believed he could hold his position, even against Poros's entire army, until his infantry arrived. And if the Indians, startled by his sudden appearance, should withdraw, his 5000 riders were enough for attack and pursuit.

When Poros learned from his returning pickets that a large number of troops was approaching, he first thought it was Abisares of Kashmir bringing his army. But would an ally have failed to announce his approach? Or to send word that he had crossed the river? It was all too clear that the troops landing were Macedonians, that Alexander had executed in good order a crossing that should have cost thousands of lives, and that his presence on the near bank could no longer be contested. The numbers of the troops arrayed upstream and downstream on the bank opposite, however, seemed to indicate that the corps advanced across the river could not be significant. Poros should have made every effort to cut it off and destroy it, once it had landed; he should have seized the offensive, which his war chariots and elephants favored and indeed required. Instead, he was concerned solely to delay the enemy's advance and avoid a decisive encounter until Abisares arrived. He sent his son with 2000 riders and 120 war chariots against the Macedonians; he hoped that these would stop them.⁵⁹

When Alexander saw this corps advancing across the river meadows, he assumed that Poros was approaching with all his army and this was the van. He had his riders prepare for combat. When he saw that behind these riders and chariots no army was following, he ordered an immediate attack. The Turanian riders swooped down on the enemy from all sides, aiming to create disorder and then to encircle. The Macedonians charged, one squadron after another. The Indians, surrounded, could neither stand up to the attack nor fall back. Despite brave resistance, they were soon wholly defeated; 400 lay dead on the field, the royal prince among them; the chariots, mired in the churned up meadow, fell to the Macedonians, who advanced more eager for battle than ever.

The survivors of the routed corps fled back to camp to report that they had been beaten and the prince killed and that Alexander was advancing. Too late, Poros understood what an enemy he was facing. He would have to act with utmost dispatch, if he was to have any hope of intercepting the consequences of a half-measure that had only magnified the danger. His sole salvation lay in throwing his superior numbers against the approaching enemy and destroying it before it could add more troops and remove the last advantage he still enjoyed. But he could not afford to vacate the riverbank opposite the Macedonian camp, lest the battle-ready army facing him there seize the opportunity to cross and fall into his rear. Accordingly, he left a few elephants and several thousand men in camp to observe Krateros's movements and cover the riverbank and moved out to meet Alexander, taking his entire cavalry of 4000 horses, 300 war chariots, 30,000 infantry, and 200 elephants. When he had moved right beyond the wet meadow beside the river and gained the sandy field, which favored both the deployment of his forces and the movement of the elephants, he arranged his army for battle in Indian fashion: at the front, a terrible line of 200 elephants, one every fifty paces, extending across almost a mile of terrain;⁶⁰ behind them, a second battle line of infantry, in squads of circa 150 men, each set off from the next by two elephants; at the tips of these wings, which extended beyond the elephant line, 2000 cavalry were attached right and left. Each end of this wide battle line was covered by 150 chariots, each carrying two heavily armed infantrymen, two archers with longbows, and two armed charioteers. The strength of the line lay in the 200 elephants, which would be the more fearsome because the Macedonian cavalry, on whom Alexander had staked his victory, could not hold the field against them.

And indeed, a well-led attack should have destroyed the Macedonians. The elephants should have charged the Macedonian line and, covered by the infantry divisions and volleys from the sharpshooters, should have forced the cavalry from the battlefield and trampled the phalanx. The Indian cavalry and the war chariots should have pursued the fleeing enemy and cut off its retreat over the river. Even the unusually extended battle line, which far outflanked the Macedonian line, could have been very effective, if the chariots and riders on the wings had wheeled and fallen into the enemy's flanks as the elephants charged. In any event, Poros should have attacked as soon as he caught sight of the enemy, in order not to lose the advantage of the offensive and the choice of the

point where battle would be joined. Instead, he hesitated. Alexander anticipated him and turned everything to his own advantage with the circumspection and boldness that alone could compensate his enemy's superior numbers.

His small army standing opposite the enemy scarcely extended one-quarter the length of the enemy battle line and its elephants. Here, as in earlier battles, he would advance on the diagonal and plunge full force into a chosen spot. He was obliged—and with his troops he could dare—to attack the enemy's ungainly mass by sending squads forward one after another and expect these squads, having prevailed, to assemble and reform at the right place and the right time. Because the enemy's strength lay in the elephants, the decisive blow would have to avoid them and direct itself against the weakest point of the enemy line; to succeed completely, it would have to be executed by Alexander's strongest arm.

Alexander had 5000 cavalry, whereas Poros had but 2000 on each wing, too widely separated to come timely to each other's aid. They were supported solely—and doubtfully—by the 150 chariots stationed next to each squad. In keeping with Macedonian practice and to be able to attack beside the river and not let himself be cut off from Krateros's corps on the other bank, the king chose to open hostilities with his right wing. When he saw that the Indians in the distance had formed up into a battle line, he halted his cavalry and waited for the chiliarchies of infantry to come up. Eager for battle, they came at a run. To let them catch their breath and hold off the enemy until they, too, could form up, he sent out cavalry detachments to keep Poros busy. The infantry line—on the right, Seleukos's elite guard, then the agema and the other chiliarchies under Antigenes, in toto about 6000 shieldbearers; on the left, the light infantry under Tauron—received orders not to enter action until they saw the enemy's left wing dislodged by the cavalry attack and the enemy infantry of the second battle line in disorder.

The riders of the charge—Hephaistion's and Perdikkas's hipparchies and the Dahae archers: about 3000 horse—moved rapidly forward and right on the diagonal, and Koinos with the agema and Demetrios's hipparchy moved down farther to the right, with instructions to fall into the rear of the enemy riders opposite him as they turned right to come to the aid of those thrown by the first shock.⁶¹ When Alexander, leading the charge, came within bowshot of the enemy cavalry line, he sent the 1000 Dahae forward to throw the Indian riders into disorder by pelting them with arrows, then rushing them on their wild horses. He himself

continued to move right in order to charge the flank of the Indian cavalry full force,⁶² before it could recover from the Dahaeian assault, reform, and advance on him. Anticipating Alexander, the enemy was rapidly gathering its riders for a countershock,⁶³ when Koinos broke out and fell into the rear of the riders opposite as they pivoted right. Completely surprised, the Indians abandoned that maneuver and tried instead to form a double front against the two groups of riders threatening them simultaneously. Alexander seized this moment between formations for his strike and again caught them unawares. They galloped away to take cover behind the unwavering line of elephants. Poros let part of that line be turned and driven against the enemy cavalry. At the trumpeting of the elephants, the Macedonian horses bolted and fled back. The phalanx of shieldbearers came up on the double, and the remaining elephants in the line charged them. A murderous struggle began. The beasts broke through the densest ranks, trampled the men, lashed them with their trunks, impaled them on their tusks, and grew angrier at every wound they took. The shieldbearers stood their ground. Their ranks broken, they effectively met the great beasts in single combat. They were able to do no more than keep the field. The Indian cavalry, regrouped, in formation, and encouraged by the elephants' advance, broke out to attack the Macedonian riders. These, however, physically stronger and more skillful, threw them back a second time, and they again retreated to the elephants.

In the course of combat, Koinos had united his forces with the king's hipparchies, so that the entire cavalry could now move forward as one body. It threw itself furiously on the Indian infantry, which could not withstand the shock and fled in disorder to the battling elephants, closely pursued by the enemy and taking heavy losses. Thus thousands, friend and foe alike, were pressed together on the elephants' gory field of combat. The elephants, now mostly without mahouts, confused and driven wild by the noise of battle and the pain of their wounds, struck and trampled everything within their reach. The Macedonians had space in which to escape the charging elephants; when the elephants turned, they pursued and shot them. The Indians, by contrast, were caught between the elephants and could neither protect themselves nor flee. Finally, it is said, Poros, who was directing the battle from atop his own war elephant, gathered forty sound animals for a charge that would decide the contest. Alexander, the report continues, opposed them with his archers, Agrianians, and javelin throwers, who, nimble as they were, moved aside when the beasts were driven toward them, shot at them and their drivers from

a distance, or crept up on them from behind and slashed their tendons with axes. The elephants fell writhing among the dead and wounded or stumbled blindly against the phalanx, which was closing its ranks again and no longer feared them.

Alexander, meanwhile, had assembled his riders at the far end of the battlefield, and at the near end the shieldbearers had formed up shield on shield. The king ordered a general advance to crush the enemy, in disorder now and surrounded. No further resistance was possible. Those Indians who could do so fled the carnage and ran inland, into the marshes, back into camp. Krateros and the other generals had crossed the river, as ordered, and landed without meeting resistance. They arrived just in time to take over the pursuit from troops fatigued by eight hours of combat.

Nearly 20,000 Indians had been killed, among them two of Poros's sons and Prince Spitakes, all infantry and cavalry captains, and all chariot and elephant drivers; 3000 horses and more than 100 elephants lay dead on the battlefield; about 80 elephants were taken by the victor.⁶⁴ When King Poros saw his strength broken, his elephants overpowered, and his army surrounded and in disarray, he had sought death in battle, but he had been saved by his golden armor and his faithful elephant. Finally, he was struck in the right shoulder by an arrow. Unable to go on fighting and determined not to be taken alive, he turned his elephant to escape the tumult. Again and again Alexander had caught sight of the tall grizzled Indian prince on his caparisoned animal, reforming his forces and urging them on, often in the thick of battle. He hastened after the valiant prince, whom he admired, to save him as he fled.⁶⁵ Suddenly aged Bukephalos, Alexander's faithful war horse, collapsed under him. Alexander sent the prince of Taxila after the fleeing king. But Poros, seeing his old enemy, turned and in a final effort flung a lance at him, which Taxiles's nimble horse enabled him to dodge. Alexander sent other Indians, among them Prince Meroes, who had been King Poros's friend. Weakened by loss of blood and tormented by thirst, Poros heard him patiently. Then Poros's elephant knelt down and lifted its master gently to the ground with its trunk. After resting and restoring himself, Poros asked Prince Meroes to bring him to Alexander. The king and a few friends came out to meet him, admiring the beauty of the old prince and the noble dignity with which he approached the man who had conquered him. After greeting Poros, Alexander is said to have asked how he would wish to be treated; "Like a king," was Poros's reply. To which Alexander responded: "That

I shall do because I desire it; require what it is that you desire"; whereupon Poros answered: "Your promise is all that I require."⁶⁶

Alexander was princely toward the man he had conquered and his largesse was perfectly politic. The Indian campaign had never aimed to acquire direct rule over India. Alexander cannot have intended to incorporate all at once into a Macedonian–Persian empire tribes whose very particular high culture emerged more and more clearly as he advanced. His policy toward India seems to have been to make himself master of all the territory to the Indus, and beyond the Indus to gain a decisive political predominance and such influence for Hellenic life that a union of India with the rest of Asia would become feasible over time. He did not intend to make the tribes dependent on him, but certainly their princes.

In devising a policy, Alexander could take good account of the position that Poros had acquired in the Punjab. Apparently Poros had had a principality in the Punjab, or sought one, and thus had excited the jealousy of the prince of Taxila. Poros's realm was confined at first to the well-cultivated plains between Hydaspes and Akesines; west of the Hydaspes, his cousin Spitakes had become ruler, and east of the Akesines in the Gandarite,⁶⁷ his great-nephew Poros, both probably by his agency. His dominion thus extended eastward to the Hydraotes, on the frontier of the independent Indian tribes. In league with Abisares, he had also dared to reach for their territory, and even while he failed in the attempt, he nonetheless retained decided dominance in the Indus territories. Alexander had enlarged Taxiles's power considerably, but he could not stake everything on the loyalty of a single prince. Putting the entire Punjab territory under the scepter of one allied prince would both have been the surest way to make that prince chafe at his dependency on Alexander and have given him the means to escape that dependency, the more readily because Taxiles's ancient enmity with Prince Poros would have attracted the independent tribes into alliances with him against Poros. The most reliable basis for Alexander's influence in India was the rivalry between these two princes. In recognizing Poros as prince in these lands, furthermore, he acquired a warrant to attack the tribes farther east, which were now the enemies of his ally, and broaden his influence in those parts by subjugating them. He would have to enlarge Poros's power to the point where it balanced that of the prince of Taxila. He could even give Poros the greater power and make him ruler over his erstwhile adversaries, because henceforth Poros could justify himself and maintain

himself against them and against Taxiles solely by virtue of the favor of the Macedonian king.

These approximately were the considerations that prompted Alexander not merely to confirm Poros in power after the victory on the Hydaspes but also to enlarge his power significantly.⁶⁸ His sole further measure was to found Hellenistic cities on the two crossings over the Hydaspes. The town situated where the way down from Kashmir reaches the river and where the Macedonians had crossed into Poros's territory was called Bukephala; the other, laid two miles downstream, where the battle had been fought, was called Nikaia.⁶⁹ Alexander rested his men for thirty days in this lovely, prosperous countryside; burial rites for those who had fallen in battle, sacrifices for the victory and games of all kinds, and early construction of the new towns amply occupied their time.

The king was busy with various arrangements to secure the results of his victory. Of foremost importance were political relations with Prince Abisares, who had moved to enter battle against Alexander, sworn treaties notwithstanding. A report came from Sisikottos, commander on Aornos, that the Assakenoi had risen and murdered the prince whom Alexander had installed. This tribe's earlier contacts with Abisares and that prince's manifest perfidy implied only too clearly that he was not entirely innocent in these dangerous machinations. Tyriespis of the Paropamisad satrapy and Philip of the Indian satrapy received orders to move against the Assakenoi and suppress the insurrection. At about the same time, an embassy arrived from Prince Poros of the Gandarite—Poros the Coward, as the Greeks called him—who seems to have deemed it a personal excellence that he had not supported his princely relative and protector against Alexander and now found the moment opportune to submit to Alexander and thus escape an annoying relationship with his aged kinsman. How astonished his envoys must have been to find the older prince, not in chains at the victor's feet, as they had expected, but rather enjoying highest honor at Alexander's side and in full possession of his realm. It will not have been the most favorable response that the high-minded king gave them to bring back to their prince. The homage of the nearest independent tribes was doubtless received more graciously; bringing lavish gifts, they were pleased to submit to a king before whom the most powerful prince in the Punjab had also bent his knee.

The more necessary was it, therefore, to resort to arms against laggards. Abisares, in particular, making no concession to a record of open disloyalty, had sent no ambassadors and made no other attempt to justify himself

before Alexander, perhaps relying instead on the mountain ramparts that guarded his principality. A campaign into the mountains would subject the mountain tribes and bring home to the renegade prince the danger that threatened him and the duty that he owed.

After thirty days, Alexander moved out of camp on the Hydaspes, leaving Krateros and the greater part of the army to finish building the two towns. Accompanied by the princes Taxiles and Poros, half the Macedonian cavalry, picked men from every division of the infantry, and most of the light troops, to which Phrataphernes satrap of Parthyaia and Hyrkania had just brought the Thracians left with him, Alexander moved northeastward against the Glausans or Glaukanikes, as the Greeks called them, in the heavily wooded foothills above the plain, a troop movement that also opened the mountain road up into Kashmir. Now at last, and in all haste, Abisares bethought himself and sought the king's pardon; he sent an embassy, led by his brother, to throw himself, with his land, on Alexander's mercy and attested his devotion by a gift of forty elephants. Alexander mistrusted these fine words and ordered Abisares to appear before him immediately and in person; if he failed to do so, Alexander would come with his army.⁷⁰ The king moved higher into the mountains. The Glausans submitted, and their densely populated territory—it counted thirty-seven cities, none with fewer than five thousand inhabitants and several with more than ten thousand, and a number of villages and hamlets—was awarded to Prince Poros.⁷¹ These forests furnished in abundance timber that Alexander ordered felled and floated down to Bukephala and Nikaia,⁷² where Krateros would oversee construction of a great river fleet on which Alexander intended to sail down to the Indus and to the sea, once he had conquered India.

The army moved eastward toward the Akesines.⁷³ Alexander had heard that Prince Poros of the Gandarite⁷⁴ had taken as many armed men and as much treasure as he could gather and fled eastward into the Ganges country, no longer hoping to be forgiven the ignoble intention of his offer to submit and concerned for his own safety, now that his great-uncle had joined Alexander. When Alexander arrived at the mighty Akesines, he sent the elder Prince Poros home to raise troops and lead them back to the army, bringing also all the elephants still fit for combat after the battle on the Hydaspes. Alexander took his troops across the river, which was so swollen that a man required three-quarters of an hour to cross it.⁷⁵ The swirling current, raging over a river bottom made treacherous by rocky banks and promontories, spun the boats around and capsized

them; stuffed tent skins proved more reliable. Koinos remained on the Akesines with his phalanx to prepare the crossing of the divisions following and to gather provisions for the entire army in Poros's and Taxiles's territory. Alexander moved quickly eastward through the northern Gandarite, meeting no resistance; he still hoped to overtake the renegade Poros. He left garrisons at the most important places to await Krateros's and Koinos's corps. At the Hydraotes, on the eastern frontier of the Gandarite, Hephaistion was detached with two phalanges, his hipparchy and Demetrios's, and half the archers and sent southward to traverse the entire territory controlled by the fugitive prince, subject the independent tribes settled between Hydraotes and Akesines, found a city beside the highroad on the left bank of the Akesines, and confer the entire area on the loyal Poros. Alexander took the main army across the stream, a less difficult crossing, and entered the territory of the so-called independent Indians.

One of the remarkable features of the Punjab, to which its geography has contributed, is that republican systems of government have formed here and prospered under many names down through the centuries, a contrast with the usual despotisms of Asia and an abomination to the strictly religious Indians of the Ganges. The Ganges Indians contemptuously call the Punjabis "arattas," men without kings. What princes they have belong to no sacred caste and exercise no ancient right; they are usurpers. It almost seems that Poros was such a prince,⁷⁶ but his attempt to gain control of all of kingless India had been unequal to the resistance of the powerful warlike tribes beyond the Hydraotes. That conquest required European weapons. Very few submitted without resistance. Among these tribes, that of the Kathaioi or Katharoi, celebrated as the most bellicose of the region, was not merely itself superbly armed for war but also had called neighboring independent tribes to arms and combined with them.⁷⁷

Hearing of these preparations, Alexander moved quickly eastward through the territory of the Adraistes, who submitted freely.⁷⁸ On the third day, he approached the Kathar capital, Sangala. The city was of impressive size, surrounded by strong walls, and protected on one side by an inland sea; on the other, a ridge rose a little distance from the gates and dominated the plain. The Kathaioi and their allies had invested the ridge as strongly as possible. They had driven war chariots together around the high ground to form a triple barricade and encamped within the circle of this formidable fort composed of chariots. They were unattackable and in a position to respond quickly and forcefully to every

enemy movement. Alexander saw the menace in their position, which bore out reports of the boldness and military resourcefulness of this tribe. He expected a daring attack and had to act quickly.

He sent the horse archers forward to harass the enemy and block a sudden assault on troops that had not yet formed up for battle. On the right wing, the agema of the cavalry and Kleitos's hipparchy, the shieldbearers, and the Agrianians marched up; on the left, the phalanges and the hipparchy of Perdikkas, who led that wing; the archers were distributed on the two wings. As the marching column continued to come up, the riders of the rear guard were distributed along the two flanks of the line and the infantry inserted to make the phalanx denser. Alexander chose as point of attack a spot on the enemy's left where the wall of chariots was thinner and the terrain more open. He hoped that the enemy would respond to a strong cavalry charge at this weak point by a sortie that would open the barricade. But when he took his two hipparchies against the spot, the wall of chariots held, and a hail of spears and arrows received the Macedonian riders, not the proper arm, in any case, to storm and scatter a chariot fort. Alexander leapt from his horse, took command of the infantry as it came up, and led the men forward on the double. It took no great effort to dislodge the Indians, who fell back to their second ring of chariots. Here they stood in a smaller circumference, more tightly closed and more numerous at every point, while the Macedonians were impeded by the chariots and the wreckage of the first ring, through which they had to clear a way. In the murderous struggle that followed, Macedonian valor was put to the test against the military skill of a bitterly resisting enemy. Finally the Macedonians broke through the second line of chariots and the Kathaioi, seeing that they had no hope of resisting such an enemy from behind the third, fled back within the city walls.

That same day Alexander cordoned off the city with his infantry, except for the side toward the rather shallow sea, around which he posted riders. He suspected that the Kathaioi, shaken by the outcome of the engagement, would steal from the city in the night and attempt to make their way through the sea. Thus it was. About the second watch, the mounted pickets facing the town observed a throng gathering under the wall; it waded into the sea, headed toward the far shore and then the open countryside. These fugitives were intercepted by the riders and cut down; survivors fled back to the city. The remainder of the night passed quietly.

Next morning, Alexander began preparations for a siege. A double mound was heaped up, running from a point close to the sea around the walls and back again to the sea; the sea itself was encircled by a double

picket line. Terrapin sheds and battering rams were set up against the walls. Then deserters brought word that the besieged intended to sally during the coming night and would try to break through at the gap in the mound on the sea side. The king sent three chiliarchies of shieldbearers, all the Agrianians, and a taxis of archers under Ptolemy the bodyguard to occupy the spot where the enemy probably could be expected. Ptolemy was instructed to resist the sortie with all his forces and sound the alarm to bring the remaining troops out to join battle. Ptolemy reinforced his position, placing what chariots could still be used broadside and heaping up spare stakes from the earthworks at various points between the wall and the pond, so that the fugitives would find their way blocked in the dark. These preparations took much of the night. About the fourth watch, the gate toward the sea swung open and the enemy erupted in packs. Ptolemy sounded the alarm and moved out with his fully prepared detachment. While the enemy was still picking its way between the chariots and the piles of stakes, Ptolemy and his band stood suddenly in their midst. After long, disordered combat, the Indians were forced to flee back into town, their escape route cut off.

At this point, Poros returned, bringing the remaining elephants and 5000 Indian recruits. The machinery for a storm had been constructed and brought up to the walls, which it undermined at various points so that breaches soon opened. Ladders were laid and the town taken. A few Indians escaped; most of the rest were cut down in the streets; the number of casualties reported, 17,000, is not improbable, since Alexander had deemed it necessary to order every armed man killed. The 70,000 prisoners recorded seem to amount to the rest of the population. The Macedonians counted 100 dead and an unusual number of wounded, 1200, among them the bodyguard Lysimachos and many other officers.⁷⁹

Immediately after the storm, Alexander sent Kardian Eumenes with 300 riders to two towns allied with the Kathaioi to announce that Sangala had fallen and offer to accept their surrender: If they submitted freely, they would have as little to fear as many other Indians, who were coming to recognize that friendship with Macedonia was their true salvation. But fugitives from Sangala had brought such hair-raising accounts of Alexander's cruelty and his soldiers' bloodthirstiness that no one believed the conqueror's overtures. The tribesmen gathered what they could and fled. Hearing this, Alexander moved rapidly out of Sangala and pursued. But the Indians had such a head start that he overtook only a few hundred who had fallen by the wayside and cut them down. He returned to Sangala,

razed the city, and distributed its territory to the neighboring tribes that had submitted voluntarily. Poros was sent to lead up garrisons to be laid on the towns.

The punishment inflicted on Sangala and the terror spread by exaggerated rumors of the foreign conqueror's savage cruelty made it easier for Alexander to pacify the remaining local tribes by clemency and generosity. Soon no further hostilities were needed; the tribes submitted wherever he went. He entered the territory of Prince Sopeithes,⁸⁰ whose rule extended to the first mountain chains of the Imaos and to the crystal salt deposits at the springs of the Hyphasis. As the army approached the prince's seat, where Sopeithes was known to be present, it found the gates closed and the towers and battlements undefended. The Macedonians hesitated between hope that the town had been vacated and fear that they were walking into a trap. Suddenly the gates opened wide and Prince Sopeithes came out to meet the great king in the brilliant state of an Indian raja: Dressed in clothes of many colors, hung with strings of pearls and precious stones set in gold, accompanied by loud music, and followed by a magnificent retinue, he offered his homage and many costly gifts, among them a pack of tiger hounds. He was confirmed in his principality, which seems to have been enlarged.⁸¹ Alexander continued into the neighboring territory of Prince Phegeus,⁸² who also hurried to present his homage and his gifts and remained in possession of his principality. It lay at the extreme eastern point of Alexander's campaign.

The tradition has left this moment in Alexander's history curiously obscure. Even reports of visible things are vague and conflicting. Cited letters home make incredible claims; Krateros, for example, is said to have written his mother that they advanced to the Ganges and found a monstrous river full of sharks and surging like the ocean.⁸³ Others at least reported truthfully that the Hyphasis marked the end of the Macedonian campaign. But in attempting to explain why a limit was imposed on this march of conquest, our sources derive from the final occasion for turning back here a causal explanation that is no more valid for the credibility of these informants in other matters or for the unsuspecting credence they have enjoyed down through the millennia.

Alexander, it is recounted,⁸⁴ advanced to the Hyphasis with the intention of crossing and subjecting the land on the far side, for he believed that war could not end as long as there were still enemies to be conquered. He learned that this rich land was held by a tribe skilled at farming, courageous in battle, and governed well, for the aristocrats who ruled

the people did not oppress them or try to stir them up. War elephants were said to be larger, wilder, and more numerous here than elsewhere in India. All these things stirred the king's desire to go farther. But the Macedonians saw with misgiving how their king imposed no end of hardship on them and exposed them to no end of danger. They came together here and there in camp, complained of their hard lot, and swore that they would follow Alexander no farther, even if he ordered them to do so. When the king learned of these things, he convened the "captains of the regiments"⁸⁵ right away, before the disorder and discouragement among the troops could spread.

Since they no longer wished to follow him, inspired by his same thought, he told them, he had summoned them either to persuade them that a continuing campaign was advisable or, having been persuaded by them, to turn back. If they took exception to his leadership and the campaign they had fought, he had nothing more to say. He knew no other goal for the valorous man than struggle for its own sake. If they wished to know the end of his campaign, they should consider that it was not far from here to the Ganges and not far from there to the Eastern Ocean, where he would show his Macedonians the sea route to the Hyrkanian and the Persian Seas, to the Libyan shore, to the Pillars of Herakles. The boundaries that the god had given the world should become the boundaries of the Macedonian empire. Between the Hyphasis and the Eastern Ocean there were still tribes to conquer; from there to the Hyrkanian Sea, hordes of unconquered Scyths still swept back and forth. Were Macedonians afraid of danger? Had they forgotten hope and glory? Once they had conquered the world, he would lead them home to Macedonia, more than rich in possessions, reputation, and memories.

A long silence followed Alexander's speech; no one dared to oppose him, no one dared to agree with him. Repeatedly, the king invited them to speak—to no avail. He would be glad to hear a contrary opinion, he told them. After another long silence, Koinos son of Polemokrates rose, the strategos of the Elymiot phalanx who had proved himself so often in battle, most recently on the Hydaspes. The king, said Koinos, wanted the army to follow its convictions, rather than his orders. Therefore he would speak, not for himself and the captains, who were ready for anything, but for the common soldier, and not to please the many but rather to say those things on which the king could best rely, now and in future. His years,⁸⁶ his wounds, his king's confidence entitled him to speak plainly. The more Alexander and his army had accomplished, the more necessary

was it now to set a term. The veterans who survived, a few in the army, others scattered about the conquered towns, longed to return home, to father and mother, wife and child; there they would live out their declining years in the bosom of their families, remembering their eventful lives, enjoying the glory and the riches that Alexander had made possible for them. Such an army was not fit for renewed battle; Alexander should lead them home. He would see his own mother again, would fill the temples of Macedonia with trophies. If he still longed for great deeds, he should equip a new army and set out for India or Libya, for the Eastern Ocean or beyond the Pillars of Herakles, and the gods in their mercy would grant him new victories. But the greatest gift of the gods was moderation in the midst of good fortune. One should beware, not of the enemy, but of the gods themselves and their doom. Koinos's words had struck a chord; many could not restrain their tears; clearly their hearts were filled with thoughts of home.

Alexander dismissed the assembly, annoyed at Koinos's remarks and at the resonance they had found. Next day he reconvened it. He would soon go on, he told them. He would force no one to follow; there were still brave men in plenty who longed for new exploits; the rest could march home; that was their privilege; no one would stop them. But when they arrived, they should report that they had forsaken their king in the middle of enemy territory. So saying, he left the assembly and retired to his tent, where he remained for three days. He thought the mood of the army would shift, that the troops would decide to go on. The Macedonians found their king's displeasure painful enough, but they did not change their mind. On the fourth day, nonetheless, the king sacrificed on the riverbank for a crossing. The omens were not favorable. He convened the elders and his most faithful companions and told them, and through them the army, that he had decided to return home. The Macedonians cheered and wept for joy, pressed about the king's tent and praised him for letting himself, unconquered, be conquered by his Macedonians.

Thus Arrian's account.⁸⁷ The accounts of Curtius and Diodoros⁸⁸ are longer and differ in certain details, of rhetorical nature, so to speak. According to them, Alexander sent his troops out to plunder the rich Hyphasis basin, that is, Phegeus's friendly territory, in an effort to win them over for a continuing campaign, and while they were gone made gifts of clothing and provisions and of a month's wages to their women and children. When the troops returned from raiding, he convened them and deliberated before the entire army, not just the war council, the

important question whether to go on. Strabo says that Alexander's ultimate decision to turn back was determined by certain sacred signs, by the mood of the army, which refused to go on because of the terrible hardships it had endured, but chiefly because of the men's suffering in the ceaseless rain.⁸⁹ This last point is of capital importance. Kleitarchos, whom one recognizes in Diodoros's account, describes the wretchedness of the troops in crassest terms. "Only a few Macedonian soldiers remained," he writes, "and these were at the point of despairing. The long marches had worn away their horses' hooves; the many battles had blunted and broken their weapons; not one of them was still dressed in Hellenic clothing; these world conquerors wrapped their scarred bodies in plundered rags, taken from barbarians and Indians and stitched together; for seventy days, they had slept and marched and fought in frightful downpours, driving wind, and flashing lightning."

The peshecal, the tropical rains, were indeed at their height and the rivers at flood. If one imagines what a western army, on the march and encamped, must have suffered during three months of such weather, of steaming dampness, lack of clothing, and strange diet; if one imagines how many men and horses must have fallen to the weather and the illnesses it caused;⁹⁰ if one imagines how both the troops' physical strength and their morale must have been sapped by spreading sickness, unrelieved wet, shortages, bad roads, and endless marches, by deepening wretchedness, rising mortality, and growing hopelessness—then one can understand how bad temper, homesickness, lassitude, and indolence could undermine even this once battle-ready and enthusiastic army, and its sole desire, both general and specific, could be to leave this land far behind before the tropical rains could arrive a second time. And if Alexander did not meet the mood of the army and its refusal to follow with unsparing severity, did not resort to military discipline to break and punish its reluctance, but rather yielded, that is proof enough that he perceived no mutiny or hatred of his person among his men but rather the understandable consequence of all the suffering of the last three months.

Certainly it seems that Alexander's wish was to carry his standards to the Ganges and the shores of the Eastern Ocean. His reasons cannot be adduced with the same probability. Perhaps it was reports of the colossal power of the Ganges princes, of the endless treasure held in their residences, of the wonders of the far East, which he had heard extolled in Europe and in Asia; perhaps equally a desire to make the Eastern Ocean the limit of his victories and find new routes of discovery and trade;

perhaps it was a last resort intended to rally his troops, whose morale was no match for nature in the tropics. He may have hoped that a bold new plan, the great future that he urged on the failing resolve of his Macedonians, his summons and the rekindled enthusiasm of going forward without pause would make his army forget its suffering, would inspire it and give it new strength. He miscalculated; his call elicited only incapacity and complaint. The king tried the more drastic measure of showing his displeasure and shaming his followers. He disappeared, leaving them to feel his annoyance, and hoped that shame and remorse would rouse them from their wretchedness and demoralization. The veterans were sorry that their king was angry, but they could not pull themselves together. Silence lay over the camp for three days. Then Alexander must have seen that all effort was in vain and sharper measures imprudent. He sacrificed on the riverbank for a crossing, and the gods gave him no favorable omen; they bade him return home. When that order resounded through the camp, it transformed the discouraged men. Now they forgot their suffering, recovered hope, rejoiced, regained strength and courage. Alexander may have been the only one who grieved as they turned westward.

Alexander's turning back on the Hyphasis—the beginning of his downfall, if one finds the summa of his life and striving in the motto of the modern western monarch who first could boast that the sun never set on his empire, if one finds it in the notion of *plus ultra*—this turning back, understood in the context of Alexander's place in history, was necessary, prepared, and already indicated by the things he had done and established. Although we cannot know whether he owed this decision to his own insight or to the force of circumstances, its significance remains the same. A campaign farther eastward would effectively have cost him his western empire. Reports already coming in from the Persian and Syrian provinces showed what consequences could be expected to follow from the king's longer absence and the ever greater remove of the fighting force. While Alexander took his army down the Indus, Persian and Macedonian grandees he had left behind began to notice that they were not being supervised or held to account. They seized the opportunity to oppress their subjects, take presumptuous measures, entertain dangerous wishes, and embark on criminal ventures. If Alexander had carried the campaign into the Ganges country, the disorder could have spread unchecked and might have led to full dissolution of an empire that was not yet firmly established. Even if Alexander, with his extraordinary

capacities, had been able to tighten the reins of power sharply and firmly as he moved eastward, his first great successes in Ganges country would have posed the greatest danger to the stability of his realm. The vastness of this river basin would have required an exorbitant investment of western garrisons and ultimately would have precluded true subjection and integration into the empire.

Geography presents a further obstacle. A desert no less extensive than the peninsula of Asia Minor separates the Punjab from India's eastern lands. Treeless, grassless, waterless except for brackish little springs as much as three hundred feet deep, made insupportable by windborne sand, by hot dust carried on the torrid air, and dangerous by the alternation of daytime heat and nightly chill, this desolate wasteland creates an almost impregnable defense around the Ganges country. A single route leads out of the north along the edge of the Imaos chain from Hyphasis and Hesudros to the streams of the Ganges basin; eastern peoples are right to call it too frail a tie to bind the great, immensely rich Ganges country to the Persian crown.

Finally, if we follow Alexander's politics from the moment he entered Indian territory, we can conclude with confidence that he never intended to make the Punjab, much less the Ganges lands, immediate parts of his empire. Alexander's empire had a natural boundary in the Indian satrapy west of the Indus. With the high passes of the "Kaukasos," he controlled the land of the Oxos and the Sogd to the north and of the Kophen and the Indus to the south. What lay east of the Indus was to remain independent under native princes, but under Macedonian influence, based securely enough, for example, on the particular relationship of the princes Poros and Taxiles to one another and to the king. For even Poros, greatly favored though he was, did not receive all the land to the river at the eastern frontier of the Punjab; and farther east, Phegeus and Sopeithes, two independent princes too insignificant to attempt anything on their own, made strong and stable only by their fealty to Alexander, balanced one another, like Poros and Taxiles. Thus were these princes, as in the modern Rheinbund, made securely dependent on Alexander's superior power by virtue of their fear and jealousy of one another and so they would remain, even if he returned to the West.

To enable conquest of the Ganges land, Alexander would have had to subject the Punjab entirely, as he had subjected Bactria and Sogdiana, and with the same harsh measures and the same investment of time. Having made himself master of Sogdiana, he abandoned a plan to push

on to a sea that he thought lay not far to the north, behind Scythian country. In similar fashion, he will have learned from Poros and Taxiles of the distances he would have to cover to reach the Ganges and the sea into which it flows. He had seized the land on the Kophen, the forecourt of India, with a firm hand; as in Sogdiana, where he set up a northern march, in the dependent principalities of the Punjab he devised an even more highly developed system of marches. He seems to have believed from the outset that the life, politics, and religion of the Indus peoples were too particular and too fixed in their development for these peoples to be won over to the Hellenistic empire right away.

Alexander cannot have contemplated incorporating directly into his empire a new series of conquered lands situated beyond principalities that were bound to him only by alliances. His beginning immediately after the battle of the Hydaspes to build a fleet that would carry his army down the Indus to the Persian Sea shows clearly that he intended to return by way of the Indus, not the Ganges, that his march toward the Ganges lands was to be no more than a raiding party, a "cavalcade." If he had intended more, we may assume that his campaign, founded, like Napoleon's great campaign eastward, on a basis of poorly controlled principalities attached to the conqueror by nothing more than gratitude, fear, and self-seeking, would have met an equally dismal end.

CHAPTER 4

It may have been in the last days of August 326 that the Macedonian army on the banks of the Hyphasis prepared to march home. To the king's specifications, it erected twelve immense tower-like altars on the riverbank in memory of the king and his army and in thanks for their victorious advance.¹ Alexander sacrificed at these altars and the troops celebrated with tournaments of all kinds, in Hellenic fashion.² Then they moved westward through friendly territory, hampered only by the rains. They crossed the Hydraotes and continued through Gandarite country to the Akesines. The town Hephaistion had been charged to build stood finished at the river crossing.³ Alexander rested here briefly, partly to prepare for the passage downstream to the Indus and down the Indus to the "great sea," partly to colonize the new town, both with Indians from the surrounding area and with invalided mercenaries, who were settled here.

During this rest, the brother of Prince Abisares of Kashmir appeared, accompanied by other minor princes of the upper regions, all bearing costly gifts, to offer homage to the king. Abisares sent thirty elephants and, in reply to the king's order that he appear in person, assured the king of his perfect devotion and pleaded illness. The Macedonians whom Alexander had sent to Kashmir confirmed these representations, and the prince's current conduct seemed to vouch for his continuing loyalty. He therefore received his principality as a satrapy and its tribute was fixed, and the principality of Arsakes was made subject to him.⁴ Alexander dedicated the new city by solemn offerings and crossed the Akesines. Toward the middle of September, the various army divisions in Bukephala and Nikaia met on the Hydaspes.

A grand idea rich in implication for the future informed the king's determination not to return from the Indus region he had crossed on his march eastward by the way he had come, but rather to carry his standards—and the seeds of Hellenistic life—into the lands that lay downstream. Because his relations with the newly discovered world of India

were based, not on direct rule, but rather on newly opened contacts and trade, on the gradual strengthening of incipient connections, they could have been neither fully effective nor even lasting, if the Indian satrapy and the Kopphen had been the sole communicating link. The satrapy offered the principal trade route, but the entire length of the Indus had to be in Macedonian hands, and the tribes farther downstream would have to recognize the same Macedonian influence as the tribes of the Punjab. Certain of these tribes—the Malloi and the Oxydrakans—vaunted their independence and their fame as warriors and abhorred or despised all foreign influence, and one would have to proceed against them decisively. Most important, Macedonian influence would have to be anchored in and reinforced by Hellenistic colonies on the Indus. Alexander had had this plan in mind before moving eastward from the Hydaspes, when he had ordered construction of a river fleet with which he intended to sail down the Indus and to the great sea. And once he could no longer carry his campaign to the Ganges and the Eastern Ocean, he may have become more interested in this expedition, which promised large successes, if not as much glory and booty as the march to the Ganges.

During the four months of the king's absence from the Hydaspes, the countryside around his two new cities had changed dramatically. The rainy season was over, the waters began to retreat, and broad rice fields, lush and green on the silt deposits of the flood, stretched along the left bank of the river. Along the far bank, under forested hills, lay miles of shipyards, where hundreds of vessels, large and small, were still being constructed or stood finished. Logs rafted down from the hills, skiffs loaded with supplies, transport ships carrying construction materials and war matériel plied the river, whose banks swarmed and swirled as a resting army composed of all possible nations went about its business. Alexander's next concern was to restore and strengthen the two forts, built hastily on lowland and damaged, berm and barracks, by high water. Then they began to equip their ships.

Keeping Hellenic custom, Alexander chose from the richest and most respected members of his staff thirty-three trierarchs who would have the honor of equipping these ships handsomely and effectively as a good work for public benefit.⁵ They vied with one another, to the great profit of the enterprise. The register of these trierarchs gives an instructive glimpse of the king's entourage. Twenty-four are Macedonians: the king's seven bodyguards and Peukestas, who was soon named eighth; the strategos and hipparch Krateros; from the strategoi of the phalanx, Attalos;

from the chiliarchs of the shieldbearers, Nearchos; Laomedon, who was not a soldier; and Androsthenes, who took the fleet around Arabia after the return to Babylon. None among the remaining eleven Macedonians is named; some may have been in civil service, like Laomedon, or with the civilian administration of the military, work of no mean importance in this army, obviously, even if our sources are silent. Six Hellenes are trierarchs, among them the king's secretary Eumenes of Kardia and the Larissan Medios, one of Alexander's closest confidants. Finally, the Persian Bagoas and two Cypriots, king's sons. Whether these trierarchs equipped the entire fleet or only the larger ships, the eighty thirty-oared galleys, is not known. The crews of the fleet, both sailors and rowers, were picked from the army's Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cypriots, and Greeks of the islands and the Asiatic coast.

In less than a month everything had been readied for departure. A thousand ships of all classes stood on the river, eighty equipped as battle-ships and two hundred undecked ships for the transport of horses.⁶ The rest, requisitioned up and down the riverbanks just as one found them, were to transport troops or to follow with provisions and war matériel. According to an uncorroborated report, huge transports had just arrived with new troops: six thousand riders and several thousand infantry.⁷

The river voyage was to begin in the first days of November.⁸ The king convened the companions and the Indian envoys who were with the army to give them the necessary instructions. He may have expressed hope that the peace he had restored to the Punjab would last, secured by his arrangements. Poros was confirmed in his enlarged territory, which comprised seven tribes and two thousand towns and extended almost to the Hyphasis, and his relations with the neighboring princes Abisares, Sopeithes, and Phegeus were clarified. Prince Taxiles's independent possession of his new and his old territories was recognized, the tribute and other obligations of the autonomous principalities within the jurisdiction of the Indian satrapy were referred to that satrap, and their contingents and the other Indian troops released home. Indications for the coming march followed: The king, all shieldbearers, the Agrianians and archers, and the escort of the cavalry, 8000 men in toto,⁹ would board ship, and the chiliarch Nearchos would receive command of the entire fleet. Onesikritos of Astypaleia would skipper the royal flagship. The remaining troops were to march down the riverbanks in two columns, one under Krateros on the right bank on the west, the other, larger column, with the two hundred elephants, under Hephaistion on the left bank. Both

men were charged to advance as quickly as possible and halt three days downstream to await the fleet.¹⁰ Satrap Philip of the Indian satrapy was to join them there.

Before the army moved out, it celebrated yet another funeral: the hipparch and strategos Koinos had died of illness. The tradition hints that the king had not forgotten events on the banks of the Hyphasis: Koinos was interred “as gloriously as circumstances permitted.”¹¹

On the day of departure, the troops began embarking at daybreak. Hephaistion and Krateros had drawn up their phalanges, cavalry, and elephants in brilliant battle lines on the two sides of the river. While the squadrons took up position on the water one after another, the king sacrificed on the riverbank in Hellenic fashion, making offerings to Poseidon, Amphitrite the Helpful, Okeanos, the Nereids, and the river Hydaspes, at the direction of his priest. He embarked, moved to the bow, poured a libation from a golden chalice, and ordered the trumpeter to signal departure. To the sound of the trumpet and the battle cry, all oars dipped simultaneously into the river, and the convoy fell in behind the eighty battleships and glided downstream under bright sails.

Incomparable, the plash of the oars rising and falling simultaneously on all ships, the shouted commands of the coxswains regulating the oarsmen, the *alalai* of the rowers as they lowered their oars. Their calls reverberated against the high riverbanks and echoed from the two sides of the gorges. Then forests closed in on the river again, their depths resounding with the call of the sailors. Indians in the thousands gathered on the riverbanks, astonished to see a water-borne army and its war horses standing at the railings of ships under sails of many colors, moving in squadrons of unchanging order. They answered the calls of the rowers with cheers and sang as they moved downstream with the fleet. For no people loves song and dance more than the Indians.¹²

On the fourth day, the king arrived at the spot where Krateros and Hephaistion had been ordered to await the fleet.¹³ He found them encamped on the two sides of the river. The army and the fleet rested here for two days as they waited for Satrap Philip to arrive with the rear guard of the grand army. When the entire Macedonian military force had assembled—now 120,000 combat troops—¹⁴ the king ordered the movements that would take it into enemy territory on a campaign to subject all the land to the mouth of the Akesines. Philip was detached left to the Akesines to secure its west bank. Hephaistion and Krateros

proceeded inland, right and left from the Hydaspes. The entire military force was to reunite beyond the confluence of the two rivers and launch the campaign against the Malloi and the Oxydrakans from that point. Reports of significant preparations by these great warrior tribes had come in. They were said to have moved their women and children into strongholds and to be gathering on the banks of the Hydraotes, by the thousands and under arms. The king wanted to move quickly and open hostilities before these preparations could be completed. The fleet continued downstream; wherever it put in, the riparian tribes submitted freely or were compelled with little trouble.

Alexander hoped to reach the confluence of Hydaspes and Akesines on the fifth day. He had heard that this passage was difficult to navigate, that the two rivers came together in surging currents and many whirlpools, and that the enlarged stream then entered a narrow bed and rushed on as rapids.¹⁵ The crews were informed and cautioned. Toward the end of the fifth day, they all heard a great roar to the south, like surf when the sea is high. Astonished, the rowers of the lead squadrons paused, uncertain whether they were about to run into the ocean or into a tempest. They were cautioned again and told to exert themselves in the confluence, and they resumed rowing. The roar grew louder; the distance between the riverbanks narrowed; they caught sight of the confluence, saw that the Hydaspes plunges into the Akesines at right angles, so that the two currents surge and seethe and battle one another in a whirling, thundering rage, then combine and plunge on between narrow banks. Again the helmsmen cautioned their crews to row hard against the pull of the whirlpools and move quickly through the narrows. The ships shot forward on the current, hardly kept on course by tiller and oars. Many were swamped, swept into the whirlpools, spun about, their hulls damaged. The longships in particular were threatened, two were driven together and wrecked, smaller vessels were driven aground. The broad transports fared better: they resisted the eddies and rode the current forward. Alexander's ship is said to have been swept into a whirlpool and so endangered that the king was at the point of stripping to swim to safety.¹⁶ A full hour farther downstream, the rapids at last began to open and the stream became more tranquil.

Here the river bends to the right around a hilly bank, behind which the Macedonians could put in safely in the lee of the current. From the projecting point they could also catch the corpses and flotsam carried down from the rapids above. The king ordered Nearchos to make rapid

repairs and then went inland on an excursion that would keep the local tribes, the Sibans and Agalassans, from coming to the aid of the Malloi and Oxydrakans on the other side of the Akesines in the coming Macedonian attack.¹⁷ Intending to intimidate, he laid waste the land on a six-mile approach to the Siban capital, a fair sized town that he took by storm with little trouble. According to another report, the town surrendered.¹⁸ On his return to the Akesines, he found the fleet ready to sail. Krateros was in camp; Hephaistion and Philip had arrived at a designated spot above the confluence.

Alexander made troop dispositions for the campaign against the Malloi, whose territory began about seven miles downstream, at the confluence of Akesines and Hydraotes, and extended northward along the Hydraotes. He knew that they were armed and prepared for attack. They would expect the Macedonian army to move down to the mouth of the Hydraotes and enter their territory from that point, because a waterless waste several miles wide separated it from the Akesines and seemed to make it unattainable from the spot where the fleet lay at anchor. The king decided on a surprise attack precisely from this angle, where the Macedonians were least expected, into the enemy's uplands, not far from the frontiers of the Gandarites and the Kathaioi. He would then drive the Malloi downstream along the Hydraotes. At the mouth of the river, where they would expect to find refuge or support on the other side of the Akesines, they would again fall into the hands of the Macedonians.

For this purpose, Nearchos took the fleet downstream to invest the right bank of the Akesines opposite the mouth of the Hydraotes and cut it off from contact with Mallian territory. Krateros was to bring his troops, the elephants, and the phalanx Polyperchon, which had been with Hephaistion, and Philip's troops, who had crossed the Hydaspes just above its mouth, to Nearchos's anchorage three days later. This important force would build a basis on the right bank for the bold operations on the left. When Nearchos had sailed and Krateros had moved out, Alexander divided the rest of the army into three corps: he would take one inland to the surprise attack and drive the Malloi downstream; Hephaistion would move out five days before Alexander with the second and invest the line of the Hydraotes to intercept all fugitives; finally, Lagid Ptolemy would take the third out three days after Alexander to block those fleeing back to the Akesines.

It is said that the Malloi and the Oxydrakans, for their part, had set aside their feuding at news of Alexander's approach and given hostages

to guarantee mutual aid. They had assembled a very significant army: more than 60,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 700 war chariots. But in attempting to choose a leader for this force (for they were *arattas*, Indians without princes), they had quarreled so bitterly that the fighting force disbanded and the contingents dispersed into their respective fortified cities. This notice, although not guaranteed by authority, finds some corroboration in Alexander's particular plan of operation.¹⁹ Other reports say that the Malloi and Oxydrakans intended to form an alliance, which would have created an important force to oppose the Macedonians, and that Alexander moved quickly to attack before that intention could be realized.²⁰

Alexander moved out on the designated day, about mid-November, taking with him the shieldbearers, the archers and the Agrianians, the phalanx Peithon, half the Macedonian hipparchies, and the horse archers. They entered the desert not far from the Akesines; five hours later they reached a stream, where they stopped, took the midday meal, and provisioned themselves with water. They marched on for the rest of the day and through the night, moving with all possible speed. On the second morning, after a march of nearly eight miles, they saw Agalassa with its citadel standing to the east.²¹ Many Malloi had retreated there. They lay encamped, without pickets and without arms, before the city walls, which could not contain them. So persuaded were they of the impossibility of an attack through the desert that they took the army they saw approaching for anything but Macedonians. Then Alexander's horsemen stood in their midst and resistance was out of the question. Thousands perished on the spot; any who could do so fled into the city, which Alexander cordoned off with his cavalry until the infantry could arrive. The storm began. The Indians, who had taken many casualties in the first attack, soon abandoned the walls. As they fell back toward the citadel, they were cut down by pursuing Macedonians. The few thousand who reached the citadel defended themselves with a courage born of despair, repulsing more than one Macedonian attack. Goaded by their king and inspired by his example, the Macedonians ultimately prevailed and made good the effort the Indians had cost them by butchering the entire two thousand who had held the fortress.

When the infantry had arrived to begin the storm, the king had detached Perdikkas with two hipparchies and the Agrianians and sent him at speed to a nearby town where many Indians had fled,²² with instructions to keep the town under close observation but make no move

until the army could arrive from Agalassa. That precaution was intended to keep fugitives from escaping and carrying news of Alexander's arrival farther inland. Perdikkas found the town deserted and went in pursuit, striking down the tribesmen who had not managed to cross the river or conceal themselves in the marshes near the bank.

After storming the citadel of Agalassa, the king rested his army a few hours. He left a small garrison on the citadel and moved out at nightfall toward the Hydraotes to cut off the retreat of Malloi in the surrounding area. When he reached the ford toward morning, he saw that most of the enemy had already crossed; those who had not he killed. Then he crossed, overtook the rest, and destroyed them, too. Survivors surrendered or fled into a nearby stronghold. When the infantry came up, the king sent Peithon with his phalanx and two cavalry squadrons against the stronghold, which fell on the first assault. Peithon took the surviving Malloi prisoner and returned to the king.

Alexander meanwhile had advanced on a Brahman city where many Malloi had retreated, condoned off the walls, and begun to undermine them. Much reduced by Macedonian missiles, the Indians had retreated into the citadel. A band of Macedonians had penetrated too far forward for prudence and entered the citadel with the retreating Indians. As good as cut off, they took important losses fighting their way back out. Alexander proceeded to storm the citadel and was the first over the rubble when a tower and the adjacent wall fell in breach. The Macedonians swept the walls of defenders, and the surviving enemy took cover in the buildings, fired them, and hurled spears and timbers at the Macedonians, until they themselves perished in the smoke and flames. About 5000 died in the storm and the fire; only a few were taken alive.

Alexander's troops were exhausted by the immense exertions of the last five days, and he let them rest for a day. Refreshed, they marched out against the other towns of the Malloi south of the Hydraotes. Everywhere they went, they found the towns abandoned; searching out the fugitives seemed unnecessary; it was enough to destroy their towns. After several days of similar operations, Alexander again rested the army. To protect the rear of his future operations, he sent the phalanx Peithon, the hipparchy Demetrios, and the necessary light infantry back to the Hydraotes to search out any Indians living upstream along the river and destroy those who did not surrender, so that the woods and marshes there would not become a refuge for routed Malloi and a staging area for a dangerous diversion.

He then took his rested army against the largest town on the near bank, where, he had heard, many Malloi had fled. He expected to meet stubborn resistance, but Macedonian methods had spread such terror that the Indians had abandoned their city, retreated across the nearby river, and invested its high north bank, intending to block a Macedonian crossing. Hearing these things, Alexander took his entire cavalry rapidly forward; the infantry was to follow without delay. He arrived at the river and immediately set about crossing, unconcerned by the enemy line arrayed on the far bank. Startled, the Indians opposite withdrew in closed ranks. But when they saw that they were falling back before no more than 4000 or 5000 cavalry, the entire Indian line, probably 50,000 men, turned and tried to push Alexander and his cavalry column back from the bank that they had just invested. By artful movements that evaded all close combat, the Macedonian riders managed to hold their difficult position until the light infantry and archers came up and the heavy infantry could be seen approaching. At that point, Alexander began to advance. The Indians did not wait for the attack; they fled instead to a heavily fortified city nearby.²³ The Macedonians pursued hotly, killed many in flight, and did not stop until they arrived under the city walls.

The king promptly cordoned off the city with the cavalry. But the infantry did not arrive until evening and all were exhausted—the cavalry from its crossing and hot pursuit, the infantry from long marching—and nothing more could be attempted on that day. They pitched camp all around the city and began the storm at first light. The king took half the army and Perdikkas the other half against the walls from all sides. Unable to hold the walls, the Indians retreated into the strongly fortified citadel. Alexander battered down a gate on his side and led his men into the city and through the streets to the citadel, meeting no resistance. Its strong walls and towers were well manned, making storm preparations dangerous. Nonetheless, the Macedonians began undermining the walls; an attempt to lay storm ladders called down on them such a hail of arrows that even the bravest men hesitated. Alexander seized a ladder and scrambled up, shield in his left hand, sword in his right, followed by Peukestas and Leonnatos; veteran captain Abreas went up another ladder.

The king reaches the battlement, holding his shield before him, attacking and fending off, pushing one defender from the wall, impaling another. He has cleared the space before him and hoists himself up onto the battlement; Peukestas, Leonnatos, and Abreas mount the battlement after him. With a shout, the shieldbearers press after them—and the

ladders break. The king is cut off. The Indians know him by his bright armor and his aigrette; they dare not approach, but arrows, spears, and stones rain down from the towers and fly up from the citadel below. His men call to him to jump back down to safety. With a glance, he measures the interior height of the wall and leaps. He stands alone inside the enemy compound. His back against the wall, he waits to be attacked. Now the Indians dare approach. Their captain advances on him, and Alexander runs him through; he stops others with stones; yet others he cuts down. The Indians fall back, hurling arrows, spears, stones, whatever they can lay hand on. Then Alexander's shield arm tires. Abreas, fighting at his side with Peukestas and Leonnatos, takes an arrow in the face and falls. And then an arrow finds the king and passes through his cuirass. Blood spurts from his breast, mixed with air. Alexander notices nothing, battles on, until he weakens from loss of blood, loses consciousness, and collapses on his shield. Peukestas, the king's shield carrier, stations himself over the prostrate king and covers him with the shield of Ilion; Leonnatos screens him from the other side. They can hardly maintain themselves under a hail of arrows, and the king is bleeding to death.

On the other side of the wall, the Macedonians are in uproar. They saw their king leap down to the citadel; he will not be able to save himself, and they cannot follow him. They rush to bring up storm ladders, siege engines, tree trunks, and only get in one another's way. Then they drive pegs into the wall and clamber up; others stand on the shoulders of their comrades to reach the battlements. Looking down, they see the king lying on the ground surrounded by enemy. Peukestas falls. Shrieking with rage and grief, they leap down, surround the wounded king, advance behind a wall of shields, pushing the enemy back. Others rip the gates off their hinges, admitting the rest of the army. The Macedonians slay women and children, all whom they meet. They bring the king out, carrying him on his shield. The arrow is still in place, and the wound must be lengthened to withdraw it. Alexander passes in and out of consciousness, seems to hover between life and death. Weeping companions surround his sickbed; weeping troops surround his tent. The evening passes and the night.²⁴

Rumors that Alexander had been wounded in battle and had died of his wounds reached the Macedonian camp at the mouth of the Hydraotes and threw it into consternation. When the first paroxysm of fright and grief had passed, the men began to ask themselves what would happen now. Who would lead the army? How would they reach home again over

endless territory, dreadful rivers, barren mountains and wastes? How would they defend themselves against warrior tribes emboldened by Alexander's passing to fight for independence and revenge? When news reached them that Alexander was still alive, they refused to believe it. Then came a letter from the king himself saying that he would soon return to camp. It was forgery, they said, concocted by Alexander's bodyguard and his generals to reassure them.

Alexander had indeed escaped death, and after a week his wound, while still open, was no longer dangerous. Reports from the camp and misgivings about growing disorder if the army believed him dead induced him to start back right away. He was carried down to the Hydraotes and on board a small ship, where he lay under a canopy. The ship floated downstream on the current, without oars, to avoid any shock to the wounded king. On the fourth day, it came within sight of the camp. Tense with expectation and tormented by doubt, the troops gathered on the riverbank. Alexander had the canopy rolled back so that all could see him. They still thought that the ship was bringing their dead king back to them. As it approached the bank, Alexander raised his arm in greeting. A cry rose from the thousands lining the shore; they extended their hands toward heaven, toward the king, wept and cheered. The ship put in to shore, and shieldbearers brought a litter to carry the king to his tent. Alexander ordered them to bring a horse, and when the troops saw him mounted and upright, they clapped and beat their shields until the forest rang. Before the tent that had been prepared for him, Alexander dismounted so that they could see him walk. The troops pressed in from all sides to touch his hands, his knees, his garment, or just to gaze upon him at close range, to call to him, to shower him with flowers and streamers.

Nearchos notes an incident, probably on this occasion. Some of the king's friends reproached him for exposing himself so; that, they said, was for common soldiers, not for a field commander. An old Boeotian who had heard these things and seen the king's annoyance came up and said in his rough accent: "A real man is a man of action, Alexandros; but the man who acts must suffer." The king nodded and remembered the Boeotian later.

The quick conquest of the capital of the Malloi had made a deep impression on all the tribes of the region. The Malloi themselves offered no further resistance, even though great stretches of their territory had never been entered. A deeply respectful embassy came to surrender both the land and the people to the king. The Oxydrakans or Sudrakans,

famous, like the Malloi, as the bravest tribe of India and capable of fielding an important fighting force, thought it prudent to submit. A huge embassy composed of town commanders, land barons, and 150 local notables came bearing costly gifts and authorized to consent to anything the king might demand. They excused their delay in presenting themselves by pleading that they loved their independence more than any other tribe and had enjoyed it since time out of mind—since the progress of the god whom the Greeks called Dionysos. They were pleased, however, to submit to Alexander, a descendant of the gods, as his exploits proved, and would be happy to receive a satrap of his choosing, to pay tribute, and to give as many hostages as the king required. Alexander demanded one thousand of the noblest of the land, who, at his discretion, should follow him as hostages or join his war until all the rest of India had been subjected. The Oxydrakans delivered the one thousand noblemen and added, gratis, five hundred war chariots, each bearing two fighting men and a charioteer. Alexander graciously released the thousand hostages and added the chariots to his army. The area of the Oxydrakans and the Malloi became part of the satrapy of India under Philip. Perdikkas, on his excursion, had had to force only the Abasthanas (Ambastha) into submission. All other tribes, far and wide, sent embassies with costly gifts: fine textiles, precious stones and pearls, glistening snakeskins, tortoise shells, and tame lions and tigers.

When Alexander had recovered fully, he thanked the gods with sacrifices and contests and prepared to break camp. Many new ships had been built during this pause; a large number of new thirty-oared galleys and transport ships that the king had ordered built in the land of the Xathras also came down the river; thus many more troops could accompany the king downstream. With him were 10,000 infantry, the lightly armed archers and Agrianians, and 1700 Macedonian cavalry. The king sailed down the Hydraotes into the Akesines, through the Oxydrakans' friendly territory, past the mouth of the Hyphasis²⁵ to the confluence of the mighty Punjab—the united five eastern rivers—and the Indus.²⁶ That confluence lies at the natural midpoint of trade between the interior and the Indus delta, and here Alexander founded a Hellenic city, important for control of the country and for trade along the Indus. This city was to become the southernmost point of the Indian satrapy, and the satrap Philip remained here with an impressive force: all the Thracians and a corresponding number of heavy troops from the phalanges. He was to secure

trade relations in the region, build a large harbor on the Indus, erect dockyards and warehouses, and see to the prosperity of this Alexandria.²⁷

It may have been February 325 when the Macedonian army left Alexandria for the lower Indus. The greater part of the army, with the elephants, had been put under Krateros and ferried to the eastern riverbank, where the roads were better and the local tribes not all predisposed to submit. The king sailed downstream with the remaining units, named previously. Army and fleet came unmolested into the land of the Çudra, whom the Hellenes called Sogdoi or Sodroi, and stopped near their capital, which became a Hellenic colony under the name Sogdian Alexandria. The spot was strongly fortified, outfitted with harbor and dockyards, and made the seat of the satrapy of the lower Indus, which was to extend from the mouth of the Punjab to the sea. Peithon was made satrap and given a force of 10,000 men.²⁸

The site chosen for Sogdian Alexandria stands at a critical point on the lower Indus: here the character of the river, the landscape, and the population begins to change. The Salaiman chains, which accompany the Indus from north to south, turn here almost ninety degrees and run westward toward the Bolan passes. The desert that borders the Indus on the east retreats. The river spreads right and left into arms and backwaters, creating many islands and shoals. Fertile, densely populated lowland spreads back from the riverbanks. Then the proximity of the ocean becomes sensible. Equally notable, uniform flat country stretches endlessly to the east, whereas a little farther south and on the west a mighty mountain rampart rises, enclosing the plain, and continues down to Cape Monze. The Indus in its present course makes a broad bow toward the foot of these mountains, then turns eastward again to reach Hyderabad, where the delta begins. In ancient times, the Indus coursed straight down the string of this bow from Sukkur southward to Hyderabad, flowing along chalky hills near Sukkur, where it has now broken through to run westward. To this day, the ruins of Alor, ancient capital of the Sindh, lie on these hills.

The Sindh is like a garden: Vineyards climb the hillsides; the frankincense of arid Arabia, flowering plants of the humid tropics, and the maize of damp river bottoms all flourish here together. Countless towns and hamlets grace the land; the river and the canals are thronged with traffic; and the tribes, dark-skinned people of the south, ruled by princes, differ greatly from the peoples of the upper Indus. The Brahman caste enjoys

high rank and exercises a decisive influence on public life; acts of the princes are determined as much by religious notions as by the usual suspicion and endless rivalry—a characteristic that has endured through the centuries, constant through changes of rule, religion, and of nature itself.

When Alexander entered the region, these peculiarities of the land and of the people promptly made themselves felt. The subjection of the Malloi had ended all resistance by the nearest tribes, and the army had proceeded in triumph until it reached the land of the Sogdians. There the king waited in vain for voluntary submission: neither princes came nor their embassies. They may have been urged by their proud Brahmans to brave the mighty stranger, or they may have been relying on their own strength. Only Prince Sambos submitted freely.²⁹ He was a vassal prince of the more powerful Musikanos and may have preferred to make himself vassal of a foreign master. Alexander confirmed him as satrap in his mountain country or, perhaps more accurately, confirmed his rule on the same terms as those imposed on the tributary princes in the satrapy of upper India.³⁰

Musikanos and the other princes of the land seemed inclined to assert their independence, and the king was obliged to resort to arms once more. From Sogdian Alexandria he sailed swiftly down into the arm of the river that extends toward the mountains and the seat of Musikanos and reached the frontier before that prince even suspected an attack. Unnerved to find his enemy on his doorstep, Musikanos undertook to obliterate his arrogant defiance by an act of abject submission: He came to meet the king in person, bringing many costly gifts, for example, all his elephants. In throwing himself and his land on the king's mercy, he admitted that he had committed a grave error—the surest way into Alexander's good graces. He obtained a pardon, and Alexander let him continue to preside over his land, albeit under Macedonian suzerainty. Alexander greatly appreciated the natural abundance of this countryside; he ordered Krateros to erect a citadel in the prince's seat, which was well situated to control the entire area, and secured it by laying a Macedonian garrison.³¹

Next, the king took the archers, Agrianians, and half the hipparchies against the Praistans and their prince Oxykanos or, as others call him, Portikanos.³² Little inclined toward submission, Oxykanos, with an important fighting force, had gone to ground behind the locked gates of his capital. On his advance, Alexander took another important city of

the principality; on arriving before the capital, he promptly laid siege—so successfully that on the third day Oxykanos withdrew into the citadel and offered negotiations. Too late: the citadel wall had already fallen in breach; the Macedonians entered, prevailed, and slew Oxykanos. After the fall of the capital and the death of the prince, the many other towns of this rich land were easily subjected. Alexander opened the towns to plunder, hoping to make an example of the Praistans and induce other tribes to submit freely.

Then trouble arrived from an unexpected quarter. Prince Sambos saw with misgiving that Musikanos, whom he had deserted to submit to Alexander, had not merely gone unpunished, but positively enjoyed the king's high favor, and he began to fear his retribution. The Brahmans at his court, prompted by loathing of the foreign conqueror, fanned these fears to the point that Sambos foolishly fled across the Indus into the desert, leaving his land in uproar. Alexander came; Sindomana,³³ the capital, opened its gates and submitted, the more confidently since it had had no part in the prince's flight. Alexander received the fugitive prince's elephants and treasure; other towns followed the example of the capital. One alone dared resist, where the Brahmans had found refuge. It was taken and the Brahmans executed.³⁴

During Alexander's absence, the Brahmans around Musikanos, undeterred by the fate of those around Sambos, had stirred up the prince and his people, who proceeded into open rebellion and murdered the Macedonian garrison. Insurrection now burned brightly on both sides of the Indus; had it been well led, the king might have found himself in some difficulty. But Musikanos fled across the Indus as the Macedonians approached, pursued, at Alexander's order, by Peithon, and Alexander moved against the other cities, which, isolated and incompetently led, soon lost hope and surrendered.³⁵ Alexander punished them sternly: Countless Indians were slaughtered, both in combat and after conquest; survivors were sold into slavery, towns razed, the few left standing garrisoned in a ruined landscape. Musikanos was captured and condemned, along with many Brahmans; they were all hanged at the crossroads of the land they had blighted.

The king returned to his fleet and the camp.³⁶ His harsh suppression and punishment of these risings seemed finally to have achieved the intended result. Prince Moeris of Pattala,³⁷ who ruled the entire Indus delta, came to Alexandria to surrender and retained his territory on the same terms as had Prince Musikanos and other princes whose realms lay

within Macedonian satrapies. Alexander questioned Moeris about the delta, which begins at Pattala, about the mouths of the river, and the ocean into which it flows, and sent him home with orders to prepare to receive the army and the fleet.

Moeris was the last independent prince of the Indus, and his surrender marked the end of the military operations of Alexander's campaign. No important general encounter was now to be expected in Indus country, and no full army was needed to meet isolated resistance and easily suppressed disorder. Similarly, no full army was needed to execute the king's plan to find a sea route from India to Persia or to march through the still unsubdued coastal territories between these two lands. Finally, provisioning a full army had been easy in India's opulent countrysides, whereas the route west along the coast was barren and supplies would be problematical.

Reports coming in from the northeastern regions of the empire, moreover, indicated that a Macedonian force of some size would have to be dispatched in that direction. The Baktrian prince Oxyartes, coming to join the army, reported that the Hellenic military colonies in Baktra had risen. A not very credible source relates that quarrels among old soldiers had led to bloodshed. Fearing punishment, the veterans had captured the citadel and called on the barbarians to declare their independence. Athenodoros, their ringleader, had promised to lead them home again, and they had made him their king. A certain Biton, jealous of Athenodoros's kingship, intrigued against him, murdered him at a banquet given by Boxos, a distinguished barbarian, and attempted next day to justify himself before the assembled army. The captains, having saved him from that raging mob, then combined against him and laid him on the rack. The soldiers broke in, freed him, and, three thousand strong, set out for home under his command.³⁸ The troops of the satrapy had probably gotten control of this pack, but one ought in prudence to provide for all eventualities. In the satrapy of the Paropamisos, too, trouble had broken out: Tyriespis had so oppressed and abused the people that they complained to Alexander.³⁹ Tyriespis was removed, and in his stead Prince Oxyartes came to Alexandria. In interior Ariana, matters were still worse: the Persian Ordanes had declared his independence and usurped rule over the Ariaspans on the lower Etymandros.⁴⁰ An important Macedonian force was urgently needed here to meet the threat before it became serious.

Approximately one-third of the infantry stood ready to march up into Arachosia under Krateros: the phalanges of Attalos, Antigenes,⁴¹ and Meleagros, part of the archers, all the elephants, and the invalided companions, mounted and on foot, who were to return home. Krateros was charged to take this army through Arachosia and Drangiana into Karmania⁴² and suppress the rebellions in these regions, and to have the satraps there ship provisions down to the coast of Gedrosia, where Alexander expected to pass on his march.⁴³

Krateros moved out; the king sailed downstream with the fleet; and Peithon took the horse archers and the Agrianians across to the left bank of the Indus to settle the new towns there with local tribesmen,⁴⁴ suppress the last stirrings of rebellion in the devastated countryside, and meet the main army again in Pattala. Hephaistion led all other units down the right bank to Pattala.

On the third day out, Alexander learned that the prince of Pattala, far from preparing to receive the army, had fled into the desert with most of his people, possibly out of fear of Alexander, probably at the behest of his Brahmins. Alexander, hurrying forward, found all the settlements abandoned and Pattala, which he reached at the end of July, empty both of people and of movable goods.⁴⁵ He sent some of his light troops in pursuit of fugitives, whom they brought before the king. Alexander, to their surprise, required only that they go out and tell other members of the tribe to return to their settlements and their accustomed lives, which they would be permitted to pursue in safety, according to their own law and custom. Most of the tribesmen came back, and Alexander could now turn to the great plan for whose execution he needed to control the mouths of the Indus.

He suspected or learned that the same sea into which the Indus flows forms the Persian Gulf and that a sea route could thus be found from the mouths of the Indus to the mouth of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The longevity to his empire, which brought the remotest peoples into immediate contact with one another for the first time, should not depend on armed force alone; it should also spring from the self-interest of these peoples. The empire, therefore, would have to be attentive to promoting trade relations, to founding an association of all regions of the realm, however removed from one another, and to the effects of comprehensive trade among regions and peoples, such as had never existed before. These considerations had always been before him. The cities founded for military

control of Iran and Turan were to function also as caravan stations; the fortified cities set up in India secured the highway down from Ariana through the Punjab and shipping on the Indus and its tributaries. Egyptian Alexandria, four or five years after its founding, had become a center of trade on the seas of the homeland. This great system of international trade would now be completed by investing the Indus delta, erecting a favorably situated maritime trading post, and opening trade routes already sketched by a series of Hellenic cities reaching up into the interior and incipient in the sea connection he hoped to establish between Indus and Euphrates.

Pattala, at the apex of the Indus delta, was a natural entrepôt between the interior and the ocean. It also dominated the lower Indus country militarily. Hephaestion therefore was charged to fortify the citadel with care and build dockyards and an expansive harbor. The king sent a number of divisions into the barren, treeless regions that began just to the east of the city to dig wells and make the land habitable, thus facilitating connections to Pattala also from that side and opening them to caravans from the Ganges country and the Deccan. An ambush by desert tribes hardly disturbed their work.

After a rest, during which fortification of the citadel was nearly completed and construction of dockyards well advanced, the king went in person to explore the mouths of the Indus and discover how navigable they were and how suited to trade. On that same voyage, he would venture out onto the ocean, where no Greek had ever sailed. He started down the principal arm of the river, on the right, while Leonnatos took 1000 riders and 9000 hoplites and light troops down the inner bank. Alexander sailed with his swiftest ships, the half-triremes, the thirty-rowers, and a few kerkurs,⁴⁶ traveling without pilots, for the citizens of Pattala and Indians in general knew nothing of ocean navigation and in any case the riparian tribesmen had fled at Alexander's approach. He relied on the courage and skills of his seamen; he did not anticipate how the sea would yet test their mettle.

It was mid-summer. The river was at its height and some of the low places along the bank lay under water, making the voyage more difficult. The first day passed uneventfully. On the second day, perhaps ten miles below Pattala, a strong wind rose in the south and, driving against the current, raised a surf that broke over the bows, damaging some ships, swamping others. The crews hastily put in to shore for repairs. The king sent out light troops to bring back fugitives who could serve as pilots.

Next day they all set out again, now with native fishermen as pilots. The great river broadened between low empty banks, and the men could feel the cooler sea breeze. The seas became heavier, rowing more difficult; the wind freshened. The current, driven back, seemed to be rising, and the ships turned into a canal indicated by a fisherman. The waters rose more rapidly yet; the Macedonians could hardly beach their craft fast enough; and hardly had they beached their ships than the waters fell again, leaving the ships stranded, some sunk in mud. They were baffled. A few hours later, when they tried to refloat their ships and find their way back to the channel, the drama began all over again: the waters rose, flooded the mud flats, raised the stranded ships, lapped against the higher banks, capsized the beached ships, wrecked some, sank others. Thus did Alexander make the acquaintance of the tides, ten miles from the sea, on a river in flood, two miles wide, and the more turbulent for the collision of two swift columns of water, fresh and salt.⁴⁷

Armed now with knowledge of the ebb and flow in the Indus delta, Alexander sent two vessels downstream to the island Skilluta, which, his fisherman pilots told him, lay near the ocean and offered good landing.⁴⁸ The crews confirmed on their return that the shoreline was accommodating, the island quite large, and potable water plentiful. Alexander took the entire fleet to Skilluta, where most of the ships put in to shore. From here the crews could see the foaming surf at the mouth of the Indus and the far horizon of the ocean beyond. They could hardly make out the low-lying, treeless riverbank two miles away to the west. Alexander sailed on with his best ships to pass through the actual mouth of the Indus and test whether it was navigable. The far right bank soon vanished altogether, replaced by a surging ocean that stretched endlessly westward. Four miles farther on and toward the east, they reached a second island, its beaches flat and empty and surrounded by ocean. At evening the ships returned with the tide to the island where the fleet had landed. Alexander celebrated this first glimpse of Ocean and of the last landmass to the south of the inhabited world with a solemn sacrifice to Ammon, as the oracle had commanded.

Next morning, the king sailed out again and landed on the island in the sea. Here he sacrificed again, as Ammon had directed. Then he sailed onto the high seas, and when the coastlines had vanished in all directions and one saw only sea and sky, he sacrificed bulls to Poseidon and cast them into the deep, and poured libations from a golden chalice, which he also cast into the sea. He dedicated new libations to the Nereids, the

Dioskouroi Saviors of Sailors, and to Silver-footed Thetis, mother of his ancestor Achilles, praying that she would take his squadrons under her protection and bring them safely westward to the mouth of the Euphrates. And he cast the wine cup into the sea.

Alexander returned to the fleet and with the fleet upriver to Pattala. He found the citadel finished and a harbor begun. Peithon had arrived with his army, having pacified the flatlands and populated the new towns.

Having discovered the many difficulties for shipping that the monsoon winds and high waters of the season conspired to create on the right arm of the mouth of the Indus, Alexander now sailed down the left. Some distance southeastward, the water broadened into a great sea, fed also by larger and smaller streams flowing in from the east to form what amounted to a gulf, where the crews sighted ocean fishes. Directed by native pilots, they put in to shore. The king left most of his troops and all kerkurs here under Leonnatos and continued with the half-triremes and thirty-rowers through the sea down to the mouth of the river. He reached the ocean without encountering the strong surf and high tides that had made the broader western arm of the river perilous. At the mouth of the river, he put in to shore and went with some of his companions three days' journey at water's edge, partly to explore the ecology of the coast, partly to dig wells for sailors. He returned to his ships and with them to Pattala, while part of the army returned along the bank to dig wells in an arid region. From Pattala he returned to the wide place in the river to make arrangements for the construction of a harbor and dockyards and left a small garrison to protect them.⁴⁹ Thus everything was arranged in keeping with the king's great scheme.

One thing was lacking, the most difficult and most dangerous: discovery of the actual sea route that would connect the Indus to the Euphrates. If one considers the state of contemporary arts of navigation and contemporary geography, one sees the boldness of this scheme. The art of ship-building was imperfect and poorly adapted to maritime navigation. Sailors steered by the stars and the coastlines, and sailing close to shore created its own hazards. Hellenic imagination peopled the ocean with marvels and monsters, and the Macedonians, steadfast and brave when they could look their enemy in the eye, had no weapons against the uncanny and were less than fearless. Who was to lead this expedition? The king, whose daring was equal to anything, could not take over the fleet, for trouble brewing in the empire since the days of the Indian campaign required his speedy return. The land route back to Persia led along a dreadful,

barren coast, and he himself would have to lead the land army, which trusted him implicitly. Who, then, should captain the fleet? Who had courage, skill, and dedication enough? Who could allay the superstitions and fears of the men ordered to the fleet and inspire their confidence in themselves, their commanding officer, and the success of their undertaking, to the defeat of a mistaken notion that they were being sacrificed to an obvious danger?


The king took loyal Nearchos into his confidence and asked who he thought should have the fleet. Nearchos mentioned one name after another; the king rejected them all: one man seemed indecisive, another not sufficiently devoted to expose himself to danger for the king's sake; others were unversed in seafaring or in the thinking of the troops, or overcome by homesickness and longing for an easy, quiet life. Nearchos recounts in his memoirs that he finally offered himself: "I, my lord, will take over the fleet and, with the help of the gods, bring ships and men back to Persia safe and sound, provided only that the sea is navigable and the undertaking within human powers." The king protested: One could not expose a man who had served so loyally and so well to new risks. Nearchos insisted, and the king well knew that he was the man best suited to the task. The troops greatly respected their proven captain and knew the king's affection for him. In Nearchos's appointment they would see their safety guaranteed, for the king would not put his friend and one of his best commanders at the head of an expedition about which he had doubts.⁵⁰

Thus Nearchos son of Androtimos, born on Crete and a citizen of Amphipolis, became admiral of the ocean fleet, the best appointment the king could have made. Any fear and discouragement among the troops ordered to the fleet dissipated before the persuasive power of a well-chosen captain, superb equipment, the king's confidence, the glory to be gained from taking part in this boldest and most dangerous of ventures, and of the example of their great king, who had sailed through the surging mouth of the Indus onto the high seas.

Alexander had informed himself about the monsoon winds. In summer they blow from southwest, in winter from northeast. Along the Gedrosian coast, stretching westward, the northeast monsoon becomes a steady east wind. Intermittent in October, as it begins, it becomes constant toward the end of that month and continues into February. To capture this natural advantage, the departure of the fleet was set for the end of October.⁵¹ The land army would have to move out sooner, since the state

of the empire required Alexander's quick return and because the fleet would have to be provisioned from shore and wells would have to be dug to supply water. The king ordered that the fleet remain at Pattala until November, provisioned it for four months, and prepared to move out with the army.

BOOK FOUR



CHAPTER 1

High mountains that run from the Kophen down to the sea border the Indus country on the west. Their last cliffs jut out over the foaming surf; notched by few passes, they form a closed barrier between the Indus delta and Gedrosia's barren coastline, between the Sindh and Ariana's high steppe. To the east are damp tropics, abundant water, luxuriant vegetation, animals of all kinds; the land is densely populated, and these peoples maintain broad social contacts, exchanging goods and gratifying their needs in a civilization as old as the world. Beyond the frontier mountains, whose rocky outcroppings mount in terraces, lies a labyrinth of blank precipices, sheer mountains, and high steppe, the tableland of Kalat in their midst, itself bare and desolate, cold and arid, except in summer, when it is briefly burning hot—truly a “desert of poverty.”¹ Steep crags enclose this wilderness to north and west; at their foot the Areian desert spreads a sea of sand. The air glows red in sandstorms and shifts endlessly as wandering dunes rise and fall, causing the pilgrim to lose his way and the camel to founder. Thus the grim way into the interior.

Grimmer yet and more terrible is the wasteland along the coast and the way over it westward. The traveler from India who climbs the passes of the barrier mountains sees in the landscape below the sea on the left, mountains to the west and north, and, in the depths, a river running to the ocean, the only freely flowing water on this route. Grain fields speckle the foot of the mountains, and villages and hamlets are sprinkled over the plain, the last the traveler will see for months. Treacherous switchback passes lead out of this “plain”² into the barren mountains of Kalat on the north; to the west, the hills of the Oreites come down to the sea. The traveler climbs them, and the terrors of the desert begin. The coast is flat, sandy, hot, without grass or scrub, furrowed by dry streambeds, as good as uninhabitable. Wretched fisher huts, constructed of whale bones and seaweed and separated from one another by miles of strand, stand under isolated clumps of palm trees, sheltering men more wretched than

their wretched land. A day's journey inland, bare cliffs rise, gashed by plummeting streams that swell in the rainy season and rush boiling to the sea, washing out deep gullies that are otherwise dry and lost in brush, mimosa, and tamarisk, a haunt of wolves and jackals and swarming with mosquitoes.

Behind these cliffs, the desert that is Gedrosia sprawls, several days' journey wide, crossed by the occasional nomadic tribe, to the stranger more than dreadful. Wilderness, drought, and absence of springs are the least of the local hazards. The sun pounds down by day, glowing dust inflames the eyes and stifles breath; night brings bone-chilling cold and howling predators searching for quarry. No shelter, no patch of grass, no source of food or drink, no clear track, no journey's end. Queen Semiramis, legend has it, marched from India through this desert home and, of the hundreds of thousands in her army, brought twenty back to Babylon; Cyrus, too, is said to have taken this route and to have met the same fate. Fanatic Islam itself did not venture to take its conquest into this desert: the calif forbade field marshal Abdullah to enter the land, visibly stricken by the wrath of the Prophet.

Alexander chose this route, not to outdo Cyrus and Semiramis, as the ancients would have it, or to mask the losses of the Indian campaign by means of even greater losses, as uncomprehending recent historians have believed. He was obliged to choose it. In the interest of preserving an unbroken occupation, no rulerless territory or unsubdued tribes could be left between the satrapies of the Indus and those of the Persian Sea—a precaution the more necessary because chains of cliffs bordering the desert offered refuge to marauding hordes and rebellious satraps. The fleet that was sailing along the barren coast to open a seaway between India and Persia was an even more important consideration: from time to time, it would have to put in to shore, to which contemporary navigation held it in any case, to take on water and provisions. For the sake of this voyage and its goal, the coast would have to be made accessible, wells dug, supplies left at depots, resistance by natives blocked, and the peoples of the richer districts drawn into the union of the empire. For these reasons, the king chose to return through Gedrosia, whose hazards will not have been unknown to him. He could not sacrifice his great scheme to unavoidable dangers; he would have to assume the costs of an undertaking of which he expected, with reason, extraordinary results. Sibyrtios, satrap of Karmania,³ was probably instructed to bring from the west as much as possible of the things the army most urgently required, and the

Macedonians may have learned by inquiry that adjacent to India lay inhabited and productive valleys; once they had been occupied, they, too, could send provisions to the columns marching along the coast.

Our sources do not permit us to conclude even approximately how many troops Alexander led through Gedrosia. The fleet may have numbered 100 ships, their crews 12,000 rowers and sailors and about 2000 ship's soldiers. The army that Krateros took through Arachosia was probably much larger. A reliable source states that Alexander's total strength in Sogdian Alexandria was 120,000 men. If we estimate that 30,000 were left with the Indian satrap and in the newly founded cities, 30,000 to 40,000 may have accompanied the king. These speculations serve to remind us how much we do not know, how far we are from a notion of this stage of the return full enough to be useful.

Alexander may have left Pattala and Indian territory toward the end of August 325. He soon reached the frontier mountains and crossed by the more northern pass. About the ninth day,⁴ the army came down into the valley of the Arbios, where the Arbites⁵ lived on the east bank and the Oreites on the west up to the mountains. Neither tribe had submitted, so Alexander divided his army to cross their territory and ravage it if necessary. He, Leonnatos, and Ptolemy led marching columns, and Hephaistion followed with the rest of the army. Alexander swung left toward the sea to attack the Oreites, said to be numerous and bellicose, and then to dig wells for the fleet. The Arbites had deserted their villages and fled into the desert, and Alexander reached the Arbios, small and shallow, and crossed it without difficulty.

He marched through the night across the sands beyond and arrived at daybreak at the cultivated fields and villages of the Oreites. The cavalry was ordered to advance in squadrons separated from one another by a certain distance, so that they were spread over greater territory, and the infantry followed in a closed line. In this fashion, Alexander attacked and took one village after another. Natives who resisted and replied to Macedonian spears with poisoned arrows were easily overcome and cut down or captured and sold into slavery; their villages were fired. The Oreites' lower territory was subjected without significant losses; even the arrow wound that threatened the life of Lagid Ptolemy was soon healed.⁶ The king encamped beside a stream and rested his army as they waited for Hephaistion to arrive. The united army then advanced against Rambakia, the Oreites' largest hamlet. Its situation was favorable for trade and for control of the land; Alexander decided to make it the capital of

the Oreite satrapy and ordered Hephaistion to colonize it as Oreite Alexandria.⁷

The king took half the shieldbearers and Agrianians, the escort of the cavalry, and the horse archers toward the mountains that separate the Oreites from the Gedrosians, for warriors from both tribes were said to have posted themselves in numbers in the passes there to stop the Macedonians. The barbarians fled at Alexander's approach, fearing both his attack and his retribution after victory. The Oreite chieftains then came humbly before him to surrender themselves, their people, and all their possessions. Alexander received them more graciously than they had expected and charged them to gather the scattered populations of their villages and assure their people in his name that they would not be disturbed or threatened. He required that they obey Apollophanes, the satrap he installed over their territory and the territories of the Arbites and the Gedrosians, and especially that they comply with the arrangements he would make to supply the Macedonian fleet.⁸ Leonnatos the bodyguard was left in the new satrapy with a significant army—all the Agrianians, part of the archers, a few hundred Macedonian and mercenary Hellenic cavalry, and a corresponding number of heavy troops and Asiatics—to await the arrival of the fleet and prepare to receive it, to complete the colonization of the new city, to respond to any eventual disorder or resistance among the people, and to reconcile the Oreites, independent until now, to their new circumstances. Apollophanes was sent into the Gedrosian interior to collect supplies and animals for slaughter and bring them to the army.

Alexander continued into Gedrosia. The hot, flat coastline broadened and became more desolate; the heat became more oppressive and the route more difficult. The army marched for days over empty sands, where isolated clumps of palm trees afforded the only protection from a sun that stood straight overhead. They came upon myrrh bushes, their unharvested resin fragrant in the heat, which Phoenician merchants in the army's train gathered and loaded on their camels to bring to market in the West as Arabian myrrh.⁹ Near the sea and the streams, blooming tamarisk perfumed the air; spreading roots of spikenard laid a trap for the unwary foot, and dense brambles became gins in which hares flushed by the passing army entangled themselves. The Macedonians passed the night near such places, gathering myrrh and nard leaves for their bedding.

With every passing day, the coast became more desolate and more impassable. The streams trickled down to nothing; vegetation came to

an end; long stretches showed no trace of man or beast. The army began to march through the night and rest during the day. It moved inland to escape the desert and gather supplies for the fleet; details were sent to carry these supplies down to the coast and stack them there, to dig wells, and to check the strand's accessibility to ships. Riders under Thoas's command brought back news of fisher huts built of whale ribs and sea-shells, inhabited by dull-witted tribesmen who lived on dried fish and fishmeal and drank the brackish water of sandpits; the Macedonians called these people *Ichthyophagoi* (fisheaters). They heard of isolated settlements farther inland, which they would have to find, for hunger was becoming a serious problem. They reached them by long, taxing night marches during which order and discipline had begun to unravel. Of the supplies they found, a small portion was allotted to the army, and the rest, protected by the royal seal, was loaded on camels to be carried to the coast. But as soon as Alexander set out again with the lead column, the men detached to guard the transport broke the seals and distributed the goods to their hungry comrades, who thronged about them, shouting. Alexander did not punish this crime. Instead, he gathered new supplies under better security—grain, dates, cattle for slaughter commandeered among the natives—and left reliable men to see to the transport.

The army was now approaching the most dreadful part of the desert. Hunger, wretchedness, and indiscipline all became graver. Stretches of ten and fifteen miles were waterless and deep in sand that the wind heaped up in great dunes into which the men's feet sank over the ankle. In the dark of night marches, order collapsed at a frightening rate; the troops' last strength dwindled to nothing or turned savage, took the form of rapaciousness. They slaughtered their horses, camels, and mules and ate them raw; they unhitched the teams from the wagons of the sick, whom they left to their fate. Anyone who fell behind, exhausted, found no trace of the army next day and even if he caught sight of it, could not catch up: he died in convulsions or more slowly of thirst. It was a stroke of luck to come upon a source of water before daybreak; otherwise the men had to keep going under the glowering sun, over sand that burned their lacerated feet. Animals and men collapsed in the heat, hemorrhaging from their eyes or their mouths, and the columns marched on, broken now and eerily silent. When they finally reached water, the men plunged in headfirst and drank until they drowned. They rested for a day under tents beside a feeble stream; suddenly water came rushing down the stream bed and washed them away: men and weapons, animals

and tents.¹⁰ Alexander himself lost his tent and some of his weapons, and hardly escaped with his life. The horrors accumulated. A high wind shifted the dunes and obliterated landmarks to the point where even the native guides admitted they had lost their bearings. This was the nadir.

Alexander took a few of his best riders and set out to find the sea. They rode south through high dunes, tormented by thirst, deeply exhausted. The horses collapsed; the riders despaired; the king pushed on with five others. When they finally saw the sea, they rode down to the shore and dug in the sand with their swords. Fresh water bubbled up. Alexander rode back to the army and brought the men down to the cooler shore and the fresh springs. The guides recognized landmarks again and led the army seven days along the shore, where they found sufficient water and supplies, and settlements here and there. On the seventh day, they turned inland and crossed lovely landscapes bright with crops to Pura, seat of the Gedrosian satrap.¹¹

Thus the army reached its destination, but in what a state! The march from the Oreite frontier across the desert had taken sixty days,¹² but the suffering and losses on this march were greater than those on all other marches combined. Troop numbers had been reduced by three-quarters;¹³ the men staggered into Pura starving and disfigured, dressed in rags, almost without weapons, their few remaining horses starving too, the entire army dissolute and depressed. They rested there, also to give stragglers a chance to catch up. The satrap of Oreitis and Gedrosia, who had received orders to lay stores at depots in the desert and failed to do so, was dismissed; Thoas succeeded him.¹⁴

Alexander continued into Karmania, where he hoped to meet Krateros with his army and a number of commanders whom he had summoned from the upper provinces. It may have been the beginning of December. Of the fleet and its fate they had had not the first report. After all he had met with in Gedrosia and uncertain now about Nearchos's dangerous mission, Alexander may have been inclined to fear the worst. The coast that had destroyed the greater part of his army was the sole, last refuge of his fleet. Desolate, barren, and without harbors, it may have exposed Nearchos to unpredictable winds and weather more than it protected him from them. One tempest, and the fleet and crews could disappear without a trace; one imprudent course, and they were adrift in an endless ocean.

Then the local hyparch¹⁵ came to tell the king that Nearchos had landed with the fleet at the mouth of the Anamis five days to the south.

Hearing that Alexander was encamped up-country, he had pitched camp behind trench and mound and would arrive shortly. But Nearchos failed to appear, and Alexander's initial joy turned to impatience, then to doubt and anxiety. He dispatched messenger after messenger. Some came back saying they could discover no Macedonians of the fleet and no news of any; others never returned at all. Alexander finally concluded that the hyparch had been spinning tales and toying with his feelings and ordered the man seized and laid in irons. He was more troubled than ever and wan with worry.

The hyparch had spoken truth: Nearchos and his fleet were on the Karmanian coast. He had completed a mission beyond any other in dangers and marvels, and complicated further by converging circumstances. His troubles began on the Indus. As soon as Alexander was over the frontier, the Indians, believing themselves safe and at liberty, started serious unrest, and the fleet was no longer safe on the river.¹⁶ Nearchos had been charged to bring the fleet to the Persian Gulf, not to control the countryside. He therefore prepared for immediate departure, before the steady east winds had set in, and sailed on September 21. He was beyond the delta within a few days, when high winds from the south obliged him to put in to port under the headland that separates India from Arbite country, in a harbor that he named for Alexander. He rested there for twenty-four days, until the wind had shifted. On October 23, he set out again and sailed through manifold hazards—a narrow channel between cliffs, high surf off the bow—past the mouth of the Arbios. After a terrible sea storm that sank three ships on October 30, he landed at Kokala for repairs and rested for ten days. Here Leonnatos had just conquered the local barbarians in a bloody encounter that cost Apollonphanes, satrap of Gedrosia, his life. Nearchos met repeatedly with Leonnatos and then sailed on, well provisioned.

On November 10, the fleet lay before the mouth of the Tomeros, where armed Oreites came down to the shore in packs to block the Macedonians' entry. The Oreites were dispatched in a bold assault, and the crews landed. On November 21, the fleet arrived off the coast of the Fisheaters, and here, like the army, it began to suffer from shortages of water and foodstuffs. In a fishing village behind the foothills of Bageia, the Macedonians found a native called Hydrakes, who offered to pilot the fleet. Now they could make longer stages and risk sailing at night, when the air was cooler. Shortages grew as they sailed past the desolate sands of Gedrosia. Discontent among the seamen was reaching dangerous levels when they finally

caught sight of the cultivated fields, palm groves, and vineyards of the Karmanian coast. They were in friendly territory and approaching the entrance to the Persian Sea.

They landed on the lovely coast of Harmozeia at the mouth of the Anamis, and the crews pitched camp along the river. They knew nothing of the land army, having lost track of it after the Fisheaters.¹⁷ Then a few of Nearchos's men went inland looking for foodstuffs and spotted a man in Hellenic dress in the distance. They hurried after him, and he told them, in response to their questions, that he came from Alexander's camp, which was not far. They brought the Hellene to Nearchos, whom he told that Alexander stood five days inland; he offered to bring Nearchos to the local hyparch. After conferring with the hyparch, Nearchos returned to his men to build a stockade that would protect them in his absence. The hyparch meanwhile hurried off to Alexander, eager to bring the first news of Nearchos and reap the rewards—to his cost.

Nearchos himself recounts the rest of the story. When he had prepared the camp and the fleet, he went inland with Archias of Pella, his second officer, and five or six others. They encountered some of the messengers Alexander had sent out, who did not recognize them, so altered was their appearance: they were shaggy and pale, wasted and ragged, black with ship's tar. They asked directions to Alexander's camp and received them, and each group went its way. But Archias suspected something. "I have the feeling," he said, "that those men were sent out to look for us. Of course they did not recognize us. We didn't look like this in India. Let us tell them who we are and ask where they are going." When Nearchos heard that the messengers had been sent in search of him and the fleet, he said, "I am the man you are looking for. Take us to the king." As they approached the camp, some rushed ahead to announce Nearchos, Archias, and five others. Hearing nothing of the rest of the army or the fleet, the king concluded that these had been lost. When Nearchos arrived, Alexander embraced him in tears and took him aside. "Finding you and Archias again," he said, "makes all the other losses less painful. But tell me, how were my fleet and my army lost?" "My lord," said Nearchos, "both are saved, and we have come to you to tell you so." Alexander wept for joy and swore by Zeus and Ammon that this day meant more to him than possession of all Asia.¹⁸

Krateros had arrived in Karmania, having brought his army and the elephants safely through Arachosia and Drangiana.¹⁹ His men were strong and rested and he had led them up quickly after hearing of the king's

terrible losses. The commanders stationed in Media these five years also came: Kleandros with the veteran mercenaries, Herakon with the mercenary riders, whom Menidas had commanded, Sitalkes with the Thracian infantry, Agathon with the Odrysian riders: 5000 infantry and 1000 cavalry in toto.²⁰ Stasanor, satrap of Areia and Drangiana, and Pharasmanes, son of the Parthyaian satrap Phrataphernes, had arrived, bringing camels, horses, and herds of draft animals originally intended as aid to the army in the desert. These were gratefully received even now and allotted to the various army units in the usual fashion. These events, the mild climate of Karmania, the care and repose that the soldiers enjoyed, and the presence of the king, who had never been more active and more effective, soon effaced the effects of their suffering and restored the army's poise and self-confidence.

In festivals of all kinds the Macedonians thanked the gods for the successful conclusion of the Indian campaign, the homecoming of the army, and the miraculous preservation of the fleet. They sacrificed to Zeus Savior, Apollo Averter of Evil, Earth-shaker Poseidon, and the gods of the sea, and celebrated with processions, choruses, and contests. At the head of a procession, Nearchos, wreathed, rode beside Alexander, also wreathed, and their cheering troops showered them with flowers and streamers.²¹ The nauarch recounted his voyage before the assembled army. The king distinguished him and other captains and many men from the army by gifts, promotion, and other honors. Peukestas, Alexander's shield carrier, who had saved his life in the storm of the Mallian citadel, was made eighth of the conventionally seven bodyguards.

Then the king gave instructions for the continuing march. The fleet was to go on along the coast of the Persian Gulf, turn into the mouth of the Pasitigris, and sail upstream toward Susa. Hephaistion was to take the greater part of the land army, the elephants, and the baggage train down the coast, which, unlike the snowbound mountains, offered mild temperatures, good roads, and plentiful supplies at this time of year, and meet the rest of the army and the fleet on the plain of Susa.²² Alexander would lead the Macedonian cavalry and light troops—the shieldbearers and part of the archers—by the nearest route across the mountains and over Pasargadai and Persepolis to Susa.²³ Thus Alexander returned to lands long subject to him.

It was high time. Serious disorder and dangerous revolution had broken out in more than one place. Only too soon, the immoderation and presumption that had prevailed in the satrapies of the old Persian empire

had reappeared among the Macedonian governors and commanders. Unsupervised during the king's absence and in possession of almost limitless power, many satraps, Macedonian and Persian alike, had pressed the tribes and indulged their own greed and lust; they had not spared even the temples of the gods and the graves of the dead. For the event that Alexander never returned from India, they had hired mercenary packs and taken steps toward seizing their provinces by force if necessary. The wildest plans, the most extravagant wishes, the most excessive hopes were the order of the day. The unending arousal of these years, which seemed to obliterate all things accustomed, conventional, and likely, could find satisfaction only in unrestrained adventure and the transports of boundless gain or loss. How easily the great military gamble that had conquered Asia might go wrong; how easily could the king's extraordinary good fortune vanish with one roll of the dice. Even the fallen Persian empire began to stir with new hope: Among the eastern grandees, more than one attempt had been made to break new ties and found independent principalities or to stir the tribes to mutiny in the name of the old Persian monarchy, risen again. And now, after the king's long absence, amid spreading disorder and usurpation, as increasingly exaggerated rumors of the destruction of the army in the Gedrosian desert were spreading, the unrest in all places and all minds may have reached a pitch that threatened the stability of everything that had been erected. These were the circumstances of Alexander's return to the western provinces with the remnants of his army.

Much was at risk. One show of weakness, one moment of hesitation, and the empire could collapse around its founder. Only fearless decisiveness, ultimate exertions of will and action could save the king and his realm. Patience and forgiveness would have been an admission of impotence and would have robbed the tribes, still deeply loyal to the king, of their last hope. Only the sternest, most unsparing justice could restore the rights of peoples oppressed by overbearing satraps and strategoi and vindicate their faith in the power of their great king. Only swift and radical measures could restore the majesty of the monarchy and make it respected far and wide. Finally, Alexander, whose fortunes passed their zenith when he turned around on the Hyphasis and who had become acquainted with the inconstancy of human affairs as his men died by the thousands in the desert, may have been in the dark mood that makes the angry autocrat truly terrible. He had left the enthusiasm of his early triumphs far behind and with it the joyful confidence of youth and its

boundless hopes. Disappointed too often in his trust, he had learned the uses of suspicion and of harshness and injustice. He may have thought them necessary. He had transformed the world, and that experience had transformed him. Now he would take up the reins of unlimited power with a firm hand: he would proceed to impose swift justice, require new levels of obedience, and exercise stringent control.

As early as Karmania, Alexander had found occasion to punish. There Astaspes, who had submitted in 330 and kept his office, was found guilty of grave offenses, removed, renewed demonstrations of submission notwithstanding, and handed over to his executioner. Sibyrtios was intended as satrap of Karmania, but was sent instead to the Oreites, to replace Thoas, who had been chosen to replace Apollophanes but had fallen sick and died. Tlepolemos son of Pythonax, proven by service in the satrapy of Parthyaia, was called to Karmania.²⁴ In interior Ariana, Krateros on his march had had no difficulty suppressing disorder fomented by the Persian Ordanes and fanned, apparently, by the coinciding death of satrap Menon of Arachosia.²⁵ Brought before the king in chains, Ordanes was consigned to just punishment. The vacant Arachosian satrapy was annexed to the satrapies of Ora and Gedrosia, under Sibyrtios.²⁶

Bad news arrived from India. Taxiles reported that Abisares had died and that Satrap Philip in Hither India had been murdered by his mercenaries. The satrap's Macedonian bodyguards soon suppressed the uproar and executed its authors. Alexander gave the satrapy to the prince of Taxila to administer and to Eudemos, captain of the Thracian troops in India, and instructed them to recognize Abisares's son as the successor in Kashmir.

Herakon, Kleandros, and Sitalkes of Media came to Karmania, as ordered, bringing the greater part of their troops.²⁷ The natives of that province and their own men had accused them of serious misdeeds: plundering the temples, digging up graves, permitting themselves every kind of transgression against their subjects. Only Herakon could mount a persuasive defense and escape punishment; Kleandros and Sitalkes were found guilty, as were, reportedly, six hundred soldiers, and cut down on the spot. This instance of swift justice made a great impression. The king, it was widely recalled, had every reason to spare these men: the captains had executed his secret condemnation of Parmenion, and battle-tested veterans were now in short supply. In this the tribes saw that the king truly was their protector, that he would oppose their being reduced to servitude. And the satraps and commanders saw what awaited them if

they could not approach the throne with a clear conscience. Some of them, aware of their guilt, are said to have tried to gather new treasure and strengthen their mercenary packs, so that they could offer resistance if necessary. A royal decree ordered the satraps to disband any mercenaries not acquired in the king's name.²⁸

The king meanwhile had arrived in Persia. The Persian satrap Phraortes, whom Alexander had appointed, had died while Alexander was in India, and Orxines, one of the noblest of the land, had invoked his high birth and his influence to take over the satrapy.²⁹ He had neglected his duties. The king was furious to find the tomb of Cyrus the Great in the grove of Pasargadai neglected. On his first visit to Pasargadai, Alexander had had the stone housing of the sarcophagus opened and the tomb renewed and decorated; he bade the magi who attended the tomb continue to exercise their sacred office. Now he found the tomb broken open and everything carried off except the sarcophagus and the bier. The lid had been ripped off the sarcophagus, the corpse had been thrown out, and everything of value had been stolen. He ordered Aristoboulos to return the remains to the sarcophagus and to restore everything to its state before the break-in. The stone door was to be set into the coping again and secured by the royal seal. He personally investigated the desecration. The magi who had guarded the tomb were seized and laid on the rack, but they knew nothing and had to be released. Further investigation produced no better result. But the satrap was ultimately answerable for the deed and guilty of negligence.³⁰ More serious offenses soon came to light. In Persepolis, seat of the satrap, where Alexander went next, the natives complained bitterly of contemptible conduct in the service of the satrap's greed: He had plundered the temples, broken open and robbed the tombs of the kings. Orxines was tried, found guilty, and hanged.³¹ Peukestas the bodyguard, son of Alexander, received the satrapy. Everything suited him to this foremost Persian land: He was at home in the Asiatic way of life, wore Median dress, spoke Persian, and loved Persian ceremonial, in which he was equally at home, to the joy of his subjects.

Satrap Atropates of Media came before the king, bringing the Mede Baryaxes, who had dared assume the tiara and call himself king of the Medes and the Persians. He may have thought that the people were sufficiently incensed at the crimes of the Macedonian garrisons in the satrapy to be prepared to defect. He and his fellow conspirators were executed.³²

The king proceeded through the Persian passes down to Susa. The scenes in Karmania and Persia repeated themselves. The tribes did not hesitate to complain loudly of their oppressors; they knew that Alexander would hear them. Satrap Abulites in Susa and his son Oxathres, satrap of the Paraitakenoi, were found guilty of grave offenses and executed. Herakon, who had narrowly escaped conviction of extortion in Media and had earlier been stationed in Susa, was found guilty of plundering the temple there and executed.³³ Punishment followed punishment, and well might those who knew themselves to be less than innocent fear for their future.

Among these was Harpalos son of Machatas, of the princely house of Elymiotis. Long connected to the king and valuable to him for important services rendered, he had enjoyed the marks of Alexander's favor from the outset. He was physically unfit for military service and had been made high treasurer at the beginning of the Persian war. He had already committed one grave offense: shortly before the battle of Issos, acting in concert with one Tauriskos, who had proposed the plan, he had fled with the royal treasury, intending to betake himself to Alexander the Molossian king, who was fighting in Italy. But Harpalos changed his mind and settled down in Megara to pursue his pleasures. Alexander had pardoned this foolishness, remembering how Harpalos, Nearchos, Ptolemy, and a few others had taken up his cause against King Philip and been punished by opprobrium and banishment. Alexander recalled Harpalos and again made him treasurer. The immense treasures of Pasargadaï and Persepolis, now in Ecbatana, were placed under his oversight, together with the treasuries of the lower satrapies, it seems.³⁴ His influence was felt throughout western Asia. Having reinstated Harpalos, Alexander continued eastward.

Undeterred by the responsibility of his position and accustomed to pleasure and extravagance, Harpalos diverted the royal treasury to debauchery and turned all the influence of his office to procuring the pleasures of the table and the bed. His habits had become a scandal known to all the world, and the derision of Hellenic comics contended with the reluctance of more serious men to see his name abandoned to general contempt. Theopompos the historian published an open letter to Alexander in which he called on the king to put an end to this outrage. Harpalos, wrote Theopompos, far from being satisfied by loose Asiatic women, had enticed Pythionike to Asia and submitted to her whims in

the most demeaning fashion—Pithionike, the most notorious harlot of Athens, who had taken service with Bacchis the singer at the outset of her career and then removed together with Bacchis to the bordello of madame Sinope. Pithionike had died, and Harpalos had shamelessly erected two monuments to this creature, at state expense. The public noted with astonishment—thus Theopompos—that neither the king nor any governor had dedicated a memorial to the brave men who had perished for Alexander's glory and the freedom of Greece at Issos, whereas at Athens and at Babylon magnificent, fully finished monuments recalled the life of a whore. To the memory of this Pythionike, long accessible to all Athens in return for payment, Harpalos, who called himself Alexander's friend and his official, had also had the insolence to construct a temple and altar and dedicate them as a shrine of Aphrodite Pythionike, in defiance of the gods' just punishment and in effrontery to the majesty of the monarch.

And that was not all. Pythionike was not yet cold in the grave, when Harpalos had enlisted himself in the service of a second mistress from Athens, the no less notorious Glykera. He had furnished the palace at Tarsos and made it her residence, had erected a statue of her on Rhossos, where he intended also to erect his own, to stand beside the statue of the king. He had ordered that any gold wreath offered him be offered also to his mistress, who was to be addressed as queen and before whom suppliants were to kneel. These, in short, were honors owed only the queen mother and the king's consort, and the lord high treasurer was squandering them on an Attic trollop.³⁵

The king had first thought these reports, and similar ones that reached him, incredible or exaggerated: Harpalos, who had already thrown away the king's favor once, was not such a fool as to risk doing so again.³⁶ Harpalos soon proved the contrary by taking flight once again. He had been counting on Alexander's never returning. Now he saw how the king was proceeding against others who had made the same miscalculation. Despairing of a second pardon, he took all the money he could lay hand on—the astronomical sum of five thousand talents—hired six thousand mercenaries, and proceeded through Asia Minor, accompanied by his mercenaries, Glykera, and a small daughter whom Pythionike had left,³⁷ to the Ionian coast, where he gathered thirty ships to sail for Attika. He was an honorary citizen of Athens and on terms of friendship with the most respected Athenians; his grain donations had made him loved among the people; he did not doubt that he and his riches would be made welcome and that Athens would keep him safe from Alexander.³⁸

While this last miscreant among the grandees of the empire was trying to escape being called to account, Alexander entered Susa with his army, about February 324. Hephaistion soon followed, bringing the remaining troops, the elephants, and the baggage train. Nearchos, having met no incident off the coast of the Persian Gulf, brought the fleet upstream. The satraps and commanders arrived with their suites, as the king had ordered; the princes and grandees of the East came with their wives and daughters, at the king's invitation. Guests came pouring in from the four corners of Europe and Asia to attend the great festival being prepared at Susa. It was to be a festival like none other throughout the ages, a wedding festival in which the melding of West and East would be consummated in exemplary fashion, the idea of Hellenism on which the king intended to build the strength and endurance of his empire.

Eye witnesses describe this festival, exceeding all others in splendor and solemnity, approximately as follows: The great royal tent had been prepared for the occasion.³⁹ Its coping, covered by richly embroidered material, rested on fifty tall columns laminated in gold and silver and set with precious stones. All around this central space, rich tapestries worked with gold thread and depicting many scenes hung from gold- and silver-plated rods. The circumference of the entire tent measured four stades. In the middle of this hall, an immense table had been laid. On one side stood one hundred sofas for the bridegrooms, resting on silver feet, spread with festival carpets; the king's sofa, in the center, was of gold. Opposite them was seating for the king's official guests. Round about stood the tables for the embassies, for the foreigners in camp, for army and navy.

From the king's tent, trumpets gave the signal to begin the festival. The king's guests, numbering nine thousand, took their places for the banquet. The trumpets sounded again to announce the king's libation to the gods; the guests also poured a libation, from golden chalices, a gift of the king. The trumpets sounded a third time, and in Persian fashion, a procession of veiled brides entered. These daughters of princes went each to her bridegroom: Stateira the Great King's daughter to Alexander; her younger sister Drypetis to Hephaistion, the king's favorite; Oxyathres's daughter Amastris, the Great King's niece, to Krateros; the daughter of the Median prince Atropates to Perdikkas; venerable Artabazos's daughter Artakama to Lagid Ptolemy the bodyguard; her sister Artonis to Eumenes, the king's private secretary; the daughter of Rhodian Mentor to Nearchos; the daughter of Spitamenes of Sogdiana to Seleukos, captain of the pages; and others, each to her own bridegroom.⁴⁰

Celebration followed celebration for five days. Countless wedding presents—in gold wreaths alone, 15,000 talents—came in from embassies, from the cities and provinces of the empire, from allies in Europe and Asia. The king in turn gave with open hand. Many of the brides had lost their parents; he provided for them like a father, gave them royal dowries. He gave extravagant gifts to all who married on this day: for all Macedonians who wed Asiatic girls—10,000 signed the list—he provided dower.⁴¹ Dinners, banquets, plays, processions, entertainment of every kind filled the following days. The camp was bright and busy with rhapsodes and harpists from Greater Greece and Ionia, with jugglers and ropewalkers from India, magi and acrobats from the Persian provinces, with Hellenic dancing girls, flute girls, bands of players. Dramas were performed—it was the season of the Great Dionysia—among them a satyr play *Agen*, said to be by Python of Byzantium, that made fun of Harpalos, the lame high treasurer, in flight from Alexander.⁴²

Heralds announced that the king would assume and pay all the debts of the army: each man should record the sum he owed, which he would then receive. At first no one complied. The captains and higher officers may have feared that Alexander only wanted to find out who was living beyond his means. The king scolded them for mistrust and had tables set up throughout the camp and piled high with gold pieces: everyone who presented an account would receive that sum without further inquiry. Now they came, as pleased by anonymity as by relief from their debts. For the army, particularly the officers, was so deep in debt, for all the booty taken and royal gifts distributed—an immoderation that the king had often reproached them—that no less than twenty thousand talents was required to cover the obligations.⁴³ Among the claimants was Antigenes, who had led the shieldbearers in the battle on the Hydaspes and lost an eye in Perinthos in 340, known equally for his bravura and for his acquisitiveness. He requested a handsome sum and received it. Then it transpired that he had no debts. Alexander, angry to find himself cheated, expelled Antigenes from court and relieved him of his command. Antigenes, a brave general, was beside himself at this disgrace; no one doubted that in this state of mind he would harm himself. Alexander rued his anger, pardoned Antigenes, recalled him to court, restored his command, and let him have the sum he claimed.⁴⁴

Alexander distributed princely gifts to those who had distinguished themselves by bravery in battle and loyal service to him personally, awarding gold wreaths to Peukestas the bodyguard and satrap of Persis, who

had covered him with a shield when he fell wounded by the Malloi; Leonnatos the bodyguard, commander in Oreitis, who had fought beside him in the same storm, conquered the barbarians on the Tomeros, and ordered affairs in Ora; Nearchos the nauarch, admiral of the fleet on its voyage from the Indus to the Euphrates; Onesikritos, captain of the royal flagship on the Indus and from the Indus to Susa; faithful Hephaistion and the other bodyguards, especially Pellan Lysimachos, Aristonus son of Peisaios, Perdikkas the hipparch, Lagid Ptolemy, and Peithon of Eordaia.⁴⁵

Yet another solemnity may fall into this period, this one more somber and affecting. One of the penitents the army had encountered beside the road in Taxila had followed the Macedonian army at Alexander's invitation, whose power and love of learning he admired, and in defiance of his master and his scornful colleagues. His gentle seriousness and his wisdom and piety had gained him the king's respect, and many Macedonian noblemen, especially Lagid Ptolemy and Lysimachos the bodyguard, took pleasure in his society. They called him Kalanos, after the expression he used in greeting; his native name is said to have been Sphines. He was advanced in years and suffered his first illness in Persia. He told the king that he did not want to waste away slowly; it was better, and the rules of his order required, that he end his life before illness disturbed the peace of his spirit. Over the king's objection, he asked for a funeral pyre. At the king's order, given reluctantly, Ptolemy the bodyguard made the necessary arrangements. On the appointed day, the army marched out early in parade dress, cavalry and infantry in full armor in the van and the war elephants in full trappings. They were followed by troops bearing incense and others bearing gold and silver chalices and royal vestments, to be thrown into the flames with the incense. Then came Kalanos himself. He could no longer walk, nor could he mount a Nysaen war horse that was brought out; he was carried in a litter. When the procession arrived at the foot of the funeral pyre, Kalanos descended from his litter, took leave of the Macedonians who attended him, and bade them pass the rest of the day in joyful celebration in his memory, with their king, whom he would see again in Babylon. He gave his horse to Lysimachos and the bowls and vestments to others nearby and dedicated himself as a sacrificial victim is dedicated: He sprinkled himself with water, cut a lock of his hair and dedicated it to the god, wreathed himself after Indian custom, and climbed the pyre, singing hymns. He looked down once more on the army, turned his face to the sun, and sank to his knees to pray. This

was the signal: The pyre was lit, the trumpet sounded, the army raised the battle cry, and the elephants raised their cry. Still in prayer, the Indian never moved as the flames engulfed him and removed him from sight.⁴⁶ Alexander, says Arrian, did not want to be present at the death of this valued man.⁴⁷

Arrian goes on to relate an earlier anecdote: Kalanos had invited the eldest of the penitents, their teacher, to accompany him in following Alexander. The elder had replied: If indeed Alexander was the son of Zeus, he himself was no less so. He neither desired anything that Alexander had the power to grant, nor did he fear anything that Alexander could inflict. For him, for as long as he lived, Indian soil would be sufficient, for it yielded the fruits of the season year in, year out. Death would deliver him from tenancy in a body that he did not love into a purer form of life. Arrian also reports that Alexander, astonished at the death Kalanos had chosen, observed, "This man has overcome a foe more powerful than I am."

In this king, as if in a parable, the intellectual universe of the West, as it culminated in Aristotle, Alexander's teacher, encountered the intellectual universe that had arisen in the Ganges country. These were the two poles of historical development that Alexander intended to bring together and to meld, in the full compass and variety of practical forms and conditions from which they sprang and which they contained as ideals to be realized. That he proceeded thus was neither arbitrary nor a result of false premises or false conclusions. Everything he did followed in perfectly correct syllogisms from the first impulse, which, for him, was the natural result of the history of Hellenic life. And that every subsequent deduction succeeded, like the earlier ones, seemed proof enough that his conclusions followed. He did not have the good fortune to meet an opponent who would teach him limit and scale. On the Hyphasis, it was the moral exhaustion of his army that had persuaded him that the means of his power also had a limit. In the Gedrosian desert, he had been forcibly taught that nature was stronger than his will and his power. But the forms that he intended to use to give his work long life, the system of a new order that he introduced—these had not been refuted on the Hyphasis or in the desert. Opposition on the part of Macedonians and Hellenes, attempted rebellion by Asiatics here and there had been put down so swiftly and so easily that they never raised his doubts. The very work he had begun led him on and forced him forward. Even if he had wanted to, he would not have been able to dam up the current or reverse it.

The Susa weddings were followed by a second act of great consequence. Long prepared, it accomplished itself now as if inevitably.

Asiatic troops had been inducted into the army since Dareios's death. But until now they had fought in native fashion, with native weapons, and been treated as subordinated auxiliary corps. The proud Macedonian warriors looked down on the Asiatics, for all their highly effective contributions to the Indian campaigns. In all other contexts, the gap separating nationalities was closing, and it was becoming necessary to obliterate the distinctions between victor and vanquished also in the military. The most effective means was to integrate Asiatics into the ranks of the Macedonian troops, give them the same weapons, and accord them the same military honor. The king had prepared the way five years earlier: He had raised a levy of young men in all the satrapies of the empire and equipped and trained them in Macedonian fashion. The fastest and most effective way to hellenize the tribes, too, was to receive young men accustomed to Hellenic weaponry and Hellenic military service into the imperial army and draw them directly into its esprit, which had to take the place of a new kind of specific nationality not yet present in the vast empire.

There were many reasons to take this step just now. After the Indian campaigns and the march through Gedrosia, the number of Macedonians in the active army had fallen to perhaps 25,000 men. Nearly half of these had been under arms since Alexander set out in 334.⁴⁸ Obviously, after immense hardships, particularly in India and Gedrosia, these veterans were not likely to rise to new challenges, but rather to long to enjoy the fruits of their labors in peace and quiet. Alexander will have known that the great projects his restless spirit was devising required the enthusiasm, rivalry, and physical and moral reserves of young troops; that the pride, sense of self, and pure obstinacy of these old Macedonians could become a hindrance, the more so because these men, in keeping with the familiar tone of their comradely relations with their king, were accustomed to an independence of mind and of conduct inappropriate now in changed circumstances. Indeed, he had to fear lest some occasion cause them to revert to the scene on the Hyphasis, for they would long since have concluded that it was not general unhappiness, but rather their firm refusal to march another step that had forced the king to relent. Since then, a certain cooling of relations between the king and his Macedonians seems to have made itself felt, to which many subsequent events had only contributed. The spirit in which they received the king's offer to settle their debts had brought home to him how mistrustful his men had

become. Perhaps he had hoped to regain control of their mood by means of gifts and honors freely distributed, by means of the wedding celebration, in which he, too, had taken part. He had not succeeded. He could see a crisis looming and see it grow more threatening at each further measure taken to give the empire Hellenistic form. He would have to move quickly to create a military force that he could use, if necessary, to confront his old phalangites.

The satraps from the conquered lands and the newly founded cities came into camp in Susa, bringing the levy of young men raised after the order issued in 331.⁴⁹ Thirty thousand troops were now under Macedonian arms, trained in all the exercises of the Macedonian military. The cavalry was thoroughly reformed. The best of the Baktrian–Sogdian, Arianan, and Parthyaian riders and of the Persian euacks, with respect to rank, beauty, or other excellence, were distributed in part to existing lochoi, in part combined with Macedonian riders to form a fifth hipparchy.⁵⁰ Asiatics were also taken into the agema of the cavalry, for example, Artiboles and Hydarnes, sons of the late satrap Mazaïos; Kophen, son of Artabazos; Sisines and Phradasmanes, sons of Phrataphernes, satrap of Parthyaia; Roxane’s brother Histanes; the brothers Aigobares and Mithrobaios; finally, Hystaspes, the Baktrian prince, who was given command of the agema.⁵¹

All this greatly angered the Macedonian troops. Alexander, they said, was becoming a complete barbarian; he disdained Macedonians because he favored the East; when he had first appeared in Median dress, respectable men had seen what would come of this; now it had happened: The king preferred those who were losing the language and giving up the customs of home; Peukestas was receiving so many gifts and other honors because he was the one who disregarded memories of home most insolently. So what, if Alexander had taken part in the wedding celebration along with all the other Macedonians—they had all been married to Asiatic women, and in a Persian ceremony. And now all these new boys under Macedonian arms, these barbarians held in the same respect as Philip’s veterans! Obviously, Alexander had had enough of Macedonians; he was already arranging to have no further need of them; he would seize the next opportunity to get rid of them altogether.

Thus the old soldiers. Any provocation could turn this mood into an eruption, and soon enough that provocation came.

CHAPTER 2

Alexander had decided to take his army up along the Tigris to Opis, where the great road forks and one way leads to the West, the other east into Media. The very situation of the city hinted at the purpose of this march. He also wanted to take opportunity to investigate the mouth of the Tigris and of the Euphrates, the navigability of the rivers, and the state of the Tigris canals, which were of critical importance to the low-lying lands adjacent to the river. Hephaistion was to lead the army up the usual route along the Tigris, while Alexander and his shieldbearers, the agema, and a few cavalry sailed with the ships Nearchos had brought up the Eulaios near Susa, probably in April. He took his swiftest ships to the Persian Gulf, while the greater part of the fleet, which had been damaged in the voyage from India, passed from the Eulaios to the Tigris by way of a canal near the mouth of the river.¹ Sailing along the coast, Alexander examined the mouths of the canals and gave instructions for founding an Alexandria hard by the coast between Eulaios and Tigris.² He entered the mouth of the Tigris and met the other ships and, a few days later, the land army, which had pitched camp on the riverbank. Traveling upstream, they came upon weirs that had been built, the Persians said, to protect against enemy attack from the sea.³ Alexander feared no such attack and wanted to open the river to trade and navigation. He therefore had the weirs destroyed, the canals dredged, and their dikes restored and equipped with sluices.

Army and fleet arrived in Opis, perhaps in July, and pitched camp around this prosperous city.⁴ The mood of the troops had not improved since their departure from Susa. Wild rumors about the king's intentions were being circulated and found credence, raising mistrust to a new level.

Alexander called a general assembly of the army on the plain of Opis to announce a measure that he claimed would please the men. Many of them, he said, were exhausted by long service, wounds, and other hardships. He did not intend to settle them in the new cities, as he had settled

other invalided troops; he knew how they longed for home. If any veterans wished to remain in his service, he would honor their devotion in a fashion that would make them more enviable than those who returned home and would inspire a taste for danger and similar glory among young Macedonians. But now that Asia had been conquered and pacified, a great number of troops could be discharged. At this point, the men began shouting. Alexander wanted to be rid of his veterans, they cried. He wanted to surround himself with a barbarian army. He had worn them out and now proposed to dismiss them contemptuously, to dump them old and exhausted on fatherland and parents, who had sent them to him in an altogether different state. The tumult rose: He should discharge them all and go to war in future supported by the one he called his father. The shouting had become a full-scale riot. Enraged, Alexander leapt down from the platform unarmed, and the officers of his suite after him. He struck the men within reach and turned them over to his shieldbearers, pointed to others, whom they seized, thirteen in toto, and ordered that they be taken away and executed. Stunned, the mob fell silent. Alexander spoke again, responding now to the mutiny.

The words that Arrian puts in his mouth may be well attested, or they may be invented for the purpose; in either case, they deserve to be quoted in their principal content:

It is not to revoke your discharge that I speak to you again. You may go where you like, for all I care. It is to tell you what I have made you. My father Philip did great things with you. When he first took you up, you were penniless nomads wandering after your wretched flocks in the hills, exposed to attack by Thracians, Illyrians, and Triballians. He settled you, replaced the sheepskins you wrapped yourselves in by outfitting you as warriors, and made you master of the barbarians around you. He gave you work in the mines of Pangaion and opened the sea to your trade. He conquered Thessaly, Thebes, Athens, and the Peloponnese for your benefit and made himself unconditional leader of all Hellenes for a Persian war. These things Philip did, great things in themselves, small in relation to what followed. After my father's death, I found little gold and silver in the treasury, not more than sixty talents, and in debt, five hundred talents; to prepare our campaign, I added eight hundred talents that I borrowed. I opened the Hellespont for you, even while the Persians controlled the seas; I defeated the Great King's satraps on the Granikos and in the rich satrapies of Asia Minor, and I gave you the fruits of these victories to enjoy. The riches of Egypt and Cyrene fell to you; Syria was yours and Babylon and Baktra; yours were the treasures of

Persia and the precious stones of India and the great ocean. I chose satraps, commanders, and strategoi from among you.

What have I gained from all this struggle, besides the royal purple and the diadem? I acquired nothing for myself, and no one can point to my riches without pointing to your possessions as well and what has been set aside for you. Why should I heap up riches for myself? I eat what you eat and sleep as you sleep. In fact, not a few among you live higher than I do, and I am awake through many a night so that you may sleep peacefully. When you are burdened with labor and exposed to danger, do you think that I am unconcerned? Who can claim to have endured more for me than I for him? If you show me your wounds, I can show you mine. Every part of my body has taken wounds, and I bear the scars of every conceivable weapon and missile—sword and dagger, bow and catapult, sling and club—all sustained while I fought for you and your glory and your enrichment and led you triumphantly over land and sea, mountain, river, and desert. I was married just as you were, and my children will be kin to the children of many of you. I settled all your debts and never asked why good pay and abundant booty were not enough to keep you solvent. Most of you have received gold wreaths, a lasting testimony to your bravery and my recognition of it. Those who fell in battle died gloriously and were buried with honor. Bronze statues of many of these men stand in Macedonia, and their parents are held in high regard and released from all taxes and other burdens. Finally, not one of you fell while fleeing, not while I led you. And after all this, I wanted to dismiss those of you who are battle-weary and send these men home to become an object of pride and admiration. You, however, tell me that you *all* want to go.

So go then. And when you get home, tell them about your King Alexander, how he conquered the Medes and the Persians, the Baktrians and the Sakai, the Uxians, Arachosians, and Drangians, how he prevailed over the Parthaians, the Chorasmians and Hyrkanians on the shores of the Caspian, how he climbed over the Kaukasos beyond the Caspian passes, crossed the Oxos and the Tanais, and the Indus, like Dionysos alone before him, and the Hydaspes, Akesines, and Hydraotes, and, had you not stopped him, the Hyphasis, and sailed down the Indus and into the ocean, how he marched through the desert of Gedrosia, which no man before him had ever crossed with an army, how his fleet went through the ocean from the Indus to Persia. And tell them how you deserted your King Alexander and consigned him to vanquished barbarians for his protection. That will do you honor before god and man. Go!

And Alexander left the platform and strode back to town.

The king had been accompanied only by his bodyguards and his intimates, and the rest of the Macedonians stood around in uneasy silence. When they finally began to speak, it was to observe that they had gotten

what they asked for. What now? And what next? They had all been discharged; they were no longer soldiers. The service and discipline that had held them together were no more. Leaderless, baffled, and wavering, some demanded to stay, others to start immediately for home. Thus they shouted among themselves. No one was giving orders and no one was taking them; not a single squad could keep itself together. The army that had conquered the world had been reduced to a rabble.

Alexander had withdrawn into the royal palace at Opis. Greatly agitated, he neither ate nor bathed, saw no one, spoke to no one. One day passed, then another. In the camp, confusion had reached dangerous levels. It was the men's misfortune to have met no resistance and to have received what they demanded in excess. Now they had been left to their fate and to their own anarchy. They were impotent and disoriented, incapable of will or action, no longer organized by the duties, privileges, and honors of rank, hungry and bewildered. The danger was that the disorder might turn violent.⁵

Alexander had to guard against this extremity. At the same time, he wanted to make one final, daring attempt to bring the Macedonians around. He decided to entrust himself entirely to Asiatic troops and to organize them in Macedonian fashion and admit them to Macedonian honors and marks of distinction. He could expect that the Macedonians, seeing themselves ostracized, would either beg forgiveness or resort to arms, and he was confident that the Asiatic army under his command would prevail over the leaderless Macedonians. On the third day, he summoned the Medes and Persians to the palace and informed them of his intentions. From their ranks he picked captains and commanders of the new army, denominated many of them royal kinsmen, and accorded them, in eastern fashion, the privilege of the kiss. The Asiatic troops were organized into hipparchies and phalanges, in keeping with Macedonian practice. Alexander created a Persian agema, Persian foot companions, a Persian corps of shieldbearers, called the silvershields,⁶ a companion cavalry of Persians, and an agema of the Persian cavalry. The palace guard and the king's aides became Persian. The Macedonians were ordered to vacate the camp and go wherever they pleased, or, if they preferred, they could elect a leader and meet Alexander, their king, in battle: That would show them that without him they were nothing.⁷

When the order reached the camp, the veterans could restrain themselves no longer. They rushed to the gates of the palace and laid down their weapons as a sign of their humiliation and remorse. They stood

before the closed gates and loudly begged admittance. They wanted to turn over the men who had started the riot, they shouted, and they would not go away until the king had mercy on them.

Alexander soon emerged.⁸ Seeing their remorse and hearing their cheering and their wailing, he too burst into tears. He approached to speak with them; they pressed about, beseeching him in a long lament, as if they feared that his first word would show he was not mollified. Kallines, a respected old officer, one of the hipparchs of the cavalry, spoke for them. What grieved the Macedonians most, he said, was that their king had made companions of Persians, that Persians called themselves his kinsmen and were permitted to kiss him, and not a single Macedonian had ever been so honored. The king called to them, "I make you all my kinsmen and will call you kinsmen from this day forth." He went to Kallines and kissed him, and every Macedonian who wished to do so came forward to kiss the king. Then they took up their weapons and returned to camp cheering. Alexander ordered an offering to celebrate the reconciliation and sacrificed to the usual gods. He held a great feast for nearly the entire army. The king sat at the center and his Macedonians around him; beyond them, the Persians; and beyond the Persians, other tribes of Asia. The king drew from the same wine bowls as his troops and poured the same libations; Hellenic diviners and Persian magi performed the religious observance. Alexander's toast invoked the gods, that they might preserve them all and grant concord and the community of the realm to both the Macedonians and the Persians. Nine thousand are said to have sat at this feast, pouring the same libations and singing the same hymns.⁹

A serious crisis had been resolved, the last important instance of repeated revolts in behalf of Old Macedonia. That specter had at last been laid. The measures taken to remove this threat gave Alexander's victory a sharper edge. The prerogatives he had been obliged to accord the Macedonian military were now abrogated, and Asiatic troops entered into the traditional titles and honors of the Macedonian army. Henceforth victor and vanquished alike would be distinguished solely by personal merit and loyalty to the king.

However powerful, indeed overwhelming, the king's personality appears in these events, it does not account for everything. One can also say that Alexander's hastily constructed, bold imperial system, in withstanding this test, showed itself to be sufficiently finished and firm to warrant removal of its scaffolding and temporary supports. But could

the veterans not have prevailed at Opis and proved that the king, like Ixion, was embracing a cloud instead of the goddess? Only if they themselves had remained true Macedonians. They had not. This new thing with which they were contending had become a part of them; they had entered into Asiatic life without crediting this new element as it deserved. Their mistake was that they arrogantly claimed to have conquered what in fact was conquering them, and this mistake cost them the contest. When the master's mighty hand broke the instrument with which he had created the work of a new age—when Alexander disbanded the Macedonian army—he pronounced that work finished and beyond challenge, with respect both to manner and to matter. However much the visible forms of this empire were to be shaken and distorted by the quarrels and confusions of the following period, Hellenistic life, that union of the Hellenic and the Asiatic worlds, with all the rewards and penalties it imported, had been established and would endure for centuries.

Thus the new had passed through all the stages of internal and external endangerment and prevailed. It had been recognized as the informing idea of a new era, pronounced as the principle of the new kingship; it was in command as governance of the realm; it had been organized as a military force; it was instrumental in the dissolution and transformation of tribal life. There remained only for it to prove itself and to prove that it was in keeping with the foremost interests of the peoples. This was the task for the brief span of life that fate would yet grant the king, its purpose or, in any event, its result.

The dismissal of the veterans probably also worked to this end. Never before had so great a number of troops come back from Asia, and these ten thousand veterans, beyond any earlier ones, had received Asiatic influence. Their example, their glory, their riches, their changed opinions and requirements, new demands and experiences would influence their friends and their families no less than western ways had influenced the peoples of the East. Whether this was a blessing, particularly for the humble classes, the peasants and shepherds of Macedonia, is another question.

Alexander took leave of his veterans with great ceremony. They would continue to draw wages until they reached home, he announced, and receive a bonus of one talent each. They were to leave the children they had had by Asiatic women with him to avoid difficulties with their wives and children in Macedonia. He would see to it that these soldiers' children received a Macedonian education and that they too became soldiers.

When they had become men, he hoped to lead them back to Macedonia and restore them to their fathers. Alexander promised to provide similarly for the children of those who had died on the campaign: They would receive their fathers' wages until they too could take service with the king and gain the same wages and the same glory. To guarantee these promises, he would give the departing veterans Krateros the hipparch, the dearest, most loyal of his generals, as their leader and protector on the march. They were accompanied home from Opis by the strategoi Polyperchon, Kleitos, and Gorgias, perhaps by Antigenes of the shieldbearers, and Polydamas and Amadas of the cavalry. In light of Krateros's frailty, Polyperchon was appointed second-in-command.¹⁰

More important yet, Krateros was sent home to replace Antipater as political and military chief in Macedonia.¹¹ Antipater, in turn, was ordered to bring replacements for the discharged troops to the army.¹² Many things may have conspired to make this change of appointment necessary. Friction between Antipater and the queen mother had sharpened. Responsibility may have lain principally, perhaps exclusively, with the passionate, domineering queen. For after her brother Alexander's death while campaigning in Italy, she had conducted herself in Epeiros as if she ruled the land,¹³ and the young widow, her daughter Kleopatra, had returned to Macedonia with her five-year-old son, the rightful heir to the Molossian throne, perhaps because she feared for her child and herself.¹⁴ Alexander honored his mother and was perfectly dutiful, but he had always rebuffed her attempts to interfere in public matters. Nonetheless, she continued to machinate: She wrote letters of reproach and complaint to her son; driven by jealousy, she sent bitter letters to Hephaistion, to his distress; but she complained most bitterly of Antipater. Antipater complained no less bitterly of her and her intrusions into public matters. Tellingly, Alexander is said to have remarked, "Antipater does not know that one tear of my mother cancels a thousand of his letters of complaint." Such letters did nothing to heighten the king's confidence in his viceroy.

It is also possible that Antipater did not entirely withstand the temptations of the enormous power that had been vested in him.¹⁵ The secret contact he took up with the Aitolians after his son-in-law Philotas was executed was reason for caution, even if Olympias's unabating complaints and warnings seem unfounded. Arrian attests that nothing the king said or did indicates that his sentiments toward Antipater had changed.¹⁶ He assumes that Alexander called him to Asia, not as punishment, but to ensure that no great harm to Antipater or Olympias and nothing he

could not repair would come of the endless quarreling.¹⁷ Antipater, moreover, was not ordered to give up his office and come to Asia right away. Rather, he was to continue to govern and await Krateros's arrival, which could be long in coming.¹⁸

At just this moment, Hellenic affairs took a turning that made the presence of this seasoned governor in Macedonia highly desirable.

If there was any sound national feeling in the Hellenic world, Alexander's deeds—his victories on the Granikos, at Issos, and at Gaugamela, his liberating the Hellenes of Asia, wrecking the commercial preeminence of Tyre, and destroying Persian power—should have affected it. These triumphs should have reconciled implacable foes and renewed Hellenic sense of self, and the Hellenes should have contributed, by friendly rivalry, to the common effort that the Hellenic states were legally bound and entitled to engage in. But the states that set the tone understood patriotism and a national cause otherwise. We have seen how Athens was in the process of throwing her sea power to Persia in the very year of the battle of Issos, how King Agis was at war with Antipater when Dareios was murdered in flight, and how the smaller states were only waiting for Agis to win his first battle before they joined him.

After the Spartan defeat in summer 330, silence had fallen on Hellas, but rancor and sullenness had not subsided. These Hellenes had no idea what times they lived in. "Is there anything unexpected and beyond our hopes that has not occurred in our lifetime?" asked Aischines in an oration in autumn 330. "For we lead no ordinary lives, and our times seem marvelous to those who will live on after us." Things even more marvelous had happened since. Those five years had been as rich in astounding deeds far away in Asia as they were mean and slack at home in Hellas. There, conquest of the Baktrian lands and of India, the opening of the southern sea; here, the threadbare triviality of small-state officiousness and endless attitudinizing. The moral worth or, if one prefers, the net weight of Hellenic politics and polity had indeed dwindled to a new low point.

Conversely, the weight and force of Macedonian power had become immense, and further resistance was out of the question. But resisting Macedonia was the only program that could enliven public life in the states of Hellas, particularly in Athens and Sparta. In consequence, the lines of distinction between the political parties, which had once profiled themselves as supporting or opposing Macedonia, now became entangled and broke down, and the little possibility of political action still present

among the masses was hobbled. This disintegration of the parties and the growing bewilderment among the demos can be observed in events in Athens.

After the election of 326, Lykurgos, who had administered state finances brilliantly during twelve years, was obliged to resign in favor of Mnesaichmos, his political and personal enemy. After 330, particularly when no revolt was mounted against Macedonia, mercurial Hypereides, who had always supported Demosthenes, turned against him and soon appeared as his accuser. Aischines was no longer in Athens, having fled to Rhodes when a jury convened shortly after King Agis's defeat found in favor of Ktesiphon and therefore to the honor of Demosthenes. But Phokion was still in Athens, that austere old patriot, who refused Alexander's magnificent gifts and at the same time, aware of his city's decline, tried to restrain the all too excitable people from entering a hopeless contest with Macedonia.¹⁹ Demades was still there, his influence based in equal measure on his relations with Macedonia and on his politics of peace, which he used to gratify the interests of the wealthy and the gluttony and greed of the rabble. "No warrior will mourn me," he told the assembly, "for war profits him and peace will not feed him; but the peasant will mourn me, and the artisan, the merchant, and every man who loves a peaceful life. For their sake, I have protected Attika against the mighty, not by trench and mound, but by peace and friendship."

When King Agis had rebelled, Demosthenes was said to have agitated for war in Sparta and elsewhere, while in Athens he did nothing more than deliver "the most wondrous" orations. He was also said to be entertaining secret contacts with Olympias and with Alexander himself.²⁰ These things will not have deepened the people's trust in his leadership. And while he had been given oversight over the grain supply during the year of the famine, in acknowledgment of his considerable administrative skills, in matters of governance the assembly paid him no more heed than his foes on the left and the right, and the final decision of the sovereign demos was usually unpredictable.

The heyday of small states had come and gone. In all respects, they emerged as unequal to the new consolidation of power. Political and social conditions had been transformed, and the governance of these states would have to be reworked entirely. Alexander's intention was to subsume the Hellenic cities under the power and authority of his great monarchy and to restrict their exercise of democratic forms to matters of communal administration. This work was cut short by his early death

or, if one prefers, by the internal necessities of the Hellenic way of being. That precisely is the origin of the ignoble decline by which the following century of Hellenic history was to tarnish the glory of a better age.

For the sake of that intention, Alexander promulgated two measures that cut to the quick. He required that the Hellenes too honor him as a god. Whatever this order leads one to conclude about the king's personal convictions and how they had changed, it was neither unprecedented nor blasphemous, as it might seem to monotheistic sensibilities, nor is the political intention of the measure far to seek. Hellenic paganism was long accustomed to seeing its gods anthropomorphically. As the philosopher had said, the gods are immortal men and men mortal gods. Neither sacred history nor dogma rested on a basis of revealed teachings definitively determined to be of divine origin. Religious matters had no other norm or form than human thought and feeling—as these were and as they were developed by experience—supplemented at most by the pronouncements of oracle shrines and the various arts of divination, which indicated nothing more than a general direction, like a cork floating on the current. When we consider that the oracle of Zeus Ammon did, after all, designate the king the son of Zeus, however much one might scoff; that Alexander, from the line of Herakles and Achilles, had conquered and transformed a world; that in truth he had accomplished greater things than Herakles and Dionysos; and when we consider that the Enlightenment has long estranged us from deep need of religion, has left us receptive only to the festivities, the visible ceremony and calendrical meaning of ancient observances and festivals of the gods, then it becomes conceivable that the notion that a man should be given divine honors and divine status did not seem far-fetched to contemporary Greek sensibilities. Just how readily acceptable these things were emerges all too clearly in the following decades, as the most wretched princes and the most depraved examples of Hellenes and Greeks alike, of Athenians in particular, attain what the great Alexander had been the first to claim, but now on the strength of next to nothing. And although some may hold that Alexander believed in his own divinity and others that he considered it a measure for governance, from Alexander himself the tradition has preserved the remark: Certainly Zeus was the father of all men, but he made only the best of them his sons.²¹

The eastern peoples are accustomed to honoring their king as a higher being, and indeed this belief underlies all monarchy and every form of

lordly rule, however much the need for such a notion may have been modified over the centuries by changing custom and received opinion. Even ancient Doric aristocrats granted descendants of their founding heroes this precedence over members of the subject tribe, and democratic Athens erected its citizens' freedom on a wholly analogous interpretation of slaves. At least Alexander's monarchy had the excellence of not seeing the barbarians as condemned to slavery by birth. From the barbarians Alexander received the "adoration" that they were accustomed to bring that "god-like man," their king. If the Hellenic world was to find its place and find peace in this monarchy, the first and the essential step was to bring the Greeks to the same belief in his majesty that Asia observed and in which he saw the fundamental guarantee of his kingship, and to accustom them to it.

While in Asia the last steps were being taken to meld East and West, an order went out requiring Greece to decree publicly that the king was to be honored as a god.²² Most of the cities complied. The Spartan proclamation provided: Since Alexander raises such a claim, let him be a god.²³ In Athens, Demades brought the proposal before the demos.²⁴ Pytheas rose to speak against it: To worship any but the traditional gods was contrary to the Solonic code. To the objection that he was too young to speak to such weighty matters Pytheas replied: Alexander is younger yet.²⁵ Lykurgos, too, rose to oppose the proposal: What manner of god is this, he asked, that one should feel constrained to cleanse oneself, not before entering his sanctuary, but rather upon leaving it?

Before Athens could resolve the matter, another supervened, of more immediate effect on the communal life of the citizenry. This was the king's pronouncement concerning the exiles of the Hellenic states. These banishments had resulted chiefly from political change. Since the Macedonians had prevailed repeatedly during the last fifteen years, it was mainly foes of Macedonia who had been sent into exile. Before the fall of Persia, many of these political refugees had taken service in the armies of the Great King, where they continued to battle Macedonia. Once Persia had fallen, they wandered the world. Some may have taken service in the Macedonian army; others were recruited by satraps acting independently during Alexander's absence in India; still others tramped back to Greece and drifted near their native cities, waiting for things to change, or they found their way to the hiring hall on Tainaron, where they took the pay of anyone who was hiring. Once Alexander had ordered the satraps to

disband their mercenary packs, the number of warriors without employ must have risen sharply.²⁶ To the extent that they were numerous, discontent, and discouraged, they were a threat to peace and quiet in Hellas.

The only way to parry this threat was to prepare their way home. As a further benefit, those who had been banished by Macedonian influence would now become obligated to Macedonia, to the profit of the Macedonian faction in the various states. Henceforth, the states were answerable for internal order in Greece, and if their factiousness should erupt anew, Macedonia had a warrant to intervene. The measure was an intrusion into the sovereignty of the states as guaranteed by the Corinthian League; its execution would give rise to endless questions of ownership and create complications even within families. Of greater importance, however, was the benefaction for the old foes of Macedonia. Now that national enmities between Hellenes and Asiatics had been softened, it was time that partisan political differences in the Hellenic cities diminish before the unity of an empire they all shared in. Exercise of the royal right to pardon in this fashion and on this scale was the first act of the higher imperial authority to which Alexander hoped to accustom the Greeks.

To promulgate the measure, Alexander had sent the Stageirite Nikanor to Greece. The king's decree was to be published at the celebration of the Olympian games in 324.²⁷ Word had spread and exiles from far and wide poured into Olympia to hear of their release. The individual states were far less unanimous. In Athens, Demosthenes volunteered to join the high theoric delegation, intending to confer with Alexander's plenipotentiary and point out to him the consequences of such a measure and the sacredness of the constitution of the Corinthian League. To no avail. Nikanor gave the king's decree to the winner of the heralds' contest, who read it aloud before the assembled Hellenes, among them some twenty thousand exiles. "King Alexander to the exiles of the Greek cities: Greetings. While we are not responsible for your banishment, we wish to restore all of you home except those who have been condemned. Therefore we have authorized Antipater to use force against any city that might refuse to receive you."²⁸ The proclamation was heard with joy; exiles coming from all directions returned home.²⁹

Only Athens and the Aitolians refused to comply. The Aitolians had driven out the Oiniadians and feared their vengeance the more because Alexander had decided the Oiniadians' rights in their favor. The Athenians found themselves threatened in their possession of Samos, the most important island they still held from the time of their hegemony. Under

Timotheos, they had expelled the Samians and distributed their land to Attic cleruchs,³⁰ who had been in possession for thirty years, either cultivating the land themselves or leasing it to others. What may have offended them most was that the king had framed the order as if he were simply respecting the good right of the exiles, as if he had no need of the consent of the affected states, whereas the treaties of 334 expressly provided that no league state could help the refugees of another in an attempt to force their way home. Alexander's order could be interpreted to challenge the autonomy and sovereignty of the Attic state, so that the demos, by obeying that order, would acknowledge its fealty to the Macedonian monarchy. Was Athens, and her demos, so diminished that she would have to submit? At just this moment, an unexpected event offered an opportunity to enhance the power of the Athenians and lend force to their refusal, if they knew how to seize it.³¹

Harpalos, Alexander's fugitive high treasurer, had embarked for Athens with thirty ships, six thousand mercenaries, and immense treasure. Some time in February, he had arrived in the roads off Munychia. He was relying on certain advantages he had gained by his grain donations during the famine, such as a grant of citizenship by the demos, and had given Phokion's son-in-law Charikles thirty talents to erect a tomb for Pythionike; he may have obligated other influential men by other gifts. But on Demosthenes's advice, the demos refused to admit him. Strategos Philokles, who commanded the harbor watch, had been expressly instructed to offer armed resistance, should Harpalos attempt to force a landing. Whereupon Harpalos made for Tainaron with his mercenaries and his treasure. While the exiles' decree may have allowed many of the soldiers of fortune on Tainaron to return home, among the Aitolians and in Athens it had created conditions that were after Harpalos's own heart. He sailed a second time for Attika, without mercenaries and with only part of the money he had stolen. This time Philokles did not refuse to admit him. In the humble guise of an Attic citizen and asylum seeker, he appeared before the demos, offering to put his treasure and his mercenaries at their disposal, surely not without implying that they were now in a position to accomplish great things if they were but bold enough.³²

A demand that Athens turn over the man who had robbed the treasury had already come from Philoxenos, Alexander's treasurer in Asia Minor.³³ It was an occasion for lively debate in Athens. Hotheaded Hypereides thought they should not throw away a magnificent opportunity to liberate Hellas. The friends of Macedonia surely pressed for extradition, which

even Phokion opposed. Demosthenes agreed and recommended that they take this asylum seeker and his money into custody until Alexander sent someone to deal with him. The demos decided accordingly and authorized Demosthenes to take charge of the money. Questioned by Demosthenes, Harpalos said he had 700 talents. But next day, when the money was removed to the acropolis, only 350 talents could be found. Inexplicably left in possession of his treasure overnight, Harpalos seems to have spent the dark hours winning friends. Demosthenes, for his part, failed to report the missing sum. He was content to leave an investigation to the areopagos and to offer amnesty to any who freely returned the money they had received.

Alexander seems to have expected that Harpalos, his treasure, and his mercenaries would find an eager reception in Athens; in any event, he sent orders into the maritime provinces to hold the fleet in readiness for an immediate attack on Attika. In camp there was much talk of a war against Athens, to which the Macedonians looked forward with pleasure.³⁴ And in fact, if the Athenians seriously intended to resist the restoration of exiles, to refuse the king divine honors, and to assert their full independence, in the offers and the means of Harpalos the asylum seeker they had everything they needed to mount an energetic defense. They could reasonably hope to be joined by the Aitolians and the Spartans, and the Achaians and the Arkadians, whom the king had denied the customary common assembly of their cities.³⁵ But if they had found themselves unable to ignore that Harpalos had grossly abused his office for a second time and invoked the king's punishment by a common crime of grand dimensions, they would have done themselves no dishonor by granting extradition and leaving the whole matter to the royal official who had made the demand. Instead, they elected to take half-measures, which, far from offering a safe and honorable solution, saddled the city with a responsibility that soon compromised it deeply.

Obviously, Philoxenos repeated his demand for extradition, now more urgently; it may also be correct that both Antipater and Olympias made the same demand. And then one morning Harpalos had vanished. This could not have happened if the commission charged with his custody, under Demosthenes, had done its duty. Unsurprisingly, Demosthenes was said and believed to have been bribed, along with all the others. He could do no less than demand an immediate investigation, also referred to the areopagos at his request. Philokles the strategos asked for the same demand from the demos and received it.

The inquiry by the areopagos proceeded at a stately pace. The question of divine honors for the king had not yet been settled; one would have to conclude that deliberation in order to dispatch ambassadors to Babylon, where they were required to be present upon the king's arrival there. This question and the question of receiving exiles were brought again before the demos; Demosthenes spoke repeatedly. "When you believed that the moment had come for the areopagos to announce the names of those who had taken bribes," Hypereides said afterwards in the court proceeding against Demosthenes, "you suddenly became bellicose and threw the city into uproar in order to avoid these revelations. But when the areopagos postponed the announcement because it had not yet reached a conclusion, you recommended that Alexander be granted the honors of Zeus and Poseidon and whatever other god he wished." Effectively, Demosthenes recommended compliance in the matter of divine honors and defiance in the matter of the exiles. Embassies were so instructed and dispatched about the beginning of November.³⁶

Harpalos had gone from Athens to Tainaron and from there to Crete, taking his mercenaries and treasure, now that a revolt in Hellas seemed out of the question. There his friend the Spartan Thibron murdered him and fled with mercenaries and treasure to Cyrene.³⁷ Harpalos's most trusted slave, who had kept his accounts, fled to Rhodes, where he was turned over to Philoxenos. He confessed what he knew about Harpalos's money.

Thus Philoxenos was in a position to send a schedule of sums disbursed and the names of those who had received them to Athens.³⁸ Demosthenes's name did not appear there. Six months later, the areopagos finished its inquiries and house searches and handed the matter up to the court. The Harpalian trials began, that remarkable series of proceedings in which the most distinguished men of Athens appeared as accusers of other most distinguished men of Athens. Among the accusers: Pytheas, Hypereides, Mnesaichmos, Himeraios, Stratokles; among the accused: Demades, who was said to have accepted six thousand staters, Philokles the strategos, Charikles Phokion's son-in-law, Demosthenes. Demosthenes did not deny having accepted twenty talents of Harpalos's money—as temporary reimbursement of a sum he had advanced to the theorika fund and had not wanted to mention, he declared. He accused the areopagos of trying to remove him as a favor to Alexander; he brought his children into court to stir the jury's sympathy.³⁹ All in vain: He was sentenced to pay five times what he had received. When he could not

raise the sum, he was thrown into prison, from which he contrived to escape on the sixth day.

The outcome of the Harpalian trials was fateful for Athens. The jurymen of the *eliaia*, the unmediated expression of public opinion, had heeded the plaintiffs who told them that they were now sitting in judgment over the accused, but eventually another would sit in judgment over them: they therefore owed it to themselves to punish even men as well known as these. But Attic politics, conducted feebly and uncertainly in the traffic that sprang up around Harpalos, had prejudiced the case being tried, and the jurymen let their decision be controlled by political considerations: they treated some defendants with unwarranted severity, others with undeserved leniency. They acquitted Aristogeiton, the most insolent and contemptible of the popular leaders, found by the *areopagos* to have accepted twenty talents, and perhaps others.⁴⁰ But Philokles, the great foe of the Macedonian monarchy, was banished, depriving the old democratic faction and its traditions of their chief support; in him the state also lost a *strategos* whom the people had elected repeatedly to this important office. Demades remained, his sentence notwithstanding,⁴¹ and his influence grew stronger after the trials, as the men who led the people became ever more obscure, more timid, and more unscrupulous.⁴² Athenian politics, more uncertain now than ever, ultimately became servile. Having refused to let the exiles return, Athens had to fear that the king's amnesty would embolden them to cross the frontier from Megara. And yet Athens did nothing to protect herself. Instead, she decided to send an embassy of *theoroi* to ask the king's permission not to receive the banished—a measure of great clumsiness if she wished to insist on her independence. For she had just announced her intention to hew to the provisions of the Corinthian League, even while the king's refusal of her request was as good as certain.⁴³

More important than the superficial effect of these events was the moral defeat of the principles that Athens was thought, and thought herself, to represent and exemplify. There had been a time when Kleon, whom the *demos* thought the keenest of democrats, had told the people that democracy was incapable of ruling over others. If Athens now submitted to the monarchical authority that Alexander's Hellenistic kingdom was asserting, the last redoubt of small-state politics and self-important particularism, which refused to understand "that a boat as long as your hand is no boat at all," had fallen. The incipient transformation of real power thus spread itself, calm and strong, also over the Hellenic world,

demanding great sacrifice, but a sacrifice that Alexander had required of himself and of his Macedonians and that he used to justify and to expiate what he was bringing about.

A noted historian has recently called Alexander the most gifted statesman of his age. He was a statesman as Aristotle was a thinker. The thinker could withdraw into the stillness of his intellect to give his philosophical system a completeness and perfection that is possible only in the world of reflection. At first glance, what Alexander achieved as a statesman may seem sketchy and punctuated occasionally by mistaken moves in certain particulars; his way of proceeding may seem to have been driven by personal passion or willfulness or by mere chance. But we should bear in mind that these were original ideas, sparked by the frictions of enormous circumstances, and that they instantly became norms, structures, and conditions for further action. Each of these ideas opened new and wider prospects, created new and hotter frictions, presented more urgent tasks to be undertaken.

The sparse record that has come down to us says nothing about the high mental and moral labors of the man who undertook these great tasks and accomplished them. At this distance, even the outlines of his achievement are fragmentary. We have only the spatial dimensions of these events to give us a measure of the effort that went into such a result, of the will that led the effort, of the thought that informed it—to give us a measure of Alexander's greatness.

His next impulse may have been to extend the struggle that his father had prepared and make the empire he had conquered secure and lasting. With the happy radicalism of youth, he seized upon or invented means that exceeded the daring of his campaigns and the conquering power of his battles. His boldest measure, for which moralists reproach him down to our own day, was to break the instrument with which he had begun his work or, if one prefers, to throw the banner under which he had gone to war—the Hellenes' arrogant hatred of barbarians—into the breach he intended to close.

In a notable passage, Aristotle says that the task of his *Politics* is to find a system of government that is not the most perfect but rather the most useful. "What is the best constitution and the best life for most states and most men, when one requires no more than the virtue of the average man and no more education than is possible without the particular favor of nature or circumstances, when one requires, not an ideal constitution, but rather a life that can be lived, a constitution that most men will be

able to live under?" He submits that it is a matter of finding a political order that is easily accessible and encourages participation as it develops under given circumstances.⁴⁴ "For it is no smaller achievement to improve a political order than to create one *de novo*, just as unlearning and relearning is no less difficult than learning for the first time." Such is Aristotle's realism. But when he speaks of most men and most states, he is thinking of the Hellenic world only, for barbarians are like plants and animals.

Alexander, too, thinks realistically. But he does not confine himself to "given conditions"; or rather, his victories have created new conditions. The domain over which he must install a system of government embraces the tribes of Asia as far as the Indus and the Jaxartes. And he has seen that these barbarians are not like plants and animals, but rather are men, with needs, natural endowments, virtues, and a way of being that is full of sound elements, some of which have been lost by those who despise them as barbarians. The Macedonians were superb soldiers because King Philip had made them so, and Alexander intended to do no less with the Asiatics, as he had already done with the Thracians, Paionians, Agrianians, and Odrysians. The Indian campaign tells us how well he succeeded. But Macedonian peasants, shepherds, and charcoal burners had no more Hellenic culture than their barbarian neighbors beyond the Rhodope and the Haimos. Nor were the Dolopians, Aitolians, Ainianians, Malians, and peasants of Amphissa esteemed otherwise among the Hellenes. And this Hellenic culture, however rich in art and learning, however excellent in developing intellectual adroitness and virtuosity of personal striving, had made men smarter, but no better. As it grew stronger, it had weakened and undermined the ethical basis on which the family and common civic and political life are built, just as wine is won by crushing grapes.

If Alexander had conquered Asia for the sake of the Hellenes and the Macedonians alone, if he had intended to make the Asiatics their slaves, they would have become Asiatics themselves, and the more quickly, but in a pejorative sense. Was it mastery and enslavement that had enabled the Hellenic world to expand, to put out new shoots, in colony after colony over the course of centuries? Had Hellenic life not spread to the Libyans on the Syrtis, the Scyths on the Maiotic Sea, the Celtic tribes between Alps and Pyrenees in the same way that Alexander now proposed to extend it over the great fortress of Asia?⁴⁵ Were the roving Hellenic mercenaries, who had squandered their energies throughout the world in ever greater numbers and only too often against their Hellenic homeland, not proof that this Hellenic homeland no longer had room for the

teeming energies it had created? Had the barbarians, whom the Hellenes considered born slaves, not maintained their dominion for a century almost exclusively by means of armed forces that Hellas sold them?

Aristotle was certainly right to require that one build on given conditions, but he did not probe deeply enough when he took these givens as they presented themselves in their weakest aspect, in unsustainable form.⁴⁶ It was only one side of the great revolution that Alexander imposed on the world that both the Hellenic and the Asiatic worlds had collapsed under the blows of Macedonian conquest, that this conquest was the instrument of history's critique of deeply decayed, intellectually exhausted, falsified conditions. The other side was that the cultural memory of Egypt counted by millennia; the Syrian-Babylonian world offered a wealth of polytechnic achievement, astronomical observation, and ancient literature; and did not the chaste Parsi teachings of the Iranians and Bactrians, the religion and philosophy of the Indian wonderland disclose a world of developments that complacent Hellenic culture had not even suspected? These Asiatics were not barbarians like the Illyrians, Triballians, and Getai, neither savage nor half-savage, as Hellenic nativism thought everything that did not speak Greek. Their conquerors came not only to give but also to receive, not only to teach but also to learn. Thus, we could say in conclusion, began the second part of the task that Alexander had set himself, the peace work, which was more difficult than his military victories. By making these victories secure, it would justify them and give them a future.

The state in which Alexander found the empire on his return from India must have shown him the weaknesses that inhere in too hasty construction. His harsh punishment may have parried the immediate threat, deterred further misdeeds, shown both oppressor and oppressed that they were being watched by a sharp eye and ruled by a strong hand. The more difficult task was to return to moderation and normalcy after ten years of enormous change, arousal, and mounting expectations among the victors, fear and embitterment among the vanquished. It was not in Alexander's nature, and perhaps not in the nature of events, to go on like this. His life had passed its zenith and the shadows were lengthening.

* * *

I turn now to consider the principal moments in a mounting tide of difficulties. Necessarily, the work done and the principles that informed it produced conditions from which sprang consequences, contradictions,

and impossibilities that are the other face of every act, and the process was gaining momentum.

We have already seen the political effect of the measure that Nikanor announced at the Olympian games. The exiles returned to houses and land that had been confiscated, sold, and resold, and in every Hellenic city disputes and procedures of all kinds followed. In Mytilene, a commission for questions of possession was set up and composed of established residents and returning exiles;⁴⁷ in Eresos, courts were set up “in keeping with the king’s order” to defend the exiles’ rights against the tyrants who had driven them out and the successors and adherents of these tyrants;⁴⁸ on Kalymna, five citizens of Iasos were convened as a court of arbitration.⁴⁹ These are notices preserved by chance. Inevitably, every Hellenic city had to go through the same unrest.

Another chance notice indicates that Alexander allotted land to veterans settled on Sipylos in Old Magnesia. We do not know when, under what circumstances, or by what right, nor whether the settlers were Macedonians, mercenaries, or something else.⁵⁰ This was no isolated case. Coins indicate that Macedonians were settled in Dokimeon and Blaundos, Thracians in Apollonia. Were the allotments given these settlers taken from municipal property or from royal domains?⁵¹ The same question arises concerning the “more than seventy cities” that Alexander founded. And by what provisions and under what law did the settlers live among established residents or natives brought into the new cities? What was or was made a royal domain? What were Alexander’s powers over such cities as Kios, Gergis, Elaia, and Mylasa when he offered to let Phokion choose one of them?⁵²

We do not know to what extent Alexander altered or adopted the old system of administration, Persian tax assessments, and the conventional system of tribute. Arrian notes that the punitive measures Alexander took on his return to Persia intended to deter those he had left behind “as satraps, hyparchs, and nomarchs.”⁵³ Is this an administrative hierarchy? Was it the same in all satrapies, or were there various systems of administration for various areas of the great empire, as Egypt would seem to indicate: one for the Syrian lands, another for the Iranian, yet another for the Baktrian? Were particular officials installed to oversee the treasury and raise tribute only in the satrapies of Asia Minor and in the areas where Syrian was spoken? We know just as little about these officials’ relationship to the military commanders of the satrapies, the particular competences of the various offices, and their remuneration. But we do learn that

Kleomenes of Naukratis, who administered Egyptian Arabia, could raise the export duty on grain, buy up all the grain in his province to profit from the famine in Athens, and impose a tax on the sacred crocodiles. Antimenes the Rhodian, who held an unidentified office in Babylon,⁵⁴ is reported to have reimposed an old duty of ten percent on all imports to Babylon and to have set up an insurance scheme that reimbursed the value of escaped slaves against a premium of ten drachmas per head. We have only such isolated notices and do not know the standing of the cities vis-à-vis the tribes (ἔθνη) for administrative purposes or the standing of the dynasts, the temple states (Ephesos, Komana, etc.),⁵⁵ the dependent princes.

One of the yeastier elements in these emerging circumstances must have been the enormous quantities of precious metal that the conquest of Asia put into Alexander's hands. Before the Peloponnesian Wars, Athens was the greatest capital power in the Hellenic world on the strength of 9000 talents of coined silver in the treasury on the acropolis, in addition to gold and silver vessels. These assured its ascendancy over the other states of the Peloponnesian league, where exchange was still in kind.⁵⁶ Persia's wealth was of another order altogether. In addition to the booty taken at Issos, in Damaskos, Arbela, and elsewhere, Alexander found 50,000 talents in Susa, another 50,000 in Persepolis,⁵⁷ 6000 at Pasargadai, and further sums in Ecbatana, according to our sources. He is said to have deposited 180,000 talents in the treasury at Ecbatana. We do not know what else fell to him in gold and silver vessels, royal purple, precious stones, and jewelry,⁵⁸ or what was added in the satrapies and in India. Nor can we use these figures to calculate the wealth in gold and silver that was put back into circulation upon Alexander's conquest and in the ten years that followed.

But if the monarchy that now ruled Asia released this dead capital, we can imagine how employment and commerce must have brought it into ever more rapid circulation through the withered arteries of the empire and how the economic life of the tribes, sucked dry by Persian rule, must have revived and gained strength. Inevitably, in this economic revival prices rose,⁵⁹ centers of international commerce shifted, and in some places trade fell,⁶⁰ a circumstance that may explain certain phenomena in the old Hellenic lands during the following period.

According to Herodotos, the yield of tribute from property tax in the Persian empire was 14,560 Euboian talents annually. Another source, less reliable, calculates the yield of tribute in Alexander's final year at 30,000

talents and adds that only 50,000 talents remained in the treasury.⁶¹ In Persian times, the most depressive force on the economy had been an enormous quantity of payments in kind, calculated at 13,000 talents rendered annually to the royal court alone. And every satrap, every hyparch and dynast followed the example of the Great King. There are indications that Alexander abrogated the system of payments in kind.⁶² Formerly, the Great King's presence in a city or a countryside had consumed all its resources; now the presence of the king and his court was to produce a profit. Toward the end of Alexander's life, maintaining the opulence of his court no longer depressed the economy; it promoted trade and lifted prosperity instead. To outfit his courtiers, for example, the king is said to have sent into Ionia to buy up all supplies of royal purple. This instance implies others like it. It may be assumed with fair probability that the satraps and strategoi in the provinces, and their likes, no longer relied on payments in kind; no less that their regular receipts covered their outlays for appropriate display. Whatever is said about their mad extravagance, they spent to gain. The king used large gifts—for example, one talent for each veteran sent home from Opis—to assure that the troops, especially those who had served a full tour of duty, could live comfortably, and when a soldier consumed more than he had, the king paid his debts with unstinting liberality. His openhandedness with poets, artists, philosophers, and virtuosi, for every kind of learned inquiry is well known. That Aristotle's studies of natural history were supported by a sum of 800 talents at his disposal seems incredible until one considers the dimensions of that achievement.

Let us note briefly Alexander's great construction projects, mentioned occasionally in our sources, such as restoring the Babylonian canal system, dredging the drainage ditches of the Kopais,⁶³ reconstructing the ruined temples in Hellas, to which he is said to have dedicated 10,000 talents,⁶⁴ building a dam at Klazomenai, and piercing the isthmus from there to Teos.⁶⁵ These examples suffice to indicate what Alexander's successes meant for economic life.⁶⁶

Perhaps never again has the influence of one man brought about such sudden, radical, and comprehensive change, change that was not the result of coincidence but, as far as we can tell, of intention and purposeful execution. The tribes of Asia had been roused; the West had learned to know and to enjoy the pleasures of the East, and the East to know and enjoy the arts of the West; westerners who remained in India or Bactria, and Asiatics from the satrapies who had gathered at the court longed for

the comforts of home; a great jumble of these many ways of life and requirements, which attained greatest brilliance at the royal court, must have become *de rigueur* in the satrapies, in aristocratic houses, in every circle. There was therefore great need of an expansive, comprehensive trade net for which routes had to be opened, improved, and protected and a series of important centers developed that would make it coherent and keep it reliable. This consideration had always been present to Alexander, beside military considerations, when he founded cities and colonized them, and to this day, his cities are the great emporia of Asia. Although caravans of our own time are exposed to raids and the willful oppression of potentates, the routes of Alexander's empire were secure, the marauding tribes of the hills and the desert intimidated or forcibly settled, and royal officials duty-bound to promote and protect trade and prepared to do so.

Commercial shipping on the Mediterranean also grew extraordinarily. Egyptian Alexandria was becoming the center of Mediterranean trade, which the king planned to protect by suppressing the Etruscan and Illyrian pirates. Alexander was tireless in his efforts to open new seaways. He had discovered a route from the Indus to the Euphrates and the Tigris and founded Hellenistic harbor cities at the mouths of these rivers to support this sea traffic. We shall see shortly what he did to enlarge traffic and to connect the interior of the Syrian low country directly to the river mouths, as he had the upcountry of the Indus; how he planned to find a sea route from the Persian Gulf around the Arabian peninsula to the Red Sea and toward Alexandria; how he intended to extend military and commercial roads from Egyptian Alexandria westward along the southern coast of the Mediterranean; how he thought to have ships built in the Hyrkanian forest and used to find a connection between the Caspian Sea and the northern ocean and eventually the Indian Ocean.

The mixing of the tribes, already begun, in which Alexander saw the means and the goals of his foundations, should be mentioned here. In the course of ten years, an entire world had been discovered and conquered, the barriers between East and West had fallen, and routes had been opened to connect henceforth the lands where the sun rises with the lands where it sets. An ancient writer recounts: "The elements of all tribal life were once mixed in a loving cup, and the peoples all drank from this cup; they forgot their old enmities and their sense of powerlessness."⁶⁷

The consequences that this mixing of peoples entailed should not be presented here; they belong to the history of the centuries that follow. But already here at the beginning, one can see the directions in which

art, learning, religion, and all things that men take cognizance of and impose their will on developed—often wretchedly enough and into malformations in which only the historical perspective, discerning connections over a span of centuries, can discover the great submerged course of progress. Hellenic art gained nothing when it moved from the tranquil grandeur of harmonious proportions to the Asiatic ostentation of massiveness, when it learned to trump the idealism of its representations with the opulent effects of costly material and to gratify a demand to see things represented realistically. Nonetheless, the Hellenic artist found a rich source of new visions and new plans by mixing the traditions of his native art with the somber splendor of Egyptian temples, the fantastic cliff palaces of Persepolis, the gigantic ruins of Babylon, and the magnificent buildings of India animated by images of coiling snakes and elephants crouching at the base of columns. Then the concepts became inflated and took on monstrous scale: Deinokrates, as we know, proposed to carve Mount Athos into a statue of Alexander, his one hand supporting a city of ten thousand inhabitants, his other sending a mountain stream cascading to the sea.

Poetry's part in this new way of life was to develop in so-called new comedy a fineness of psychological observation and a virtuosity in representing the characters and situations of everyday life—social life on a small scale, one could say—that shows how removed one now was from the pull of great common interests, of the great ideas and passions that make life worth living. The heroic scale of battles currently in progress and the admirable things these battles yielded opened no new avenues to Hellenic poetry, absorbed now in realistic representation on a scale no larger than the interest of the individual. Hellenic poetry was not able to receive the colorful richness of the Persian tale or the ethereal solemnity of the monotheistic psalms and prophecy. When it wanted to rise above the quotidian, it turned back to imitate the classical period and left it to the East to remember their common hero Iskander in a thousand epics and odes down through the ages. Only the most recent trend in Hellenic rhetoric, vigorously practiced, could try out new forms: so-called Asiatic rhetoric, flowery and laden with ornament, is a characteristic product of the age.

The transformation of knowledge begun at the time was more fruitful. Aristotle had created the great empiricism needed to master the enormous stores of new material in every branch of learning that Alexander's campaigns produced. The king was a pupil of Aristotle and familiar with and

constantly interested in the work of Hellenic physicians, philosophers, and rhetors. Men of all avenues of inquiry accompanied him on his campaigns, to observe, investigate, and collect. They mapped out the new countries and paced off their principal roads. History, too, entered a new era. The historians who accompanied Alexander could conduct their researches *in loco*; they could compare tribal sagas with tribal monuments, the fortunes of the tribes with their mores. For all the countless errors and inventions disseminated by Alexander's so-called history writers, the material and subsequently the method of great historical scholarship date from this period. In many ways, the Hellenes could learn from the East: from Babylon's grand tradition of astronomical observation, from India's knowledge of medicine and remedies, from the Egyptian priests' knowledge of anatomy and mechanics, to all of which the Hellenes gave new meaning. They had always seen philosophy as the soul of knowledge. Now other approaches to learning broke away and established themselves, for example, the exact sciences, based on independent observation. Philosophy, meanwhile, quarreling over the relationship of mind to matter, sometimes said that phenomena were inadequate to ideas, sometimes that perception was inadequate to phenomena.

Necessarily, the transformation of tribal life, in mores, social practice, and religion, proceeded more slowly, indeed imperceptibly except for the occasional eruption. After Alexander's death, a reaction against innovations introduced too suddenly, without preparation and often by force, set in and favored first one side, then the other during the thirty years of the successors' struggles. The result of this long unrest was that what had been new became accustomed and took on forms that each tribe adapted and ultimately all tribes adopted as a common principle for their further development. New social forms emerged as national prejudices diminished; needs, customs, and ways of seeing things became more similar; and tribal sense of self, once wary and quarrelsome, became more receptive to foreign contact. Just as in modern times certain opinions, assumptions, and conventions, right down to questions of fashion, announce a unity of the civilized world, during Hellenistic times, and, I do not doubt, in similar forms, a common culture worked its way through the peoples and imposed the same conventions on the banks of the Nile and of the Jaxartes as appropriate to polite society and cultivated circles. Attic speech and Attic manners created a norm for the courts of Alexandria and Babylon, of Baktra and Pergamon. When Hellenism forfeited

its political independence to the Roman state, it came to dominate fashion and culture in Rome. With reason one can call Hellenism the first world-wide unity. While the Achaimenid empire was no more than an aggregate of land masses whose peoples had nothing in common except subservience, Hellenism brought to its lands a higher unity of education and culture, taste, fashion, and other elements of this ever changing standard of human society, a unity that held even when the empire crumbled into smaller realms.

Political change affects the moral climate of a people to the extent that that people participates directly in the functions of the state. The historical bogging down that had left the peoples of Asia caught in the most lethargic of political forms, despotism and hierarchy, also left them largely mute and passive in the boundless change that had overtaken them. Alexander had variously accommodated their conventions and prejudices as the only way to bring them to move beyond themselves. The result of this effort depended on the particular tribe: the Uxians and the Mardaite had to learn to till the soil, "the Hyrkanians to live in wedlock, the Sogdians to care for their aged parents instead of killing them." The Egyptians, on the other hand, had already begun to abandon their revulsion toward casteless foreigners and the Phoenicians their atrocious offerings to Moloch. Nonetheless, only in the succeeding period could an analogous new way of being, thinking, and acting develop, to no small extent because the ancient peoples of Asia found the basis of their morals and of their personal and legal relations grounded in religion and therefore peremptory and unchallengeable, while contemporary Hellenes looked to positive law or to advanced understanding of ethical principles. It was the task of Hellenism in Asia, brought to fruition, at least in part, over the long course, to lead the peoples of Asia to enlightenment, to free them of the trammels of superstition and enforced piety, to make them willing and able to think for themselves and to assume the consequences, good and evil—in short, to emancipate them into history.

The transformation of the moral climate among the Macedonian and the Hellenic peoples was more rapid and more decided. In Alexander's time, both experience a heightening of abilities and of drives, a sharpening of demand and of their passions, a tendency to live in the moment and for the moment, an uncompromising realism. But with great differences. The Macedonian, thirty years earlier a simple peasant bound to the soil and content with the indifferent monotony of his impoverished

homeland, is now obsessed with glory, power, and battle. He feels himself master of a new world and prides himself less on having once conquered this world than on now being able to despise it. From a long succession of campaigns he has brought home the truculent self-confidence, cold military abruptness, and contempt of danger and of the value of his own life that return in caricature in the period of the successors. If the great historical events a people has lived through impress themselves on the mind and the face of that people, then the scars of ten years of war in the East, features deeply seamed by endless hardships, by deprivation followed by excess of all kinds are the type of the Macedonian. The Hellenic world is different. Its time is past. The once so vigorous Hellenes, buoyed now neither by an impulsion toward new deeds nor by an awareness of political power, are content to bask in the glory of their memories. Braggadocio stands in for honor; sated with pleasure, they now seek its most superficial form, which is constant change. More frivolous now, more volatile, and full of talk, each individual further removed than ever from submitting to common responsibility or authority, looser and more unrestrained in general, the Greeks and their world embark on the clever, piquant, high-strung busyness that is the final stage in the life of a people. All things positive, restraining, cohesive, even the sense that they are dross, have been lost. Enlightenment has run its course.

One can certainly say that by virtue of this enlightenment, however leveling and repugnant it may seem in its particulars, the power of paganism had been broken and a more spiritual development of religion made possible. Nothing promoted this effect more than the curious amalgamation of gods, the theocracy, in which all the peoples of Hellenism participated in the following centuries.

The most formidable obstacle to Alexander's great work was that divinities and cult, the myths of paganism are the proper and liveliest expression of ethnographic and historical differences among peoples. He penetrated to the heart of the matter when he, whose person and regime represented ideal unity, kept in his entourage equally the Indian penitent Kalanos, the Persian magus Ostanes,⁶⁸ and the Lykian diviner Aristander; when he, no less than the faithful, accepted the divinities of the Egyptians, the Persians, the Babylonians, Baal of Tarsos, Jehovah of the Jews, performed their ceremonies and met their requirements, and laid to one side unanswered questions of meaning and content. In these observances he may have encountered here and there ways of seeing things and occult priestly teachings, framed in the pantheistic, deistic, nihilistic versions of popular

belief, that corresponded to what cultivated Hellenes gained from their philosophy.⁶⁹ The king's example will have affected ever widening circles. Hellenes began to adopt foreign gods more boldly and to recognize native gods in foreign ones, and to compare and reconcile the myths and theogonies of various peoples. They became persuaded that all peoples honored the same divinity, in more or less successful representation, in their own gods; that they were trying to express, more or less deeply grasped, the same inkling of things transcendental and absolute, concerning ultimate purpose or cause; and that differences of divine names, attributes, and offices were superficial and accidental and were to be adjusted and deepened to the level of their own thinking.

Thus it was revealed that the time of local, national, that is to say, of pagan religions had passed and that humanity, finally becoming one, was in want of and capable of a single common religion. Theocracy itself was nothing less than an attempt to produce unity from a blending of various religious systems. The difficulty was that unity could not be reached this way. The task of the Hellenistic centuries was to create the elements of a higher, truer union, to develop a sense of finiteness and powerlessness, a need of expiation and consolation, and the strength of deep humility and exaltation to the point of freedom in God, as a child of God. In these centuries, a sense of divinity went out of the world and out of men's hearts; these were centuries of deepest abandonment and desolation, of a rising call for redemption.

In Alexander the anthropomorphism of Hellenic paganism reached its highest form: a man became God. His was the kingdom of this world, in him man was elevated to the highest height of finiteness, through him humanity was abased to the point of addressing as a god one who was born mortal.

CHAPTER 3

At the end of seven years of war, a great warrior prince of modern times writes that his many campaigns have made him an old man.¹ And yet he was just over forty, and at the height of his powers, when he began his campaigns. Alexander had campaigned without pause for twelve years and taken serious wounds, more than one of them life-threatening. He had endured endless hardships and the strain and tension of immense exploits: the shattering events on the Hyphasis, the terrible march through the Gedrosian desert, the veterans' riot at Opis. He had killed Kleitos with his javelin, had had Philotas and Parmenion put to death. The tradition does not tell us whether his mind and body were still as fresh and resilient as in the days of the Danube campaign and on the Granikos, or if he had begun to become "nervous" and felt prematurely aged. The next period would bring more painful experiences.

Shortly after the veterans left Opis, Alexander and his army moved out toward Ecbatana. During his absence in India, Media in particular had suffered from the excesses of overbearing Macedonian officials and commanders. The tribes had remained loyal despite the oppression and provocation to rebel, and the satrap Atropates had delivered Baryaxes, who had attempted to start a rising, to the king's justice. Nonetheless, there was ample occasion there to investigate matters and set them to rights. The effects of Harpalos's flight and his plundering of the treasury would require closer examination, and the highway through the Median mountains was less secure than the lively traffic between the Syrian satrapies and the uplands required. The Kossaians, a marauding tribe of the Zagros Mountains and one of a number of mountain tribes between Armenia and the Karmanian coast, had never been tamed, and they threatened every transport not closely guarded on the way to the Median passes. For these reasons the king decided to delay his return to Babylon until spring and his operations toward the south and the west, already being prepared.

About the end of August 324, Alexander took the usual Median road from Opis to Ecbatana.² The troops followed in several divisions, crossing

the northern districts of Sittakene. Four days beyond the hamlet Karrhai he reached Sambata, where he remained for seven days, until the various columns had come together again. In three marches they reached Kelonai (Holwan), a few miles from the Zagros passes. In the days of the Persian wars, Kelonai had been settled by Hellenes, and it preserved Hellenic custom and speech, influenced albeit by local practice. Alexander proceeded toward the passes of Bagistane, where he visited the celebrated gardens laid out on the plain and called the gardens of Semiramis.³ Further marching brought him to the Nysaen fields,⁴ pasture of the Persian kings' enormous herds of horses, fifty or sixty thousand in number, by Alexander's count. There the army rested for a month. Atropates, satrap of Media, came out to meet the king on the frontier of his satrapy, bringing, legend has it, one hundred mounted women, who carried battle axes and small shields and whom he described as Amazons—a tale that has been elaborated in the most curious fashion.⁵

This rest was punctuated by an eruption between Hephaistion and Eumenes. Eumenes of Kardia was the king's chief of staff, valued for his adroitness and his dependability; at the Susa weddings, Alexander had rewarded him with Artabazos's daughter. His reputation in money matters was less sterling. Word had it that the indispensable chief secretary profited handsomely from Alexander's largesse whenever his advantage seemed to conflict with his duty or his devotion. Only once did Eumenes's conduct provoke Alexander to the point of teaching him a lesson. Having exhausted his own funds, Alexander had made the equipping of the Indus fleet a matter of honor for the grandees in his entourage. Eumenes was supposed to contribute 300 talents. He gave only 100 talents, protesting that he had had difficulty producing even that amount. Alexander knew how rich Eumenes was. He refused Eumenes's contribution but made him no reproach. Instead, he ordered that Eumenes's tent be set afire in the middle of the night, intending to expose him when he rushed out carrying his treasure. But the troops lost control of the blaze and it consumed the tent and all its contents, which included Alexander's official correspondence. The molten gold and silver recovered from the ashes alone amounted to more than 1000 talents, which Alexander let Eumenes keep. Copies of the burned correspondence were requested from the satraps and strategoi to whom it had been addressed.⁶

Eumenes served with stylus and tablet, not with spear and shield, and in camp he was little loved. The influence and prestige he enjoyed with Alexander had made him widely resented. Hephaistion, in particular,

who came into frequent contact with Eumenes, disliked him as a simple matter of character. Hephaistion, all sources tell us, was noble, chivalrous, devoted, truly and touchingly attached to the king. Alexander loved him as his boyhood playmate. No brilliance of throne or military glory or alteration in Alexander's inner or outer life, which estranged many whom the king had trusted, could disturb their warm and intimate friendship, marked by the enthusiastic tenderness of youth, which neither of them had left behind entirely. We have an image of their relations with one another in an anecdote: Alexander was reading a letter from his mother, full of reproach and complaint, which he preferred to keep to himself. Hephaistion, however, came up and read the letter over Alexander's shoulder. Whereupon Alexander pressed his seal ring against Hephaistion's mouth.⁷

Hephaistion and Eumenes had often quarreled, and their dislike of one another required no great provocation to erupt again. Eumenes's envious reaction to a gift Alexander had made to Hephaistion led to a shouting match in which both men forgot themselves, stopped only when Alexander intervened. Alexander made a similar gift to Eumenes, reproved Hephaistion for disregarding the dignity of his own rank, and required that they promise to keep the peace. Hephaistion refused, offended; Alexander insisted, and for Alexander's sake, Hephaistion finally offered Eumenes his hand.⁸

After thirty days in the valley of Nysa, the king moved out to Ecbatana, which he reached in seven days, about the end of October.⁹ The tradition says little about what he arranged, founded, and organized there, which was his principal activity in those days,¹⁰ and correspondingly more about the Great Dionysia as they were observed in the grand capital of Media.¹¹

Alexander had taken residence in the royal palace, which stood below the citadel and dated from the time of Median greatness. It was laid out over a space of seven stades, and its splendor bordered on the fabulous. All woodwork was of cedar and cypress; beams, ceilings, and columns in the antechambers and interior spaces were sheathed in gold or silver, the roofs shingled in silver. The temple of Anytis nearby was supported by columns with gold capitals, and the roof was shingled in gold and silver.¹² The rapacious Macedonian commanders in Media had stolen much of this ornament, but what remained was still an astonishing sight. The surrounding area was equally magnificent. An artificial hill rose behind the palace, surmounted by the strongly fortified citadel, glorious with battlements, towers, and the vaults of the treasury. Below, the great

city spread out over a circumference of three miles; to the north the peaks of the high Orontes towered above gorges through which the aqueducts of Semiramis ran down to the town.

In this truly kingly city Alexander celebrated the Dionysia of autumn 324. Observances began with the great sacrifices by which Alexander customarily thanked the gods for the good fortune they had granted him and continued in contests, processions, and artistic competitions, punctuated by dinners and banquets. Atropates the satrap exceeded himself in brilliant extravagance: He made the entire army his guests; surrounded by foreigners who had streamed in to watch the spectacle, the Macedonians sat at long rows of tables and made merry, while heralds pronounced their toasts and good wishes for the king and announced the gifts they dedicated to him, all to the sound of the trumpet. The king's master of arms proclaimed memorably: "To King Alexander, son of Zeus Ammon, Gorgos¹³ dedicates this wreath made of three thousand gold pieces and, for his coming siege of Athens, ten thousand sets of armor and as many catapults, and all the missiles he will need in war."¹⁴

While the army reveled, Hephaistion had fallen ill, and all the arts of Glaukias the physician could not slow his consuming fever. Alexander, who was obliged to leave his friend's bedside and show himself in public, was present in the surging crowd at the pages' contest on the seventh day of the festivities when a message came that Hephaistion was worse.¹⁵ The king returned immediately to the palace and to Hephaistion's bed-chamber, where he found that Hephaistion had just died. The gods could have inflicted nothing more painful. Alexander sat beside the corpse of his favorite, snatched away in the bloom of youth, for three days, neither eating nor drinking, grieving loudly.¹⁶ The games were stopped, and the army and the people mourned the noblest of Macedonians. The magi doused the sacred fires in the temples as if a king had died. When his friends had separated him from the corpse and he had recovered his composure, Alexander made arrangements for a funeral procession that would carry the body down to Babylon. Eumenes directed the strategoi, hipparchs, and companions to bring weapons, jewelry, and other gifts to decorate the hearse.¹⁷ Perdikkas was to lead the procession, and Deinokrates, who accompanied him, would set about constructing a funeral pyre. Funeral games would follow in the spring.

Toward the end of the year 324, Alexander moved out of Ecbatana to take the army back to Babylon by way of the Kossaians' mountains, now deep in snow, so that the tribes could not flee from their valleys onto the heights. He sent the main army ahead down the military road and

took the light troops southward, where the sheep-herding Kossaians lived and followed their flocks to the edge of the Uxians, a related tribe. In two columns, one under Alexander, the other under Lagid Ptolemy, the Macedonians swept the mountain valleys, picking off one by one mostly small hordes, who resisted boldly, and destroying their fastnesses. Many thousands were killed or taken prisoner, the rest subjected and forced into fixed settlements, where they would till the soil. In the course of forty days, the last remaining independent mountain tribes in the countryside around the passes had been reduced, like the Uxians, Kadousians, Mardaites, and Paraitakenoi before them, and the first steps taken toward civilizing them.¹⁸

Alexander moved down to Babylon in short marches, gathering his various units from the mountain valleys. There he intended to unite all his forces for new projects. Babylon was to become the center of the empire and the royal residence, functions to which the city was well suited by size, ancient glory, and, especially, by situation. It lay between western and eastern tribes, but closer to the west, where Alexander would probably direct his efforts, now that the East had been conquered. To the west lay Italy, where the Epirote king, his sister's husband, had recently lost his honor and his life; Iberia, rich in silver, lay to the west, and the Phoenician colonies, whose founding cities now belonged to the empire, and Carthage, which had allied itself with Persia during the first Persian wars and never ceased to battle the Hellenes in Libya and in Sicily.

The enormous changes in the East had carried Alexander's name to the remotest tribes, which, willingly or not, must have seen that it was necessary to take up relations with the power that would determine the future. Thus it happened that embassies from the most distant peoples came into camp, bringing homage and gifts or seeking arbitration of quarrels with neighboring tribes. Only now, says Arrian, did Alexander and his staff understand that he truly was lord of land and sea.¹⁹ Alexander gave precedence to the missions sent on sacred matters—from Elis, the Ammonion, the temples at Delphi, Corinth, Epidauros and elsewhere—according to the importance of their respective shrines; those bearing gifts came next, then those who wanted to negotiate disputes across frontiers; second-last were referrals of internal or private matters, and last the Hellenic delegations who came to make representations about the return of exiles.

Our sources name only the missions that are notable in some respect and these they merely mention, so that their precise nature must be construed from what is otherwise known about the affairs of the peoples

who sent them. Arrian cites Bruttian, Lucanian, and Etruscan embassies but doubts the Roman embassy noted by other writers. The contemporary state of affairs in Italy will indicate whether there was occasion for such a mission.

War with Molossian Alexander had given the Bruttians and Lucanians reason enough to fear Alexander his brother-in-law, master of Asia and the obvious defender of the Hellenic world. Tarentum, a rich commercial center, had called Alexander the Molossian to its aid against the Bruttians and Lucanians, whom he then defeated, with their allies the Samnites, in a great battle at Paestum. He went on to demolish the Messapii and the Daunii on the east coast of the Italian peninsula, with the result that his power now extended from sea to sea. The Romans allied themselves with him for their own attack on the Samnites;²⁰ they extended their territory and colonized it to the edge of Campania while the Samnites were away fighting in the south. Molossian Alexander's growing power may have caused the Taurentines to fear that he would make himself lord of Greater Greece. They sought alliances with those against whom they had invoked his help, and a Lucanian fugitive murdered him, freeing the Samnites to address the Romans, who had taken both Kyme, the oldest Hellenic city on the coast, and Capua. The Romans' attempt to extend their conquest to Neapolis and Palaiopolis (328) touched off the great Samnite war, which, after fluctuating fortunes, reached its first truce in the Caudine passes and a Roman treaty of surrender. The Greek cities of Italy, riven and paralyzed, took no advantage of these events, but rather pinned their hopes on the conqueror of Asia, whom the Italic peoples feared, believing he might come and snatch the rich coastal cities that they looked upon as their rightful booty. After all, he had sent booty from Gaugamela to the Krotonites, because one of their number had fought against Xerxes at Salamis.

It may be chance that no notice of a Samnite embassy survives, or none may have come. But the clever, far-sighted patrician regime in Rome, which had won over the nearby Lucanians and Apulians in its hard struggle with the Samnites and allied itself with Molossian Alexander, certainly might have thought it prudent to seek the favor of the man whose intervention they feared as they set out to subject the Greek cities of Campania. Another notice indicates that Alexander cautioned the Romans about the piracy that their subjects the Antiates continued to practice along with the Etruscans.²¹ An Etruscan embassy can be explained as the result of the many and various conflicts that their piracy created with the Hellenic states. Indeed, the Athenians had just equipped an expedition to

the entrance of the Adriatic to found a colony that was to assure them a well-defended trading and warehousing post there and protect Hellenic commercial shipping.²²

The missions of the Carthaginians, Libyans, and Iberians are readily explained. Alexander's possession of Phoenicia will have made Carthage and its closely associated colonies in north Africa and Iberia especially attentive to the ruler of a mighty empire from which they had more to fear than mere trade rivalry. The Carthaginians in particular will have studied their prospects carefully in light of their earlier relations with the Hellenes of Sicily, chronic since the days of Timoleon, offered occasion enough for an intervention that would not be to their advantage.²³ The "Libyan" ambassadors mentioned as coming to congratulate the king on his conquest of Asia came in fact from the tribes south of Cyrene.

Among other delegations, those of the European Scyths, the Celts, and the Ethiopians are named, the last probably of great interest to the king, now making plans to circumnavigate Africa and extend his seaways, which already connected Indus and Euphrates, into the Red Sea and northward along the east coast of Egypt. Phoenicia had already received orders to raise a levy of sailors, build ships, and transport them dismantled overland to the Euphrates; Nearchos had been told to bring the standing fleet up the Euphrates to Babylon; the campaign against the Arabs was to be opened shortly after the king arrived in Babylon. Herakleides Argaios's son had been sent with a team of shipwrights to the Caspian shore to fell trees in the Hyrkanian mountains and build warships, decked and deckless, in Hellenic fashion. The intention was to look for a northern passage by which the Caspian communicated with the Maiotis or the open sea and ultimately with Indian waters. That expedition may have been connected also with a campaign against the Scyths, discussed five years earlier with the Chorasmian king.²⁴ Very significant reinforcements for the land army had also been recruited and were expected to muster in Babylon in the course of the spring. Manifestly, Alexander had large plans. It seemed that campaigns to the north, south, and west would be undertaken simultaneously and perhaps entrusted to field commanders, while Alexander reserved to himself oversight of all operations from the capital in Babylon, at least at the outset.

On the march down to Babylon, the troops and their captains were probably wondering what would happen next. What they did not know was how deeply Hephaistion's death had affected Alexander, how he was

seeking diversion and consolation in ever more daring plans and projects. With his friend, Alexander had buried his youth. On the very threshold of manhood he had begun to age, and his heart was full of foreboding.²⁵

When the army had crossed the Tigris and could see the battlements of great Babylon, it was met by the highest of the Chaldaeans, Babylon's astrologer priests, who took the king aside. Bel, they said, had disclosed to them that the moment was not propitious for Alexander's entry into Babylon.²⁶ Alexander replied by citing verse: The best seer was the one who prophesied favorably. To which the Chaldaeans replied: Not looking westward, not from this side of the river, should the king come into Babylon. Let him go around the city until he is looking eastward. Alexander had the army pitch camp on the east bank of the Euphrates and went down that bank next morning, intending to cross and enter the city from the west. But the marshes adjacent to the river stopped him, and there were no bridges outside the walls. He was going to have to make a long detour. The Sophist Anaxarchos came to the king, the story goes, and opposed his superstitious fears on philosophical grounds.²⁷ It is more likely that Alexander mastered his misgivings himself and came to see the whole affair as a waste of time, that his greater fear was to seem timid in the eyes of the army and the people, and that he did not doubt that the Chaldaeans had good reason to find his presence in Babylon inconvenient. The immense temple to Bel had lain in ruins since the days of Xerxes, and in 330 Alexander had ordered it rebuilt. During his absence, construction had come to a halt: The Chaldaeans had their own uses for the proceeds of the temple lands, designated to keep construction going. Thus it was wholly explicable that the stars forbade or discouraged the king's entry into Babylon. Alexander ignored the Chaldaeans' warning and entered the city from the east. His return was celebrated in festivals and banquets.

In these days, Aristoboulos recounts, the Amphipolite Pithagoras, of priestly descent and an interpreter of entrails, was present in Babylon. His brother Apollodoros, local strategos since 331, had been ordered to bring his troops out to meet the king, returning from India, and Alexander's subsequent punishment of miscreant satraps had left him worried about his own future. He had therefore sent to his brother in Babylon asking him to read the signs. Pithagoras, having inquired, learned that Apollodoros feared Alexander and Hephaestion most; he then sacrificed and wrote his brother, now in Ecbatana, that Hephaestion would soon

no longer stand in his way—a letter that arrived on the day before Hephaestion died. Pithagoras sacrificed again and read the signs, and wrote Apollodoros the same thing about Alexander. Apollodoros, intent, it is said, on demonstrating that his devotion was greater than his concern for his own fortunes, went to the king, told him of the omens, and cautioned him. Alexander, returned to Babylon, summoned Pithagoras to ask what he had seen. The victim's liver had been without a lobe, was the reply. Alexander thanked the diviner for his forthrightness and dismissed him with all indications of his favor. But he was shaken by the congruent results of Hellenic divining and Chaldaean astrology. He was uneasy within these walls. The gods had warned him. But he could not leave.

New embassies had come in, from the Hellenic lands and from Macedonia and its dependencies. We know that among the earlier Hellenic missions, received on the march down to Babylon, those in local and private matters met with satisfaction, whereas those against the return of exiles were definitively rebuffed. The missions now sent to Babylon, therefore, probably brought congratulations on the Indian campaign or expressions of thanks for the return of exiles and other benefactions. The king responded with his usual graciousness; for example, he returned to the Hellenic states the plundered statues and offerings that he had found in Pasargadae, Susa, Babylon and elsewhere.²⁸ Many Macedonians had also come, and missions from Thrace, Illyria, and other dependent areas, to complain of Antipater the viceroy. Antipater is said to have sent his son Kassandros to justify him. He may also have wished to send this, his eldest son, to the king, whom his son Iollas already served as cupbearer, as a pledge of his loyalty, in an attempt to restore his weakened relations with Alexander before he himself arrived. Tense scenes between Kassandros and the king are reported, but not by the most reliable authority.²⁹

During his stay in Babylon, Alexander also attended to local matters. He is reported to have inspected the abandoned restoration of the temple of Bel and to have ordered that it be resumed forthwith, and to have set his soldiers, momentarily without occupation, to work there. Twenty thousand men labored for two months just to cart away debris and clear the site. But supervening events delayed actual construction.³⁰

Preparation for the new campaign continued. The river fleet, which Nearchos had taken down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf and up the Euphrates, lay at anchor before the city walls. Two penteremes, three tetraremes, twelve triremes, and about thirty thirty-rowers had been built

in Phoenicia, sawed into sections, and transported overland to Thapsakos, where they were reassembled and sailed down the Euphrates to Babylon. To build ships in Babylon, where only native palms grew, the king ordered the many cypresses in the royal gardens cut down. To create a harbor, for which the river offered no natural site, he ordered a basin to accommodate a thousand vessels excavated near the palace. Having heard of all this shipbuilding, sailors, shipwrights, merchants, and traders streamed in from Phoenicia and other coastal areas, hoping to have use of the new trade routes or to take service with the fleet in the next campaign. Mikkalos of Klazomenai was sent into Phoenicia and Syria with five hundred talents to acquire coastal dwellers and seamen and take them to the lower Euphrates. Alexander, who knew of the many specialties produced in Arabia, planned to establish colonies along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and its islands for the purpose of securing these coasts and enlarging trade to the south. If one could tame the Bedouin tribes that patrolled the great desert from the edge of Egypt almost to Thapsakos and Babylon and disturbed the open highway and the frontiers of the adjacent satrapies, a direct connection between Babylon and Egypt would become possible. Petra and the northern extremes of the Red Sea would have to be acquired and colonized and extant land routes connected to the Red Sea routes that Alexander intended to open.

Three ships had been sent down the Euphrates to explore the gulf. Archias with a thirty-rower returned to report that he had discovered an island to the south, near the bay of Gerrha, that was small, densely forested, and inhabited by a peaceful little tribe that worshipped Artemis, letting the island's deer and wild goats browse freely in her honor.³¹ From Gerrha, a wealthy town of enterprising traders, a highway led through the Arabian interior to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Oddly, Alexander called this island after the mythical Ikaros, who flew too close to the sun and fell into the sea. South of Ikaros, said Archias, he had found a second, larger island that the natives called Tylos.³² It was neither stony nor wooded and was suited to agriculture. He might have added that the island lay in the midst of fabled pearl reefs, known also to the Macedonians. Androthenes returned with the second ship, which had sailed for some distance along the Arabian coast to observe its features. Hieron of Soloi brought back the third. He had been instructed to circumnavigate the Arabian peninsula and find an entrance into the gulf that extends northward to within a few miles of Heroonpolis in Egypt and had sailed as far as he dared. He reported that the peninsula was extraordinarily long and perhaps as large as India. He had proceeded southward until he reached a

promontory that jutted eastward far into the open sea, where he had turned back, frightened by bare and barren beaches that offered little support for a ship.³³

While these works continued, Alexander took a few ships down the Euphrates to inspect the system of dikes on the Pallakopas.³⁴ This canal branches westward from the Euphrates about sixteen miles downstream from Babylon and carries water from the river into a sea that runs along the Arabian frontier southward into marshes that reach the Persian Gulf. The canal regulates the rise and fall of the Euphrates and is of immense importance to the local countryside. As the snows on the Armenian mountains melt and the river rises in spring and continues to rise in summer, canals, particularly the Pallakopas, carry away the overflow, protecting the river valley and irrigating regions beyond that valley. But when the river falls in autumn, the canal must be closed to keep the river from turning into it and forming a new bed. The difficulty was that the canal met the river in an area of loose ground that even very laboriously transported fill could not make firm enough to withstand the current, to say nothing of the river in flood. The dikes were constantly crumbling and in danger of total destruction in periods of high water, and had to be repaired at great length and with great effort before the canal could be closed. At the time of Alexander's inspection, ten thousand men under orders of the satrap of Babylonia had been working on the dikes for three months. One hour downstream from the established junction of river and canal, Alexander found a stretch of rock face in the riverbank. He ordered that it be pierced and a canal be dug from that point northward into the Pallakopas, whose old mouth would then be filled and closed.

To continue his exploration, Alexander returned to the Pallakopas and rowed through it into its sea, then along the Arabian frontier. The beauty of the land and its strategic importance led him to plan a fortified city here that would open a way into Arabia and shield Babylon from Bedouin raids,³⁵ against which the sea and the marshes southward to the gulf protected the river valley. Construction was begun immediately, and the town was settled by Greek mercenaries, some of them veterans, others volunteers.

Back in Babylon, meanwhile, the funeral pyre for Hephaestion had been completed and funeral games were about to begin, and the new troops had arrived. The king turned back, unconcerned about reentering the city, it is said, because the Chaldaeans' prophecies had come to nothing during his previous stay. On the return voyage, he wanted to

visit the tombs of the Babylonian kings in the marshes and took the helm in waters made treacherous by reeds and shallows. As he steered, a gust of wind lifted the royal Macedonian kausia, with the diadem, from his head. The diadem separated from the kausia, which sank, and became caught in the reeds among the tombs. A Phoenician sailor swam out to retrieve it and, to have his hands free, bound it around his head—an ominous augury. The soothsayers, who now accompanied the king at all times, prevailed on Alexander to have the man beheaded and nullify the sign. Alexander had him flogged instead, for contempt of the diadem, and then gave him one talent, because he had salvaged the insignia of the realm.³⁶

On his return to Babylon, Alexander found the new troops he expected. Peukestas, satrap of Persia, had brought 20,000 Persians and a large number of Kossaians and Tapurians, among the most bellicose of the tribes of Persia. Philoxenos had brought an army from Karia and Menandros a second one from Lydia;³⁷ Menidas had brought the requisite riders from Macedonia.³⁸ The king received the Persian troops with particular pleasure, delighted at their superb condition, for which he thanked Peukestas, and their willing response to the satrap's call-up, for which he thanked the men.

He used these Asiatic troops to give his infantry, or part of it, a remarkable new formation. The Macedonian army had never had a mixed corps that used the various arms in combination, had never formed miniature armies. Infantry and cavalry, lightly and heavily armed, mixed and side by side, were used in almost every action, but they were put together specifically for a given encounter and remained discrete. The new formation abandoned the old character of the phalanx and created a combination of heavy troops, shieldbearers, and light infantry that produced an entirely new kind of tactic. Formerly, each regiment of the phalanx had been composed of sixteen ranks of hoplites. Now the battle pack was so composed that a dekadarch, a Macedonian commander, stood in the first rank, a double-salaried Macedonian in the second, and a high-wage Macedonian veteran (dekastateros) in the third and in the sixteenth to bring up the rear (uragos).³⁹ Ranks four through fifteen were made up of Persians: javelin throwers, whose weapons had hurling straps, and archers. If 20,000 Persians were introduced among the Macedonians in this fashion, the result was a corps of easily 26,000 men, that is, with allowance made for unavoidable shortfalls, about 12 regiments, each with a front of 125 men.⁴⁰

This formation still advanced in closed ranks; for battle, it deployed into three successive battle fronts. First the archers deployed left and right through the intervals for an initial assault at long range; then the javelin throwers ran forward; the three front ranks and the last moved behind them as reserves (*triarii*) or, more correctly, as support. After skirmishing, the archers and javelin throwers retired through the intervals into their proper ranks and the entire corps rushed in a closed mass into the weakened enemy lines. The tactic of this new formation combined all the advantages of the Italian legion's arrangement into maniples with the excellences of the old phalanx: mobility and massiveness. For the light troops could be deployed very quickly against an attacking enemy, then covered very effectively during hand-to-hand combat. The phalanges were still walking fortresses, but now they could launch their own sorties of light troops, and they controlled a broader range of the enemy, whom the light troops could reach with their arrows as they broke out.

This reform, which seems to have been made with the tribes of Italy in mind,⁴¹ will have aroused a great deal of interest in Babylon. Rumor also had it that the Mediterranean provinces had received orders to equip countless ships. All Babylon speculated about campaigns into Italy, Sicily, Iberia, and Africa. And indeed it looked as if the fleet would be sent against the coasts of Arabia, while the land army marched across the Arabian interior, or by whatever route, to conquer the barbarians of the west, the foes of the Greek world in Africa and Italy.⁴²

Alexander himself presided over the integration of the new, mostly Persian, troops. He sat on a golden throne in the palace garden, dressed in royal purple, wearing the diadem. On his two sides, his closest advisers sat on silver-footed sofas a little lower than the throne. Behind them, at a proper distance, stood the eunuchs, in Median dress, their arms crossed in eastern fashion. Over several days, company after company of new recruits passed in review, was mustered and then distributed to the phalanges. On one of these days, the king, fatigued, removed diadem and royal purple and left the throne to bathe in one of the basins in the garden. Protocol required that his staff accompany him while the eunuchs remained in place. In the king's absence, a man appeared, walked calmly through the ranks of eunuchs, who, by custom, were not permitted to detain him, mounted the steps to the throne, donned the diadem and the royal purple, seated himself, and stared straight ahead. The eunuchs tore their garments, beat their breasts and their foreheads, and broke into loud wailing at the dreadful omen. Alexander, returning, started

back at the sight of a doppelgänger on the throne. He ordered the man seized and interrogated. Silent and impassive at first, the stranger finally replied: "My name is Dionysios and I am from Mesene. I was accused and brought here in chains from the coast. The god Sarapis set me free and told me to take the royal purple and the diadem and sit there without moving." He was laid on the rack to determine whether he had criminal intentions or accomplices; he insisted that he was following the god's instructions. It became clear that the man was not in his right mind; the soothsayers demanded that he be put to death.⁴³

In May 323, Babylon was throbbing with preparations for war. Thousands of new recruits, about to make their first trial of arms in the coming campaign, performed battle exercises in the new formation; the fleet, at anchor and under sail, ran out almost daily to practice rowing and steering exercises, drawing crowds of spectators to the embankment; the king himself was mostly present and awarded prizes for the contests.⁴⁴ All the world expected the campaign to be opened any day, thought that Hephaistion's funeral would be followed by the sacrifices and banquets with which the king usually announced a new military operation.

Countless foreigners had streamed into Babylon for the occasion. Hellenic ambassadors came in the capacity of sacred *theoroi* to accord the king the divine honors he had required of the Greeks. The king's own *theoroi*, sent to the Ammonion to inquire how the god wished Hephaistion to be honored, returned with the response: as one of the heroes.⁴⁵ The king ordered the funeral observances to begin with inaugural sacrifices to Hephaistion the *heros*.

The city walls had been breached and a magnificent pyre erected in five staggered stories to a height of two hundred feet. The king had contributed ten thousand talents to its construction; his friends and the *grandees*, ambassadors, and Babylonians had added two thousand more. The tower was splendid with gold and purple, pictures and statuary; at the top stood hollow images of sirens from which a choir could sing dirges.⁴⁶ Amid sacrifices to the dead, funeral processions, and laments, the pyre was lit; Alexander was present when it collapsed into a smoking ruin. Sacrifices to Hephaistion followed. Alexander poured the first libations; ten thousand bulls were sacrificed to the memory of the new *heros* and their cooked flesh distributed to the entire army, Alexander's guests.

In the following days, the king sacrificed to the usual gods, for the day of departure for the fleet had been named and the Arabian campaign was about to open; he also sacrificed to Good Fortune, and, on the advice

of the soothsayers, to the gods who avert evil. While the army feasted, he convoked his friends for a farewell dinner in honor of Nearchos. Toward the end of the meal, the Thessalian Medios, one of the companions, invited the king to prolong the evening with a little drinking party in select company. Alexander accepted and passed a merry evening, toasting them all one after another. The party broke up toward morning with promises to assemble again in the evening. It was the 16th Daisios.

Alexander went home, bathed, and slept far into the following day. He went again to Medios at evening, and again they drank far into the night. The king returned home feeling unwell, bathed, ate a little, and went to bed with a fever. On the morning of 17 Daisios, he felt very unwell. All the recent excitement, the revels coming one after another had left him susceptible, and the fever progressed rapidly. He had to be carried to the altar where he sacrificed every morning. Afterward, he lay on a couch in the men's hall giving his commanders their instructions for departure: the land army was to move out on the 20th, the fleet, with which he would sail, to weigh anchor one day later. Toward evening, he had himself carried to the river and on board ship to cross to the gardens on the far bank. There he bathed and passed the night shaking with fever.

After his bath and his sacrifice next day, he lay on a couch in his study, where Medios tried to cheer him up with conversation. The king appointed his captains to come next morning. He took a small meal in the evening and lay down. His fever rose and he passed a sleepless night. On the morning of the 19th, the king told his waiting naval officers that everything would have to be delayed by one day. He hoped to recover enough to embark on the 22nd. He remained in the bath hall, where Nearchos sat by him and recounted his ocean voyage. Alexander listened attentively, looking forward to facing such dangers himself. But he grew worse and his fever continued to rise.

On the morning of the 20th, nonetheless, he convened the officers of the fleet and ordered them to hold everything in readiness to receive him on shipboard and weigh anchor on the 22nd. After his evening bath, he experienced new chills and grew visibly weaker. He passed a wretched, sleepless night. Next morning, in a raging fever, he had himself carried to the altar, where he performed the sacrifice with difficulty. He received his officers, gave orders for the voyage, discussed several vacancies in their ranks, which he left to his generals with instructions to proceed carefully with the promotions. On the 22nd, he was worse again. Nonetheless, he had himself carried to the altar for the usual sacrifice. He ordered

the departure of the fleet delayed a second time. After yet another bad night, he was scarcely able to perform the sacrifice. He ordered his generals to assemble in the anterooms of the palace; the chiliarchs and pentakosiarchs were to wait in the courtyard. He had himself carried from the garden back into the palace. He was growing weaker every minute; when his generals entered, he still knew them, but he could not speak. The fever persisted through two more nights and a day, and the king could not speak.⁴⁷

The reaction of the army and the city was indescribable. The Macedonians gathered in a throng around the palace, demanding to see their king. They were afraid that he had died and his death was being kept from them. They stood before the gates shouting lamentations, threats, and entreaties until they were admitted. Then they filed past the king on his sickbed. Alexander could still raise his head a little and meet their gaze; he gestured with his right hand, but he could not speak. That same day, Peithon, Peukestas, Seleukos, and others went to the temple of Sarapis to ask the god if the king should be brought before him to pray. The response was: "Do not bring him. He will soon be better where he is." Next day toward evening, Alexander died. It was 28 Daisios.

There are many other versions of events in these days, all unreliable, some visibly invented, in good intention or in bad. In particular, no reliable account indicates that Alexander on his deathbed made provision for the succession of the empire, for a regency, or for the measures that had to be taken immediately. If this is indeed the case, we may conclude that he was no longer lucid enough to understand what his death meant when he finally understood that he was dying. His wordless leavetaking of his Macedonians was his last half-conscious act. The agony that followed will have obscured from his gaze the wretched future of everything he had willed and done.

At his last breath, his grandees fell to quarreling, his army rioted, his house tottered, and his empire began to decline.

APPENDIX

PEOPLE, PLACES, BATTLES

These remarks are intended as an aid to reading. They supply information, especially about Greece before Alexander, that Droysen could assume in his classically schooled reader. And they bring together in one brief description widely separated points of narrative to help the reader see a given figure all at once. A few items lent themselves to synoptic treatment, for example, Droysen's many ancient sources, the cohort of Alexander's boyhood friends, and Artabazos and his distinguished sons and daughter. These are presented first; the rest follow alphabetically. Indian rivers are treated together, as are Persian cities. Key words defined within an entry appear in bold.

My remarks are everywhere indebted to Paul Cartledge, *Alexander the Great*, 2004; to A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 1988; and to the indispensable *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3d ed. rev., 2003.

Droysen's Ancient Sources

Droysen's many lively exchanges with his ancient sources open a secondary front of operations in his footnotes. Brief descriptions of these authors follow, arranged within their respective traditions, that is to say, the **official tradition** founded by those who knew Alexander and the **vulgate** (or Kleitarchan) tradition of those who did not. The late historians (Curtius, Arrian, and Plutarch) benefited from both traditions.

Kallisthenes. A Greek native of Olynthos, Aristotle's nephew or great-nephew, and Alexander's chosen official historian, who accompanied the campaign into Asia. His *Deeds of Alexander*, an admiring account now lost, may have been sent back to Greece in installments. In any event, Kallisthenes underlies all subsequent histories of Alexander. In 327 Alexander condemned Kallisthenes to death on a count of treason; 329 may be the year of the last events covered in his history.

Ptolemy. Alexander's friend from childhood (*see* "Alexander's Boyhood Friends," below, p. 418) and a member of his general staff. In Egypt, which he ruled as one of Alexander's successor kings, Ptolemy wrote a very early history of Alexander, valuable especially for military and administrative matters. It survives preeminently in the work of Arrian.

Aristoboulos. A Greek technician on the campaign whose admiring history of Alexander, written in old age, became Arrian's second source, after Ptolemy.

Nearchos. Like Ptolemy, a friend of Alexander from boyhood (*see* "Alexander's Boyhood Friends," below, p. 418). He was cut out of the division of the empire after Alexander's death and consoled himself by writing a self-interested account of Alexander's Indian campaign and return through Gedrosia, and of his own return by sea, which Arrian used in his *Indike*.

Onesikritos. Helmsman of the fleet that sailed down the Hydaspes and that Nearchos commanded on the return from Pattala to Harmozeia. His lost history of Alexander may have been less a history than a romance. It earned him a reputation for mendacity that endures to this day.

Kleitarchos. Alexandrian historian whose very early history of Alexander (ca. 310), now lost, gained wide circulation in the ancient world. That work founded a tradition, called the **vulgate** (as opposed to the official tradition), that proceeds through the writings of Diodoros, Justin, and Curtius.

Diodoros Sikolos. Greek historian at the time of Caesar and Augustus whose vast compilation of ancient authors preserved the work of these authors for later historians. The historians of Alexander, especially Kleitarchos, figure in his seventeenth volume, which survives in part and was used by Curtius.

Justin. Author of an epitome, probably third century AD, of a lost Latin work by Trogus (first century BC), in which Alexander appears in books 11 and 12. Of the ancient histories, only Justin's epitome survives complete.

Curtius. Properly, Quintus Curtius Rufus. Roman historian at the time of Claudius or Vespasian who wrote a *History of Alexander the Great* in ten volumes, of which eight survive. Kleitarchos and Ptolemy are among his many sources.

Arrian. Greek politician, military commander, and historian who governed Kappadokia under Hadrian and whose *Anabasis* is the first largely surviving history of Alexander and the most reliable. His principal source is Ptolemy's lost history. Arrian stands at the end of the **official** tradition, founded by men who served Alexander: Ptolemy, Nearchos, Aristoboulos.

Plutarch. Born in Chaironeia in Boeotia at the beginning of our era (ca. 46) and celebrated even today for his fifty parallel *Lives* of famous men. Alexander is paired with Julius Caesar. Plutarch's tone is moralizing and his intention is to edify. His *Life* is an invaluable record of Alexander's early years.

Alexander's Boyhood Friends

Alexander was educated by tutors at Mieza, with a group of chosen fellow pupils. These young men remained loyal to him all his life and some served with great distinction in his army.

Hephaistion. Alexander's favorite. He was made hipparch in Drangiana after Philotas was executed. He emerges with specific commissions in India: with Perdikkas he led the southern army, which threw a bridge over the Indus; he figured at the battle against Poros on the Hydaspes; with Krateros he led an army down the Indus, again in southern India, and after the return to Persia. He died suddenly in Ecbatana (324), a loss from which Alexander seems never fully to have recovered.

Perdikkas. A nobleman of Orestis in southwestern Macedonia. Bodyguard, strategos, and hipparch. With Leonnatos, he slew King Philip's murderer. He was prominent in every campaign and major excursion, and in Alexander's councils. With Hephaistion, he led the southern army in India, and he figured in the battle against Poros on the Hydaspes.

Peukestas. Alexander's shield carrier. He saved Alexander's life in the Mallian city and was named eighth bodyguard. At the end of the campaign he received the satrapy of Persis. He was noted, and resented, for his knowledge of Persian language and custom.

Leonnatos. A relative of the Macedonian royal house through Philip's mother. Bodyguard to Philip, then to Alexander, and slayer of King Philip's murderer. He comes to prominence in the Indian campaign, where he, and Peukestas, shielded a gravely wounded Alexander in the Mallian city. At the end of the campaign, he was left in Oreitis with an army.

Ptolemy. Macedonian nobleman and Alexander's bodyguard. He was awarded many special assignments: to receive captured Bessos in Sogdiana, to assault Aornos in India, to watch the walls at Sangala, to erect Kalanos's funeral pyre at Susa (or Persepolis). In the division of the empire after Alexander's death, Ptolemy took Egypt, where, as Ptolemy I Soter, he founded the house that ended with Kleopatra and wrote a very early history of Alexander (*see* "Droysen's Ancient Sources," above, p. 416).

Nearchos. A Cretan. He was made satrap of Lykia early in the campaign. He was given command of the fleet at the outset of the Indian river voyage and charged with command of the return voyage from Pattala to Persia. He was about to take the fleet down the Arabian coast when Alexander died. He wrote an account of the Indian campaign (*see* "Droysen's Ancient Sources," above, p. 416).

Harpalos. Of the princely house of Elymiotis in southwestern Macedonia. A cripple, he served Alexander as paymaster and high treasurer. He twice made off with the treasury: in 333, a fugue that is unexplained, and again in 324, upon Alexander's return from India. That evasion, by way of Athens, occasioned the Harpalian trials. Harpalos went from Athens to fight in Crete, where he was murdered by a confederate.

A Persian Nobleman: The House of Artabazos

Artabazos, one of his many sons, and his brother-in-law (and eventual son-in-law) gained historical stature in high Persian circles, as did one of his daughters, said to have become Alexander's mistress.

Artabazos. Grandson, through his mother, of Artaxerxes II, son of Pharnabazos, and scion of the satrapal dynasty of Hellespontine Phrygia. He rose against Ochos (Artaxerxes III) in 359–58 and with Memnon, his brother-in-law, took refuge at the Macedonian court (352). Having returned to Persia (343), he accompanied Dareios on his flight through Media (330) and after Dareios's murder surrendered to Alexander in Hyrkania, with his sons Arsames and Kophen. He served as Alexander's satrap of Baktria until he asked to be relieved (327). Kleitos the Black was intended to succeed him.

Pharnabazos. Son of Artabazos. He was named commander of Persian sea power upon Memnon's death (333). With Autophradates, he was active in the eastern Mediterranean after Halikarnassos, opposing Hegelechos and Amphoteros and maneuvering to recapture the Greek cities there. As the sea war turned against Persia, he was taken alive, but escaped on Kos.

Memnon. Formidable Rhodian soldier in the service of Persia. He was married to Barsine, daughter of his sister and her husband, Artabazos. With Artabazos, he took refuge at the Macedonian court (352) after Ochos suppressed a revolt by the western satraps. He resisted the Macedonian expeditionary force on the Propontis and was among the Persian officers on the Granikos (334); he energetically defended Halikarnassos, received command of total Persian sea power and the coasts, and died of illness at the siege of Mytilene (333). Pharnabazos, son of Artabazos, succeeded to his command.

Barsine. Daughter of Artabazos, wife and then widow first of Mentor, then of Memnon, her maternal uncles. She became Alexander's mistress after Damaskos. Later she is known to have been living at Pergamon with her small son, Herakles.

Alphabetical Register

Abisares. Prince of Kashmir (modern Hazara); like Fortinbras, more mentioned than seen. After Alexander's entry into Taxila, he sent his brother bearing gifts, but he was allied with Poros, who was expecting him momentarily when Alexander arrived on the Hydaspes. He was suspected of complicity in the rising of the Assakenoi and sent another embassy, now bringing elephants, as Alexander moved northeastward from the

Hydaspes. At last living mention, he had defied Alexander's order to present himself in person, pleading illness.

Agema. The king's escort. The agema of the cavalry guarded the king's life in battle. The agema of the shieldbearers protected the king on excursions and in other special operations and when he fought on foot.

Agesilaos II. Spartan king who set out for Asia Minor in 396, at the beginning of his reign, and at the end took service with Nektanebo of Egypt. He died on the voyage back to Sparta (360).

Agis's War. King Agis III of Sparta rose against Macedonia ca. 332. He approached the Persian admirals Pharnabazos and Autophradates for aid shortly before Issos. That Persian defeat curtailed aid but released a large number of Greek mercenaries, whom Agis could use for operations on Crete. At a moment when Antipater was distracted by unrest in Thrace, Agis shifted his operations to the Peloponnese. He was besieging Megalopolis, which stood between Sparta and its traditional helots in Messenia (and Athens was declining to enter the fray), when Antipater arrived with an army from the north. Sparta never recovered from the defeat that followed.

Alexander the Molossian. Epeirote prince and Olympias's brother. Philip installed him on the Molossian throne and betrothed Alexander's full sister **Kleopatra** to him, her maternal uncle (and died by assassination at the wedding celebration). Molossian Alexander took an army into southern Italy, where he campaigned in defense of Tarentum; he died at Pandosia, ca. 330.

Alkibiades. Athenian politician and military leader of some brilliance and few loyalties. He proposed and led an armed expedition to Sicily, where, under pressure by his enemies at home, he fled to Sparta and betrayed the expedition to the Spartans (415).

Amphiktiony. A league among those who "dwell around" a temple, ostensibly for the preservation of its cult. In practice, such a league could become a powerful instrument in the shifting political order among the Greek cities when it sanctioned violators of a temple cult, transferred votes among members of the league, and waged **sacred war** in behalf of a cult. A case in point is the third sacred war in behalf of the temple at Delphi,

which brought in Philip of Macedonia, disarmed the Phokians, and awarded their votes to Philip (339).

Amphipolis. City founded by Athens (437) at the western edge of Thrace, near the silver mines of Pangaion, and “surrounded” by the river Strymon, which flowed around it on three sides. Amphipolis, like Olynthos, was one of the independent-minded northern cities that pursued a politics of its own, until it was captured by Philip in 357.

Antialkidas. Spartan general under Agesilaos II. The common peace he negotiated with the Persian king abandoned the Greek cities of Asia Minor to Persia and imposed an “autonomy” that obviated every attempt at solidarity and alliance among the Greek polities.

Antipater. Philip’s foremost aide and Alexander’s viceroy in Macedonia during the ten years of his campaign in Asia. He defeated Agis, king of Sparta, who had risen against Macedonia (331), and continued to serve the Macedonian house in the unrest that followed Alexander’s death in Babylon (323), until his own death in 319.

Areopagos. The “hill of Ares,” site of the Athenian council. In the late fourth century, the areopagos was competent to investigate judicial matters, including treasonable offenses, such as taking bribes. The results of these inquiries were handed up to the assembly or to the courts, which could institute trials.

Arrhidaaios. Alexander’s half-brother, by Philinna of Larissa. He was mentally impaired and less a rival than a pawn of the parties around Alexander. After Alexander’s death (323) he was named king, jointly with Alexander’s posthumous son—an arrangement of short duration.

Athens. Foremost city of ancient Greece and foil of Sparta, its principal antagonist. Athens is associated with democracy and therefore with the frictions, equivocations, and perfidies of government by the people, with imperial expansionism, and with a splendid fleet in its harbor at Peiraieus. Athens was the center of high Greek culture of its day. The district of Athens is **Attika**.

Attalos. Macedonian soldier, Parmenion’s son-in-law, and uncle to Philip’s seventh wife, Kleopatra. This union had dynastic implications, and Attalos

impugned Alexander's legitimacy at the wedding banquet. He was sent, with Parmenion, to lead an advance corps into Asia, where, said to have mutinied, he was removed by assassination after Philip's death. Olympias then removed Kleopatra and her infant daughter by Philip.

Barsaentes Persian satrap of Arachosia and Drangiana. With Bessos and Narbazanes he took Dareios captive and, with Satibarzanes, murdered him (330). At Alexander's approach, he fled from his satrapy to the Indians, who handed him over to Alexander in India.

Bessos. Persian satrap of Baktria and a distant relative of Dareios. At Gaugamela, he led Baktrians, Sogdians, Indians, and Scythian Sakai. He accompanied Dareios on his flight through Media and, with Narbazanes, captured him. Taking the regnal name Artaxerxes, he led a movement to establish a Persian empire of the east. To put down that movement was the object of Alexander's Baktrian campaign. Spitamenes delivered Bessos to Alexander. He was tried and convicted according to Persian custom and elaborately punished (329).

Byzantium. Celebrated and wealthy Greek city on the European side of the Bosporos, just above the Propontis. Byzantium passed back and forth between Spartan and Athenian alliance, was besieged by Philip in 340 (while Alexander acted as regent in Macedonia), and sent ships to the mouths of the Danube in support of Alexander's Thracian campaign (335).

Carthage. Ancient city on the gulf of Tunis, founded by Tyre in Phoenicia and supported by trade. Carthaginian expansionism threatened Greek settlements on the African littoral (Cyrene) and the Greek cities of Sicily (Syracuse, Acragas, Himera, etc.).

Chaironeia. Town in northwest Boeotia, on the highroad to Thebes, where Philip triumphed over Athens and Thebes (338). That victory prepared the way for his domination of mainland Greece, memorialized in the terms of the common peace pledged by member states of the Corinthian League.

Chalkidic Confederacy. Confederation of northern cities with its capital at Olynthos (432). The confederation attracted the attention, favorable

or unfavorable, of Sparta, Athens, and Macedonia by turns, to the ultimate destruction of Olynthos by Philip in 348.

Chares. Athenian soldier and general, usually of mercenary armies. He fought at Chaironeia and was among those whose surrender Alexander demanded at Athens (335). When Alexander crossed into Asia, Chares came out from occupied Sigeion to meet him. He turns up again at Methymna and Mytilene on Lesbos, leading mercenaries and looking for empire (333 and 332).

Chersonese. The long peninsula that forms the western shore of the Dardanelles. It was controlled, by turns, by Persia, Athens, Sparta, and Philip, and greatly valued for its wheat production and for strategic reasons.

Cleruchy. An Athenian colony founded on conquered territory, often an Aegean island (Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, etc.). Cleruchs were allotted land, sometimes displacing natives. They remained Attic citizens and typically set up local governments on the Athenian model.

Corinth. The city on the Isthmos, with a citadel at **Acrocorinth**. Corinth controlled communications between northern Greece and the Peloponnese, mediated relations between major cities, and was made seat of the league whereby Philip and then Alexander united Greece in the name of war against the Persian king.

Corinthian League. A broad alliance of Greek states and Macedonia, arrived at in the settlement that followed Philip's victory at Chaironeia (338). Alexander adroitly enforced his own succession to his father's office as chief of the league and leader of the Greeks for the purpose of a war of revenge against Persia and began to gather an invading army.

Demosthenes. Celebrated Athenian orator and statesman. Droysen presents him, and Athenian democracy in general, as being of much talk and little action. Demosthenes worked incessantly to liberate Athens from Macedonia in an era when the Greek city-state was in decline, suffered defeat in internal Athenian rivalries, and died by his own hand in exile (322).

Elis. Bucolic district at the northwest corner of Peloponnesos. **Olympia** in Elis was the site of the main sanctuary of Zeus in Greece. Many Greek

states had deposited treasuries at Olympia, and the quadrennial festival and games were held here.

Epameinondas. Theban statesman celebrated for his large-mindedness and general who met and defeated the invading Spartan army at **Leuktra** (371). He then invaded the Peloponnese in behalf of Arkadia. He took his army into the Eurotas valley, where Sparta lay, and liberated the enslaved Messenians. He died in battle against the Spartans at Mantinea (362).

Epeiros. Greek district west and south of Macedonia, from whose princely Molossian tribe **Olympias**, Alexander's mother, descended, as did her brother Alexander, whom Philip installed on the Molossian throne. **Dodona**, near Molossis, was the site of an oracle. The **Pindos** mountains separate Epeiros from Thessaly on the east.

Eurotas Valley. The valley in which Sparta lay, legendarily first invaded by Epameinondas of Thebes (369).

Halys. Great river of Asia Minor that rose in the mountains of Armenia and looped through Kappadokia in a deep bow to reach the Pontos. The traditional boundary between the Lydian kingdom and the Persian empire.

Harmost. Title given a Spartan military governor or commander abroad.

Helots. A servile population ranking somewhere between the free man and the slave. The **Messenian helots** of Sparta are the most well-known example. Helots lived, with their families, in their own communities. They engaged in domestic service and in agriculture and pasturage, from which they delivered fixed quotas to their masters. Thebes, in the person of Epameinondas, freed the Messenian helots in 369.

Heros. A superhuman figure accorded honors after death, for example, Theseus of Athens. Hephaistion, Alexander's favorite, was named heros after death, with the sanction of the Ammonion, which, one tradition says, denied him divine status.

Illyria. Barbarian countryside west and north of Macedonia. For generations Illyrian tribes harassed the northwest frontiers of Macedonia, sometimes in league with the neighboring **Taulantians**. Alexander returned

from the Thracian campaign to the mouths of the Danube to meet the Illyrian prince, **Kleitos**, and his Taulantian allies at **Pelion** in the mountains at the northern frontier of Macedonia (335), before moving south at speed to put down Thebes.

Indian Rivers. The rivers of Alexander's India, west to east, are **Kophen** (Kabul), **Suastos** (Swat), **Indus**, and four of the five rivers of the Punjab: **Hydaspes** (Jhelum), **Akesines** (Chenab), **Hydraotes** (Ravi), and **Hyphasis** (Beas). North of the Kophen, on the **Choaspes** (Konar), Alexander encountered **Aspasioi**; on the **Guraios** (Panjkora), **Guraioi**; and in the Suastos basin, **Assakenoi**. **Aornos** (Pir Sar) stood on the Indus; **Taxila** lay east of the Indus. Alexander met Poros on the Hydaspes; he pursued the younger Poros on the Akesines; beyond the Hydraotes lay **Sangala**; and on the Hyphasis, the army mutinied and he turned back.

Ionia. The coast of Asia Minor, opposite mainland Greece, and the nearby islands (e.g., **Chios**, **Samos**). Ionia was populated by Greek cities, often ruled by proxies of the Persian crown and therefore politically volatile.

Iran. The immense Iranian plateau, extending from the Tigris to the Indus. *See also* Turan.

Isthmos. The spit of land that joins the northern landmass of ancient Greece (and Athens) to the southern landmass, called the Peloponnese (and Sparta). Corinth was the major city of the Isthmos and the traditional seat of the Hellenic leagues.

Jason of Pherai. Tyrant of that Thessalian city who, as tagos, undertook to organize a Thessalian state. He alarmed all Greece by mobilizing the entire Thessalian army; he was assassinated before his intentions emerged clearly.

Jaxartes. Great river of central Asia (modern Syr Darya) at the extreme northeast corner of Alexander's empire. Called the **Tanais** by the Greeks, who took it for a river of that name (the modern Don) that flows into the Pontos from the north.

Kaukasos. The Greeks' name for the Hindu Kush, which they took for the Caucasus they knew between the Caspian and the Pontos.

Kleitos. Called Kleitos the Black. Distinguished Macedonian cavalry officer, leader of the mounted agema, eventually hipparch, and in the front line of every assault. He saved Alexander's life on the Granikos (334) and was picked to succeed Artabazos as satrap of Baktria. Alexander, in a fit of rage, murdered him at a drunken banquet in Marakanda in spring 328: Kleitos had defended Old Macedonia too vigorously in a noisy quarrel over Alexander's Persian ways.

Koinos. High infantry and cavalry officer, and Parmenion's son-in-law. He led men in important movements at Tyre, at Gaugamela, in Hyrkania, and, especially, against Spitamenes in Sogdiana, and again in India, against Bazira and Aornos, and against Poros on the Hydaspes. He spoke against Philotas, his brother-in-law, at Farah and in defense of the army's longing to return home on the Hyphasis, to Alexander's displeasure. He died before the army embarked to sail down the Hydaspes.

Krateros. Like Perdikkas, a nobleman from Orestis. Antipater's son-in-law, one of Alexander's finest soldiers, and at Farah, a member of his inner council. Phalanx commander, hipparch, and strategos. Krateros stood on the front line at Gaugamela and in command of an army in the Persian passes. He was repeatedly left in charge of the main army when Alexander took troops on rapid operations or sent with a small army against such enemies as the Baktrian barons, in particular, Spitamenes. On the Hydaspes, Krateros remained in camp with an army, opposite Poros's camp; he led an army down the Indus, opposite Hephaistion. From India, he led an army back through Arachosia and Drangiana, suppressing disorder on his way. At Alexander's death, he was leading the discharged veterans from Opis back to Macedonia and carrying orders to replace Antipater.

Lydia. Ancient kingdom of Asia Minor, east of Ionia, through which important trade routes passed. **Sardeis** was a major city; the last king of Lydia, conquered by Persia, was **Kroesos**.

Lynkestis. Canton, named after the local lynx, in northwest Macedonia, bordering Illyria and, like Illyria, a source of early disturbances in the inchoate Macedonian kingdom. The sons of Lynkestian Aeropos were implicated in Philip's murder (336). One of them, **Lynkestian Alexander**, was present in the army, eventually as a prisoner, until he was executed shortly after Philotas the hipparch (330).

Lysander. Spartan general and statesman whose friendship with the younger Cyrus strengthened Sparta's hand in the Peloponnesian War and who helped impose the Thirty Tyrants on Athens (404).

Marathon. Plain on the northeast coast of Attika, opposite Euboia. Here the Athenians, aided by the Plataians, defeated the Persian king in 490.

Mazaïos. Persian satrap of the two Syrias. He was sent to the Euphrates to observe the Macedonians in the run-up to Gaugamela. After that defeat, he went south to Babylon, which he opened to Alexander; he was made satrap of Babylonia.

Nabarzanes. Persian chiliarch. He led Dareios's massed cavalry at Issos and accompanied Dareios on his flight through Media. With Bessos and Barsaentes he captured Dareios. He surrendered to Alexander in Hyrkania.

Olynthos. City of Chalkidike, situated just north of its western gulf. Seat of the Chalkidic Confederacy, which attracted attack first by Sparta, then by Athens. Olynthos combined with Philip against Athens, then with Athens against Philip. Philip leveled Olynthos in 348 and the city was never rebuilt on the same site.

Parmenion. Philip's foremost general in his many campaigns into Thrace and Illyria and Alexander's second-in-command, in charge of the left wing on the Granikos, at Issos, and at Gaugamela. He was left at Ecbatana to guard the Persian treasury, which Alexander had deposited there. Parmenion's eldest son **Philotas**, who commanded the companion cavalry, was convicted of treason at Farah. If one was taken down, the other could not be left standing, and assassins were dispatched to Ecbatana (330).

Pelopidas. Theban statesman and soldier who defended Thebes against its Spartan garrison (379) and fought at **Leuktra**, where Sparta was expelled from the north (371). He aided Epameinondas, intervened in Thessaly against Alexander of Macedon, Philip's brother, and died leading Thessalians against Alexander of Pherai, Jason's nephew (364).

Peloponnesian War. Devastating thirty years' war (431–04) between Athens and Sparta and their respective (and shifting) allies. Sparta eventually

prevailed, but all Greece was weakened and the Greek cities became more wary of one another than ever.

Persia. In the narrow sense, the district **Persis** on the Persian Gulf. **Pasargadai**, Cyrus's ancient capital, is here and **Persepolis** (Parsa), the ceremonial capital of the empire.

Persian Cities. Roughly southeast to northwest: in Persis, **Pasargadai**, the ancient capital, founded by Cyrus the Great, ca. 550, and **Persepolis**, the ceremonial capital, founded by Dareios I; in Susiana (ancient Elam), **Susa**, city of lilies, the administrative capital; in lower Mesopotamia, **Babylon**, conquered by Persia in 539, intended by Alexander as his capital; and to the northeast, in Media, **Ecbatana**, modern Hamadan, the summer capital, developed by Artaxerxes II.

Phoenicia. The cities of the Mediterranean littoral west of the Libanon mountain chain: **Arados**, **Tripolis**, **Byblos**, **Sidon**, and **Tyre**. The Phoenicians were a trading people and in Alexander's time, the greatest sailors of the Mediterranean. The fleets of their kings, and of Cyprus, composed the **Persian navy**. Crucial for Alexander's long and difficult siege of off-shore Tyre, the only Phoenician city that resisted, the Phoenician fleet came over to him in spring 332.

Phokion. Athenian statesman and general. Stern, high-minded, basically conservative, and greatly esteemed (he was elected strategos forty-five times), he opposed the more fiery politics of Demosthenes and Hypereides and generally sought to protect overmatched Athens against rising Macedon.

Phokis. District bordering Boeotia on the northwest. **Delphi** is here, with its temple to Apollo, oracle, Pythian festival, and Amphiktionic League. The important Kephissos valley runs through Phokis and the great road from the north of Greece.

Phrataphernes. Persian satrap of Hyrkania and Parthyaia. After accompanying Dareios in flight through Media, he surrendered to Alexander in Hyrkania. His satrapy was restored to him, and he and his sons served Alexander faithfully in Areia, Sogdiana, and India, more than once on missions to put down disloyal satraps.

Poros. The great Paurava prince between Hydaspes and Akesines in the Punjab. Alexander met him (and a line of trained war elephants) in his last pitched battle, on the Hydaspes. Having defeated him, Alexander enlarged his territory, possibly to include the Sindh, and made him, like Taxiles, a favored Indian prince.

Proskynesis. Gesture of obeisance in Persian society and, in particular, to the king in Persian court ceremonial. Proskynesis became the rod around which all the swirling controversy over Alexander's Persian ways crystallized. An attempt to introduce proskynesis into Alexander's court ceremonial created a scandal (winter rest in Baktra, 327). Kallisthenes's recalcitrance in this matter led to a charge of treason and eventually cost him his life.

Sacred War. *See* Amphiktiony.

Salamis. Island off the west coast of Attika, situated between Athens and Megara. Site of a crushing defeat of Xerxes's Persian fleet (480).

Satibarzanes. Persian satrap of Areia who rose against Alexander and then fled to Bessos in Bactria. Bessos used him to keep Areia stirred up. He was killed by Erygios in an expedition that Alexander sent from Arachosia into Areia and in which Artabazos cooperated (329).

Semiramis. Legendary Assyrian queen who, as a widow, waged war and built Babylon. The historical basis of the legend is an Assyrian queen regent of the late ninth century.

Social War. A war against rebellious allies. (The Latin for "allies" is *socii*.) Athens was caught up in a ruinous social war 357–55.

Sparta. Foremost city of the Peloponnese, foil of Athens and its major rival. Sparta is associated with oligarchy, military order and discipline, harsh rule over subjected territories (e.g., Messenia), and opportunistic league with the Persian king. The district of Sparta is **Lakonia** and Sparta is also called **Lakedaimon**.

Spitamenes. Sogdian baron who joined in Bessos's insurrection. When that movement failed, he seized Bessos and delivered him to Alexander (329). Spitamenes then harassed Alexander in the northeast corner of

the empire: he took part in the Sogdian rebellion and led desert tribes in raids against remote outposts. He was ultimately betrayed by his Massagete followers, who brought his head to Alexander (328).

Strategos. A military commander. In ancient Athens military commanders were elected to political office, so that the term also took on a political dimension, in Athens and elsewhere.

Strymon. River at the western edge of ancient Thrace and traditional northernmost boundary of Greece, including Macedonia. It reaches the Aegean east of the Chalkidic peninsula, just below the site of Amphipolis.

Syracuse. Greek city on the east coast of Sicily, founded by Corinth and ruled expansively (until 367) by the tyrant **Dionysios**, on whom Sparta looked with favor. After a long period of decline, Syracuse was restored by **Timoleon**, sent from Corinth (344).

Syria. Koile Syria corresponds approximately to the Syria we know today. Mesopotamia, beyond the Euphrates, was also called Syria. These were “the two Syrias.” From a Persian perspective, Mesopotamian Syria lay on the near side of the waters and Koile Syria on the far side.

Syrtis. A shallow bay off the coast of north Africa, west of the Nile. Inland lay **Cyrene**, settled by Greeks. The countryside was called **Cyrenaica**.

Tainaron. The southern tip of mainland Greece. A great hiring hall of mercenary armies and therefore a destination of warlords wishing to raise an army (Chares, Harpalos) and of vagrant troops looking for service (e.g., scattered Greek mercenaries of the Great King after Issos).

Tarentum. Important Greek city on the southern coast of Italy, founded by Sparta. Pressed by Italic tribes in the fourth century, Tarentum hired Greek kings (Archidamos III of Sparta, Alexander of Epeiros) for its defense.

Tauros. Mountain chain behind the southern coast of Asia Minor, setting off coastal Pamphylia and Kilikia from the high plain of Phrygia and the peninsula of Asia Minor on the west from the Asian interior.

Taxiles. Indian prince of Taxila, east of the Indus, and traditional enemy of Poros, the Paurava prince. In Sogdiana, Taxiles proposed an Indian

campaign to Alexander. He provisioned Alexander's southern army, under Hephaistion and Perdikkas, received Alexander lavishly in Taxila, and joined the campaign. Alexander made him, with Poros, a favored Indian prince and enlarged his territory.

The Ten Thousand. Legendary corps of Greek mercenaries who, having survived the younger Cyrus's defeat by his brother Artaxerxes at **Kunaxa** near Babylon (401), marched overland to the Pontos and sailed home.

The Thirty. Thirty tyrants imposed by Sparta upon defeated Athens at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War (404). The Thirty suppressed Athenian democracy and ruled the city ruthlessly for more than a year, until moderate oligarchs gained influence and democracy was eventually restored.

Thebes. Third of the great cities of ancient Greece, legendarily associated with Kadmos; seat of the Boeotian federation (378). Thebes was garrisoned by Sparta in 382; under Pelopidas it recovered and drove out the Spartans at Leuktra (371), then dominated Greece under Epameinondas. It was during this time that fifteen-year-old Prince Philip came to Thebes as a hostage for the good behavior of the Macedonian king, his brother. In 338 at Chaironeia, Philip defeated Thebes and Athens and garrisoned the **Kadmeia**. In 335 rumors of Alexander's death in battle in Illyria brought Thebes into open revolt. Alexander came down from Pelion and leveled the city. Thebes never recovered.

Theorika. State funds. Originally a fund to enable the poor of Athens to attend festivals, later the repository of public monies in general.

Theoroi. Title given delegates sent to another city's festival or to a sacred shrine.

Thermopylai. The "hot gates," so called after local sulphur springs. Thermopylai is a pass in Lokris, hard by a long forked inlet from the sea. Traditionally, it was the critical point for stopping an army from the north. Greece south of Thermopylai was said to lie "within the gates."

Thessaly. Northern Greek district bordering Macedonia. A loosely organized state led by a **tagos**, for example, Jason of Pherai, and subsequently dominated by the Macedonian kings Philip and Alexander. Thessaly was

famed for its horses: Alexander's charger **Bukephalos** was a Thessalian stallion; the Thessalian cavalry was invaluable in Alexander's campaigns.

Thrace. Great barbarian countryside bordering Macedonia to the east and north and reaching approximately north to the Danube and east to the Pontos. The river Strymon borders Thrace on the west; other rivers, west to east, are the **Nestos** and the **Hebros**. The mountain chains are the **Orbelos** and the **Rhodope** south to the Aegean and the **Haimos** to the north. Important tribes against which Philip, and then Alexander, marched repeatedly are the **Odrysiens**, **Triballians**, **Paionians**, and **Getai**. The **Agrianians** of Thrace were traditional Macedonian allies. The coasts of Thrace were settled by Greek cities, for example, Byzantium, **Perinthos**, Amphipolis, and **Abdera**.

Turan. Ancient name for the remote territory beyond the Oxos at the northeast corner of the Persian empire. More loosely, the nations of central Asia, as opposed to the nations of **Iran**, who spoke Indo-European languages.

Xerxes. Persian king who set out against the Greeks in 480. After performing feats of engineering (e.g., throwing a bridge over the Hellespont), he forced Thermopylai and drove the Greeks back to the Isthmos. But his fleet was defeated at Salamis and the army he left in Greece was defeated at **Plataiai**; after a third defeat at Mykale, the Persian alliance collapsed.

NOTES

Book One, Chapter 2

1. Demosth., *Phil.* III. 32; *Olynth.* III. 16. 24; *De fals. leg.*, par. 305, 308.
2. Herod. 1. 56. For details of these sagas, see Abel, *Makedonien*, p. 97 ff.
3. Ἄργος τὸ ἐν Ὀρεστεΐᾳ ὅθεν οἱ Ἀργεῖάδαι Μακεδόνες (Appian., *Bell. Syr.* 63). Cf. Strab. V, p. 329; *epit. fr.* 11, and the Sibylline verses cited by Pausanias (VII. 8. 9).
4. Herod. VIII. 137 ff. and V. 22; Thucyd. II. 99. Since Thucydides speaks explicitly of "the eight kings before Archelaos," the line of kings that goes back to Karanos was established only later, by Euripides, as Weissenborn and Gutschmid have shown.
5. A question recently treated by A. Fick, "Zum makedonischen Dialekte," (*Kuhns Zeitschrift*, 22, p. 193 ff.). G. Meyer's rebuttal notwithstanding (in Fleckeisen, *Jahrbuch. f. klass. Phil.*, 1875, p. 186), Kuhn demonstrates convincingly, I believe, that most of the surviving Macedonian glosses and names are essentially Greek, particularly the names that are older than Alexander the Philhellene, and therefore the name of this Alexander and of his predecessors in ascending order: Amyntas, Alketas, Aeropos (a king's name in Tegea: Pausan. VIII. 44. 8), Philippos, Perdikkas. Nonetheless, some very remarkable Macedonian names occur in a series from Ol. 89 (C. I. A., no. 42): Γαιτέας, Σταδμέας, and in a probably pertinent fragment (42 d), Ἐθαρος, Κρατέννας. In the Macedonian glosses (Meyer, no. 50), γράβιον for the fir splinter used as a torch suggests the name of the Illyrian prince Γράβος in an inscription dated to 355 (*Εφημ. Αρχ.*, 1874, p. 451; now also C. I. A. II, no. 66 b).
6. Aristot., *Pol.* VII. 2. 6.
7. Hegesandros, ap. Athen. I, p. 18.
8. Duris, fr. 72, traces the custom to Herakles's daughter Makaria, who is said elsewhere to have sacrificed herself in expiation. Cf. O. Müller, *Dorier*, I, p. 55.

9. Pausan. IX. 40. 8.

10. μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μοναρχοῦσι . . . διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐκούσιον μὲν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὥστε ἀμαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς, etc. (Aristot., *Pol.* X. 10. 22).

11. These brothers are mentioned in an inscription of the treaty between Perdikkas and Athens in 422 (C. I. A. I, no. 42), witnessed and signed by the king's relatives, then by other Macedonians. The names of the king's brothers appear first, followed by the king's son Archelaos, then by the sons of the king's brothers. The series begins: Μενέλαος Ἀλεξάνδρου, followed by: Ἀλκέτης Ἀλεξάνδρου. This is the same Mene-laos whom Justin mentions in very confused fashion (VII. 4. 5). Perdikkas's other brother is the same Alketas who is supposed to have been called the Funnel for his drinking habits and of whom Plato relates (*Gorg.*, p. 471) that Archelaos Perdikkas's son murdered him and his son Alexander to gain the throne. In third and fourth place the inscription reads: ΑΡΧ—ΕΛΑΣ Περδίκκο . . . ΟΑ. ΕΡ. ΟΣΦΙΛΙΠ After *Περδίκκο* and before omicron enough room remains for *Ἀμύντας Φιλίππ* . . . , who would be the Amyntas mentioned as son of the partial prince Philip, who had died by 429. There is no other mention of Philip's second son, and the missing letters, though only two, cannot be supplied with confidence. After this second son, the inscription reads: . . . υρος Ἀλέκτου. The two missing letters would yield Γαῦρος or Ταῦρος. Amyntas, probably the eldest brother of Perdikkas, does not appear among the witnesses; Dexippos describes him as *ἰδιωτικῶς ζήσας*. That Amyntas was older than Perdikkas seems probable, since Perdikkas soon married the widow of Amyntas's son Arrhidaios (see p. 438, n. 26). This is the line of kings from which Philip II and Alexander the Great descend.

12. Plato at least, although unreliable in matters related to persons, says that Archelaos murdered his seven-year-old brother (*Gorg.*, p. 471 a). This was Perdikkas's son by his lawful wife Kleopatra, widow of Arrhidaios.

13. This form of *προστασία τῆς βασιλείας* figures prominently in the events of 323, after Alexander's death, where it will be discussed.

14. Δέρδας Ἀριδαίου παῖς, ἀνέψιος Περδίκκα καὶ Φιλίππου (Schol. Thucyd. I. 57).

15. Abel (*Makedonien*, p. 152) conjectures that the Persian king favored the satrapy of Macedonia with these neighboring territories.

16. οὐ βία ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἄρχοντες διετέλεσαν (Callisth., ap. Arr. IV. 4. 11).

17. ἐλεύθεροι ἄνδρες (Lucian., *Dial. Mort.* 14).

18. σκοῖδος · ἀρχή τις παρὰ Μακεδόσι τεταγμένη ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων · ἡ λέξις κείται ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου (Hesych., s.v.). Whatever one may think of the letters of Alexander, even a forger will have used the proper word. According to Fick, the word is formed from the root *skaidh*, to separate. A second gloss by Hesychios, ταγανόγα · Μακεδονική τις ἀρχή, is inexplicable and probably corrupt; the first two syllables recall the Thessalian ταγός.

19. To my knowledge, no trace of the Doric φυλή appears among the Macedonian people or nobility. The king also receives foreigners into the ranks of the hetairoi (Arr. I. 15. 6). Theopompos (fr. 249) says of Philip: οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ ἐκ πόλλων τόπων συνεῤῥυηκότες · οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Θετταλίας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἀριστίνδην ἐξελεγμένοι. Theopompos estimates that Philip's 800 hetairoi owned as much land as 10,000 Hellenes. Macedonia, therefore, had huge estates, such as no longer existed within the Thermopylai.

20. Herod. V. 22.

21. I use this formulation because Perdikkas II seems not to have succeeded Alexander the Philhellene immediately in 454 (Pack, "Die Entstehung der makedon. Anagraphe," *Hermes*, 10, p. 282). As noted previously, Amyntas was probably the eldest of Alexander's sons. Perdikkas, like Philip, may originally have held only a partial principality. He probably pushed Amyntas aside, just as he fought Philip about 431 (Thucyd. I. 57. 59); the Thracians marched on Macedonia in 429 to restore Philip's son (ἐς τὴν Φιλλίπου πρότερον οὔσαν ἀρχήν: Thucyd. II. 100. 3; Diod. XII. 50. 3).

22. καὶ τὰλλα διεκόσμησε τά τε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ (Thucyd. II. 100. 2). That is to say, he brought order both to the cavalry and to the hoplites.

23. Dio Chrys. II. 18.

24. μακάρων εὐωχίαν (Aristoph., *Ran.* 85). Other details in Aelian., *Var. Hist.* XIV. 17 and II. 21. The poets Agathon, Choirilos, and Euripides and the painter Zeuxis were at his court; Plato is mentioned as one of his great friends (Athen. XI, p. 508, etc.).

25. Ἀρράβαιος is the orthography of an Attic inscription (C. I. A. I, no. 42).

26. τῷ Ἀρρίδαίου υἱεῖ Ἀμύντᾳ (Aristot., *Pol.* V. 8. 11, with Sauppe's emendation, *Inscr. Macedon. quatuor*, 1847, V. 17). This is the same Amyntas who is mentioned in the inscription concerning the *συνθήκαι* concluded with the Chalkidians (Le Bas, II, p. 325, no. 1406), where one finds in the first line: πρὸς Ἀμύτον τὸν Ἀρρίδαίου, and in the second: . . . τὸν Ἑρρίδαίου. From Aristotle, Sauppe concludes convincingly that Arrhidaios's widow, married now to Perdikkas, gave birth to the son whom Archelaos murdered and that Archelaos forestalled her vengeance by marrying his daughter to a son of her first marriage, Amyntas. According to Dexippos, this Amyntas is Arrhidaios's son, Amyntas's grandson, and great-grandson of Alexander the Philhellene, who died about 454. He became Amyntas III, father of Philip II, not by Archelaos's daughter, but by Eurydike Sirrhas's daughter, granddaughter of Lynkestian Arrhabaios (Strab. VII, p. 326). Aelian (*Var. Hist.* XII. 43) writes: Μενέλαος (?) ὁ Φιλίππου πάππος εἰς τοὺς νόθους ἐτέλει, ὁ δὲ τοῦτου υἱὸς Ἀμύντας ὑπὸν ἑρέτης Ἀερόπου καὶ δοῦλος ἐπεπίστευτο.

27. According to Diodoros (XIV. 37), ἀκουσίως. According to Aristotle (*Pol.* V. 8. 10), he was murdered by his favorite Krateuas; he had promised his eldest daughter to Krateuas and then given her to Sirrhas.

28. Aristotle calls him Amyntas ὁ μικρὸς and notes that Derdas murdered him διὰ τὸ καυχῆσασθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ (*Pol.* V. 8. 10). This Amyntas is probably a son of the Philip in whose behalf the Odrysiens undertook to invade Macedonia in 429 (Thucyd. II. 95 ff.). At the time, he was no more than twenty years old. Derdas is without doubt Sirrhas's son and succeeded him as prince of Elymiotis. His relationship with Amyntas indicates that he was born no later than 410.

29. ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν (Diod. XIV. 82. 2).

30. Eurydike is the daughter of Sirrhas of Elymiotis by his marriage to a daughter of Lynkestian Arrhabaios (Strab. VII, p. 326). Eurydike's brother is Derdas, who was still quite young when he murdered Amyntas the Small in 390; he was probably born about 406. The marriage of Amyntas and Eurydike produced three sons: Alexander, Perdikkas, and Philip. Alexander, the eldest, was perhaps sixteen or seventeen and Philip, the youngest, perhaps ten when their father died (369). The marriage therefore may have been concluded in 386.

31. According to the scholiast of Aischines (*De fals. leg.*, par. 27), this Pausanias is τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, therefore surely not the Lynkestian whom Amyntas removed in 390. The line of the royal house to which he belonged can no longer be ascertained.

32. According to Karystios of Pergamon, διατρέφων δ' ἔνταῦθα δύνάμιν, ὥς ἀπέθανε Περδίκκας, ἐξ ἐτοίμου δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης ἐπέπεσε τοῖς πράγμασι (ap. Athen. XI, p. 507).

33. Diodoros's assertion (XV. 22) is now clarified by an inscription recording: συμμαχία Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Κετρίποριν τὸν Θρᾷκα καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφούς καὶ πρὸς Λύππειον τὸν Παῖονα καὶ πρὸς Γράβον τὸν Ἰλλύριον, (*Εφημ. Αρχ.*, 1874, no. 435 and C. I. A. II, p. 406), an alliance concluded under the archon Elpines, 356–55. The inscription enables us to place chronologically the coin bearing ΚΕΤΡΙΠΟΡΙΟΣ that Waddington recognized as Thracian (*Rev. Numism.*, 1863, p. 240) and the coin of ΛΥΚΚΕΙΟ or, more correctly, ΛΥΚΠΕΙΟ described by Eckhel (Six, *Numism. Chron.*, 1875, I, p. 20). If the coins bearing ΑΔΑΙΟΥ (Pellerin, *Peuples et villes*, I, p. 183) belong to this period (which I no longer find probable), Philip may have installed this man as prince of Paionia, in place of Lykpeios, with obligation to military service of course, and one would recognize in him the (Paionian) Addaios whom the satirists characterize rather drastically as ὁ τοῦ Φιλίππου ἀλεκτρυών (Athen. XI, p. 468 and XII, p. 532). The coins bearing ΕΥΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ, formerly placed in the Paionian series, (*Berl. Kat.*, 1851, p. 262), probably belong to another region, certainly to a later period.

34. Arr. I. 25. The objection that these Lynkestians were too young to be sons of Aeropos, king in 396, is not irrefutable. If the sons were eight, five, and three years old at the time of their father's death, they would have been fully capable of intrigue at the time of Philip's death in his sixties, in 336. In 334, Arrhabaios's sons Neoptolemos and Amyntas were grown men and Amyntas was hipparch of the sarissa bearers (Arr. I. 14. 1). These calculations indicate that the ἡγεμὼν Aeropos mentioned by Polyaios (IV. 2. 3) was not the father of these Lynkestian brothers, but more likely a son of Alexander or Heromenes and named for his grandfather the king.

35. Curt. VI. 9. 17.

36. Anaximenes (fr. 7) attributes the establishment of a companion cavalry and of an infantry of foot companions and the division of the foot

companions εἰς λόχους καὶ δεκάδας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς to Philip's elder brother Alexander. Demosthenes's well-known description of Philip's army about 348 (*Olynth.* II. 17) could imply a sharp distinction between the levy on the one hand and the ξένοι and πεζέταιροι as standing troops on the other, if that datum were not visibly, and perhaps intentionally, distorted. But we do see that the ξένοι, that is to say, the hired troops, played a role in this military organization from the outset, not unlike the 6000 ξένοι in Jason's Thessalian army (Xen., *Hellen.* VI. 1. 4).

37. Frontinus (IV. 2. 4) cannot be considered proof of this figure; Diodoros (XVI. 85) is more reliable, though the count of 3000 riders to 30,000 infantry clearly cannot be right.

38. ἀπὸ πανδοκείου ψαλτρίαν μισθωσάμενοι (Polyaen. IV. 2. 3). Polyaenos names Aeropos and Damasippos as the officers. How harshly they were disciplined is described by Aelian (*Var. Hist.* XIV. 49).

39. An example of this sense of honor is given by one Pausanias, who, having been accused of "womanish" sexual acts, redeemed himself by stepping between the enemy and the endangered king in a battle in Illyria and letting himself be cut to pieces (Diod. XVI. 93). We shall see a different example set by another Pausanias.

40. Theopomp., fr. 249, ap. Polyb. VIII. 11. 13; Athen. IV, p. 166 and VI, p. 260.

41. This seems a fair inference from Demosthenes (*De fals. leg.*, par. 89); the result is even more clearly implied by Philip's policy concerning mines, currency, and commerce; Theopompos (fr. 249) judges the matter quite differently.

42. Αἰθίκων βασιλεύς (Tzetzes ad Lycophr. 802).

43. Perdikkam et Leonnatum stirpe regia genitos (Curt. X. 7. 8). According to Arrian (*Ind.* 18), Perdikkas came from Orestis. We do not know whether Antiochos king of the Orestians, mentioned by Thucydides (I. 80), was his ancestor or whether *stirps regia* means the royal house of Macedonia, to which Perdikkas belongs, or whether both conjectures are valid.

44. Δέρδας Ἀριδαίου παῖς, ἀνέψιος Περδίκκα καὶ Φιλίππου (Schol. Thucyd. I. 57). Aridaïos therefore was a brother of Alexander the Philhellene. This is probably the Derdas mentioned among the witnesses to the treaty of 423. The Sirrhas mentioned by Aristotle (*Pol.* V. 8. 11) is probably his son, and Sirrhas's son is the second Derdas. Cf. Theopomp., fr. 155.

45. ἀδελφὴν Δέρδα καὶ Μαχάτα (Satyr., ap. Athen. XI, p. 557 c).

46. The third brother Harpalos appears in Demosthenes (*In Aristocr.*, par. 149), where we read that he, with Iphikrates, delivered a number of Amphipolites as hostages in 366. Παυσανίας Μαχήτου, named among the witnesses to the treaty of 423 (C. I. A. I, no. 42), belongs to the same family and is probably the one mentioned by Thucydides (I. 62).

47. Plut., *Apophth.* 24 and 25. The kinsman of Harpalos mentioned there is Krates. I no longer hold to my earlier conjecture that the Antigonids belonged to this house. Antigonos Philip's son, known as the "One-eyed," was certainly of a noble house, apparent still in Seneca's attribution, *nepos Alexandri*, and no αὐτουργός, day laborer, as Duris, after his usual fashion, would have us believe. But his father cannot be the Philip who became satrap of India in 327 and who probably belonged to the Elymiot house, for Antigonos, according to the age that Porphyrios gives him, was born as early as 384.

48. Ἀντίπατρος γὰρ ἐργηγόρει (Plut., *Apophth.* 27). χρὴ πίνειν, Ἀντίπατρος γὰρ ἱκανὸς ἐστὶ νηφεύων (Athen. X, p. 435).

49. Anon. ap. Boissonade, *Anecdota*, II, p. 464.

50. Plut., *Alex.* 2. Her father, Neoptolemos, is mentioned with his father, Alketas, in a decision taken by the Attic naval league in 377 (C. I. A. II, no. 17, v. 14). After the death of Alketas, Neoptolemos and his brother Arybbas ruled the Molossians, first together, then separately. After Neoptolemos's death, his children Olympias and Alexander became wards of their uncle Arybbas. Olympias married Philip in 357, and her brother soon appeared at the Macedonian court (in Macedoniam nomine sororis arcessit omnique studio spe regni sollicitatum, etc.: Justin. VIII. 6). In 352 Philip found occasion to march against Arybbas (Demosth., *Olynth.* I, par. 14). When Alexander was twenty years old, Philip set him against his uncle (ereptum Arybbae regnum puero admodum tradit: Justin. VIII. 6), who fled to Athens. There he obtained a decree to the effect that the Attic strategoi would take measures ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ κομίσωνται τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πατρώαν (C. I. A. II, no. 115). At the time, Philip was subjecting the cities the Elians had founded in Kassopia on the Ambrakic Gulf and awarding them to Molossian Alexander. Arybbas seems to have died shortly afterwards, and Alexander became sole ruler in Epeiros.

51. We do not know whether the representation of Olympias on a gold coin in the Berlin collection (a unique example, it seems) is supported by tradition. Von Sallet dates the coin to the time of Caracalla (*Num. Zeit.*, 3, p. 56).

52. These are: an Olympian victory (Ol. 106), the conquest of Potidaea, and Parmenion's victory over the Illyrian Dardanians (Plut., *Alex.* 3). Ideler has calculated that Alexander's birth falls during Boedromion Ol. 106.1, that is, 16 September to 14 October 356 (*Abhandl. der Akad.*, 1820 and 1821; *Handb. der Chronol.*, I, p. 403 ff.). In no case could news of the Olympian victory, won about 17 July, have taken until 15 September to reach the king. This synchronism, like many others in the historical tradition, belongs either to folklore or to mnemonic practice and has no application to reality.

53. Theopomp., fr. 27, ap. Polyb. VIII. 11.

54. If this anecdote, which we owe to Plutarch, is well founded, it must belong to the period before the war against Perinthos and Byzantium, that is to say, before Alexander was fifteen; earlier yet, Persian Artabazos and his brother-in-law Rhodian Memnon were present as refugees at the court at Pella.

55. Incontrovertibly, this letter, celebrated in ancient times, is a forgery. Aristotle was not thirty years old at that moment and had not yet acquired the reputation on which the letter is predicated.

56. Continence in fact is one of his most attractive qualities and is attested by many examples. As a youth, he was so far removed from indulgence that his worried parents slipped a beautiful hetaira into his bed chamber; Alexander turned away in shame and protested bitterly afterward.

57. Typical among the many pertinent stories is one concerning the effect of music on him: as Antigenides was singing a war song accompanied by the flute, Alexander leapt to his feet and reached for his weapons ([Plut.,] *De fort. Alex.* II. 2).

58. The government had been entrusted to him during Philip's absence. Plutarch (*Alex.* 9) uses the formulation: ἀπολειφθεὶς κύριος ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς σφραγίδος.

59. Curt. VIII. 1. 25. This Illyrian incursion probably belongs to the first months of the year 337. Demosthenes (*Pro Coron.*, par. 244) indicates that he himself was sent to Illyria as an envoy.

60. Plut., *Apophth. Phil.* 22. Of Aristotle's instruction, Philip remarks to Alexander: ὅπως μὴ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα πράξης, ἐφ' οἷς ἐγὼ πεπραγμένος μεταμέλομαι.

61. Our oldest report of this scene is from Satyros (fr. 3, ap. Athen. XIII, p. 527). Illyrian Audata and Elymiot Phila probably died before 357, the year in which Philip married Olympias. Satyros says of the two Thessalian women merely that Philip begat children with them; they therefore were not his lawful wives. Olympias seems not to have protested when Philip ἐπεισήγαγε the Thracian Meda.

62. The exact nature of this dependency is unclear. Satyros (fr. 5) says of Philip: προσεκτήσατο δὲ καὶ τὴν Μολόττων βασιλείαν γήμας Ὀλυμπιάδα. Therefore some kind of female succession must have been practiced in Epeiros by which Olympias, with her brother Alexander, was heir to half the land, while her uncle and guardian Arybbas held the other half. Philip then drove out Arybbas and his house, acquired the cities on the Ambrakic Gulf, and awarded these and the entire kingdom to Alexander—certainly not without attaching conditions. Epeiros had been a Thessalian dependency; Xenophon describes King Alketas as: ὁ ἐν Ἠπειρῷ ὑπάρχος (*Hellen.* VI. 1. 7).

63. Plut., *Alex.* 10; Arr. III. 6. 5.

64. Polyaeos puts the strength of this corps at 10,000 men (V. 44. 4). Trogus says: quum bella Persica moliretur praemissa classe cum ducibus (*Prol.* IX). The other information about this advance guard appears in Diodoros. Remarkably, Arrian makes no mention of it. Are we to conclude that the tradition, which goes back to Kleitarchos, is a tale? Dareios's letter to Alexander after the battle of Issos (Arr. II. 14. 2) says that King Philip started the war: ἀδικίας πρῶτος ἐς βασιλέα Ἄρσην ἤρξεν οὐδὲν ἄχαρι ἐκ Περσῶν παθῶν, which can only refer to this invasion of Persian territory.

65. Arr. I. 25 and II. 14. 5, where Alexander's letter to Dareios says that the Persian king incited the murderers of Philip, ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πρὸς ἅπαντας ἐκομπάσατε. Plutarch says that both Olympias and Alexander knew of Pausanias's plan (*Alex.* 10).

66. Diod. XVI. 94; Val. Max. VIII. 14. Plutarch relates the same anecdote of Alexander. The motive for the murder is mentioned by Aristotle (*Pol.* VI. 10. 10).

67. For the chronology, see appendix and Droysen, *Über die Echtheit der Urkunden in Demosthenes Rede vom Kranz*, published separately, p. 64. Alexander's beginnings date to September 336 (Ol. 111.1) in the archontate of Pythodelos, by Ideler's reckoning.

68. According to Diodoros, who describes these events in detail, the wreath sent by Athens was accompanied by a popular decree: ἄν τις ἐπιβουλεύσας Φιλίπῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ καταφύγῃ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, παραδόσιμον εἶναι τοῦτον (XVI. 92).

69. According to Diodoros (XVII. 2), Kleopatra gave birth to a son "a few days" before Philip's end. Diodoros is following Kleitarchos, who, however given to colorful writing, is too immediate to events to have reported the birth of a daughter as the birth of a son. In Justin (XI. 2. 3), we find that Kleitarchos has preserved the name: Caranum ex noverca natum. But Justin says elsewhere (IX. 7. 12) that Kleopatra's child was a daughter, an inconsistency that Grote has tried to resolve. Satyros's notice, 150 years later, of a daughter cannot take precedence over Kleitarchos, in my estimation.

70. It is probably after Kleitarchos that Pseudo-Plutarch says: πᾶσα δ' ὕπουλος ἡ Μακεδονία πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας, that is to say, the Lynkestians (*De fort. Alex.* I. 3).

71. Arr. I. 25; Curt. VII. 1. 6.

72. Schäfer (*Demosthenes*, III, p. 65) concludes correctly from Arrian (I. 16. 5) that *immunitas cunctarum rerum* (Justin. XI. 1. 10) applies only to land taxes. Similarly, *Macedonibus immunitatem . . . dedit* applies only to Macedonians in the army; after the battle on the Granikos, Alexander gave the parents and children of the fallen: τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀτέλειαν καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι ἢ τῷ σώματι λειτουργίαι ἢ κατὰ τὰς κτήσεις ἐκάστων εἰσφοραί (Arr. I. 16. 5 and VII. 10. 4). These therefore are the privileges of those who serve in the military.

73. εὐπειθῇ κατεσκεύασε τὴν δύναμιν (Diod. XVII. 2).

74. Amyntas "Arrhabaios's son" (Arr. I. 20. 10) is probably Neoptolemos's brother. He was with the army standing in Asia, and it is unlikely that he had any part in the conspiracy; he distinguished himself in the campaigns in Asia.

Book One, Chapter 3

1. διὰ τῶν κατασκόπων τῶν παρὰ Χαριδήμου πυθόμενος (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 77).

2. ἱερὰ μὲν ἰδρύσατο Πausanίου, εἰς αἰτίαν δὲ εὐαγγελίων θυσίας τὴν βουλὴν κατέστησε (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 160.)

3. His word was *Μαργίτης* (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 160; Marsyas, fr. 8).

4. We have no exact wording of the treaty of the Corinthian League and therefore do not know whether it could be interpreted to say that at Philip's death not only his command of the war against the Persians would lapse but also the concluded peace to which the allies had sworn, ἡ κοινὴ εἰρήνη.

5. The participation of Argos (Diod. XVII. 3 and 8) is now confirmed by an Attic decree in honor of Aristomachos of Argos: . . . καὶ συμβάν-τος κοινου πολέμου Ἀθηναίοις τε καὶ τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἀργείων πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. . . . (C. I. A. II, no. 161).

6. τῶν φίλων (Diod. XVII. 2). Whether φίλος was an official title in state affairs in Macedonia at the time should not be decided on the strength of Curtius's formulation, *ex prima cohorte amicorum* (VI. 7. 17). In Arrian (I. 25. 4) we find that Alexander convoked τοὺς φίλους for a council and that what they told him is formulated: ἐδόκει τοῖς ἐταίροις. But Arrian's expressions are not always technically exact.

7. Diod. XVII. 5.

8. Polyæn. IV. 3. 23. I see no reason to deem this story a fiction. It appears in the third series of Polyæn's extracts, which, according to Petersdorff, seem to have been drawn each from a different source, the first (par. 1–10) perhaps from Kallisthenes, the second (par. 11–22) probably from Kleitarchos, and the third (par. 23–32) from an unknown author.

9. Theopomp., ap. Harpocrat., s.v. *τετραρχία*. A more detailed account is found in A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes*, II, p. 402.

10. ἔπεισε τὴν πατροπαράδοτον ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτῷ συγχωρῆσαι κοινῶ τῆς Θεσσαλίας δόγματι (Diod. XVII. 4). *exemplo patris dux universae gentis creatus erat et vectigalia omnia reditusque suos ei tradiderunt* (Justin. XI. 3. 2). Justin's expression seems to describe the office of tagos. According to Diodoros, Alexander demanded only the powers that were his in his capacity as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ of the

Hellenic League. The table of *Thessalorum reges* notwithstanding, Philip's formal relationship with Thessaly remains unclear.

11. Philostr., *Heroic.*, p. 130.

12. Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 161.

13. τὰ συνορίζοντα τῶν ἔθνων (Diod. XVII. 4. 2).

14. Diodoros's expression, τὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων συνέδριον συναγαγών, seems to signify the convening of an extraordinary assembly, not the usual *πυλαία ὄπωρινή*, which was probably held a few weeks earlier.

15. For Acrocorinth we have Plutarch (*Arat.* 23) and an indication for Chalkis in Polybios (XXXVIII. 1 c, 3rd edition, ed. Hultsch), made more probable by Proteas's being sent against the Persian fleet in 333 (ἀνάγεται ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος: Arr. II. 2. 4).

16. τοῦ νεανίσκου τὸ πρῶτον παροξυνθέντος εἰκότως (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 161).

17. The characterization comes from the oration *ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας* (par. 14), attributed to Demades.

18. τὸν Ὀρωπὸν ἄνευ πρεσβείας λαβών (Demad., par. 9). Aristotle mentions Oropos (fr. 561, ed. Rose) and Drymos (fr. 560) on the Boeotian-Attic frontier toward Megara. Both fragments are taken from *Δικαιώματα Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἐξ ᾧ Φίλιππος τὰς φιλονεικίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων διέλυσεν* (*Vita Aristot. Marcian.*, ap. Rose; Aristot., *Pseudep.* I, p. 246).

19. Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 161. According to Deinarchos (*In Demosth.*, par. 82), he refused to join the embassy sent to the king.

20. φιλανθρώπους ἀποκρίσεις δούς (Diod. XVII. 4). Justin, by contrast, notes: quibus auditis et graviter increpatis (XI. 3). Justin conflates this campaign and that of the following year, saying of this one what is true of the next. We have a few fragments of the treaty concluded with Alexander: . . . οὐδὲ ὅπλα ἐποίσω ἐπὶ πημονῇ ἐπ' οὐδένα τῶν ἐμμενόντων ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε κατὰ θάλασσαν . . . οὐδὲ χωρίον καταλήψομαι . . . ἐπὶ πολέμῳ οὐδενὸς τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνούντων τεχνῇ οὐδεμίᾳ . . . Further: καὶ πολεμήσω τῷ . . . παραβαίνοντι καθότι . . . τῷ καὶ ὁ ἡγεμὼν . . . (C. I. A. II, no. 160).

21. Arr. I. 1. 3. Probably relevant here is a passage of an inscription where Lykurgos accounts for his administration (cf. Köhler in *Hermes*, 5, p. 224) and notes that two gold wreaths were decreed for Alexander. The

Megarans also honored Alexander by making him an honorary citizen of their city. Alexander, εἰς γέλῳτι θέμενος τὴν σπουδὴν αὐτῶν, accepted because the Megarans, as they told him, had granted Herakles the same honor (Plut., *De monarch.* 2).

22. οἱ συνεδρεῦειν εἰωθότες (Diod. XVII. 4. 9).

23. Arr. I. 1. 2.

24. Plut., *Adv. Colot.* 32.

25. Tenedos may also have declared itself at this time: τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας γενομένας σφίσι (Arr. II. 2. 2.). That Tenedos joined at this point and not in 334 is implied by the treaties of 334, which are concluded with Alexander alone, not with both Alexander and the Corinthian League.

26. Plut., *Alex.* 14; Pausan. II. 2 and 4, etc. To this period may belong also the charmingly invented story of Alexander's visit to Delphi. The Pythia refused to prophesy because it was not the season: Apollo was said to be away during the winter months. When Alexander took her by the arm to lead her forcibly to the tripod, she exclaimed, "My son, you are irresistible," words that Alexander was pleased to take as an oracle.

27. Diod. XVII. 5; Curt. VII. 1. 3. The sources do not say just how the murder was accomplished. Diodoros indicates that Parmenion's authority restored the troops to loyalty.

28. Diodoros (XVII. 7) mentions both Macedonians and mercenaries as under the command of Kalas, who succeeded Attalos.

29. Plut., *Alex.* 10; Diod. XVII. 2; Justin. IX. 7. Pausanias's account of her death is more gruesome (VIII. 7. 7).

30. In the proceeding against Philotas, Alexander testified: Amyntas qui mihi consobrinus fuit et in Macedonia capiti meo impias comparavit insidias (Curt. VI. 9. 17; cf. Arr., ap. Phot., par. 22). The date is determined by Kynane's betrothal to the Agrianian prince (Arr. I. 5. 4).

31. Events at Magnesia, where the Persian field commander Memnon kept the upper hand, took place before Attalos's end, for Polyaios (V. 44. 4) names Attalos in conjunction with Parmenion, which would place these events in the year 336.

32. Arrian (I. 5. 1) uses the expression ἀφεστάναι of the Illyrians, implying that they had recognized their dependency on Macedonia. Nothing is known about the exact form and the extent of this dependency.

33. The Illyrians whom Kleitos leads seem not to be the same as the tribes under Pleurias whom Alexander fought two years earlier. Their settlements probably lay south of Pleurias's, in the hills and glens through which the Ergent and the Devol flow. The Dardanians against whom Philip battled long and hard and who emerge again later as an important force go unmentioned in this period. Their settlements were scattered from the northern end of the passes of Skopje over the Field of Blackbirds to the Drin at the point where the river becomes navigable. Was Pleurias perhaps a prince of the Dardanians?

34. Arr. I. 5. 4. Strabo (VII, p. 318) says that the Autariates had invaded the land of the Triballians and overcome them (*καταστρεψάμενοι*). Diodoros (XV. 36) gives the date, but he says that the Triballians had moved away *σιτοδεία πιεζόμενοι* and in fact *πανδημεί*.

35. The earlier settlements of the Triballians are made perfectly clear by Herodotos (IV. 49). He describes the *πεδίου Τριβαλλικόν* in terms of the rivers Angros and Brongos. No one says explicitly that the Triballians went from their raid on Abdera to settle beyond the Haimos, east of their former territory, downstream along the Timok or the Iskar approximately, but this seems clear from the circumstance that after the time of King Philip, the Getai were no longer to be found on the right bank of the Danube.

36. The Istrians who harassed King Ateas (Justin. IX. 2. 1) are not Greeks of the city Istros on the coast of the Dobrudja, for they have a king. Thirlwall was correct, I believe, to suspect that by *Istriani* is meant a Danube tribe who were not Scyths—in his opinion, the Triballians.

37. King Philip conquered the Paionians in 356 and forced them into dependency. Whether Patraos was king of the Paionians at Alexander's outset is unknown. They held the southern slope of the passes of Skopje and performed their ceremonial king's bath in the river Astykos (Polyaen. IV. 12. 3), probably the Pčinja.

38. According to Demosthenes (*Phil.* III, par. 27), King Philip wrote the Athenians in 341: ἔμοι δ' ἐστὶν εἰρήνη πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούειν ἐμοῦ βουλομένους.

39. We know with certainty that there was a Thracian prince Seuthes after the events of 330 and 323, for Curtius notes: Seuthes Odrysas populares suos ad defectionem compulerat (X. 1. 45). The mention of his son

Kotys in an Attic inscription of 330 (C. I. A. II, add. 175 b), to which we shall return, implies that Kotys, too, had a principality. Agathon Tyrimmas's son, who led the Odrysian cavalry in Alexander's army in 334, was probably also a Thracian prince, as perhaps was Sitalkes captain of the Thracian infantry in Alexander's army in 334.

40. Arrian (I. 25. 3) establishes that Alexander made Alexander the Lynkestian *στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ Θράκης*. About 330, Memnon occupies this post. Philip probably created the post, but we have no proof.

41. Arrian, who introduces everything from the time of Philip's death to the first battle in the Haimos (I. 1. 4) by *λέγεται*, writes: ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ Θράκης, ἐς Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ Ἰλλυριοὺς, so that ἅμα τῷ ἦρι does not necessarily apply to the departure from Amphipolis. Using *λέγουσι*, he reports that Alexander, διαβάς τὸν Νέσσον δεκαταῖος ἀφίκετο ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος τὸν Αἶμον. When Arrian uses *λέγουσι*, he is not drawing on Ptolemy and Aristoboulos.

42. We do not know whether the dependency of Byzantium was established by particular treaties or by the city's membership (also undocumented) in the Hellenic League. A passage in Suidas (s.v. *Λέων*) makes treaties seem more likely.

43. That Antipater acted in this capacity, for which we have no title, is indicated by Deinarchos (*In Demosth.*, par. 18): ambassadors from Antipater arrive in Arkadia during Alexander's absence.

44. The strength of this army is stated nowhere. But we can gather from Arrian, who mentions three, or rather four, squadrons of cavalry (I. 3. 5), that at least 1500 riders were present (I. 3. 6). Arrian also mentions the agema and the other shieldbearers—therefore several *τάξεις*—and the phalanges of Koinos, Perdikkas, and Amyntas (I. 6. 10 and 8. 1). From the passage at I. 4. 5, we may conclude that the phalanges of Meleagros and Philip were present, and from I. 2. 1 that two others may have been present. Finally, 2000 archers and Agrianians are mentioned, yielding a total fighting force of perhaps 20,000 men. Artillery was also present: *μηχαναί* (Arr. I. 6. 8).

45. Arrian's formulation *διαβάς τὸν Νέσσον* (I. 1. 5) would indicate that Alexander did not follow the Nestos valley up to Razlog (Meomia), then cross the pass of Tchpina into the valley of the Elliden to descend to the Hebros basin and Philippopolis. He probably crossed the Nestos

sooner, either at Boukia, to enter the valley of the Arda south of high Kruchova and drop down to the Hebros by way of Asmilan to Adrianople, or at Nevrekop, where north of the Kruchova the pass of Karabulan leads into the valley of the Kričim and down to Philippopolis. (The routes are taken from Kiepert's detailed map of 1870.) We do not know which of these passes was more suited to the passage of an army. For Alexander's purposes, the way over Nevrekop was shorter.

46. Alexander probably took approximately the same route as Philip III according to Polybios (XXIII. 8. 4) and Livy (XXXIX. 53): διελθὼν διὰ μέσης τῆς Θράκης ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ὀδρύσας, Βέσσους καὶ Δευθηλήτους. Arrian (I. 25. 2) says that Alexander was hailed as king first by Lynkestian Alexander, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἐν τιμῇ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν εἶχε στρατηγόν τε ἐπὶ Θράκης στείλας, etc. We cannot know whether he sent the Lynkestian ahead as strategos or left him there in that capacity in 335.

47. τῶν δὲ ἐμπόρων πολλοί in Arrian (I. 1. 6) has properly been emended to read τῶν ἐκ τῶν ὄρων πολλοί. These are probably Bessi, who presided at the shrine of Dionysos in the mountains (Dio Cass. LI. 25 and LIV. 34; Herod. VII. 110). According to Strabo (VII, p. 318) and Pliny (IV. 40), the Haimos was settled from the Pontos westward by Korrales (more correctly, Korpillians), Bessi, and Maidans, in that order. Suetonius (*Aug.* 94) recounts that Alexander sacrificed at the shrine of Dionysos at the top of the mountains. The στενὰ τῆς ἀνόδου τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρος (Arr. I. 1. 6) appear to me to be the pass of Kalofer, through which Heinrich Barth passed in 1862. The pass from Aitos toward Chumla as Cyprian Robert describes it (*Die Slaven der Türkei*, II, p. 186) would be wholly unsuited to travel by wagons, and the pass from Aitos over Karnobat, described by Hochstetter (*Mitteil. der k. k. Geogr. Gesell. in Wien*, 1871, p. 587) even more so.

48. Arr. I. 2. 1; Polyæn. IV. 3. 11. The Philotas whom Arrian names here is to be distinguished from the Philotas in command on the Kadmeia and from Parmenion's son Philotas, who led the cavalry (Arr. I. 2. 5).

49. The Lyginos is mentioned nowhere else. It should not be identified with the Oiskos (Iskar), as I once thought, which no longer formed the eastern frontier of the Triballians, as it had in Thucydides's time (II. 96). Arrian's description of the Lyginos—ἀπέχει ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰστροῦ . . . σταθμοὺς τρεῖς—does not necessarily say that it flowed directly into the

Pontos; that could only be the Kanitschyk, on which Chumla lies. We do not know whether Alexander came down out of the mountains in the direction of Trojan or of Gabrovo. We should note, however, that the Jantra flows generally eastward from below Gabrovo almost to Tarnovo, the old Bulgarian capital, and that the distance from Tarnovo to the Danube at Rusčuk is about fourteen miles. R. Roesler (*Rumänische Studien*, 1871, p. 20) sees the Lyginos “in the little river Ljig, a tributary from the right of the Kolubara, which flows into the Danube.” He believes that Alexander moved northwestward through the passes at Sofija (Porta Traiani). In that case, the Triballians would have to have been settled still on the Morava and the Getai on the Danube near Belgrade.

50. Arrian says: ἐς νήσόν τινα τῶν ἐν Ἰστροῦ; Strabo (VII, p. 310), doubtless following Ptolemy, says: τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ [the Ister] νήσου, and both call the island Peuke. Commentaries say this is the great Peuke of which Strabo says (VII, p. 305), πρὸς δὲ ταῖς ἐκβολαῖς μεγάλη νήσός ἐστιν ἡ Πεύκη, and those following Skymnos of Chios (v. 789), οὐκ ἐστ’ ἐλάττων μὲν Ῥόδου. An island in the boggy mouths of the Danube cannot possibly fit Arrian’s description: τῆς νήσου τὰ πολλὰ ἀπότομα ἐς προσβολήν (I. 3. 4.), even less, the claim of a current strong and difficult to traverse because of narrows, οἷα δὲ ἐς στενὸν συγκεκλεισμένον. Oddest of all is the assertion that Alexander decided not to land on the island, but instead to cross to the opposite bank. This island, called Peuke, cannot be the size of Rhodes; it can only have been a river island such as one finds above Silistra off the southern bank of the Danube, which is higher than the northern. These observations are consistent with Strabo’s (or Ptolemy’s) description: Ὅρων μέχρι τοῦ Ἰστρου καθήκοντας καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ νήσου Πεύκης, τὰ πέραν δὲ Γέτας ἔχοντα (VII, p. 301).

51. καὶ οἱ Θρᾷκες οἱ πρόσχωροι τοῖς Τριβαλλοῖς . . . συμπεφευγότες ἦσαν (Arr. I. 2. 3). Arrian does not name these Thracians, but we see that other Thracian settlements lay between the Triballians and the Pontos and that these Thracians were no longer Getai.

52. In 340 the Thracian tribe of the Getai was loyal to King Philip, who was fighting the Scythian king, Ateas, their oppressor, and eventually conquered him. Alexander’s campaign establishes that the Getai were now settled on the north bank of the Danube. He may not have intended to attack them as he set out, and the ships at Byzantium may have been mus-

tered against the Triballians. When Getaien forces appeared on the far side of the Danube, Alexander may have concluded that they, too, would have to be taught a lesson.

53. According to an oral communication by a botanist who saw grain as tall as a man standing here at mid-May.

54. Arr. I. 4. 5.

55. Arr. I. 4. 8; Strab. VII, p. 301, following Ptolemy.

56. The situation of Agrianian territory indicates with fair certainty that Alexander crossed the land of the Paionians by the road over Sofija and Kjustendil to Skopje on the upper Axios. This was the shortest way to the threatened western frontier. Thus Arrian (I. 5. 1): ἐπ' Ἀγριάνων καὶ Παιόνων προύχωρει. At Sofija, Alexander was still forty-eight miles from Pelion.

57. Pelion, once laid much too far to the northeast for want of attention to Livy's indications (XXXI. 40), has now been placed substantially correctly by Barbié du Bocage. We must look for it somewhere near present-day Korčë, perhaps closer to the narrow Tchangon pass, which the Devol breaks through, flowing westward, and approximately where Kiepert places Plyassa, before the western entrance to the pass ("Karte der Flussgebiete der Drin und des Wardar," 1867).

58. I am not sure that I have understood the technicalities of this maneuver correctly. The specification of τὸ βάθος τῆς φάλαγγος at 120 men may have been given to establish the strength of the infantry brought together here "in phalanx," since this depth of formation implies a square of approximately equal front and depth.

59. τοῖς σωματοφύλαξι καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐταίροις (Arr. I. 6. 5) designates, not the seven elite bodyguards, but rather the corps of βασιλικοὶ παῖδες, often mentioned in the late war years.

60. By τῇ παρουσίᾳ δυνάμει, Arrian (I. 5. 8) seems to indicate that reinforcements had been sent for.

61. Arr. I. 6. 11.

62. The Illyrian crown remained at length in the line of Bardylis and Kleitos. Illyrians do not appear in Alexander's campaign into Asia, Diodoros's explicit statement to the contrary notwithstanding (XVII. 77). The Illyrian princes are thought to have recognized Macedonian suzerainty, since Antipater was charged in 323 with governing τὰ ἐπέκεινα τῆς

Θράκης ὡς ἐπὶ Ἰλλυρίους καὶ Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ Ἀγριᾶνας, etc. (Arr., *τὰ μετὰ Ἀλεξ.* 7).

63. Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 238.

64. Arr. II. 14. 6; Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 239; Dinarch., *In Demosth.*, par. 10. Plutarch (*Demosth.* 20 and 23) speaks of letters by Demosthenes and of γράμματα τῶν βασιλέως στρατηγῶν δηλοῦτα τὸ πλῆθος τῶν δοθέντων αὐτῷ χρημάτων.

65. ἐν Τριβάλλοις μόνον δ' οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος νεκρὸν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον προέθηκαν (Ps.-Demad., par. 17).

66. Arrian (I. 7. 2) names them: Ἀμύνταν καὶ Τιμόλαον τῶν τὴν Καδμεῖαν ἔχόντων. Niebuhr recognized in them the leaders of the Macedonian faction whom Demosthenes lists in the catalogue of traitors (*Pro Coron.*, par. 295) and emended Ἀμύντας to Ἀνεμοίτας.

67. Plut., *Demosth.* 23. παρὰ Δημοσθένους ὅπλων τὸ πλῆθος ἐν δωρεαῖς λαβόντες (Diod. XVII. 8).

68. Deinarchos (I, par. 18) says of the Arkadians: τὴν μὲν παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβεῖαν ἄπρακτον ἀποστειλάντων. Demochares's decree in honor of Demosthenes shows that Antipater did not merely demand that they turn around: καὶ ὡς ἐκώλυσε Πελλοποννησίους ἐπὶ Θήβας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βοηθῆσαι χρήματα δούς καὶ αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας (*Vit. X Oratt.*, p. 850). If a Macedonian garrison lay on Acrocorinth after 338, it is remarkable that instead of sending it in, Antipater chose to negotiate.

69. Aischines, writing an oration about five years later (*In Ctesiph.*, par. 239), tells quite a different story: For their military service, the Arkadians had demanded advance wages drawn from the Persian subsidies. But Demosthenes in his stinginess refused, wanting to keep everything for himself, and the Arkadians went home. A few talents would have induced the Macedonian garrison to withdraw, too, but Demosthenes would part with nothing. Circumstances alone suffice to refute these allegations. Or are we to believe that Demosthenes had so little conception of his own advantage that he would risk a reversal that could cost him not merely his popularity but also his fortune and perhaps his life, just to hold on to a few talents? If the garrison on the Kadmeia really could be suborned, could the Thebans no longer muster the necessary five talents? That Deinarchos says much the same things in his oration against Demosthenes does nothing to make this account sound less apocryphal.

70. Diodoros (XVII. 9) puts the strength of the army at more than 30,000 infantry and no fewer than 3000 riders. The count is not improbable in itself, but Kleitarchos, Diodoros's source, has no great claim to credibility.

71. Arr. I. 7. 5. Alexander did not go up the valley of the Aous (Viossa) and through the pass of Mezzovo into Thessaly, for Arrian tells us that he marched through Eordaia and Elymiotis and along the mountains of Tymphaia and Parauaia, that is to say, he moved between the mountains on his right and the Haliakmon on his left. He took the passes of Katakati into Thessaly, described by Gorceix ("Aperçu géogr. de la région de Khasia," *Bulletin de Géogr.*, 6, 1874, 7, p. 449).

72. προσμίξας δὲ ταῖς Θήβαις καὶ διδοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων μετάνοιαν ἐζήτει . . . καὶ τοῖς μεταβαλλομένοις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄδειαν ἐκήρυττε (Plut., *Alex.* 11). Arrian mentions no such offer.

73. Plut., *Alex.* 11. These two names in conjunction render the account suspect. If Philotas the commander on the Kadmeia is meant, it is odd that Antipater would be named, too, and if Antipater is correct, the mockery would have been perfected by naming, not Philotas, but rather Philotas's father Parmenion.

74. In Arrian's words, he penetrated to a point εἴσω τοῦ χάρακος (I. 8. 2); he would then τοῦ δευτέρου χάρακος εἴσω παρελθεῖν (I. 8. 3).

75. Thus Arrian, following Ptolemy, who witnessed the storm of Thebes. Diodoros's account, taken from Kleitarchos, is worthless for military matters; its points of correspondence with Arrian merely underscore its general unreliability. Alexander's plan was probably to take the outer works and force the Thebans to capitulate. That the city fell on the first assault was the work of circumstance. Kleitarchos transforms this chance event into a formal plan of operation that deployed three successive battle fronts: the first would storm the fortifications, the second would keep the Thebans busy, and the third would lie in wait for a surprise attack (ἐφεδρεύειν). In these we recognize Perdikkas's assault, the light infantry that then came up, and finally the storm by the phalanx. Polyaios (IV. 3. 23) provides a further touch, taken perhaps from another source, when he puts the surprise attack (τὴν κεκρυμένην δύναμιν) under Antipater's command and has this "concealed force" scale the wall at a spot where it had crumbled and was unguarded. Antipater's bringing his forces down from

Macedonia to join Alexander at Thebes is an event that Arrian would not have passed over in silence. Polyaeus's assertion appears in the second of his three versions of collected aphorisms, which is often at variance with what is known from other sources. Hegesias's high-flown locutions (fr. 1), taken from Agatharchides (ap. Phot., p. 446, ed. Bekker), are useless.

76. Thus Arrian (I. 9. 9). Diodoros speaks of *σύνεδροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων* (XVII. 14). By the terms of the league treaty, all members should have joined the effort against Thebes. The king acted in accordance with the treaty when he put the decision about Thebes to *τοῖς μετέχουσι τοῦ ἔργου συμμάχοις* (Arrian). That only the old enemies of Boeotia, including the Thessalians, no doubt, performed as the treaty provided was not Alexander's doing, and for Thebes it was fateful.

77. Perhaps we may assume an article in the league treaty as a basis for such a judgment. The treaty for the second Attic naval league of 378–77 provides: *εάν δὲ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ιδιώτης παρὰ τὸδε τὸ ψήφισμα ὥς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν αὐτῷ ἀτιμῶ εἶναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω . . . καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὥς διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν, ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ οὐπερ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κράτουςιν* (C. I. A. II, no. 17, v. 50 ff.). A century later, the treaty of the Achaian League seems to impose a death penalty for violation of the league: *. . . καὶ ἐξέστω τῷ βουλομένῳ αὐτῷ δίκαν θανάτου εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν . . .* (fragment of the treaty with Orchomenos, *Rev. Arch.*, 1876, p. 97). Finally, Themistokles is accused of high treason by the terms of the Hellenic League of 480 (*συλλαμβάνειν καὶ ἄγειν κριθησόμενον αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν*). Hellenic jurisprudence, therefore, seems to have recognized such a penalty and the right to impose it in federations of this kind, and a similar article must have been present also in the treaty for the Corinthian League.

78. The count of 6000 dead and 30,000 sold is given by Diodoros (XVII. 14), Plutarch (*Alex.* 11), and Aelian (*Var. Hist.* XIII. 7). It is not unthinkable, for not only Thebans but also freedmen and resident aliens fought and were sold.

79. Plut., *Alex.* 12 and *De virt. mulier.* 24; Polyaeus. VIII. 40. No trace of Thracians present in the king's army during this campaign is to be found in Arrian. He makes no mention of this incident either, which Plu-

tarch notes as having been taken from Aristoboulos. It does not appear in *Alexander*, however, but in passing (*Non posse suaviter*, ch. 10) in the *echt* Plutarchan dictum: “Who would prefer sleeping with the loveliest of women to hearing read while waking what Xenophon wrote of Pantheia, Aristoboulos of Timokleia, and Theopompos of Thebe?” This great moralist is wholly capable of having written Aristoboulos for Kleitarchos.

80. Arrian (I. 10. 3) notes: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φιλανθρώπως πρὸς τὴν πρεσβείαν ἀπεκρίνατο—a description that casts doubt on Plutarch’s claim (*Phoc.* 17) that Alexander threw down the Athenians’ letter and turned his back on the ambassadors. If Plutarch’s report were true, the king’s indignation at the canine friendliness of the Athenians’ address to him would be only too understandable.

81. This account draws on Plutarch (*Lives* of Demosthenes and Phokion) and on Diodoros and Arrian. Phokion is said to have taken part in the second embassy; Plutarch credits him with all negotiations with Alexander and with their successful outcome.

82. Plutarch (*Alex.* 13 and *Phoc.* 17) tells us that Alexander treated Athens so generously because, as he puts it, Athens had to keep an eye on Greece, which would properly come under Athenian hegemony, should Alexander fall in battle. Alexander’s politics was not that puerile, but the Athenians were probably pleased to hear and to believe such a silly story.

83. Deinarchos represents Charidemos’s flight as a patriotic decision freely taken (*In Demosth.*, par. 12; cf. Arr. I. 10. 6).

84. Diodoros (XVII. 16) speaks of τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἀξιολογωτάτους τῶν φίλων, whom the king convened—terms that are neither technical nor precise.

85. τὰ κατὰ Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἀντιπάτρῳ ἐπιτρέψας (Arr. I. 11. 3). We have no formal title for this appointment.

86. devicta perdomitaque Thracia petens Asiam veritus ne post ipsius discessum sumerent arma, reges eorum praefectosque et omnes quibus videbatur inesse cura detractae libertatis secum velut honoris causa traxit (Frontin. II. 11. 3). et reges stipendarios conspectioris ingenii ad commilitium secum trahit, segniores ad tutelam regni reliquit (Justin. XI. 5. 3). We may assume that these princes and sons of princes were: Sitalkes, who led the Thracians; Ariston, who led the Paionian riders (Plut., *Alex.*

39); Attalos, who led the Agrianians; and perhaps Agathon Tyrimmas's son, who led the Odrysian riders.

87. συμβουλευόντων πρότερον παιδοποιήσασθαι (Diod. XVII. 16).

88. A story found in Plutarch. It need not be invented: A simple fact may have been elaborated in the retelling and then given a pointed version in the writings of Kallisthenes or another author.

Book Two, Chapter 1

1. Thus Alexander's oration in Arrian (VII. 9. 6). Even if it is not authentic, it contains authentic material. Plutarch (*Alex.* 15) supplies other information, drawn from Aristoboulos, Onesikritos, and Duris.

2. "C'était comme un acheminement éloigné à la conquête de la Perse, qu'il projetait déjà." Th. Mommsen, *Histoire de la monnaie romaine*, traduite de l'allemand par le duc de Blacas et J. de Witte, I, p. 69. In the Persian empire, gold stood to silver at 1:13.33, whereas gold in commerce was sinking steadily.

3. Brandis, *Das Münz- Mass- und Gewichtswesen in Vorderasien*, p. 250.

4. Or at any rate, there are no tetradrachms, didrachms, or drachms. Of the three half-drachms in the Berlin Collection, which Mr. von Sallet kindly weighed for me, one registered 2.09 grams, the other two, 1.93 and 1.38 grams, respectively; a half-obole, by contrast, weighed .32 grams.

5. To give an example: Lykurgos states in his accounting (inscription published in *Εφημ. Αρχ.*, no. 3452, and by Köhler in *Hermes*, 1, p. 318) that he purchased more than a talent of gold at a price of 22 drachmas 5½ oboles silver per stater, therefore at an exchange rate of 1:11.47. Effectively, he gained nearly 210 drachmas for every 100 staters. If Alexander took out his 800-talent loan in silver before introducing his new monetary system, after that reform he gained 16,800 staters on the 800 talents, if my calculations are correct. If he contracted to pay the usual 12% interest in gold, he saved 2100 staters on his annual obligation. Arrian's terminology for the three Macedonians in the new formation of the battalion (*δεκαδάρχης*, *διμοιρίτης*, and *δεκαστάτηρος*) permits the conclusion that wages were calculated in staters, that is to say, in gold; we know that it had long been customary to fix that wage in dareikoi, Kyzikan staters, etc. If Alexander now had 30,000 men at a wage of 1 dareikos per man per month, the falling price of gold let him realize a gain of something more than 30,000 staters per annum. The terms of contracts for the purchase of supplies, etc., will have been similarly favorable. Thus it is *possible* to think of the new currency system as a financial measure.

6. Such were the 10,000 Illyrians from Sarnus (Polyaen. IV. 2. 12). Such a city was Kalybe: Φιλίππου τοὺς πονηροτάτους ἐνταῦθα ἰδρύσαντος (Strab. VII, p. 320), whence the name Πονηρόπολις, etc.

7. We have Alexander coins from Odessos, Mesembria, Kallatis, Apollonia, and Dionysopolis, but they belong to the classes IV, V, and VII of Müller's classification and were probably minted in the time of Lysimachos or thereafter.

8. The relevant provision in the treaty between Sparta and Argos reads: ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις καὶ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ . . . αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, etc. (Thucyd. V. 79). It is certain that at Philip-*poi* both the king's gold coins and municipal coins were struck (obverse: head of Herakles with the lion's skin; reverse: tripod with legend ΦΙΛΙΠΠΩΝ). The question whether contemporary Amphipolis also minted autonomous coins seems not yet to have been studied.

9. These cities on the southern coast of Thrace, except Perinthos and Selymbria, all minted Philip's coins. From Perinthos and Selymbria we have Alexander coins belonging to class I and class III. It follows that after Philip's death and by Alexander's agency these two cities entered into a relationship with Macedonia different from that of Byzantium and from that of the cities in the Corinthian League.

10. The silver pieces of Patraos and Audoleon (12.6 grams) correspond neither to Philip's didrachms (14.47 grams) nor to Alexander's tetradrachms (17.2 grams); they are most closely related to the older didrachms of Thasos (12.55 to 12.10 grams).

11. Frontinus (II. 5. 10) mentions a campaign of the Molossian king against the Illyrians and another against Leukas (III. 4. 5). If the former was undertaken in 335, the two Illyrian kings would not have expected the Macedonian attack; we have even less reason to date the attack on Leukas to 335.

12. Aristot., *Δικαιώματα*, fr. 571.

13. The sole indication of a connection between the two undertakings would be that Tauriskos, who induced the Macedonian treasurer to flee to Megara, continued to Italy, where he joined Molossian Alexander (Arr. III. 6. 7). Justin's notation—*simulato moerore propter Alexandri cognitionem exercitui suo triduo luctum indixit* (XII. 3. 1)—leads no further.

14. According to Arrian (VII. 9. 10), Alexander speaking to the Macedonians at Opis said: Θεσσαλῶν δὲ ἄρχοντας . . . ὑμᾶς ἀπέφηνεν. In the first class of Alexander coins we have examples from Lamia, Pharsalos, and Trikke (in L. Müller, no. 503. 527. 528). In Hellas proper, only Chalkis and Histiaia on Euboia are represented by coins of the first class

(Müller, no. 757. 758). Ambrakia, which struck coins in Philip's name and with his stamp, became autonomous again in 336 and struck no Alexander coins.

15. ὅσοι ἐντὸς Πυλῶν [instead of *Πελοποννήσου*] ἦσαν (Arr. I. 1. 2, with Niebuhr's apt emendation). This was a technical formulation of the time, as we see in a passage of Demosthenes: οὐδεὶς οὔτε τῶν ἔξω Πυλῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔτε τῶν εἴσω, etc. (*Pro Coron.*, par. 304). Thucydides (II. 101) already makes the distinction among the tribes of Thessaly: καὶ οἱ μέχρι Θερμοπυλῶν Ἕλληνες.

16. In the *Vita Aristotelis Marciana* (in the academic edition of Aristotle, p. 157 b. 20) we read of Aristotle's *Δικαιώματα Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων*: ἐξ ὧν Φίλιππος τὰς φιλονεικίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων διέλυσεν, ὡς μεγαλλογρόρημονήσαντά ποτε καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥρισα γῆν Πέλοπος. Fragment 571 indicates that the *Δικαιώματα* appeared only later or with additions.

17. Diodoros (XVII. 48) writes that the *σύνεδροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων* sent Alexander a gold wreath for the battle of Issos, and Curtius (IV. 5. 11) notes that the decision was taken at the Isthmian games, therefore, toward the end of Ol. 114.4, approximately June 332. Of greater importance is another passage (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 254): ἡμέρων μὲν ὀλίγων μέλλει τὰ Πύθια γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ συνέδριον τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων συλλήγεσθαι, which should not be construed to be the amphiktionies sitting as league court. Presumably, the synhedrion (οἱ συνεδρεύειν εἰωθότες: Diod. XVIII. 4) also convened on the occasion of the great Panhellenic festival. We have no explicit proof that it sat regularly at Corinth, but a passage of Hypereides (*Pro Euxenipp.*, par. 32) sounds as if one always accompanied the other. These questions and others concerning the constitution of the league deserve more detailed inquiry.

18. Not this contrast, but one with Roman rule is meant when Pausanias (VII. 10. 10) says: οὔτε γὰρ Μακεδόνων οἱ ἰσχύσαντες μέγιστον, Φίλιππος Ἀμύντου καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, τοὺς καθεστηκότας σφίσιν Ἑλλήνων ἐς Μακεδονίαν ἐβιάσαντο ἀποσταλῆναι, διδόναι δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐν Ἀμφικτυόσιν εἶων λόγον.

19. The formulaic expression *Ἀθηναίων σύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν συμμάχων* and others like it are examined by Busold, "Der zweite attische Bund," in Fleckeisen, *Jahrb.*, Suppl. 7, p. 684 ff. Arrian points to a similar relationship between Macedonia and the Corinthian League in a passage where

the Persians on Tenedos threw over *τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας γενομένας* (II. 2. 2), as do the instructions after the victory on the Granikos: *Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες*, etc. (I. 16. 7). The essential difference between this league and earlier ones seems to be that the synhedrion of Corinth exercised a number of competences (for the common peace, etc.) in which Macedonia did not participate.

20. According to Arrian (I. 11. 6 and 18. 4), Alexander crossed to Asia with a fleet of 160 ships. How many of these were Macedonian is unknown. We may assume that Byzantium put ships on the Hellespont in 334, as it had on the Danube in 335. Other Greek cities of the Thracian coast will also have contributed. According to Diodoros (XVII. 22), 20 Attic ships were present in the fleet.

21. Diodoros's catalogue (XVII. 17), from which these numbers are taken, betrays the very unmilitary source he used. The figures are useful as an indication of the relative strength, not of the military divisions, but rather of the national elements that composed this army. I have addressed the matter more closely in an article in *Hermes* (12, p. 266 ff.). Diodoros's mention of Triballians and Illyrians cannot be right; these tribes do not figure in Arrian, except in Alexander's address (II. 7. 5), where a mention of Illyrians proves that the text was not taken from Ptolemy.

22. Arr. I. 11. 3. Arrian is surely drawing on Ptolemy, where, however, precise rather than rounded figures appear (fr. 2). Anaximenes (fr. 15) gives: 30,000 infantry and 5500 cavalry; Kallisthenes (fr. 33): 40,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry; Aristoboulos (fr. 1): 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry; Diodoros, which is to say, Kleitarchos: 30,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry. Arrian expressly gives the number of troops now marching out of Macedonia; he does not indicate whether the advance corps that had crossed under Attalos and Parmenion two years earlier—10,000 Macedonians and mercenaries, according to Polyaios—was still standing, in whole or in part, on the Asiatic shore. Kallisthenes's figure of 40,000 infantry makes sense if these 10,000 are thought to be still standing in Asia.

23. Arrian uses the word "phalanx" in a variety of senses. It may mean: 1) the battle order in its entirety (III. 12. 1; I. 28. 3); 2) the entire infantry except the *ψιλοί* (III. 11. 8); or 3) the heavily armed (*ἡ φάλαγξ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν*: I. 13. 1). Finally, each *taxis* of the heavy troops is called a phalanx (*ἡ Περδίκκου φάλαγξ*: I. 14. 2, etc.).

24. This is clear in Arr. III. 18. 1.

25. In Polyaeos's description of arms in Philip's time, no breastplate is mentioned (III. 2. 10). From Polyaeos we also learn that Alexander had *ἡμιθωράκια* issued to troops who had turned and fled, so that their backs were exposed (?). We can conclude that *τῆς Μακεδονικῆς φάλλαγγος οἱ κουφότατοι* (Arr. III. 23. 3) were used for special missions from the fact that they were lightly armed and perhaps stood in the rear ranks.

26. Köchly and Rüstow, p. 228, give more precise information about the sarissa.

27. A passage in Arrian (I. 6. 1) seems to indicate that the phalanx was composed of squads of eight men each, as in Hellenic tactics, for a phalanx can be arranged to a depth of 120 men only by means of squads of eight.

28. The attack at Thebes and the battle at Pelion show that the phalanx was not used merely defensively.

29. The Greek Charidemus describes the phalanx to the Great King thus: *peditum stabile agmen, vir viro, arma armis conferta sunt; ad nutum monentis intenti sequi signa, ordines servare didicere: quod imperatur omnes exaudiunt; obsistere, circumire, discurrere in cornu, mutare pugnam, non duces magis quam milites callent* (Curt. III. 2. 13).

30. Arrian's enumeration of the phalanges at the battle of the Granikos clearly contains an error, for Krateros's phalanx is named twice (I. 14. 3). One mention should be stricken.

31. This seems to be the official title (Arr. I. 28. 3). For a war council the king convenes *στρατηγούς τε καὶ ἰλάρχας καὶ τῶν συμμαχῶν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας* (Arr. II. 7. 3; similarly, III. 9. 3). Another time, however, one reads: *τοὺς τε ἐταίρους καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ ταξιάρχας καὶ ἰλάρχας* (II. 16. 8). The strength of the *τάξεις* surely did not conform to the schematic calculation of the tacticians; it varied according to particular circumstances.

32. This can be deduced from the fact that there is no mention of heavy allied or mercenary troops as a separate corps in Alexander's battles. I attempt to justify this deduction in my article in *Hermes*, mentioned above. Lochoi are suggested by Arrian's repeated mention of the *λοχαγός* (particularly, III. 9. 6 and II. 10. 2). The lochos probably consisted of 512 men in 32 squads, a surmise consistent with *quingenariae cohortes* in Curtius (V. 7. 3).

33. Herod. V. 111. The shield carried by a given man covers the next man, and the term *ὑπασπιστής* would seem to go, not to the shield, but to the act of covering. In the proper sense, therefore, the hypaspistai are a guard.

34. We have no information about the strength of this corps. It is composed of a number of *τάξεις*, two of which Arrian names with their captains (II. 22. 2). On reporting the death of one of these (II. 22. 7), he also gives the title, chiliarch. Whether the corps included Hellenic allies or mercenary peltasts is unknown. In the Indian campaign the total strength of the hypaspistai is given as 6000 men (Arr. V. 14. 1). They are properly called *οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ τῶν ἐταίρων* (Arr. I. 14. 2).

35. The *βασιλικοὶ σωματοφύλακες*, whom Arrian mentions repeatedly (I. 6. 5; III. 17. 2, etc.) and counts among the hypaspistai (IV. 3. 2 and 30. 3) are doubtless the young noblemen (*οἱ βασιλικοὶ παῖδες*) whom he ranks thus: *τῶν πεζῶν πρώτους μὲν τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς τοὺς βασιλικούς . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἄγημα τὸ βασιλικόν, ἔχομένους δὲ τούτων τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπασπιστάς* (V. 13. 4). Those mentioned first mount carrying their shields; part of the corps then dismounts and fights on foot. Those mentioned last are the royal *σωματοφυλακία*, the *seminarium ducum praefectorumque* (Curt. VIII. 6. 6), the king's noble guard, of whom we have an example in Pausanias at Philip's death. The seven *σωματοφύλακες* (Arr. VI. 28. 4), such as Leonnatos, Ptolemy, Balakros, etc., were later, and more correctly, called *ἀρχισωματοφύλακες*. They were not commanders of designated corps, but rather the king's general adjutants, so to speak.

36. The fragments of the so-called Battle of Alexander give a fairly precise notion of their weaponry. One is struck by the length of the pike.

37. An inference from Arrian (I. 24. 3), where Parmenion receives *τῶν τε ἐταίρων ἱππαρχίαν καὶ τοὺς Θετταλοὺς ἱππέας*.

38. Arr. III. 11. 10. If Diodoros is right in saying that 1500 Thessalian riders accompanied the campaign, then it is remarkable that in the time of Jason of Pherai, the Thessalian mounted troops numbered 6000 riders *ὅταν ταγεύηται Θετταλία* (Xen., *Hellen.* VI. 19). Diodoros (XVII. 17) also puts the Macedonian cavalry at 1500. Both figures appear in the marginalia of a manuscript, and in both instances the figure in the text is 1800. According to Arrian (II. 9. 4), two of these Macedonian *ἱππείας* numbered 300 men each; others may have been stronger. At the Danube, Alexander had at least 1500 Macedonian riders.

39. A passage in Arrian may permit the conclusion that they were not a contingent but rather ξένοι: τοὺς θρᾶκας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ἐς τετρακισχιλίους (I. 18. 5). We have no reliable indication whether the Odrysian riders under Agathon, the Paionian riders under Ariston, and the Agrianians under Attalos were ξένοι or contingents. It may be relevant that the comedy writer Herakleides (Athen. XII, p. 532) mocked Chares's victory over (Paionian) Adaios as ἡ γενομένη μάχη πρὸς τοὺς Φιλίππου ξένους, but Adaios is not explicitly called a Paionian.

40. αἱ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τάξεις (Arr. I. 27. 8).

41. Xenophon (*Hellen.* VI. 1. 9) says of Jason's army that the tribes on the Thessalian frontier that follow him are almost all akontistai, ὥστε καὶ πελταστικῶ εἶκός ὑπερέχειν.

42. τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς (Arr. I. 14. 1). Arrian also speaks of Prince Langaros's ὑπασπισταί (I. 5. 2). These were always used side by side with the archers and seem to have been more lightly armed than the Thracians; perhaps they carried no shield. In Thrasybulos's army, Xenophon tells us, there were πελτοφόροι τε καὶ ψιλοὶ ἀκοντισταί (*Hellen.* II. 4. 12).

43. According to Diodoros (XVII. 17), 1000 Agrianians and archers were present in the army. That count is probably low. In the campaign of 335, 2000 Agrianians and archers were present, and in the Indian campaign οἱ Ἀγριᾶνες οἱ χίλιοι play their part (Arr. IV. 25. 6). Arrian makes no mention of slingers, and their presence cannot be inferred from the passage at II. 7. 8.

44. Diodoros puts the number of Θρᾶκες πρόδρομοι καὶ Παίονες at 900 men (XVII. 17). At one point in Arrian (I. 12. 7), τῶν προδρόμων καλουμένων ἵλαι τέσσαρες are sent forward as an advance guard. The passage at III. 8. 1 speaks of τῶν προδρόμων τοὺς Παίονας. If the battle on the Granikos was indeed opened by thirteen iles sent across the river (Plut., *Alex.* 16), then the sarissa bearers and Paionians together would have numbered only five iles. The lovely didrachm of Patraos (no. 242 in the catalogue of the Berlin Collection) showing a Paionian rider impaling an enemy displays his equipment in great detail.

45. Our sources tell us almost nothing about the tactics of Alexander's cavalry. We do not even know whether it rode into combat at a depth of three, four, or more ranks. Nor do we know whether the lines could support one another or replace one another, once they were engaged in combat.

46. The bronze statue of a rider in combat, found at Herculaneum (*Mus. Borbon.*, III, tab. 43), which represents, if not Alexander, then surely one of the twenty-five companions who fell at the Granikos (Arr. I. 16. 5), shows the rider with right arm raised to strike with his sword, his right leg extended back over the croup of his mount, his left stretched far forward—a position that, if possible at all, is more that of an acrobat than of a well-schooled rider.

47. When Arrian (III. 9. 3; II. 6. 8, etc.) speaks of *hetairoi* convened first among the ranking officers, or indeed alone (ἐν τῷ συλλόγῳ τῶν ἑταίρων: II. 25. 2), these cannot be the hundreds of *hetairoi* of the cavalry. Elsewhere (I. 25. 4) Arrian says that the king, *συναγαγὼν τοὺς φίλους*, put a question to them and, the passage continues, *ἔδόκει τοῖς ἑταίροις*, etc. This wording implies that *οἱ φίλοι* was not a technical term for these *hetairoi* in the narrow sense, as it became later at the Hellenistic courts.

48. It is worth noting that Perdikkas, who was strategos of a phalanx in the first years of the war, has a hipparchy in the Indian campaign (Arr. V. 12. 2, etc.); but Koinos is strategos of a phalanx even while he has a hipparchy (Arr. V. 16. 3).

49. Arr. III. 9. 3.

50. We do not know whether the Hellenic mercenaries appointed their own officers of the lower ranks: for example, whether the Elia Alkias, who recruited 150 Elia riders and brought them to the army (Arr. I. 29. 4), then became their captain. We do know that Jason of Pherai already had among his mercenaries men who received double, triple, and quadruple wages (Xen., *Hellen.* VI. 1. 6); these mercenaries must have been the officers.

51. Many technical questions remain and can no longer be answered. In the interest of further inquiry, it may be useful to note the gaps in our knowledge. We know from the battle at Pelion that the army carried artillery. The teams for this machinery and for the baggage and supply wagons raised the number of horses that had to be fed and kept. King Philip had decreed that each rider could be attended by only one groom (Frontin. IV. 1. 6), and the groom, of course, was mounted. If, then as now, a horse required four measures of oats or barley daily and if, for example, on the march into Asia, fodder for three days was carried, an informant tells me,

the second horse could not carry a groom, hay, and twenty-four measures of grain. A pack animal was therefore necessary, which also carried the baggage of the *hetairos*. This will have been the case for the Thessalian cavalry, as for the Macedonian. If each numbered 3000 combatants, we arrive at 9000 horses. We know nothing about arrangements for the Hellenic riders, the *sarissa* bearers, and the Paionians. The same passage in Frontinus speaks of a porter authorized for every ten phalangites, which was probably also the case for the allies and the mercenaries. The king's headquarters of course required a chancellery, a commissary, and a pay master, among other functions. We learn incidentally that Harpalos, one of the friends of Alexander banished in 337, who was physically unfit for military service, was given charge of the royal treasury and that another of this circle, Laomedon of Mytilene, *ὅτι δίγλωσσος ἦν ἐς τὰ βαρβαρικά γράμματα* (Arr. III. 6. 6), was put in charge of barbarian prisoners. And the *βασίλική θεραπεία* mentioned by Arrian (IV. 16. 6) is probably a field hospital, etc.

52. According to the Canon of Kings, the reign of King Arses ended in the course of the year 413 of the era of Nabonassar, which is to say, before December 336. According to Diodoros (XVII. 6), Kodomannos Dareios III came to the throne about the time (*περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς χρόνους*) Alexander succeeded his father. Mordtmann's reservations notwithstanding (*Zeitschr. der deutschen Morgenl. Gesell.*, 19, 1865, p. 411), I have retained the name Kodomannos in my account. It may be mentioned by Justin alone (X. 3. 3), but Justin nonetheless found it in his sources. To conclude that the name is impossible because it derives from a Semitic root (*gad*) and no Achaimenid would have carried a Semitic name—such is Mordtmann's line of argument—seems unwarranted.

53. Arr. II. 14. 5.

54. This is the same Kalas who has already been mentioned as captain of the Thessalian cavalry, an appointment that he obtained only after spring 334. His father Harpalos is probably not the one we know from the great trial in Athens in 324-23, but rather the one whom Demosthenes mentions in his oration against Aristokrates (par. 149) for an incident in 367.

55. A passage in Arrian (I. 17. 8) permits the conclusion that *ἡ χώρα ἡ Μένωνος* lay east of Daskylion to the Pontos. A conclusion that he set out from Lampsakos is less well founded. The city belonged to him (κυ—

ριεύσας Λαμψάκου: [Aristot.,] *Oec.* II. 30), which does not conflict with the fact that coins of Spithridates were struck there (ΣΠΙΘΡ on a silver coin in the Berlin Collection). See H. Droysen in von Sallet's *Num. Zeit.*, II, p. 313).

56. Polyæn. V. 44, where Χάλκας ὁ Μακεδών obviously is Kalas.

57. Macedonian discipline precludes any conjecture that Parmenion and Kalas crossed back over the Hellespont without orders, the more surely since both men were soon (334) appointed to high commands.

58. Thus Arrian (I. 14. 4). Diodoros (XVII. 19), by contrast, gives 10,000 riders and 100,000 infantry; Justin (XI. 6. 11) puts the number at 600,000 troops. The *σύλλογος* that Arrian mentions (I. 13. 10), set in the context of similar *σύλλογοι* in Zariaspa (IV. 1. 5 and 7. 3) and Ecbatana (IV. 7. 3), indicates that the enfeoffed magnates of Asia Minor and their men-at-arms were called up.

59. Only the names and titles that Arrian gives should be taken into consideration. He names, with their titles, Arsites and Spithridates (I. 12. 8), Mithrobuzanes (I. 16. 3), and Atizyes (I. 25. 3 and II. 11. 8). Close relatives of the royal house were also present among those convened at Zeleia: Mithridates (Mithradates?) ὁ Δαρείου γαμβρός, probably the Mithridates from whom the later rulers of the Pontos descend; Pharnakes, brother of the Great King's consort; finally, Arbupales, whose father Dareios was the son of Artaxerxes II. Diodoros creates a great confusion of names and titles in his account. In an appendix on the sources, I shall discuss the *septem satrapae* (*Itin. Alex.*, ch. 19).

60. ἄμα τῷ ἡρὶ ἀρχομένῳ (Arr. I. 11. 3): according to usual Greek usage, in March.

61. The proximity of so great a fleet will have caused the island Tenedos to declare for Alexander and the Hellenic cause (Arr. II. 2. 2).

62. Peukestas of Mieza, son of Alexander, became, in Arrian's account: ὁ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀσπίδα φέρων ἦν ἐκ τοῦ νεῶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Ἰλιάδος λαβὼν ἅμα οἱ εἶχεν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐφέρετο ἐν ταῖς μάχαῖς (VI. 9. 3).

63. Strab. XIII, p. 593; C. I. Gr. II, no. 3595.

64. Polyæn. reports in the second series of his notices (IV. 3. 15) that Alexander ordered his foragers to spare Memnon's holdings (τῶν τοῦ Μένωνος χωρίων) in order to make him suspect among the Persians.

65. Pausanias recounts that Alexander had vowed to do the opposite of what the ambassadors from Lampsakos would ask of him, whereupon Anaximines urged him to punish the faithless city (VI. 18. 2). In any case, a charming anecdote.

66. Plutarch reports that Alexander changed the name of the month Daisios, during which the Macedonian kings customarily did not do battle, making it a second Artemisios. This anecdotal notice proves no more than that the battle took place toward the end of May (Thargelion). Cf. Plut., *Camill.* 19.

67. At least Diodoros (XVII. 19) gives these details of the battle line. On the right wing he puts 1000 Median riders, 2000 riders under Rheomitres, and 2000 Baktrians.

68. Surely a taxis of shieldbearers: Arrian (I. 22. 4) mentions two, one of which he puts under the command of the chiliarch Addaios.

69. This is Sokrates's ile; Arrian (I. 15. 1) indicates his presence. If Ptolemy led this ile, even while the ilarch was present, we can conclude that this was Ptolemy the somatophylax, who appears in Arr. I. 22. 4—a telling point for rank and position of the seven somatophylakes.

70. προεμβάλλει εἰς τὸν ποταμόν (Arr. I. 14. 6). Alexander crossed by the ford: ἐμβαίνει εἰς τὸν πόρον λοξὴν αἰὲ παραπεταίνων τὴν τάξιν ἣ παρείλκε τὸ ρεύμα. Polyenos (IV. 3. 16) calls Alexander's maneuver an outflanking (ὑπερεκέραιον), which says much about the quality of the source he used for the second series of his extracts.

71. We know from Arrian (I. 15. 6) that Alexander led the agema.

72. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 16), these Hellenic mercenaries requested a capitulation. We would have to know the conditions they demanded. If unmolested retreat to rejoin the Great King, then Alexander did the necessary thing when he destroyed them. It is very curious that these 20,000 Hellenes, engaged in a life-and-death struggle, could do no more than let themselves be hacked to pieces. Plutarch says that Alexander took most of his losses in the battle with the mercenaries: the twenty-five riders fell ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἐσβολῇ.

73. A night battle at Halikarnassos produced 16 dead and 300 wounded, a ratio of 1:18.5. The high number of wounded would seem to indicate that the men were unable to cover one another effectively in darkness. If we posit a ratio of merely 1:8 for combat in daylight, then almost every man in the Apollonian ile must have been wounded.

74. τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκε καὶ ὅσας ἄλλας ἢ τῷ σώματι λειτουργίαι ἢ κατὰ τὰς κτήσεις ἐκάστων εισφοραί (Arr. I. 16. 4; cf. VII. 10. 4). *cognatisque eorum immunitates dedit* (Justin. XI. 6. 13).

75. Σάρδεις τὸ πρόσχημα τῆς ἐπὶ θαλάσσει τῶν βαρβάρων ἡγεμονίας (Plut., *Alex.* 17).

76. Arrian (I. 17. 5) frames his narrative of this omen in such a fashion that he would seem to have taken it from Ptolemy. Such signs and marvels usually come from Aristoboulos.

77. Arrian (I. 17. 8) says explicitly: ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνωνος. It is unclear whether this means the area on the Askanian Sea or something else. The Bithynian tribes in the interior of this corner of Asia Minor were free under their chieftain Bas, son of Dydalsos (Memnon, ap. Phot., cod. 20. 2).

78. The remarkable inscriptions in Conze, *Reise auf der Insel Lesbos*, p. 35 ff. and p. 29, (C. I. Gr. II, no. 2166 b, add. p. 1023) provide information on the tyranny of Agonippos at Eresos. We learn that the tyrant, πόλεμον ἐξαράμενος πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, drove the citizens from the city, locked up their wives and daughters in the citadel, raised 3200 gold staters, etc., and τὸ τελευταῖον ἀφικόμενος πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον κατεψεύδετο καὶ διέβαλλε τοῖς πολίταις. We do not know how the king intervened. It is notable that Erigyios and Laomedon were from Mytilene.

79. Polyæn. VII. 27. 2.

80. Since Arrian (I. 17. 9) says that this Amyntas fled Macedonia, he cannot be the Amyntas who was sent ahead to Asia with Parmenion and Attalos in 336 (Justin. IX. 5. 9).

81. The notion that “temple politics” made common cause with the oligarchs and took the side of Persia, however attractive, enjoys little documentary support. For the statue of King Philip stood in the temple of Artemis until the oligarchy, supported by Memnon, prevailed and threw it down, and it was the oligarchy, not the demos, that plundered the temple treasure. Arr. I. 17. 11.

82. The anecdote of Alexander’s offer to complete the construction of the temple at Ephesos if the Ephesians would let his name be inscribed in the frieze belongs to a later period, as proved by an anachronism in an Ephesian’s reply: It was unseemly that a god should dedicate a temple to a goddess. The tale would be considered an invention of the schools of dec-

lamation had it not been reported earlier by Artemidoros (ap. Strab. XIV, p. 641). But the witness of this Ephesian from the time of Mithridates's wars makes it no more credible. Even less can his other observation, τοὺς δὲ Ἐφεσίους μὴ ἐθέλησαι, πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλησαντας ἐξ ἱεροσυλίας καὶ ἀποστερήσεως φιλοδοξεῖν, be accepted as meaning that Alexander's offer of a consecration was tartly refused by one party as ἱεροσυλία, while the other party gave its refusal the courtly turn cited above.

83. This mission and that of Alkimachos, each, according to Arrian, with 2500 *πεζοὶ τῶν ξένων καὶ Μακεδόνες παραπλήσιοι* and 2000 *ἵππεῖς τῶν ἐταίρων*, demonstrate conclusively that division into phalanges was no consideration for such expeditions.

84. The name is given as Ἀντίμαχον in *Cod. Flor.*; other mss. give Ἀλκίμαλον. The Parisian codex used by C. Müller gives Ἀλκίμαχον. The inscription at C. I. A. II, no. 123 is in his honor.

85. The expulsion of the tyrant of the two Lesbian cities is mentioned in Pseudo-Demosthenes (*De foed. Alex.*, par. 7); the garrisoning of Mytilene is mentioned by Arrian (II. 1. 3). Only Aristonikos of Methymna, whom Polyaeos calls Aristonymos (V. 44. 3), seems to have held out (Arr. III. 2. 4).

86. Plin. XXX. 5. 10; Aelian., *Var. Hist.* II. 2 and XII. 34. Aelian's account is full of confusions. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 21), the story of nude Pankaste would appear to be a charming tale invented to Alexander's greater glory.

87. The consecration of the construction or reconstruction of the temple at Priene probably belongs to this period. It is attested by the inscription at C. I. Gr. II, no. 2904 (Le Bas, III. 1, no. 187): Βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος / ἀνέθηκε τὸν ναὸν / Ἀθηναίῃ Πολιάδι. That Alexander is called βασιλεύς seems to place the dedication later in his reign.

88. ἄλσος καθιερώμενος Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ Φιλίππου καὶ ἀγὼν ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἰώνων Ἀλεξάνδρεια καταγγέλλεται συντελούμενος ἐνταῦθα (Strab. XIV, p. 644). But it was not exactly Mount Mimas that Alexander intended to pierce (cf. Pausan. II. 1. 5).

89. The two columns under Parmenion and Alkimachos counted 10,000 infantry and 400 riders; the Thessalian and the Greek riders and contingents of allied infantry detached to Bithynia with Kalas surely counted 6000 men on foot and 1200 horsemen. Alexander therefore must have been left with not more than 13,000 to 14,000 infantry and approximately

3000 cavalry. He was probably joined again by Parmenion and his column on the way from Ephesos to Miletos.

90. Gell. II. 9.

91. Diodoros remarks that some authors praised the disbanding of the fleet as a strategic move to goad the Macedonians to bravery by cutting off their return home—an interpretation that does justice neither to the strategic talents of the king nor to the courage of his army.

92. Theopomp., fr. 111, ap. Phot., cod. 176; Isocrat., *Panegy.*, par. 162. Isokrates calls him *Καρίας ἐπίσταθμος*. According to an inscription (C. I. Gr. II, no. 2691 c), his son Mausolos is “satrap” (*ἐξαίθραπείοντος*) in Karia.

93. This can be gathered from [Aristot.,] *Oec.* II. 15. About 380, Isokrates writes: *Λυκίας δ' οὐδ' εἰς πώποτε Περσῶν ἐκράτησεν*. Lykia may have been awarded to the acquisitive “satrap” of Karia to teach that tough federation obedience. The badly mutilated inscription published by G. Hirschfeld (*Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.*, 1874, p. 716), clearly a treaty between Mausolos and Phaselis, is probably to be understood in this connection.

94. We know that the Karian dynasts had garrisons on Rhodes, Kos, and Chios during the social war, and Demosthenes in his oration on peace (346) says: *τὸν Κᾶρα ἐῷμεν τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον*. Polyenos (VI. 8) indicates that they also reached for Miletos. It is doubtful that the Milesian coins with EKA and those with MA are to be attributed to Hekatomnos or Mausolos (Waddington, *Mél. de Numism.*, p. 14).

95. ΠΙΞΩΔΑΡΟΥ (with Ω, not O, as Pinder renders it: *Die ant. Münzen des Berl. Museums*, 1851, no. 350. 351). Indications for his gold coins can be found in Brandis, *Münzwesen Vorderasiens*, p. 475.

96. ΟΘΟΝΤΟΠΑΤΟ (Mionnet, III, 400 s; VI, t. 7, 5), not Ὀροντοβάτης, as Arrian calls him (I. 23. 1 and 8). For the succession of Karian dynasts, see Strab. XIII, p. 657. Their reigns cannot be dated precisely.

97. Arr. I. 23. 1. Cf. Strab. XIII, p. 657.

98. τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμῶν καὶ τῆς παραλίου ξυμπάσης (Arr. II. 1. 1). He was seconded by Autophradates, hardly the one who (as karanos?) had led the Great King's cause against the rebellious satraps thirty years earlier, but surely the same as had recently marched against Ephesos.

99. αἱ τε τριηρεῖς (Arr. II. 5. 7), which seems to indicate that the fleet had retired to Halikarnassos.

100. Arr. II. 5. 7. We no longer know where the last two cities stood.

101. He took with him the iles of the cavalry, the shieldbearers, and the three regiments Amyntas, Perdikkas, and Meleagros.

102. The earthworks for this siege and the construction of machinery permit a confident conclusion that technical arms were well represented in Alexander's army. We may assume that the soldiers themselves carried out projects that the engineers ordered and that the engineers led this work. Our sources tell us nothing more precise.

103. Arrian relates this very characteristic event (I. 21).

104. Diod. XVII. 2. 3. Diodoros recounts many of these skirmishes around Halikarnassos, but his details are not reliable and some of them are muddled, such as identifying Neoptolemos at his death as a Macedonian strategos. Although this part of his narrative may derive ultimately from Kleitarchos or Kallisthenes, his source was obviously framed to flatter the Athenians. Thus, while it may well be true that the young Macedonian soldiers required encouragement by their elders, the veteran Atharrias, who then appears repeatedly also in Curtius, is a conspicuous miles gloriosus, such a figure as is required by a "painter" of history. This must be the same Tharrhias who is said to have lost an eye at the siege of Perinthos ([Plut.,] *De glor. Alex.* II. 7).

105. The Salmakis (Arr. I. 23. 3), to be distinguished from the acropolis inside the city, as the map in Newton shows (*History of Discoveries at Halikarnassus*, 1862).

106. Alexander's gift of six cities to Halikarnassos, among them Pedason, noted by Pliny (V. 29; par. 107, ed. Detlefsen), belongs to a later period.

107. Since Arrian gives no patronymic, we cannot tell which Ptolemy this is—perhaps the one who led a phalanx at Issos (Arr. II. 8. 4).

108. Diod. XVII. 27.

109. Arr. I. 24. 3. The Thessalian cavalry and the Hellenic contingents had remained with the satrap Kalas and their march to Halikarnassos is nowhere mentioned. Thus it is possible that they joined Parmenion only on the way to Sardeis. Memnon (fr. 20 in C. Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Graec.*, p. 537) mentions that the Bithynian prince Bas repulsed Kalas, erroneously called strategos.

110. Self-evidently, the king had riders with him on his march, as Arrian also indicates (I. 28. 4). It is unclear which corps; perhaps a few files of sarissa bearers or the Odrisians. The phalanges that accompanied Alexander must have been much reduced, since the Hellenic allies had been assigned to Parmenion, 3000 mercenaries stayed behind in Karia, and many of those on furlough were phalangites.

111. ἐν ἀκμῇ ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος (Arr. I. 24. 5). The countryside Milyas, says Strabo, extends from the defiles above Termessos and the yet higher territory that reaches the Tauros at Isinda on its southern edge to Sagalassos and Apameia in the north.

112. Suidas, s.v. (Westermann, *Biogr.*, p. 147). His son, also called Theodektes, composed a panegyric to Alexander the Epeirote.

113. σατραπεύειν Λυκίας καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης Λυκίας χώρας ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸν Ταῦρον τὸ ὄρος (Arr. III. 6. 6). Therefore Nearchos was not made lykiarch.

114. Strab. XIV, p. 664. Dio Cassius (XLVII. 34) gives the title "strategos" for the ranking official of the individual cities. The inscriptions (C. I. Gr. III, no. 4270. 4303 h, etc.) refer to ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος of individual cities. The title lykiarch occurs in Strabo and in inscriptions in Roman times (C. I. Gr. III, no. 4198. 4247). Theopompos (fr. 111) speaks of "King" Perikles, and a victory epigram by the son of Harpagos, about Ol. 100 (C. I. Gr. III, no. 4269), speaks of the συγγενέσι τῆς βασιλείας, with whom the victor shared his spoils.

115. Plut., *Alex.* 17.

116. Arr. I. 25; Diod. XVII. 32 and 80; Curt. VII. 1, etc.

117. Kallisthenes (fr. 25) uses the technical expression for the Persian form of homage: ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὑποκυρτουῦσθαί πως δοκῇ προσκυνεῖν. Alexander's letter to his mother is mentioned by Plutarch (*Alex.* 17).

118. So says Arrian (I. 27. 4). The older coins of Side show a script that is said to be similar to that of Palmyra (Luynes, *Num. des Satrapes*, p. 23). Imhoof-Blumer gives further references (v. Sallet's *Num. Zeit.*, 3, p. 330).

119. Arrian indicates that this fortress stood between Aspendos and Side. In Strabo's description (XIV, p. 667), πόλις ὑψηλὸς ὡς τοῖς ἐκ Πέργης ἔποπτος, G. Hirschfeld (*Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.*, 1874, p. 724) recognized the cliff castle Syllion and supplied the name, which does not appear in Strabo. The inscription of Syllion, which Hirschfeld

has published in a recent transcription, illustrates the dialect of these cities, as do the legends of the older coins: ΣΕΛΥΝΙΥΣ for Syllion, ΕΣΤΦΕΔΠΥΣ for Aspendos, ΠΡΕΠΑΣ for Perge (Friedländer in v. Sallet's *Num. Zeit.*, 4, p. 298 ff.).

120. Polybios (V. 73) would seem to indicate that the damaged neighbors were Sidetans.

121. φόρους ἀποφέρειν ὅσα ἔτη Μακεδόσι (Arr. I. 27. 4).

122. For the situation of Termessos, see Droysen, *Hellenismus*, I, p. 177; Schönborn, Forbes et al.; and the informative article of Hirschfeld, *Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.*, 1874, p. 716.

123. He also took the archers, τὰς τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τάξεις, and τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ὅσοι κουφότεροι (Arr. I. 27. 8).

124. Leake (*Asia Minor*, p. 150) rightly recognized Sagalassos in the position of Aglason, which appears as Aghlasun on Kiepert's map on two sheets.

125. Ordinarily, Amyntas led the files of the sarissa bearers; cavalry did not take part in the engagement, being οὐκ ὠφέλιμοι ἐν τῇ δυσχωρίᾳ (Arr. I. 28. 4).

126. Diodoros (XVII. 28) mentions an undertaking against the Marmaridai at about this point, but his carefully recounted details do not fit any of the actions of this winter campaign as Arrian recounts them.

127. Xenophon (*Anab.* I. 2. 9) mentions Xerxes's castle; the salty Askanian Sea is the Gendieli Gheul, much visited in recent years. Kelainai (Apameia Kibotos) lies fourteen miles from Sagalassos; hence the army marched about three miles each day.

128. Curtius (III. 1. 8) speaks of sixty days, which is not improbable. Our sources give no indication of the weather the troops met on the march from Halikarnassos to Gordion, not even of the snows and storms of the Pisidian mountains.

129. We now have documentary proof that the title "satrap" was retained, as implied by the historians' usage. An inscription from Mylasa (C. I. Gr. II, no. 2692) reads: βασιλεύοντος Φιλίππου . . . Ἀσάνδρου σατραπεύοντος. In a hieroglyphic decree by Egyptian priests in 310, cited below in a subsequent volume, Ptolemy is represented as speaking of himself in the first person as satrap.

130. Ἄρπαλον ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων κατέστησεν (Arr. III. 6. 6).

131. Herod. IV. 166.

132. τούτων τὸ κράτιστον τὸ περὶ νόμισμα, λέγω ποῖον καὶ πότε τίμιον ἢ εὖωνον ποιητέον On import and export: πότε καὶ τίνα παρὰ τῶν σατραπῶν ἐν τῇ ταγῇ ἐκλαβόντι αὐτῷ λυσιτελήσει διατίθ-εσθαι. [Aristot.,] *Oec.* II. 1.

133. The *ἕξ εἶδη τῶν προσόδων* are: ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἰδίων γενομένων, ἀπὸ ἐμπορίων, ἀπὸ τελῶν, ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. The sentences that follow explain these six articles and furnish a basis for my remarks, which will be substantially correct, even while some particularities remain obscure.

134. Σαρδιανούς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Λυδοὺς τοῖς νόμοις τε τοῖς πάλαι Λυδῶν χρῆσθαι ἔδωκε καὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι ἀφῆκεν (Arr. I. 17. 4). The appointment of Nikias as epimelet *τῶν φόρων τῆς συντάξεώς τε καὶ ἀποφοράς* shows that the Lydians' freedom did not preclude an obligation to pay tribute.

135. Arr. I. 17. 1. In this same area, King Antiochos (probably Antiochos III) later made a magnificent gift to one of his loyalists: 2000 plethra ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλικῆς χώρας, with the provision that the βασιλικοὶ λαοί of the environs could live in the citadel Petra ἀσφαλείας ἔνεκε (inscription cited by Schliemann, *Trojanische Alterthümer*, p. 204). Crown land seems to have been whatever did not belong to cities or dynasts or, in the Persian period, to hyparchs or satraps.

136. διότι ἐπὶ τε Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Ἀντιγόνου αὐτόνομος ἦν καὶ ἀφορολόγητος ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν (inscription from Erythrai : *Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.*, 1875, p. 554).

137. προσαγορεύσαι πόλιν . . . ἐλευθέραν τε κρίναι καὶ ἄφορον (Strab. XIII, p. 593). The material at our disposal is insufficient for a clear legal definition and distinction of ἐλεύθερος, αὐτόνομος, ἀφορολόγητος, etc. Relevant citations are too numerous to be adduced here. These relationships can be thought of as no less various and particular than those that obtained at the time of the first Attic naval league and the Spartan alliance, where the concepts ὑπήκοος and αὐτόπολις must be added to the mix.

138. Thus the gold coins of Rhodes, Chios, and Pergamon discovered in Saida in 1863 (Waddington, *Rev. Numism.*, 1865, pp. 8, 11, 13). Thus also the silver coins of Chalkedon, Ephesos, and Rhodes in this period.

Ephesos is particularly telling: we have drachmas bearing the bee of Ephesos and the legend ΑΡΣΙ, therefore from the time when the city was called after Lysimachos's wife Arsinoe. These coins are not of the weight of Alexander drachmas (4.10 to 4.25 grams); rather, they range between 4.93 and 5.59 grams.

139. According to an inscription from Ilion in Schliemann, *Trojanische Alterthümer*, p. 204.

140. When the Persian admirals came to Tenedos in autumn 334, Arrian tells us, κελεύουσι τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας γενομένας σφίσι ταύτας μὲν καθελεῖν, πρὸς Δαρεῖον δὲ ἄγειν τὴν εἰρήνην ἣν ἐπὶ Ἀνταλκίδου Δαρείῳ συνέθετο (II. 2. 2). In Mytilene they demanded that: τοὺς μὲν ξένους τοὺς παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου σφίσι κατὰ συμμαχίαν ἦκοντας ἀπελθεῖν, Μιτυληναίους δὲ καθελεῖν μὲν τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον σφίσι γενομένας στήλας, συμμάχους δὲ εἶναι Δαρείου κατὰ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου γενομένην πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον (Arr. II. 1. 4). Pseudo-Demosthenes (*De foed. Alex.*, par. 7) observes that Alexander restored the tyrant in Messenia even while he expelled the tyrants on Lesbos, but he does not imply that the Corinthian League had competence in these matters on Lesbos.

141. We know from an inscription (C. I. Gr. II, no. 2166, add., p. 1024, transcribed more completely in *Μουσεῖον καὶ βιβλιοθήκη τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς σχολῆς*, Smyrna, 1876, p. 128) that Antipater, acting in the name of the king and preparing to go to war with Perdikkas in 321, demanded an *εἰσφορά* of Nasos (Hekatonnesos) and other cities, from which he then released the Nesiotas, and that Kassandros, preparing war against Cyprus, demanded *εἰσφοράς καὶ μεγάλας δαπανάς*, which he then reduced for Nasos in response to a petition.

142. This possibility is suggested by silver and copper coins from this period and subsequently, bearing on the obverse the head of Pallas that is found on Alexander's staters and on the reverse a thunderbolt with the legend ΑΙΟΛΕ. The double axe often found on Karian coins is probably not relevant here. A renewal of the Ionian league or its renewed importance is implied when Smyrna, which Alexander and Antigonos restored, is received into the league again (Vitruv. IV. 1) and a grove or contests are dedicated to Alexander *ἀγῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἰώνων* (Strab. XIV, p. 644).

143. Inscription from Ilion (Hissarlik) published by G. Hirschfeld in *Archäol. Zeit.*, N. F. 7, p. 151. It contains six *γνώμη τῶν συνέδρων* and an appended petition of Simalos of Lampsakos in honor of Malusios of Gargara. In the first *γνώμη*, Antigonos is mentioned without title, in the second he appears with the title "king." Malusios is honored: ὅτι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ τὴν πανηγύριν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν πόλεων (v. 31. 55) and because he advanced money without charging interest, among other things, ἀποστελλόντων συνέδρων πρέσβεις εἰς τὸν βασιλέα ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ αὐτονομίας τῶν πόλεων κοινονουσῶν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς πανηγύρεως. The inscription explains formulas found elsewhere: Ἰλιεῖς καὶ αἱ πόλεις αἱ κοινονοῦσαι τῆς θυσίας, etc. (C. I. Gr. II, no. 3602); σύνεδροι (C. I. Gr. II, n. 3601, v. 2. 9. 16 ff.); ἡ τε πόλις καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις (C. I. Gr. II, no. 3595, v. 40).

Book Two, Chapter 2

1. Arr. III. 2. 5.

2. These events, as recounted by Polyaios (V. 44. 3), belong to this moment, as one may conclude from Arrian (III. 2. 6), and not to the time of the war of Byzantium, when Memnon is not known to have had a fleet at his disposal.

3. Arrian says nothing of these deliberations. They are reported by Diodoros (XVII. 30) and Curtius (III. 1). There is nothing improbable about them: Kleitarchos may have taken them from Kallisthenes, who may have gotten his information from Persian prisoners and elaborated it. But Kleitarchos's work never implies careful research.

4. Arrian (II. 2. 1) says ἐπὶ Λυκίας; but another passage (II. 13. 2) makes clear that the mercenaries were taken to Phoenicia.

5. τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας γενομένους σφίσι . . . καθελεῖν (Arr. II. 2. 2).

6. Arr. II. 2. 3. This is surely the Hegelochos who led the avant garde on the approach to the Granikos. He was seconded by Amphoterios, Krateros's brother. According to Pseudo-Demosthenes (*De foed. Alex.*, par. 20), the fleet was assembled in the bay of Besika: εἰς Τένεδον ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πόντου πλοῖα κατήγαγον. Hegelochos could gather ships off Tenedos only as long as the Persian fleet was held up off Lesbos; therefore Alexander must have sent the order as soon as the Persian fleet under Memnon sailed for Chios and beyond. Thus Curtius (III. 1. 19): nondum enim Memnonem vita excessisse cognoverat.

7. [Demosth.,] *De foed. Alex.*, par. 20; Plut., *Vit. X Oratt.*: "Demosthenes." Menestheus is *ex Thressa natus, Cotyis regis filia* (Corn. Nep., *Iphicr.* 5).

8. One can gather from Anaximenes (fr. 17) that Alkimachos—the same who led a column through Aiolis (Arr. I. 18. 1)—was sent to Athens to demand Attic ships to oppose the approaching Persian fleet; hence Curtius (III. 2. 20): ex foedere naves sociis imperatae quae Hellesponto praesiderent. Phokion advised that the Athenians should comply if they did not want to risk a war with Macedonia (Plut., *Phoc.* 21), but Demosthenes and Hypereides rejoined that no one could be sure the king would not use the ships against Athens. The trireme that entered the harbor at Peiraieus ([Demosth.,] *De foed. Alex.*, par. 27) may have belonged to

Alkimachos, who in his capacity as an Attic citizen may also have asked permission to build smaller ships for Macedonia in Attic shipyards, ὃν ἔδει εὐθὺς ὑμᾶς μετὰ τῆς τριήρους ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀπολωλέναι, Demosthenes told his hearers. He concludes by fairly openly recommending war. The oration probably dates to summer 333.

9. Arr. II. 2. 4; Curt. III. 4. 1.

10. The chronology of events at sea and Memnon's death can no longer be fixed precisely. If Dareios was still in Babylon when he learned of Memnon's death, as Curtius says (III. 2. 2), the following sequence can be reconstructed: At the end of October, the Persian army was at Sochoi near the river Haleb. The army of the Ten Thousand had gone from the Haleb to Pylai in thirty-five marches, covering 220 parasangs. From Pylai to Babylon is a distance of another twenty parasangs. Dareios therefore moved out of Babylon no later than the beginning of September. At that point he had already had news of Memnon's death. That news came to him, not by way of the imperial post over Sardeis, but rather over Phoenicia by way of a wide detour at sea. Memnon's death therefore occurred no later than the end of July. Thymondas, who went to Tripolis to confer Memnon's command on Pharnabazos, took charge there of the Greek mercenaries of the fleet. His orders must have been sent from Babylon at least eight weeks earlier, no later than the beginning of June. Pharnabazos therefore had sailed for Phoenicia with the mercenaries and part of the fleet no later than the end of June. Memnon may have died in the course of May or even earlier.

11. Three thousand mercenaries and 200 horse were in Karia; 1500 men were before Kelainai; other garrisons lay in Side, Lydia, and Little Phrygia, surely about 3000 men. It is unlikely that these 8000 men were replaced by the mercenaries, who occasionally went from Persian service into Macedonian, and we have no clear evidence that contingents of Asiatic Greeks joined the Macedonian army. Kallisthenes (fr. 33) reports 5000 infantry and 800 riders recently arrived. These he adds to the 40,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry he counted at the outset of the first campaign and arrives, in Polybios's report (XII. 19), at 45,000 infantry and 5300 cavalry in Alexander's army at the battle of Issos. He does not subtract those detached to other missions or those left behind in garrisons. Even Polybios, taking vigorous exception to Kallisthenes, calculates too few, only 3000 men.

12. Aristoboulos gives another version of this event: that the king pulled the kingpin that passed through the shaft and held the knot together. Even if this is true, the army reliably will have preferred the version with the sword and have passed it on. As with the egg of Columbus, not the result but the novelty of the solution is the mark of genius.

13. Alexander did not delay in Gordion until he could find green fodder in the fields, for the Phrygian plateau stands high in grass as early as May. He probably moved out once he had received news that the mercenaries of the fleet had been ordered to Tripolis, perhaps at the beginning of July. If he marched over Ankyra, he did not take the route southward across the salt steppe but rather the royal road over the Halys, as Arrian reports (II. 4. 2): ἐπὶ Καππαδοκίας ἐλάσας ξυμπάσαν τὴν ἐντὸς Ἄλυσ ποταμοῦ προσηγάγετο καὶ ἔτι ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἄλυν πολλήν. He probably did not reach Kilikia until the beginning of September.

14. Curtius (III. 1. 22) says that Alexander personally entered Paphlagonia; Arrian's explicit assertion proves the contrary. Diodoros (XVI. 90. 2) establishes virtually beyond doubt that Mithridates son of Ariobarzanes held Paphlagonia at the time. This is the same Mithridates who later became friends with Antigonos and his son Demetrios and conserved at least part of his βασιλεία, as Diodoros calls it, through many vicissitudes until 302, when Mithridates III the Founder succeeded him.

15. That Kappadokia had been divided into two satrapies, Kappadokia on the Pontos and Kappadokia on the Tauros, as Strabo calls it (XII, p. 534), since the time of Datames (about 360) is now proven by H. Droysen ("Die Münzen der persischen Satrapen in Kleinasien," *Sallets Num. Zeit.*, 2, p. 314 f.). With reason, H. Droysen doubts whether the silver and copper coins struck in Sinope and perhaps Graziura with the legend "Ariorat" should be ascribed to the Ariarathes who fled at this time and fell eleven years later in battle with Perdikkas. He attributes them to the son, Ariarathes II, as he is now called.

16. This curious name appears in Arrian (II. 4. 2); Curtius (III. 4. 1) writes "Abistamenes." Both the nature of things and Arrian's explicit statement confirm that Kappadokia submitted. When Hieronymos (ap. Ap-
pian., *Bell. Mithrid.* 8) asserts that Alexander never entered Kappadokia, moving instead along the coast of Pamphylia and Kilikia to meet Dareios, either he is wrong or Arrian is. Since Ariarathes appears later, and in fact

as prince of Kappadokia, we may conclude that the part of Kappadokia situated toward the Pontos remained in his control.

17. Memnon (ap. Phot. 223. 40, ch. 4) describes the fears of Dionysios, tyrant of Herakleia, and the local exiles' embassy to Alexander, *καὶ κάθοδον καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως πάτριον δημοκρατίαν ἐξαιτούμενοι*.

18. We may assume that Alexander recognized the importance of the position of Mazaka (Caesarea), which stands at the foot of the Ardisch on the plain of the river Melas and controls the road to Armenia. From this point he continued between the Ardisch and the mountain fastness Nora, which would become important under the successors, toward Tyana (roughly Kilissa Hissar: cf. the commentaries to Xen., *Anab.* I. 2. 20 and Kinneir, *Journey*, pp. 105 and 110). Tschihatscheff writes "Kisser Hissar" (Petermann, *Geogr. Mitt., Ergänzungsheft*, 20, p. 15).

19. The pass by which Alexander crossed is better known since Kinneir's (p. 118 ff.) and especially since Tschihatscheff's report of his journey in 1853 (*Ergänzungsheft*, 20, p. 55 ff.).

20. Arr. II. 4. 8. Seneca (*De ira*, II. 23) attributes the letter of warning to Olympias. Aristoboulos makes no mention of bathing in the Kydnos; he attributes the illness to exertion and hardship.

21. Arr. II. 12. 4.

22. Arr. II. 5. 8–9; Strab. XIV, p. 676. We shall see below that the freedom granted these Hellenic cities was not altogether the same as that granted the Greek cities on the west coast of Asia Minor. According to Arrian (II. 20. 2), a number of triremes from Soloi and Mallos were still with the Persian fleet.

23. Rennel believed he had found this Sochoi near Derbesak, to the east, below the passes of Belen. Obviously, the battle with the Macedonians would also have been decided on this well-worn battlefield (Strab. XVI, p. 751), had Dareios not taken his army through the Amanid Gates. A distance of two marches from the Amanid Gates would place Sochoi approximately where Niebuhr puts Anzas ("Azas" on recent maps). It stands eight miles from the pass and five from Aleppo, at the entrance of the so-called Field of Blood. Onchae in Curtius (IV. 1. 3; variants: Unchae, Orchae), over which Dareios fled after the battle, seems to be the same place.

24. According to Arrian (II. 11. 10), the battle of Issos was fought in Maimakterion, that is, between 28 October and 27 November 333.

25. It is remarkable that Arrian (II. 6. 3–6) reports these events in Dareios's council and even more remarkable that the turn of phrase, καταπατήσιν τε τῇ ἵππῳ τῶν Μακεδόνων τὴν στρατιάν ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν αὐτῷ ἐπαίροντες ἐπέλεγον, returns in Demosthenes's reference to Issos (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 164): ἐπειδὴ πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει Δαρείῳ καταβεβήκει, ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ἦν ἀπειλημένος ἐν Κιλικίᾳ πάντων ἐνδεής, ὡς ἔφησθα σύ, αὐτίκα δὲ μάλα ἤμελλεν, ὡς ἦν ὁ παρὰ σοῦ λόγος, συμπατήσεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς Περσικῆς ἵππου, etc., whereupon Demosthenes produced letters to this effect.

26. The historical soundness of this observation by Curtius (III. 9. 20) is supported by the opening of Alexander's address to the troops in Arrian (II. 7. 3): θαρρύνειν παρεκάλει, etc.

27. Arrian (II. 7. 8) adds, with λέγεται, that Alexander also mentioned Xenophon and the Ten Thousand. Such a reference could imply that the address, which is represented in indirect, not direct, speech, is drawn from Ptolemy and essentially authentic. My discussion of the sources in an appendix attempts to show why the address was neither delivered by Alexander in this form nor composed by Ptolemy.

28. ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν δεξιούμενοί τε τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἐπαίροντες ἄγειν ἤδη ἐκέλευον (Arr. II. 7. 3).

29. A letter, said to be from Kardian Eumenes to Antipater, recounts: "On the morning before battle, Hephaistion came into the king's tent. Either he forgot himself, or he was agitated, as was I, or a god put the words in his mouth—in any event, he said, 'God save you (ὕγαινε), my lord, it's time.' Everyone was disturbed by this maladroit greeting and Hephaistion was anxious and ashamed. But Alexander said, 'I take this greeting as a good augury, Hephaistion. It tells me that a god will protect us and bring us safely through the battle'" (Lucian., *Pro lapsu in salutando*, par. 8). Curtius reports (III. 8. 21) that during the night Alexander sacrificed at a high point on the road and by the light of many torches—a fine way to announce his presence to an enemy hardly a mile away and to betray that he had not yet brought his army through the passes.

30. Kallisthenes, as reported in Polybios (XII), estimates the breadth of the level at fourteen stades. We may assume that the numbers of the Persian army are exaggerated, but even the Macedonian front line could not have deployed in a space so narrow, as Polybios has amply proved.

Both battle lines, furthermore, extended up into the foothills. The site is indicated by Rennel's researches and Kinneir's description (*Journey*, p. 136 ff.); other information can be found in the reports of the pasha of Egypt published in the newspapers of 1, 2, and 3 August 1832. The much-cited passes over which Alexander retraced his steps are those of the now destroyed fort Merkes and are precisely described by Xenophon (*Anab.* I. 4. 4) as they extend along the shore: three stades across; at the entrance and the egress, walls that reach from the heights down to the sea; halfway between, a stream, the Kersos. The distance from Issos to these passes is five parasangs (150 stades). According to the English admiralty chart before me, the plain is one-quarter mile wide at Merkes, then becomes more narrow; at the Pinaros, finally, the hills retreat and the plain opens to a breadth of one-half mile from the sea to the foot of the hills.

31. Arrian's two notices (II. 8. 6), *πρώτους ἔταξεν*, which can only mean the placement of the Hellenic mercenaries on the right wing, and *ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν*, said of the kardakes, produce a contradiction that Curtius's report would seem to resolve in favor of *πρώτους*.

32. According to Curtius (III. 9. 3), these were led by Aristomedes of Pherai.

33. The disposition of the Persian army is obscure enough. The representation here has been gathered from Arrian and from Kallisthenes's errors. In Curtius's account, the Persian riders of the right wing open combat by attacking the Thessalian horse; they therefore stand to the right of Dareios's Hellenic mercenaries. Curtius reports (III. 9. 1): Nabarzanes equitatu dextrum cornu tuebatur . . . in eodem Thymonides erat Graecis . . . praepositus. Both Kallisthenes (fr. 33) and Arrian (II. 8. 11) say that the Great King took up a position in the center of the battle line; Curtius says that he was surrounded by his bodyguard of 3000 chosen riders and 40,000 infantry. Nothing reliable is known about the length of the Persian battle line; the 30,000 Greek mercenaries on its right wing must have occupied fully half the plain.

34. Arrian (II. 8. 5) names only five regiments of the phalanx, omitting Krateros, whom he names as commander of the left wing of the infantry regiments. Curtius, too, (III. 9. 7) makes no mention of Krateros's phalanx. It is hard to believe that the king did not have his six regiments in place for this battle, effectively, that he had detached an entire regiment

or dispersed it into garrisons. Even the 3000 men left before Halikarnassos were ξένοι, not Macedonians.

35. This formation at an angle (*en potence*)—ἐς ἐπικαμπὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος (Arr. II. 9. 2)—also gives us a picture of the terrain.

36. καὶ ἄλλοι ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατον τῶν οὐκ ἡμελημένων Μακεδόνων (Arr. II. 10. 7). This is Ptolemy the bodyguard (Arr. I. 24. 1), who therefore must have been given command of the phalanx that Philip had led on the Granikos.

37. According to Diodoros (XVII. 37), Alexander pursued over a distance of 200 stades. The city Nikopolis, which he founded on the eastern egress of the Amanid passes, may have marked the end of his pursuit. I am informed that Professor Haussknecht has found the ruins of ancient Nikopolis in present-day Nebul.

38. Arrian (II. 11. 10) puts the money taken at “not more than 3000 talents,” meaning talents of silver.

39. Arrian says explicitly (II. 12. 5) that Ptolemy and Aristoboulos report these matters thus. Leonnatos is described as ἓνα τῶν ἐταίρων, which tells us that he was not yet one of the seven bodyguards, as Diodoros (XVI. 94) might be interpreted to say.

40. This story, often mentioned by the ancient authors, might be thought suspect because Alexander declares in a letter probably written later (Plut., *Alex.* 22) that he has never seen Dareios’s consort, an assertion that others repeat (Plut., *De curios.*; Athen. XIII, p. 603)—if only we could believe in the authenticity of the letter.

41. Thus Diodoros (XVII. 36); Justin (XI. 9. 10) says 130 infantry and 150 riders; Curtius (III. 11. 27), 32 infantry and 150 riders, and 504 wounded. If Arrian is correct in saying that 150 hoplites τῶν οὐκ ἡμελημένων fell in battle on Parmenion’s wing alone, the total of Macedonian dead must have been significantly greater; the number of wounded will have been eight to ten times that total.

42. Cic., *Ad Fam.* XV. 4. 9 and *Ad Attic.* V. 20. 3. Arrian (II. 11. 10) gives the date of the battle: ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις Νικοκράτους μηνὸς Μαιμακτηριῶνος—about November 333, by Ideler’s calculation.

43. Curt. IV. 1. 35; Diod. XVII. 48.

44. Not by way of Myriandros, obviously, but rather probably by way of the road up the Orontes.

45. Curtius (IV. 1. 25) says that Amyntas led 4000 fleeing Greeks to Tripolis and on to Cyprus; Diodoros (XVII. 48) says that Agis of Sparta hired 8000 of the mercenaries who fled Issos and that Amyntas took 4000 to Tripolis and on to Cyprus, where he recruited more mercenaries. My account follows Arrian, who says that Amyntas Antiochos's son, Thymondas Mentor's son, Aristomedes of Pherai, and Bianor the Akarnanian, *ξύμπαντες οὔτοι αὐτόμολοι*, were the leaders of the fugitives.

46. This letter is probably authentic, as is Alexander's reply (Arr. II. 14). Otherwise, King Ochos, as he is called in the reply, would not have been given the king's name "Artaxerxes" in Dareios's letter. Curtius (IV. 1. 8) had a somewhat different version of the letter before him, and the version that Plutarch mentions (*Alex.* 29) is different again. The *Itin. Alex.*, which usually relies only on Arrian, mentions (ch. 39) an offer of 10,000 talents, as does Plutarch, who adds the offer of Dareios's daughter in marriage and the offer of territory to the Euphrates.

47. αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς παρὰ βασιλέως (Arr. 14. 3). Curtius (IV. 1. 7) observes: praecipue eum movit quod Darius sibi regis titulum nec eundem Alexandri nomini adscripserat. To say that "a king demands of a king" will have been, for Dareios, a major concession, a grant of equal standing, which a king of kings otherwise never concedes.

48. This is probably the same Thersippos who is mentioned about 320 in the inscription from Nasos as τῶν τοῖς βασιλήεσσι φίλος καὶ τοῖς στρατήγοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Μακεδόεσσι (C. I. Gr. II, no. 2166 c, p. 1024).

49. Arr. II. 14. 4-9. This same original is unmistakable in Curtius's rendering (IV. 1. 10). I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of the letter; its being promulgated as a manifesto would explain how it has survived.

50. [Demosth.,] *De foed. Alex.*, par. 30: τὸ δ' ἐὰν βουλώμεθα ἔστιν ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἐνάντιον. The oration can be dated by events mentioned: Hegelochos has just released the Attic ships he stopped (par. 20), and Alexander has expelled the tyrants of Eresos and Antissa (par. 7). (The expression *ἐκβαλεῖν* does not exclude their reestablishing themselves in the meantime.) Shortly afterward, Hellenic ambassadors to the Great King will fall into Parmenion's hands in Damaskos. These are Iphikrates, son of the famous Iphikrates, the Thebans Thalassikos and Dionysidoros, and the Spartan Euthykles. All things considered, they probably were not sent

at the time of the Theban rising in 335, but rather in 333. For Alexander forgave the Thebans who were pardonable as *ἡνδραποδισμένης τῆς πατρίδος*, and the fortunes of Thebes before 335, and after the battle of Chaironeia, would not have attained to *ἀνδραποδισμός* in Macedonian eyes. And why should Iphikrates have been sent to the Great King in 335, a moment when Dareios was approaching the Athenians with offers? Why should he have remained at that court for more than two years, while the Attic state, which presumably had sent him, again made peace with Alexander?

51. Reported only by Curtius (IV. 1. 34).

52. A passage in Arrian—τινὰς τῶν νεῶν ἐς Κῶ καὶ Ἀλικαρνασσὸν ἔστειλαν (II. 13. 4)—could be read to mean that at this moment, just before the fleet sailed for Siphnos, Othontopates had not yet been defeated. A bit further on (II. 13. 6), Arrian lets King Agis go to Halikarnassos (εἰς Ἀλικαρνασσὸν παρ' Αὐτοφραδάτην ἀφίκετο) after the defeat at Issos had become known to the fleet, and go again some time later. Either this is an error or Autophradates had kept his position in the bay of Halikarnassos. According to Curtius (IV. 5. 13), Miletos was still occupied by Hydarnes and retaken by Balakros only after the battle of Issos. If we credit this report, Miletos must have surrendered to the Persian fleet in spring 333 and the Balakros who retook the city could only be the son of the Amyntas who replaced Antigonos as commander of the allied Hellenic infantry at Gordion (Arr. I. 29. 3), the same Amyntas who was left in Egypt as strategos at the beginning of 332 (Arr. III. 5. 5).

53. Arrian indicates this: ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου αὐθις συναγαγεῖν δύναμιν ναυτικὴν προσετέτακτο, etc. (II. 2. 3). Curtius (IV. 1. 36) completes Arrian's information.

54. καὶ τὰς ἐπιστολὰς ἃς ἐξηρτημένος ἐκ τῶν δακτύλων περιήεις ἐπιδεικνύων. The sentence ends: . . . οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ἔπραξας οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἰς τινὰ καιρὸν ἀνεβάλλου καλλίῳ (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 164).

55. Arr. III. 6. 7. Harpalos fled *ὀλίγον πρόσθεν τῆς μάχης ἐν Ἰσσω*, therefore about October 333. Tauriskos, who had corrupted Harpalos and now accompanied him, went on to Alexander the Molossian in Italy, giving us a firm moment for the chronology of this Italian undertaking. A passage in Aristotle, taken from *Δικαιώματα τῶν πόλεων* (fr. 571) reads: Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Μολοττός ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ταραντίνων

αὐτὸν μεταπεμψαμένων ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πόλεμον, etc. But Ammonios, who conserved this fragment, does not tell us what contemporaneous event the synchronism refers to.

56. Curtius says 30,000 persons. The figure is not improbable if we consider a fragment from Parmenion's report to Alexander authentic (Athen. XIII, p. 667). Enumerating a small portion of an immense number, it lists: dancing girls and singers for the king, 329; wreath weavers, 46; preparatory cooks, 277; full cooks, 29; milkmen, 13; beverage tenders, 17; wine warmers, 70; salve makers, 40. Polyenos (IV. 5) reports Parmenion's ruse with the pack animals.

57. Arrian (II. 12. 2) says merely: σατράπην ἀποδεικνύνει; Diodoros (XVIII. 22. 2) says: ἀποδεδειγμένον στρατηγὸν ἄμα καὶ σατράπην. He adds that Balakros ἔτι ζῶντος Ἀλεξάνδρου fell in battle against the Isauri.

58. Müller shows Alexander coins of classes II and III from Mallos, Soloi, Nagidos, etc. It is known that numerous coins were minted in Kilikia in Persian times, also by satraps. A coin from Issos, with legend ΙΣΣΙΚΟΝ, held by the Berlin museum, can now be added to those bearing ΣΟΛΙΚΟΝ, ΤΕΡΣΙΚΟΝ, ΝΑΓΙΔΙΚΟΝ. See *Sallets Num. Zeit.*, 4, 1876, p. 145.

59. As Arrian explicitly states (II. 20. 1 and 13. 7), describing Gerostratos as Straton's son. Curtius (IV. 1. 15) erroneously mentions a king Straton of Sidon about this time. Hieronymos calls King Tennes's predecessor, who rose against Ochros, Straton (cf. Perizon. ad Aelian., *Var. Hist.* XII. 2); Theopompos also mentions him (fr. 126, ap. Athen. XII, p. 532), and he appears in an Attic inscription (C. I. A. II, 86).

60. These seem to be the basic facts of a tale made obscure by all kinds of embellishment and set by Diodoros in Tyre (XVII. 47), by Plutarch in Paphos (*De fort. Alex.* II. 8); Curt. IV. 1. 18; Justin. XI. 10. Arrian makes no mention of Abdolonymos.

61. Arr. II. 17.

62. Cf. Prutz, *Aus Phönicien*, 1876, particularly the map on p. 214, which gives the depths around the island according to the English admiralty chart. These data and Prutz's own observations on site reveal that on the south side of the island, where the temple of Melkart once stood, only reefs, sand bars, and endless rubble remain in the shallow sea. The circumference that Pliny gives the city, twenty-two stades, embraces its

extension to the south; without this southern extension, the circumference would be between fourteen and fifteen stades.

63. Curtius and Diodoros are probably not wrong to say that Alexander demolished Old Tyre, which still stood (Scylax, p. 42, ed. Hudson), to build his mole. According to Arrian (II. 24. 9), its inhabitants had fled to the island city, where they were counted among the ξένοι. Other things that Curtius and Diodoros report about the siege of Tyre are to be credited only when confirmed by Arrian. Skylax gives the distance of the island from the mainland as four stades; Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* IV. 17) as 700 paces. Since the siege lasted seven months (Diod. XVII. 46: μῆνας ἑπτά; Plut., *Alex.* 24), it must have commenced about January 333.

64. The story goes that Alexander filled the first gabion and laid it in place, whereupon the cheering Macedonians began their long labors (Polyaen. IV. 3. 3).

65. Arrian (I. 25. 1) says simply, ἔτι ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ, etc. Curtius (IV. 5. 1) places the embassy with offer to cede territory to the Halys after the fall of Tyre; he mentions a third embassy shortly before the battle of Arbela (IV. 11. 1). Diodoros (XVII. 54) and Plutarch (*Alex.* 29) place the second embassy after Alexander's return from Egypt. Alexander had rebuffed Dareios's first offer during Marathos, about mid-December 333. The earth moving for the mole must have lasted at least four weeks, and destruction of that work was followed by a pause. Dareios had every reason not to delay a second approach.

66. Pardoning these new allies "because they had fought for the Persians under constraint rather than by choice" was not arrogance, as has been said. The king had been duly appointed champion of the Hellenic world, and he had every reason to adhere to this principle. When the Rhodians and the Cypriots declared for the Hellenic cause so tardily, a grant of ἀδεια was necessary: it gave them the status of Hellenes and protected them from being treated as turncoats.

67. Curtius puts Alexander's fleet at 180 ships, Plutarch at 200. But Arrian makes clear that the king already disposed over a number of triremes before the squadrons from Phoenicia and elsewhere arrived.

68. These are the tribes later called Ituraeans, the Durse or Druse of the Middle Ages, whom Pompey fought, as Alexander had. Curtius believes that Alexander attacked the Arabs because they had killed several

Macedonians who were felling cedars in the Libanon. Chares's bravura tale (Plut., *Alex.* 24) may have been recounted to better effect by old Macedonian warriors than by a serious historian.

69. According to Curtius (IV. 2. 10 and 3. 19), the Carthaginians, who had just sent a solemn embassy, had promised aid, but begged off later, pleading a landing of the Syracusans on the coast of Africa. The history of Sicily during precisely these years, between the death of Timoleon and Agathokles's beginnings, is missing in Diodoros. But there is no trace in any other source of a Syracusan landing on the African coast, and the contemporary state of Syracuse and of Sicily in general make such an expedition improbable.

70. Neither at the siege of Tyre nor at the siege of Halikarnassos does Arrian mention Alexander's engineers. Polyeides the Thessalian, who was active at the siege of Perinthos, probably did not join this campaign; he may be the Polyeides named as father of Epokillos (Arr. III. 19. 6). As Polyeides's pupils, Diades and Chairias are mentioned in connection with Alexander (Athen., ap. *Mathem. vett.*, p. 2, ed. Thévenot) along with a third, Deimachos (var. Διήνεχος), whose *ὑπομνήματα πολιορκητικά* Stephanos of Byzantium cites (s.v. *Λακεδαίμων*); they may also be mentioned by Athenaios (ap. *Mathem. vett.*, p. 2). Here, however, Wescher (*Poliorc.*, p. 5) reconstructs the text as: this thing and that can be seen ἐκ τῶν Δηιμάχου Περσικῶν [*var.* σετικῶν, περσετικῶν, πορθητικῶν] καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀκολουθησάντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ. Arrian (II. 26. 1) says that Alexander also had Cypriot and Phoenician construction engineers.

71. The date 20 August is no more than approximate. It results from Arrian's notice (II. 24. 6) that Tyre was taken during Hekatombaion (ca. 22 July–20 August 332) and from Plutarch's account of a marvel: Aristander's pronouncement on the last day of the month that the city would yet be taken within that same month (*Alex.* 25). Aristander, of course, was referring, not to the Attic, but to the Macedonian month. The date must remain uncertain, because we do not know whether the Macedonian month coincided with the Attic month. August 20, furthermore, can be right only if the Metonic cycle as calculated by Ideler (*Handb. d. Chronol.*, I, p. 386) was controlling in Alexander's time.

72. Arr. II. 24. 4–5. ἐξηνδραποδισμένον μετὰ βίας (Polyb. XVI. 39). According to Diodoros, 7000 men fell in battle (Curtius says 6000), 2000

able-bodied men were crucified, and 13,000 old men, women, and children were sold; a greater number had already fled to Carthage. Arrian gives the number of dead as 8000, of prisoners as 30,000. Obviously, the city had more than the 40,000 inhabitants that Arrian could be read to imply. Its eighty ships alone, some of them penteremes, required as many as 20,000 men. Tyre was densely built and composed of multistory houses within a circumference of twenty-two stades (Pliny). By the standard of major modern cities, it may have counted as many as 80,000 inhabitants. Thousands had probably fled before the siege began; gradually they found their way back.

73. Curtius (IV. 4. 15) puts the number at 15,000 persons. Justin (XVIII. 3) has curious things to report: *genus tantum Stratonis* [in his view, the ancient royal house] *inviolatum servavit regnumque stirpi eius restituit, ingenuis et innoxiiis incolis insulae attributis, ut exstirpato servili germine genus urbis ex integro conderetur*, etc. Strabo (XVI, p. 757) and others report that Tyre was soon again a prosperous and important commercial center.

74. No ancient author speaks clearly on this point. Indeed, Arrian's notice that Azemilkos was pardoned (*ἀδεια*) and Diodoros's confused account of Abdolonymos could easily be taken to prove the contrary. However, both the course of events here and later history support my conjecture, for kings on Cyprus and in Sidon, Byblos, and Arados are mentioned in the quarrels among the successors, whereas in Tyre a Macedonian phrourarch figures. And Perdikkas kept his treasury in Tyre (Diod. XVIII. 37).

75. Curtius's notice, *Philota regioni circa Tyrum praesidere jusso* (IV. 5. 9), is not impossible on the face of it. But he also says that Sokrates was installed over Kilikia and Andromachos over Koile Syria (*Syriam Andromacho Parmenio tradiderat, bello quod superat interfuturus*), while Arrian names Menon as satrap in Syria and Balakros as satrap in Kilikia. We may assume that a commander of the troops was appointed beside the satrap in Syria as elsewhere and that Andromachos succeeded Parmenion in this office.

76. As evidence of this effect, one might cite Curtius (IV. 5. 8), who reports that the Hellenes, gathered for the Isthmian games, decided, *ut sunt temporaria ingenia*, to dispatch fifteen delegates bearing a gold wreath

to Alexander *ob res pro salute ac libertate Graeciae gestas*. These Isthmia fell at the beginning of summer 332, before Tyre was conquered. The resolution, if it was taken, would therefore have been to send a *victoriae donum* for the outcome at Issos. Diodoros (XVII. 47) recounts a similar resolution, taken, however, by the *σύνεδροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων* and occasioned, he says explicitly, by the victory in Kilikia.

77. Arrian (II. 25. 4) calls him Batis; Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* XI. 8. 4) gives the name as Βαβαμήσης (var. Abimases, Babimasis). An unintelligible βασιλεύς in a passage of Hegesias (fr. 3) has been explained as a confusion with one of these names.

78. A complete silence among credible authors makes it difficult to say anything certain about Alexander's conduct toward Samaria and Judea, the more so because the mendacities of the Samaritans and the Jews cancel one another. Cf. St. Croix (*Hist. d'Alex.*, p. 547 ff.), who, however, gives too much credence to the Abderite Hekataios, fabricator of the much discussed palace of Ozymandias in Thebes.

79. Arrian's description of the siege (II. 26. 2 ff.) is brief and sometimes obscure, especially in what concerns the construction of this second berm. It has been thought that *χωμα χωννύναι ἐν κύκλῳ πάντοθεν τῆς πόλεως* means a circumvallation of the entire city. The city covered at least the surface of the mound on which it stood, for which Stark (p. 25) estimates a circumference of two English miles, or about 5000 paces. A simple calculation tells us that 20,000 men toiling daily to surround a city wall of no more than 4000 paces by a berm of the necessary height would have taken years. And such a berm would have left no space for operations to undermine the wall.

80. φρούριον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον (Arr. II. 27. 7).

81. Curtius or the source on which he drew has laced the account of this siege with material of no historical value, found in Hegesias: for example, a murder attempted by an Arab deserter and revenge taken on Batis, whom Philotas and Leonnatos have captured (Hegesias, fr. 3). Curtius makes no mention of Philotas, whom he has left behind in Tyre, or of Leonnatos. Both Diodoros (XVII. 48) and Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* XI. 8) say that the siege of Gaza required two months. The army may have arrived before Gaza at the end of September and taken the city about the end of November; the march to Pelusion took seven days, and Alexander was not

in Memphis before the end of November. In the Canon of Kings, Alexander's first year is the one that begins 1 Thoth 417 aer. Nabonassar, that is, 14 November 332. Cf. Ideler, *Handb. d. Chronol.*, I, p. 122.

82. But not those of Tyre, which are dated after 306 and belong to class V.

83. There are two reports of this find, one signed "W" (in Egger's *Wiener Num. Zeit.*, 1, 1865, 1) by the Austrian general consul Weckbecker, who was present in Saida at the time of the discovery; the other by Waddington (in *Rev. Numism.*, 1865, p. 1 ff.), based on information from Weckbecker and Péretié, chancellor of the French general consulate in Beirut.

84. ἵνα περ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμήθη (Arr. III. 1. 1).

85. The more inventive depictions of Alexander's life and deeds (e.g., Ps.-Callisth. I. 34, Jul. Valer. I. 34) make of this sacrifice a veritable pharaonic consecration (ἐνεθρονίσαν), such as was reinstated by Alexander's successors in Egypt from the time of the fifth Ptolemy and called the ἀνακλητήρια.

Book Two, Chapter 3

1. This is the story told by Plutarch (*Alex.* 30 and *De fort. Alex.* II. 6) and embellished by Curtius (IV. 10. 34). It was known to Diodoros, as we see by his placing the queen's death (XVII. 54) shortly before the battle of Gaugamela, where Curtius also places it. The original source is probably Kallisthenes, elaborated in turn by Kleitarchos. Arrian also mentions the story (IV. 20. 1), where *λόγος κατέχει* indicates that he did not take it from Ptolemy or Aristoboulos. He says nothing of Stateira's pregnancy and death; he says that the eunuch fled "shortly" after the battle of Issos. Only so would a death in childbed be credible; the story as it survives in the rhetorical tradition makes a mockery of chronology.

2. Arr. III. 8. 1 ff.

3. Curt. IV. 9. 4. The numbers are according to Arrian (III. 8. 6).

4. Curtius (IV. 5. 13) says of Alexander's captains in autumn 332: *praetores quoque ipsius, egregii duces pleraque invaserant, Calas Paphlagoniam, Antigonus Lycaoniam, Balacrus Hydarne Darii praetore superato Miletum (codd. II. duos militum)*. He also reports (IV. 1. 37) that Miletos had been plundered earlier by Pharnabazos.

5. Mitylenen, quam Chares Atheniensis nuper occupatam duorum milium Persarum praesidio tenebat . . . urbe tradita pactus ut incolumi abire liceret Imbrum petit (Curt. IV. 5. 20); cf. Arr. III. 2. 6). Plutarch reports that Chares then went to Tainaron (*Vit. X Oratt.*: "Hyperides," par. 3).

6. Only Curtius (IV. 8. 15) speaks of a mission *ad liberandam Cretam*, which he would place after the departure from Egypt. Since Alexander sent a further order from Tyre (Arr. III. 6. 3) and since Hegelochos held the high command of the fleet (Arr. III. 2. 6), it would seem that Hegelochos sent Amphoteros to Crete before he sailed for Alexandria (late autumn 332).

7. Arr. III. 2; Curt. IV. 5 and 8. The proceeding against the dreadful Agonippos of Eresos occasioned the inscription cited previously, reproduced by Conze (*Reise auf der Insel Lesbos*, p. 36).

8. Plut., *Alex.* 3.

9. *Itin. Alex.* 18.

10. Curt. IV. 7. 9. *φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν* (Diod. XVII. 49).

11. Ptolemy says two snakes. Obviously, *δράκοντας δύο φωνήν ιέντας* does not mean “talking snakes.” That their *συριγμός* is correctly called *φωνή* can be shown by a citation from Aristotle: *ἡ φωνὴ ψόφος τις ἐστὶν ἐμψύχου* (*Hist. Anim.* IV. 9).

12. Diod. XVII. 51; Callisth., fr. 36, ap. Strab. XVII, p. 814; Plut., *Alex.* 27.

13. Aristoboulos says that Alexander returned by the same way; Ptolemy has him return directly to Memphis. Ptolemy is probably correct: Once a treaty had been concluded with Cyrene, a return over Paraitonion and Alexandria would have served no purpose.

14. According to Plutarch, Curtius, and Diodoros.

15. Brugsch, “König Dareios Lobgesang im Tempel der grossen Oase von El-Kargeh,” *Gött. Gel.-Anzeig.*, 6, 1877, with a brief explanation.

16. Arrian (III. 5. 1) gives these two figures. However, 400 mercenaries under Menidas, sent by Antipater, is a strikingly low number and at Gaugamela, Menidas leads, not infantry, but riders. By contrast, a corps of *ἀρχαῖοι καλούμενοι ξένοι* is present at Gaugamela under Kleandros and arrayed on the right wing, to correspond to the Thracians under Sitalkes on the left wing, a corps of perhaps 4000 men. We may assume a lacuna in Arrian III. 5. 1, where these *ξένοι* under Kleandros and perhaps other troops are mentioned. These reinforcements are not, as has been thought, the subject of a passage in Curtius (IV. 6. 31), where immediately after the king’s arrival in Pelusion (November 332), Amyntas is sent with ten triremes to Macedonia *ad inquisitionem novorum militum*. This Amyntas is Andromenes’s son, strategos of the regiment of the phalanx that Simmias led at Gaugamela in his stead, *ὅτι Ἀμύντας ἐπὶ Μακεδονίας ἐς ξυλλογὴν στρατιᾶς ἐσταλμένος ἦν* (Arr. III. 11. 9).

17. Arr. III. 5; cf. Justin. XIII. 4. As different as these arrangements are from those of Egypt under the Lagids, Lagid Egypt can be used to throw light on Alexandrian Egypt. Kleomenes was appointed *ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων* of all the Egyptian nomoi. This position and, even more, his own adroitness soon made him the most influential figure in the satrapy of Egypt, as he all too clearly showed himself to be six years later.

18. *ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ὑποφαίνοντι* (Arr. III. 6. 1).

19. Plut., *Alex.* 29. Cf. Gysar, *De Graec. trag. Demosth. aetat.*, p. 29.

20. Thus the name of the sacred ship according to Böckh, *Urkunden des Seewesens*, where she is described as a trireme before Ol. 106 (IV. c. 355) and as a quadrireme before Ol. 113.3 (XIII. a. 62 and XVI. c. 155).

21. Arrian. III. 6. 8 reads ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἀρίμμου, whereas earlier (II. 13. 7) we read that Μένων ὁ Κερδίμμος has been appointed strategos of Syria. Surely Arrian means the same man and wrote: ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ Μένωνος τοῦ Κερδίμμου.

22. Curt. IV. 5. 10 and 8. 10.

23. Details concerning Thapsakos and nearby Nikephorion, founded by Alexander not far from present-day Raqqa, are given in an appendix on Alexander's foundations. According to Arrian (III. 7. 1), Alexander arrived in Thapskos during Hekatombaion in the archontate of Aristophanes, that is, between 12 July and 10 August 331.

24. The passage in Arrian (III. 7. 2), ἵππείας μὲν ἔχων τρισχιλίουσ καὶ τούτων Ἑλληνας μισθοφόρους, has been judiciously restored by Sintenis in keeping with Curtius IV. 9. 7 to read: τρισχιλίουσ πέζους δὲ ἑξακισχιλίουσ καὶ τούτων, etc.

25. Barbié du Bocage has identified Mosul as the place where Alexander crossed the Tigris. He does not take account of Arrian's notice that Alexander then marched four days before he saw the enemy, whereas Gaugamela lies only a few hours east of Mosul. Four marches lead from Gaugamela back approximately to Bedzabde on the Tigris, frequently mentioned in ancient times, its importance indicated by modern Cizre, twenty miles above Mosul.

26. The time can be fixed by the lunar eclipse (Arr. III. 6. 1) that took place during the night from 20 to 21 September (Ideler, *Handb. d. Chronol.*, I, p. 347).

27. Curtius and Diodoros add many other touches, for example, that the fleeing riders burned villages (cf. Polyæn. IV. 3. 18), but these details take poor account of the exact location of Tigris and Euphrates.

28. Felix Jones's "Map of the Country of Niniveh" (1852) offered the first indications for a topography of the battlefield. We now have the superb map of the Austrian engineer Czernik in *Petermanns Ergänzungsheft*, 45. The usual caravan route leads from Arbil fairly directly westward over a rather low mountain ridge of many defiles (Dehir Dagħ) to the broad river Zab (ancient Lykos), then over another rocky ridge (Arka Dagħ) to the stony river bottom of the Ghazir. One crosses the river at Zara-Khatun and after a short climb reaches "a broad plain stretching to the horizon" (Rich., *Narrat.*, II, p. 23). This is the *equitabilis et vasta planities* of Curtius

IV. 9. 10. Ten kilometers beyond Zara-Khatun lies Kermelis, on the banks of a stream that flows southward to the Tigris. Thirteen kilometers beyond Kermelis, the village Abu Zuaga lies in a shallow depression through which a stream flows southeastward to join the stream that flows through Kermelis. Halfway between the two villages and a bit northward, Bartallah stands on a rise that projects from the mountains to the north (Meklub Dagħ). Another, easier but longer way leads from Arbil along the stream that flows at the foot of Dehir Dagħ to the confluence of Ghazir and Zab at Vardak, then mounts to the plateau of Kermelis, twenty or thirty meters above the Zab at Vardak. These are the principal points of the battlefield.

29. According to Arrian (III. 8. 7 and VI. 11. 5), Dareios at Gaugamela was encamped on the Bumodos, "which is at most 600 and at least 500 stades distant from Arbela." He also reports (III. 15. 5) that Dareios was pursued over a distance of 600 stades from the battlefield to Arbela. By this reckoning, the Bumodos, on which Gaugamela lay, cannot be the Ghazir and the route of pursuit cannot be the road Arbil, Eski-Kelek, Zara-Khatun. By this route, according to Niebuhr and Kinneir (*Persia*, p. 152), the distance would have been only 6 miles or 240 stades. If one posits that Kermelis is Gaugamela and the stream there (Hazna Dere) the Bumodos, one arrives at a distance of 450 stades, having allowed an additional one-sixth for detours. Curtius (IV. 9. 8) has the Persians march 80 stades from Lykos to Bumodos, a distance that cannot be confirmed at any point between Zab and Ghazir but readily fits the removal of Vardak from the stream at Kermelis.

30. His camp may have stood to the north of the little stream Hasser, which flows southwestward past the mounds of ruins at Khorsabad to join the Tigris.

31. The depression that extends to Abu Zuaga lies exactly sixty stades from Kermelis. The spot reached after another thirty stades was probably Bartallah.

32. Dareios's laying *murices* (Curt. III. 13. 36) and *τρίβολοι* (Polyaen. IV. 3. 17)—snares, harrows, and the like—before his front lines must have been intended to make enemy attack impossible at these places, so that at other places, where his elephants and scythed chariots stood, he could move to attack. Alexander's *παράγειν* to the right would have been intended to force the Persians out of their protected positions, and the

Persians' ἀντιπαράγειν (Arr. III. 13. 1) would indicate that he succeeded. In the event, the satraps Bessos on the left wing and Mazaios on the Persian right opened combat.

33. Here Arrian seems to have omitted the Areians, whom he mentions in his first catalogue (III. 8). The mountain Indians named there were probably placed next to the Arachosians, under whose satrap they stood. Arrian (III. 11. 1), following Aristoboulos, asserts that a written plan of the Persian battle order was found among the booty.

34. Plut., *Alex.* 32; Arr. III. 10. 1.

35. It was one of the last days of Boedromion, the month Aristander had prophesied.

36. καὶ λοξὴν τὴν τάξιν ποιούμενος (Diod. XVII. 57).

37. Arrian's expressions ἵππομαχία and βία κατ' ἱλᾶς προσπίπτοντες establish beyond doubt that the ξένοι mentioned (III. 13. 3) are Menidas's troops, who are joining the Paionians to make a second charge.

38. Plutarch (*Alex.* 32), who describes precisely the armor, sword, and helmet, etc., that Alexander carried that day, says only now, as the charge begins, that he was mounted on Bukephalos, whom he usually spared on account of his great age.

39. Plut., *Alex.* 32. Polyaeus (IV. 6) gives another version: Parmenion sends word that the camp is threatened and the baggage must be rescued. The king riposts: That is no reason to break up the battle line. If we are beaten, we will have no further need of baggage; if we prevail, we will have our own and that of the enemy to boot.

40. This becomes clear when both Koinos and Menidas are wounded at this moment.

41. Arr. III. 15. 2. Total Macedonian losses ἐς ἑκατὸν μάλιστα (Arr. III. 15. 6) is self-evidently wrong. Curtius (IV. 16. 27) says, minus quam CCC desiderati sunt. Diodoros (XVII. 61) says, ἐς πεντακοσίους; in Arrian ρ' may have mistakenly been substituted for φ'.

42. Plutarch (*Alex.* 31) places the battle on the eleventh day after the lunar eclipse (20 – 21 September), that is, on 1 October. In the *Vita Camilli* (par. 19), he puts it on the fifth-last day of Boedromion, so that it appears that Boedromion ended on 5 October that year and not, as Ideler's tables would indicate, on 7 October. Because Aristander, according to Arrian (III. 7. 6), interpreted the eclipse to mean that the battle would be fought

in that same month, we may conclude that in this year the Macedonian month coincided with the Attic month. Further on, Arrian notes (III. 15. 7) that the battle was fought in Pyanepsion, which is either an error of conversion or a copyist's error. Cf. Ideler, *Handbuch*, I, p. 347. In the Kleitarchan tradition, the battle is called after Arbela.

43. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 34), after the battle of Gaugamela, Alexander assumed the title βασιλεὺς τῆς Ἀσίας, made solemn offerings, distributed magnificent gifts, and sent a letter to the Hellenes announcing that all tyrants had been deposed and the cities were to be made autonomous; he ordered that the Plataians' city be rebuilt and that booty from Gaugamela be sent to the Krotonites because they had taken part in the battle of Salamis. Plutarch tells us nothing concerning his authority for these stupendous notices.

44. Rawlinson ("Notes of a Journey," *Journal of the Royal Geogr. Soc.*, 10, 1840, 1, p. 23 ff.) indicates a road from Arbela to Ushnei southwest of the Sea of Urmea, which may be the route of Dareios's flight.

45. Curt. V. 3. 17; Diod. XVII. 56; Arr. III. 18.

46. More precisely: along the first terrace. The route that Alexander took has become clearer since Czernik's observations (*Petermanns Ergänzungsheft*, 44, 1875), and since Petermann's *Reise* (II, pp. 312–21). On the fourth day after leaving Arbela, he arrived at Mennis (Plutarch says Ecbatana), where there were bitumen springs (Curt. V. 1. 16). "Kerkuk is only twenty hours from Arbela and Dus-Churmathu about thirty-five hours. Perhaps the latter is ancient Mennis, for Hêt, where there are also bitumen springs, is too far for Alexander to have reached it in four days" (Niebuhr, II, p. 349). Strabo (XVI, p. 737) describes the route: first Arbela, then the Victory Mountain, as Alexander called it (Qaraqôsch in Petermann, southwest of Arbil), then across the Kapros (the little Zab at Altin-Köprü), then the naphtha springs (at Kirkuk, according to Czernik, p. 44), then Sardakai, Dareios Hystaspes's castle (probably Tuz Khurmatu, where Czernik saw "enormous castle ruins" atop a sheer rock, "a positively monumental building"), then the river Kyparisson (probably the river Kifri, or, better, the Nahrin, into which the Kifri flows), finally, ἡ τοῦ Κάπρου [?] διάβασις ἣδη συναπτοῦσα Σελευκείᾳ καὶ Βαβυλῶνι, that is to say, the Diyala or, as Isidor Charax calls it, the Silla. The distance from Arbela to Babylon is between sixty and sixty-five miles, and the army could have arrived in Babylon at the end of October.

47. Curt. V. 1. 43; Diod. XVII. 64. Ἀγάθωνι τῷ Πυδναίῳ with 700 men, according to Diodoros; with 700 Macedonians and 300 mercenaries, according to Curtius. On Agathon, see Böckh, C. I. Gr. I, no. 105. The distributions of booty to the troops, as recorded by Diodoros and Curtius, are notable, if only as an indication of scale: to every cavalryman, 600 drachmas; to every allied rider, 500 drachmas; to every Macedonian phalangite, 200 drachmas; to every mercenary, two months' salary. We do not know what the salary was.

48. Since the mission was to preserve the treasury at Susa, this may have been Philoxenos, the general treasurer of anterior Asia; we know of no other Philoxenos in Alexander's army.

49. According to Diodoros (XVII. 65), some authors related that Abulites had received orders from Dareios to surrender, with the treasure, to the Macedonians, so that Alexander would be delayed and Dareios could gain time to flee and to rearm—an odd stratagem. Cf. Curt. V. 2. 8.

50. Curtius and Diodoros say that Alexander let his troops rest on the plain of Sitakene on the way to Susa to give them time to recover from the drunkenness and debauchery that had nearly wiped out the army in Babylon. But if an army of this size undertook to march sixty miles in twenty days, it had little time to spare.

51. Arr. III. 16. 7. According to Strabo (XV, pp. 728 and 731), some said 40,000 talents, others 50,000. Curtius (V. 2. 11) says: *L milia talentum argenti non signati forma, sed rudi pondere*; Plutarch (*Alex.* 36) says: τετρακισμύρια τάλαντα νομίσματος.

52. Arrian says merely: ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἀφίκετο. According to Diodoros (XVII. 65) and Curtius (V. 1. 40), Amyntas brought 6000 infantry and 500 Macedonian riders, 600 Thracian riders, 3500 Thracian infantry (Τραλλεῖς, says Diodoros), 4000 mercenaries, and nearly 1000 riders from the Peloponnese (Curtius says 380), and 50 young Macedonian noblemen πρὸς τὴν σωματοφυλακίαν.

53. From Arrian's formulation, τοὺς πεζοὺς δὲ προσέθηκε ταῖς τάξεσι . . . κατὰ ἔθνη ἐκάστους συντάξας (III. 16. 11), we may infer that these were not trained corps (τάξεις, etc.) arriving from the homeland but rather replacements who were then integrated into the mobile regiments that had been raised in their respective cantons. Hence it appears that the τάξεις of certain cantons had remained at home and been complet-

ed *κατὰ ἔθνη*, as were the six mobile regiments (of Elymiotis, Tymphaia, Lynkestis-Orestis, etc.).

54. φρούραρχον δὲ Μάζαρον τῶν ἐταίρων (Arr. III. 16. 9). Only Curtius (V. 2. 16) gives the number of troops; as phrourarch he names Xenophilos, who in any event held the office at a later time (Diod. XIX. 17).

55. Diod. XVII. 67.

56. My discussion of the rivers of Susiana at this point in the first edition has subsequently been confirmed in part and in part corrected, particularly by the work of Baron Bode and of Loftus. I shall refer here only to Kiepert (*Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.*, 1857, p. 123), who confirms my finding that the Choaspes is the present-day Karkheh, and to Spiegel (*Eranische Alterthumskunde*, II, p. 623). Mencke ("Die Geographie von Susiana," *Fleckeisens Jahrb.*, 85, 1862, p. 545) has a different view of these streams. The most important unresolved questions are whether the Jerahi and the Tab meet or flow to the sea separately, as on Kiepert's latest map (see below), and whether the Tab or the Jerahi is the Arosis, or Oroatis (Aurvaiti), of the ancients.

57. This is the opinion of Kenneir, who made the trek himself: "This plain [of Behbahan] is separated from the Valley of Ram Hormuz by a pass, which I conjecture to be that of the Uxians" (*Geogr. Mem.*, p. 72). Baron Bode (*Travels in Luristan and Arabistan*, 1845, II, p. 358) places the Uxian passes at Mal-Amir, about twelve miles east of Dezful, on a tributary of the Kuran. One should not attempt to support that conjecture by citing Curtius (and Diodoros): *quartis castris ad . . . Pasitigrim pervenit*. Nöldeke (*Nachrichten der Gött. Gesell. der Wiss.*, 8, 1874) has shown how the three languages of Susiana produced identical names for Susa, Uxians, Kossaians (Elam, Elymais-Afarti) in the second series of cuneiform inscriptions.

58. Arrian (III. 18. 2) says that Parmenion marched with the heavy troops and the train *ὡς ἐπὶ Πέρσας ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν ἀμάξιτον τὴν ἐς Πέρσας φέρουσιν*. This can only mean a highroad much traversed by recent travelers and precisely described by Chereffeddin as Tamerlane's route in 1403. Baron Bode, coming from Shiraz over Kazerun, turned onto this highroad only at Fahijan and described the little plain of Sha-'b-bevan, which extends to Kelah-i-Sefid. He gives the distance from Shiraz over Kazerun to Behbahan at fifty-one miles, over Kelah-i-Sefid at thirty-seven miles (Bode, I, p. 189).

59. Stockqueler (*Pilgrimages*, II, p. 211) describes the road from Behbahan to Tang-i-tekab, where he turned northward. To my knowledge, we have no report of the road as it continues eastward to Basht, twelve farsangs from Kelah-i-Sefid, by an author who has traveled it recently. On Kiepert's map, based on Professor Haussknecht's *Routen im Orient* and kindly shown to me in proof, the approximate direction of this shortcut toward Basht can be reconstructed as it threads through numerous villages on the terrace behind Kuh-i-Dib, 10,400 feet above sea level. On the same map one also sees the road that leads from Fahijan northward around Kelah-i-Sefid, as I describe. Beyond Kelah-i-Sefid, according to Kenneir (p. 73), lies a high plateau, three and one-half English miles long, leading to the long and difficult defiles of Lucreab, which, however, seem ill-suited to a defense. Zolling (*Alexander des Grossen Feldzug in Centralasien*, 2d ed., 1875) offers a critical discussion of the routes Alexander may have taken and arrives at a conclusion that I find unpersuasive.

60. τὸν Πασιτίγρην (Arr. III. 17. 1). Curtius and Diodoros confirm the name of the river, even as they note, wrongly, *quartis castris*. Arrian seems to call the Kuran the Pasitigris even before it joins the Dezful and calls the plain on the other side the land of the Uxians.

61. Therefore the army remained undivided until it reached these passes. The king avoids the passes by moving left through the mountains in the night. One could conjecture that Alexander moved out to the left at the spot Chereffeddin calls Jaezan (using the spelling of Bode, II, p. 333) and Kinneir calls Jarsun, five farsangs out of Behbahan.

62. Arr. III. 17. Curtius (V. 3. 4) calls Madates *eius regionis praefectus*. This would indicate that the subjected Uxians on the plain were under him and the free Uxians in the mountains had joined him for the battle. Hence Curtius says that they were placed under the satrap of Susiana (non Madati modo ignovit, etc.: V. 3. 16). Arrian (*Ind.* 40) says that the king tried to introduce this sheep-herding tribe to agriculture and built towns for them in the mountains.

63. This passage of Arrian (III. 18. 1) shows that the Macedonian hoplites of the τάξεις were less heavily armed than the σύμμαχοι and μισθοφόροι. Another passage (III. 23. 3) notes that the κουφότατοι were picked from the Macedonian phalangites, telling us that they were not all equally heavy—with respect to arms, no doubt.

64. ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας τὰς Περσίδας (Arr. III. 18. 2). Diodoros says: ἐπὶ τὰς Σουσιάδας καλουμένας πύλας, which Curtius adopts (V. 3. 16).

65. πεμπταίος (Diod. XVII. 68), similarly Curtius. The distance from Behbahan to Kelah-i-Sefid is thirty-five farsangs, about twenty-seven miles. The road forms a great bow toward the south and the string of this bow will be the route Alexander took, of perhaps twenty miles.

66. triginta fere stadia quae remensi sunt (Curt. V. 3. 23). Polyaeos (IV. 3. 27) gives the same figure; in Diodoros (XVII. 68) it has become *τριακόσιοι*. These three and Plutarch (*Alex.* 37) go on to say that one of the prisoners, a Lykian, described the tracks through the mountains. Alexander probably camped in the valley Sha-'b-bevan, described by Bode (I, p. 243).

67. Curtius (V. 4. 20) also names Polyperchon. Because Arrian does not name him, we may assume that he went on with Parmenion as captain of the heaviest hoplites. But the matter is too uncertain to bear further extrapolation.

68. τὸν ποταμὸν ὃν ἐχρῆν περᾶσαι ἰόντα ἐπὶ Πέρσας [i.e., Persepolis] γεφυροῦν ἐκέλευσεν (Arr. III. 18. 6). I believe, with Kiepert (Sintenis, *Index* to Arrian, s.v.), that the Araxes (Bend-emir) is meant, which, according to Strabo (XVII, p. 729), Alexander *πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ Περσεπόλει διέβη*. Only older maps (Ousely, Ker Porter) would support a conjecture that the Tab was bridged. There the entire road from Behbahan is shown to lie in the valley of the Tab, whereas more recent reports say that the road crosses a number of mountain streams flowing southward.

69. This term appears nowhere else in Arrian. The explanation lies in the reorganization of the cavalry: each of its eight *iles* was divided into two *lochoi* and the entire cavalry was divided into four *hipparchies*, each composed of four *lochoi*.

70. Curt. V. 5. 2; Diod. XVII. 69. The king could afford to rest his fatigued troops briefly (*eodem loco quo hostium copias fuderat, castra communivit*: Curt. V. 5. 1) because the advance column had secured the road and the crossing on the Araxes.

71. There is still no agreement about the situation of Pasargadai. Cf. Spiegel, II, p. 617, where Oppert makes combinations that seem to be supported by Strabo's sequence of streams crossed: the Kyros, on which Pasargadai lies, is mentioned before the Araxes, or Bend-emir (XVIII,

p. 729). Also on Alexander's return from India, Pasargadai seems to be situated south of Persepolis. Pliny's observation—*flumen Sitioganus quo Pasargadas septimo die navigatur* (VI. 26; par. 99, ed. Detlefsen)—is unquestionably the result of some error, as no river in the area can be navigated moving upstream for a length of seven days.

72. According to Diodoros, Curtius, and Plutarch (*Alex.* 37). Curtius (V. 6. 9) and Diodoros (XVII. 71) give the total value of the treasure as 120,000 talents; Arrian (III. 18. 10) gives no figure.

73. Kleitarchos, Alexander's Ségur, who had an extraordinary talent for spinning a story and exercised it at the expense of historical truth, produced a particularly resourceful and inventive account of the winter rest in Persepolis. The aged, mutilated Greeks, branded by hot irons, who come out to meet the king, ashamed and despairing; the order to massacre the population; the king's orgies; the Athenian dancing girl Thais, who, transported by the dance, snatches a firebrand from the altar and flings it into the palace and whose example Alexander and his friends follow, drunk on wine and victory: these are all tales drawn from the same source and repeated down through the ages by after-born authors so often and with such conviction that they have become historical certainty. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 38), who makes brief mention of the wild tales: οἱ μὲν οὕτω ταῦτα γενέσθαι φασίν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ γνωμῆς.

74. Arrian (III. 18. 11) mentions Parmenion's intervention: Παρμενίωνος σώζειν συμβουλευόντος.

75. Plutarch (*Alex.* 38) says so explicitly: ὅτι δ' οὖν μετενόησε ταχὺ καὶ κατασβέσαι προσέταξεν ὁμολογεῖται. Arrian (III. 19. 12) reproaches Alexander for this act: ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ σὺν νῶ δρασαι τοῦτό νε Ἀλέξανδρον οὐδὲ εἶναί τις αὕτη Περσῶν τῶν πάλαι τιμωρία.

76. ἐμοῦ τῆς Ἀσίας ἀπάσης κυρίου ὄντος. And further: παρ' ἐμὲ ὡς βασιλέα τῆς Ἀσίας πέμπε μηδὲ ἅ βούλει ἐξίσου ἐπέστελλε, ἀλλ' ὡς κυρίῳ ὄντι τῶν σῶν φράζε εἴ του δέη (Arr. II. 14. 8).

77. ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸς με τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ εἰ ἄλλο τι ἐθέλεις αἶτει καὶ λάμβανε · ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν πείθης ἐμὲ, ἔσται σοι (Arr. II. 14. 8).

Book Two, Chapter 4

1. Only Curtius reports this expedition in any detail. He, however, offers no more than a handful of picturesque exaggerations, with the result that neither the direction nor the course of the undertaking can be discerned. He places it before the burning of Persepolis and *sub ipsum Vergiliarum sidus* (V. 6. 12). The Pleiades set at morning in November and at evening at the beginning of April; they rise at morning in May and at evening in September. Only their evening setting in April accords with other information, but even that would correspond to earliest spring and seems too late. This particular description of the season would appear to be Curtius's invention, intended as a poetic framework for the wintry scenes to follow. Diodoros (XVII, p. 73) reports that after burning Persepolis, Alexander attacked the other cities of Persia and took some by clemency, others by force. Arrian (*Ind.* 40) says that Alexander conquered the marauding tribes—Uxians, Mardaites, and Kossaians—in winter, when they think themselves safest in their mountains. The Mardaite settlements seem to have lain in the southern mountains of Persis, for the western mountains were occupied by Uxians and the northern ones by Kossaians. Hamdulla (Ousely, III, p. 566), too, relates that Firuzabad, an ancient city once called Khur (Cyropolis regio ibi maritima: Plin. VI. 26), was destroyed by Alexander. Strabo (XI, p. 524 and XV, p. 727) observes that Mardaites lived in this area, not just in the Caspian mountains.

2. Curt. IX. 10. 21. Arrian does not mention Astaspes.

3. Both notices are taken from Curtius (V. 5. 11 and 7. 30). As commander of the citadel he names Nikarchides, as leader of the fresh troops, the Athenian Platon.

4. Should Alexander remain in Babylon and Susa, Arrian reports (III. 19. 1), Dareios's plan was: αὐτοῦ προσμένειν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν Μηδοῖς εἰ δὴ τι νεωτερισθεῖη τῶν ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον.

5. The route that Alexander took probably led through the pass of Ourtchiny (Ousely, III, p. 567; *climax Megale*. Plin. V. 26, par. 114, ed. Detlefsen) toward Esfahan or Aspadana (cf. Ousely, III, p. 5), which seems to have been the seat of the satrapy of Paraitakene (Spiegel, II, p. 528). The rest of the way to Ecbatana, or Hamadan, cannot have deviated much from the present road, because Arrian (III. 19. 3) reports, δωδεκάτῃ

ἡμέρα ἐς Μηδίαν ἀφικνεῖται, by which he probably means the frontier of the satrapy. According to Ouseley (II, p. 457), the distance from Mayn, the northern part of the plain of Persepolis, to Esfahan is fifty-six farsangs, or forty-two miles.

6. The treasures of Ecbatana are also mentioned by the eastern authors (see *Extraits et Notices*, II, p. 501). The number of the troops who accompanied Dareios is taken from Arrian (III. 19. 6). Curtius gives: 30,000 light infantry, 4000 Greeks, and 3500 mostly Baktrian riders.

7. According to Curtius (V. 13. 1), Alexander marched, not by way of Ecbatana, but straight to the passes over Tabae (Saveh).

8. A revealing note for the rules of the military is that the discharged riders, who had sold their horses, were accompanied to the sea by Epokillos and a detachment of cavalry and that Menes, hyparch of Syria, Phoenicia, and Kilikia, received orders to prepare triremes to carry them across to Euboea.

9. The site of Rhagai is now known, thanks to the painstaking researches of Ouseley, who found extensive ruins fully two hours southeast of Teheran.

10. Curtius V. 8-12. Only Curtius recounts events in the Persian camp. Arrian (III. 21. 1) says merely that Narbazes and Bessos *ξυνειληφότες εἶεν Δαρείου*.

11. Alexander had left Choarene late in the evening. (The pass at the prosperous present-day village Aradan leads along the edge of the heath or the desert to Padi.) Moving through the night to the middle of the following morning, he must have reached Lasjerd, a distance of nine miles. Nine miles covered in the following night will have brought him to Thara, halfway between Semnon and Davletabad, probably near Akhuri.

12. Curt. V. 13. 7.

13. Arrian (III. 21. 5) adds: "and because all these things happened in Bessos's satrapy." In fact, they had happened in Parthyaia, which was Phrataphernes's satrapy. Perhaps we should assume that Bessos, like earlier princes of Baktria (Ctesias, ap. Phot. 31 a 15), had supreme command of the eastern part of the empire, perhaps as karanos.

14. These things took place in July 330 (Hekatombaion: Arr. III. 22. 2). In the first edition, I discuss the geography of this pursuit in an extensive note, giving particular attention to Alexander's forced marches.

Subsequently, new material and continuing research by C. Ritter, Mützell, Zolling, and Mordtmann (*Berichte der bair. Akad.*, 1, 1869, p. 524) have confirmed my representation in the main and corrected certain details. For example, I agree with Mordtmann that Hekatompylos can be found near Shahrud, not Damghan, as I once believed. This correction clarifies Alexander's final march, when 400 stades covered at speed (Arr. III. 21. 9) brought him next morning within sight of the enemy; he was moving down the string of the bow that brought the fugitives from Damghan to Shahrud. The demands Alexander made of his men and of their horses in this chase border on the incredible. According to Eratosthenes (ap. Strab. XI, p. 514), the distance from the passes to Hekatompylos is 1960 stades (not 1260, as in a datum attributed to Apollodoros at the bottom of the same page, and not *130 millia pass.*, as Pliny says: VI. 15), and from Rhagai to the passes, 500 stades. These figures will reflect the distances paced off by Alexander's surveyors, and are real distances, not distances as the crow flies. The first fourteen of these approximately sixty miles, the distance from Rhagai to Choarene (Aradan), were traversed in two marches; the remaining forty-six miles may have been reduced to forty-two by the shorter route that Alexander took for the last march. On the most recent maps, a straight line from Aradan to Shahrud yields a distance of about thirty-five miles, and the fugitives seem to have been beyond Shahrud when Alexander finally overtook them.

15. This is the story as Plutarch tells it (*Alex.* 42). Arrian (VI. 26) sets the action in Gedrosia, Curtius (VII. 5. 10) in the Paropamisos; Polyaeos (IV. 3. 25) tells the story without indication of place.

16. Arr. III. 22. 2. Curtius (VI. 4. 24) says that Amminapes sought refuge from King Ochus at Philip's court; both representations may be true, as they are of Artabazos.

17. As *ἐπίσκοπος*, says Arrian (III. 22. 1), who mentions two *ἐπίσκοποι* at III. 5. 3.

18. Curt. VI. 4. 23.

19. These marches have now been clarified by Spiegel (I, p. 64 and II, p. 53), using new material, and I will not repeat my earlier account here. Curtius is not useful, since his descriptions are more colorful than accurate. Krateros's route may have led over Firuzkuh or Goor-i-Sefid into the road over the pass to Sari, precisely described by Ouseley, for the military

importance of both these points meant that they had to be invested. Eri-gyios almost certainly took the eastern route over Kalpush to Asterabad (see Melgunoff, *Das südliche Ufer des Kaspischen Meeres*, 1868, p. 143). Alexander probably took the shortest, most difficult road, which lay between the other two and traversed the long valley Shamen-Saver toward Asterabad, roughly where Zadrakarta stood (see Melgunoff, p. 133).

20. Arr. III. 23. 4; Diod. XVII. 76.

21. Curtius (VI. 5. 1) says *cum propinquis Darii*; earlier (2. 9) he had said that a number of Persian noble men and women fell into Alexander's hands in the attack on Dareios's wagon, for example, the granddaughter of King Ochos and Dareios's brother Oxathres. According to Curtius, Artabazos was ninety-five years old and came accompanied by nine sons.

22. Kleitos's sister, and Andronikos's wife, was Lanike, Alexander's nurse (Arr. IV. 9. 4); Proteas the admiral was their son.

23. These passes, whose present-day name is unknown to me, lie between Ardabil and the coastal settlements Astara and Lekeran. The Kadousians, "as the Greek calls the Gelai" (Plin. VI, par. 48), inhabit the mountains of Khilan, which extend eastward to the river Amardos (Qesel-Ozein or Sefid-Rud). For details, see Spiegel, II, p. 538.

24. The pass of Pyl-Rudbar is here, on the road from Qazvin to Rasht (cf. Morier, *Voyages*, II, p. 26).

25. Tamerlane met the same difficulties in these parts (Chereffeddin, VI. 21, p. 161).

26. Arr. III. 14. 3; Curt. VI. 5. 11. In one of these ambushes, the story goes, the barbarians captured Bukephalas, the king's warhorse. Alexander threatened to exterminate them to the last man if they did not surrender their captive, and they hastened to do so. Recounted by Curtius, Plutarch, and others.

27. Arrian (III. 24. 4) names four Spartiates and the Athenian Dropides; Curtius (III. 13. 15) puts the capture of these men earlier, at Damaskos. Among the ambassadors brought in here, he names the Athenian Demokrates (var. Dinocartes), who *venia desperata gladio se transfigit* (VI. 5. 3). The Demokrates named in trierarchian inscriptions (Böckh, p. 235) cannot be this one and, as far as I know, no other Athenian of this name is mentioned at the time.

28. Arrian's formulation leaves unclear whether Herakleides of Kalchedon was released because Kalchedon, like Sinope, had not joined

the κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων or because Kalchedon had sent him *πρὸ τῆς εἰρήνης τε καὶ συμμαχίας τῆς πρὸς Μακεδόνας γενομένης*. The latter is the more probable.

29. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐπιμελῆσθαι τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένους, ὅπως . . . οἱ δὲ τοσούτου δέουσι τούτων τι κωλύειν ὥστε καὶ συγκατασκευάζουσι οὓς πῶς οὐ προσήκει ἀπολωλέναι ([Demosth.,] *De foed. Alex.*, par. 15).

30. Niebuhr (*Vorlesungen*, II, p. 474) has attempted to relate to this contest in Crete a passage of Aristotle (*Pol.* II. 10. 7): οὐτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὅς πεποίηκε φανεράν τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων. Such a reference would be of great value for fixing the date of the *Politics*. But Aristotle surely means the struggles of the Phokian Phalaikos with King Archidamos of Sparta, treated at length by Diodoros (XVII. 61 ff.).

31. The date of these events can no longer be fixed exactly. Justin's report (XII. 2. 14 and 3. 1) of three bulletins that reached Alexander simultaneously in Parthyaia, therefore in August 330, announcing the death of the Molossian, Zopyrion's disaster, and Agis's war, proves little. Greater weight should be given a passage where Aischines (*In Ctesiph.*, par. 242) says that Ktesiphon has recently (*πρώην*) been appointed ambassador to Kleopatra, *συναχθεσθισόμενος ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ Μολοττῶν βασιλείῳ Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτῇ, νυνὶ δὲ οὐ φήσεις δύνασθαι λέγειν*. This tells us that *πρώην* lies not long before August 330. From Livy (VIII. 24), whose Graeco-Roman synchronisms are usually to be treated with caution, we can gather that he found the Molossian's death and the founding of Alexandria listed in the same year, Ol. 112.1 (332–31), in the aids he used for Greece, for example, Apollodoros's chronological tables; he then goes on to convert the year erroneously to 428 by the Roman calendar.

32. ὥς ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοττία αὐτῆς (*Hyper.*, *Pro Euxenipp.*, par. 32).

33. The inscription is described and published in *Ἀθήναιον*, 1876, p. 102 and now in C. I. A. II, no. 175 b. Below the picture one reads: Ῥηβούλας Σεύθου υἱὸς Κότυος ἀδελφὸς ἀγγέλλων. The restoration is problematical; a no more assured, but a more appealing solution would be Ἀγγεληθέν, proposed by H. Droysen. This comports with the assumption that Seuthes was descended from the line of Kotys and, like him (his grandfather?) and Kersobleptes (his father?), an Attic citizen. In the bas

relief, the fiele that the man holds may denote the *σπονδαί* that he offers. The date reads: ἐπὶ Ἀριστοφάνους ἄρχοντος . . . Σκιροφοριῶνος δεκάτῃ ἰσταμένου. According to Ideler's calendrical tables, Skirophorion Ol. 112.2 had twenty-nine days and ended 30 June 330.

34. epistulae, quibus bellum Agidis regis Spartanorum in Graecia, bellum Alexandri regis Epiri in Italia, bellum Zopyrionis praefecti ejus in Scythia continebatur . . . Zopyrion quoque, praefectus Ponti ab Alexandro Magno relictus . . . bellum Scythis intulit, etc. (Justin. XII. 1. 4 and 2. 16). Μέμνων ὁ καθεσταμένος στρατηγὸς τῆς Θράκης . . . ἀνέσεισε τοὺς βαρβάρους (Diod. XVII. 62).

35. iisdem fere diebus literas a Coeno accipit de rebus in Europa et Asia gestis, dum ipse Indiam subegit. Zopyrio Thraciae praepositus, quum expeditionem in Getas faceret, tempestatibus procellisque subito coortis cum toto exercitu oppressus erat, qua cognita clade Seuthes Odrysas populares suos ad defectionem compulerat: amissa propemodum Thracia ne Graecia quidem . . . (Curt. X. 1. 43). It was probably for reasons of narrative composition that Curtius or his Greek original has this collection of bulletins reach Alexander only in 325. Curtius's specifying that Zopyrion was strategos of Thrace would seem to be an oblique reference to Memnon of Thrace, whose name has been omitted here. Koinos as author of these letters is no less abstruse. The man whom we know as Koinos was no longer alive at the time, and no other Koinos is mentioned in the western lands. For this reason, Mützell suspects in "Coeno" a translator's error for ἀπὸ κοινοῦ in the Greek original, meaning the *κοινόν* of the Hellenic League.

36. Antipater conspecto *priore neciorum* exercitu qui audita Alexandri morte ad infestandum imperium ejus confluerant, dissimulans, etc. (Frontin., *Strateg.* II. 11. 4). The corrupted words are probably not to be corrected *Nessiorum* or *Bessorum*, leaving *priore* unexplained, but rather *Peloponnesiorum*.

37. The passage in Polyaeus, Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῇ Τετραχωριτῶν στρατεύων, etc. (IV. 4. 1), probably belongs here. We know from Stephanos of Byzantium that the Bessi were so designated. We do not know whether the name applied only to the Bessi or extended to the three other tribes mentioned by Strabo in the passage that Stephanos cites: VII, p. 318.

38. Borysthenitae obpugnante Zopyrione servis liberatis . . . hostem sustinere potuerunt (Macrob., *Sat.* I. 11. 33). Zopyrion therefore reached Olbia, besieged the city at length, and was returning home when he perished with his army *tempestatibus procellisque subito coortis*, as Curtius says,

or, as Pompeius Trogus says: *ut Zopyrion in Ponto cum exercitu perit* (XII). The satirical verses that Plutarch says exacerbated the mood in the room before Kleitos's fateful end were probably composed about these events: ποιήματα . . . εἰς τοὺς στρατηγούς πεποιημένα τοὺς ἑναγχοὺς ἡττημένους ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπ' αἰσχύνῃ καὶ γέλῳτι (*Alex.* 50). We do not know whether the ultimate source is Kleitarchos.

39. παρεκάλουν τοὺς "Ελληνας συμφρονῆσαι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας (Diod. XVII. 62).

40. καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐπίδοξος ἦν ἀλῶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθεισθήκει, ὁ δὲ Ἀντίπατρος πολὺν χρόνον συνῆγε στρατόπεδον, τὸ δὲ ἐσομενον ἄδηλον ἦν (Aesch., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 165). Deinarchos (I, par. 34) says similar things.

41. Plutarch (*Alex.* 49) says of events in 324: ἐφοβούντο . . . Ἀλέξανδρον Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ἀνάστασιν, ἣν πυθόμενος οὐκ Οἰνιαδῶν ἔφη παῖδας, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐπιθήσειν δίκην Αἰτωλοῖς. Only in 330 would the Aitolians have dared commit this act of destruction.

42. Decree in honor of the Plataian Eudemos: ἐπηγγείλατο τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιδώσειν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἴ τι δεοίτο (C. I. A. II, no. 176). The decree is dated archontate of Aristophanes (Ol. 112.3), 1 Thargelion, about May 329.

43. Plut., *Reip. ger. praec.* 25. We do not know who brought the motion. It was not Demosthenes, if we are to believe Aischines's reproach for inaction, τί ποτ' ἦν ὁ ἔπραξας, etc. (*In Ctesiph.*, par. 166), and Deinarchos (I, par. 34). Plutarch (*Demosth.* 24) says of him: κινουμένῳ δὲ Ἁγίδι βραχέα συνεκινήθη πάλιν, εἴτ' ἔπητξε. We do not know whether it was an impending Spartan hegemony or something else that made him hesitate.

44. This is Plutarch's version of events (*Reip. ger. praec.* 25); cf. Böckh, *Staatshaushaltung*, I, p. 229; II, p. 117. Mention of the festival of Choes, which was observed in February, is striking. Was the proposal to send out the fleet made in January 330? Or did Demades, speaking in April or May 330, mean the Choes of February 329? The entire story bears the marks of an anecdote. There were other reasons for prudence. In spring 331, one hundred Cypriot and Phoenician ships had been sent to Amphoteris: πρὸς αἷς ἔχοντα Ἀμφότερον ἔπεμπε στέλλειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου (Arr. II. 6. 5). If this fleet was now lying before Aigina, it could block the departure of the Attic fleet.

45. Except for Diodoros's notice: διεπολέμει πρὸς τὸν Μένωννα (XVII. 62).

46. This is Diodoros's figure (XVII. 63); he also gives Agis's numbers (XVII. 62). Deinarchos (I, par. 34) says that Agis had 10,000 mercenaries.

47. This representation is supported by the passage of Frontinus (II. 11. 4) cited previously, corrected to read *Peloponnesiorum*, which comports well with what is said about Antipater: dissulans se scire qua mente venissent, gratias his egit quod ad auxilium ferendum Alexandro adversus Lacedaemonios convenissent adjecitque id se regi scripturum; caeterum ipsos, quia sibi opera eorum in praesentia non esset necessaria, abirent domos hortatus est. According to Curtius (VI. 1. 20), the Elians and Achaians were punished after the war, but not the Arkadians: *Tegeates* veniam defectionis praeter auctores impetraverunt. "Tegeates" is a conjecture for *precati geatae*, which makes no sense; others correct: *precati a rege*.

48. Curtius's expansive description of this battle (IV. 1. 1 ff.) derives from Kleitarchos, as can be seen from what Diodoros has to say about Agis's death (XVII. 63). Both authors put the number of Spartan dead at 5300. Diodoros gives 3500 Macedonian dead; Curtius says: ex Macedonibus haud amplius mille, caeterum vix quisquam nisi saucius revertit in castra (IV. 1. 16). The date of the battle can be fixed by Aischines's oration against Ktesiphon, delivered after the defeat of Agis and before the Pythian festival (September 330). Almost certainly it was fought after the decree in honor of Thracian Rhebulas, effectively, after May 330. Curtius is wrong when he says: hic fuit exitus belli quod repente ortum prius tamen finitum est quam Dareum Alexander apud Arbelam superaret (IV. 1. 21). He himself contradicts this notice subsequently (VII. 4. 32).

49. Plut., *Apophth.* (Eudamid. 5).

50. Plut., *Apophth. Lacon.* 51; cf. Aeschin., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 133: Λακεδαιμόνοι δ' οἱ ταλαίπωροι . . . νῦν ὀμηρεύσοντες καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς ἐπίδειξιν ποιησόμενοι μέλλουσιν ὥς Ἀλέξανδρον ἀναπεμπέσθαι, etc.

51. ἐκείνου δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἀποστείλαντος οἱ μὲν σύεδροι συνήχθησαν εἰς Κόρινθον, etc. (Diod. XVII. 73).

52. Where and how the envoys met him is related nowhere. Curtius says that news of the Spartan rising reached Alexander as he came to Baktra after the winter rest in the high Kaukasos, that is, in spring 329: nondum enim victi erant quum proficiscerentur tumultus ejus principia nunciaturi (VII. 4. 32).

Book Three, Chapter 1

1. The figures, while taken from Plutarch (*Alex.* 47), appear among notices that he found in a source that Curtius (VI. 8. 17) and Diodoros (XVII. 74) also used.

2. Arrian mentions the regiments of Krateros, Amyntas (III. 23. 2), and Koinos (III. 24. 1). A further regiment, Perdikkas's, was probably also with the king, since only 6000 men had been left in Ecbatana.

3. I have omitted the story of the homesickness and demoralization of the army and of an address by the king that restored their eagerness for battle, recounted by Plutarch (*Alex.* 47), Diodoros (XVII. 75), and, expansively, by Curtius (VI. 8. 17), because it does not appear in Arrian. The letter in which the king reverts to these matters, introduced by Plutarch, has the same marks of rhetorical invention as does Curtius's account of the event. These same authors insert here the story of the Amazon queen Thalestris, which would seem to derive from the same source. Plutarch (*Alex.* 46) lists the authors in whom this story is to be found. Onesikritos is the only one among them who could have known it at first hand.

4. A fact confirmed by Arrian: ἔχων πάσαν δύναμιν ἥει ἐπὶ Βάκτρων . . . ἰόντι δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ Βάκτρα (III. 25. 4). Similarly, Strabo: διώκων τοὺς περὶ Βῆσσον ὥς ἐπὶ Βάκτρων (XV, p. 724).

5. Further information concerning the whereabouts of Susia can be found in the appendix on Alexander's foundations. Alexander was coming from Hyrkania and therefore must have taken the northernmost of the three roads that run from the Caspian passes eastward through Khorasan. He was in a hurry and will have looked for the shortest way; he also wanted to invest this countryside and probably did not take an established road. It is unlikely that he doubled back over the mountains to Hekatompylos to reach the Ochos (Areios) by the southern route over Nishapur or the middle route over Jajarm and Mashhad. Arrian (III. 25. 1) says that Alexander moved through Parthyaian territory (ὥς ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους) to Susia (ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀρείας ὄρια καὶ Σουσίαν πόλιν τῆς Ἀρείας). Basically, he followed the road indicated by Isidoros of Charax, which reaches Susia by way of Parthyaian Nisa (Παρθαύνισα) and the fertile valley at Kabushan. Wilson (*Ariana Antiqua*) would place Susia at Suzan, between

Mashhad and Herat on A. Burnes's map. It is more likely that Susia is Tus, an ancient city of Jemshid, a few miles from Mashhad on the road to Kabushan, where the road from Hyrkania meets the road from Shahrud.

6. Curtius (VI. 6. 36) counts 500 Greek, 3000 Illyrian, 130 Thessalian, and 300 Lydian riders and 2600 Lydian infantry. The numbers are suspiciously copious, and the more suspicious for citing Illyrian troops. Arrian says: "Alexander set out for Baktria with his entire army; on the way he was joined by Philip, coming from Ecbatana." Obviously, the troops had come to Susia in various marching columns, and they may have crossed the mountains of Khorasan by the main roads.

7. The sites of the towns and cities of this region can no longer be fixed. In no event is Artakoana (cf. Mützell on Curt. VI. 6. 34 for the orthography of the name) present-day Herat. Curtius's description, if it is as accurate as it is vivid (*praerupta rupes est quae spectat occidentem*: VI. 6. 23), tells us that the city stood in a valley that extended northward, not westward, like the valley of Herat. That the principal district of the Areians lay in a river valley is obvious from its dimensions in Strabo: 2000 stades long and 300 stades wide on the level. According to Ptolemy (VI. 17), Artikaudna lies 40 min. farther west and 10 min. farther north than Alexandria Areion, or Herat. Since Alexander on the march toward Baktra stood at a distance of 600 stades from this fortress (Arr. III. 25. 6), his march must have proceeded toward Merv-Rud.

8. Herbelot, II, p. 240; St. Croix, p. 822; et al. Ammianus Marcellinus (XXIII. 6. 69) says that one can travel from Alexandria to the Caspian Sea by water. At 1500 stades he underestimates the distance, but the fact itself is beyond doubt, for Strabo (XI, p. 509) says that the Ochos flows through Hyrkania to the sea and that Nisaia stands on the river, and Ptolemy describes the mouth of the Ochos and the mouth of the Oxos very precisely. The ancient Ochos, apparently, was formed by the confluence of the river of Merv-Rud and the Tejend, and the Tejend in turn by the confluence of the river of Herat and that of Mashhad. Today the two rivers expire in the desert before they can meet.

9. Arrian makes no mention of this name; nonetheless, there is good reason to assume it was the Zarangian capital. Wilson (*Ariana Antiqua*, p. 154) places the ancient capital at Peshaverun, on the way from Doshakh to Farah; Spiegel (II, p. 451) gives other information. I once thought

Farah was ancient Prophthasia; more precise knowledge of the streams that flow to the Areios Sea indicates that Alexander cannot have followed the river of Farah. The first river he came upon was the Ardakan, along which Khanikoff traveled.

10. Mentions of the Euergetes have been assembled in the commentaries to Curtius VII. 3. Their earlier name was Ari-aspons (horse Areians); their settlements lay in the valley of the river Etymandros, modern Hindmend, or Helmand (Arr. IV. 6. 6). The river flows through the desert in a narrow valley between steep crags; as the valley approaches the Areios Sea, it broadens to form a lovely fertile expanse marked today by the ruins of several large cities, canals, and aqueducts. These were probably the settlements of the Ariaspans.

11. καταμαθὼν ἄνδρας οὐ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ταύτη βαρβάρους πολιτεύοντας, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἴσα καὶ τοῖς κρατίστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων μεταποιουμένους, ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε, etc. (Arr. III. 27. 5). Curtius says they received Dareios's private secretary as their satrap; Diodoros says that Tiridates became satrap of both the Gedrosians and the Euergetes; Arrian says they remained free.

12. Alexander seems to have founded an Alexandria here too; see the appendix on foundations.

13. These are the passes of Kalat and Urghundab (see Sultan Baber, *Mem.*, pp. 171, 224, etc.; Chereffeddin, II, ch. 47, p. 366).

14. Arr. III. 28. 1. Curtius (VII. 3. 5) gives the number of troops.

15. According to eastern tradition, related by Ferishta, Abul Gazi, etc. (cf. Elphinstone, *Kabul*, II, p. 152, transl. Rühs), Kandahar was founded by Alexander—a tradition that Wilson's objections (*Asiat. Researches*, 15, p. 106) have not defeated. Subsequently, the satrapies of Arachosia and Gedrosia and of Areia and Drangiana are usually mentioned as united. From Curtius (IX. 10. 20) one can conclude that the satrap of Arachosia also ruled the Gedrosians. The Drangians and Zarangians are reliably the same people; Strabo's indications for the settlements of these tribes are so precise that their location is no longer in doubt.

16. According to Lassen (*Ind. Alterth.*, I, 27, n. 4), the name of these mountains is Paropa-nishadha, the low mountains, as opposed to Nishadha, the high mountains, the name given the peaks of the Hindu Kush.

The Babylonian text of the great Dareios inscription gives Parupara-
‘isana; among the many Greek renderings of the name, therefore, Ptol-
emy’s would be most nearly correct: Παροπάνισος. It seemed appropri-
ate to retain the traditional orthography here. Baber (p. 209) describes
with great charm how snowy the winters are in these mountains. Strabo
(XV, p. 724) says that the king marched *διὰ τῶν Παροπαμισαδῶν ὑπὸ
Πλειάδος δύσιν*, which seems to render impossible a stay of sixty days
among the Euergetes, noted by Curtius (VII. 3. 4).

17. οὐ γὰρ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήσι
ἡγεμενικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενος, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὡς
φίλων καὶ οἰκείων ἐπιμελούμενος [like an epimelet], τοῖς δὲ ὡς ζώοις ἢ
φύτοις προσφερόμενος (Aristot., fr. 81, ap. Plut., *De Alex. s. virt. s. fort.* I.
6). The authenticity of the fragment, which has been questioned, is estab-
lished by Strabo’s citation of substantially the same thought, taken from
Eratosthenes.

18. Aristot., *Pol.* VII. 7. 1.

19. ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον (Aristot.,
Pol. III. 13. 8).

20. Polybios (XII. 22), reproving Timaios for claiming that Kallisthenes
glorifies Alexander, says: ἀποθεοῦν Ἀλέξανδρον οὐκ ἐβουλήθη . . . ἄνδρα
τοιοῦτον, ὡς πάντες μεγαλοφύεστερον ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπον γεγονέναι τῇ
ψυχῇ συγχωροῦσι.

21. τὴν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν . . . τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων
δουλεύειν (Aristot., *Pol.* VII. 14).

22. Aristot., *Pol.* VII. 14. 15. The giver of laws must *σπουδάζειν ὅπως
καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν ἐνεκεν
τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης*, for most military states last only as long as they
make war, κατακτησάμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται · τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν
ἀφίσαι, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες · αἴτιος δ’ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ
παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

23. οὐ γίνονται δ’ ἔτι βασιλεῖαι νῦν . . . διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐκού-
σιον μὲν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, etc. (Aristot., *Pol.* V. 10. 22).
ἅπαντες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη εὐεργετεῖν
ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης (*Pol.*, V. 10. 5).

24. Plut., *Alex.* 45.

25. Plut., *Alex.* 39.

26. Plutarch tells us that Dimnos, furiously resisting arrest, was stabbed to death by the officer sent to apprehend him. If not an invention, the story attests the magnitude of the present danger: the man the king dispatched removed a crucial witness in the interest of protecting Philotas.

27. Curtius (VI. 8. 20) says that the veteran Atharrias led this commando—a touch that adds nothing to the credibility of his account.

28. According to Curtius, 6000 Macedonians were present, and baggage boys, grooms, etc. jostled for a place behind them; the other troops must have been scattered among the cantonments.

29. This probably refers to denunciations such as one that Antigone of Pydna, who was taken prisoner at Damaskos and subsequently became Philotas's mistress, first passed to the king by way of Krateros and ultimately came before the king to make in person (Plut., *Alex.* 38).

30. οἱ Μακεδόνες κατέγνωσαν τοῦ Φιλώτα καὶ τῶν καταιτιαθέντων θάνατον, ἐν οἷς ὑπῆρχε Παρμενίων, etc. (Diod. XVII. 80). Surviving documentation is too meager to indicate whether these proceedings were controlled by a Macedonian jurisprudence valid also in peacetime or by a sterner justice imposed on an army in the field.

31. πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ἔπεμψε κρύφα πίστεις δούς καὶ λαμβάνων (Plut., *Alex.* 49).

32. Olympias may have notified him.

33. One recourse may have been the *τάγμα ἀτάκτων*, to which the malcontent and the insubordinate were relegated.

34. According to Arrian (III. 29. 7), Ptolemy received a corps in which there were *τῶν ἐταίρων ἵππαρχίαι τρεῖς*, an indication that this was no mere replacement of the discharged Thessalian cavalry. Another corps is mentioned later (Arr. IV. 4. 7), also with three hipparchies of companions. In the Indian campaign, six hipparchies are mentioned by the names of their hipparchs. Comparison of three passages (Arr. IV. 22. 7; 23.1; and 24.1) indicates the presence of eight hipparchies exclusive of the agema.

35. According to Arrian (IV. 4. 6), the attack on the Scyths is carried out by *μία ἵππαρχία τῶν ξένων* and four *ἱλὲς* of sarissa bearers; in one detachment a cavalry of 60 companion riders and 800 *τῶν μισθοφόρων* is noted, among other forces (IV. 3. 7).

36. Arr. III. 24. 1; IV. 17. 3; V. 11. 3, etc.

37. Arr. VII. 6. 1; Plut., *Alex.* 47. Suidas, s.v. *Βασίλαιοι παῖδες*.

38. Trajan's column shows that the Roman soldier of the Dacian campaign wore trousers. We know from Josephus that his soles were studded with nails.

Book Three, Chapter 2

1. Arr. III. 28. 10 and IV. 7. 1.

2. Arr. III. 28. 2. The internal probability of the figures that Curtius gives (VII. 3. 2) confirms their reliability. The allied contingent, according to Diodoros, to be sure (XVII. 17), counted 600 riders and at Arbela was divided between Erigyios and Koiranos (Arrian's spelling at III. 12. 4, instead of Diodoros's "Karanos"). Andronikos led the Greek mercenaries who had been with Dareios, about 1500 men. It is not implausible that Artabazos, whom Alexander greatly respected and who had repeatedly worked with Greek mercenaries, was given the high command of this part of the heavy infantry. As a Persian, surely he was particularly preferred for this expedition.

3. According to Curtius (VII. 3. 4), Alexander was joined on this march by the troops that had stood under Parmenion in Ecbatana, 6000 Macedonians and 200 Macedonian riders, 5000 mercenary infantry and 600 riders, *haud dubie robur omnium virium regis*. Arrian does not indicate how these troops executed the order to follow through Kadousian country, that is to say, along the coast of the Caspian (III. 19. 17), or when the corps joined the king. It would be arbitrary to surmise that Polydamas brought the marching orders along with the order to murder Parmenion and then to develop a chronology from this surmise. From Arrian (III. 25. 4) it is clear that a portion of these troops, the mercenary cavalry and the Thesalians who chose to remain in service, joined the army shortly after it marched out of Zadrakarta.

4. Strab. XVI, p. 812. Curtius's account of this march over the plateau of Ghazni is full of exaggeration, but many of his geographical notices are confirmed by Baber, Elphinstone, and others.

5. This rest can be deduced from Arrian's notice (III. 28. 4) that Alexander founded a city here, with sacrifices and contests, and from Strabo (XV, p. 725): διαχειμάσας αὐτόθι.

6. The route to the Tul pass, also called after the fort Khawak, is described by Wood (*Journey*, p. 275), who chose this route in 1837, after he had found the springs of the Oxos.

7. The locus classicus for this pass region is in the *Memoirs* of Sultan Baber (p. 139). Tamerlane marched through the region of the eastern

passes, and Chereffeddin gives a fascinating account at the beginning and again at the end of his fourth book. More precise information can now be found in Masson, *Journey*, II, p. 352 ff.

8. Differing with C. Ritter, who would place the ancient city *sub ipso Caucaso* (Plin. V. 16) at Bamian, I have long thought it lay near the point where the Ghorband and the Panjsher drop down from the last heights and unite. The ruins at Charikar and Ghorband that Wilson (*Ariana Ant.*, p. 182) notes forty or fifty English miles from Kabul seem to mark the spot. Cunningham (*The Ancient Geogr. of India*, 1871, I, p. 21 ff.) now gives more precise detail; his equating Ἀλεξάνδρεια . . . ἐν τῇ Ὀπιανῇ κατὰ τὴν Ἰνδικήν of Stephanos of Byzantium with Alexandria *sub ipso Caucaso* is probably erroneous. I no longer believe that Alexander took the road over Bamian, but rather the road to Andarab, which seems to be called Drapsaka in Arrian (III. 29. 1) and Adrapsa in Strabo (XI, p. 516). Curtius (VII. 3. 23) says that 7000 Macedonian veterans remained in this new Alexandria; Diodoros (XVII. 83) says that 3000 of the ἐκτὸς τάξεως συνακολουθούντων, 7000 barbarians, and the mercenaries who wished to do so remained there and in foundations nearby.

9. καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἔκτισεν ἡμέρας ὁδὸν ἀπεχούσας τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας (Diod. XVII. 83). Surely not ἄλλην πόλιν . . . ἀπέχουσιν, as Wessling writes, following a Parisian codex. Further details may be found in the appendix on cities founded.

10. πεντεκαίδεκαταῖος ἀπὸ τῆς κτισθείσης πόλεως καὶ τῶν χειμαδίων ἦκεν εἰς Ἀδραψα (Strab. XV, p. 725). Wood (*Journey*, 2d ed., 1872, p. 273 ff.) calculates the distance from the end of the Panjsher valley to Andarab at 125 English miles. He found four feet of snow on the passes in the second half of April. Burnes (*Asiat. Journ.*, 1833, Feb. 16) says of his journey over Bamian: "For four days [of May] we moved under steep cliffs and sheer ramparts that hid the sun from our sight and rose perpendicular to a height of 2000 or 3000 feet. My nose was frostbitten and I was almost blinded by the light from the snowfields. We could move only in the mornings, when there was a crust on the snow. These mountains are as good as uninhabited, and our camp was a stream bed during the day."

11. ἐπὶ τὰ σφῶν ἕκαστοι (Arr. III. 28. 10); in suos quisque vicos (Curt. VII. 4. 21). Perhaps it is permissible to associate here the expression that Arrian uses later (IV. 21. 1) for the rising of the Baktrians: Χορίνης καὶ

ἄλλοι τῶν ὑπάρχων οὐκ ὀλίγοι. Neither Arrian nor any other author names a Persian satrap for Sogdiana. Even the rich Margiana (Merv Shahijan) belonged to the Baktrian satrapy, at least in earliest times, as the inscription of Bisotun (3. 11) indicates: there the satrap of Baktria strikes down the man who rose in the Margiana.

12. I will not venture an opinion whether the city was given the name Alexandria and is Stephanos's Ἀλεξάνδρεια κατὰ Βάκτρα or whether that city is to be found farther east, where the eastern geographers place Iskandereh (Ebn Haukal, p. 224; Abulfeda, p. 352, ed. Reiske,). Mützell (p. 654), commenting on Curtius, conjectures that Alexander moved down from Andarab along the river that flows to the Oxos at Kondozi (called the Ghori in A. Burnes). That, in any event, would have been the natural route.

13. Arr. III. 29. 5; Curt. VII. 5. 27.

14. Curtius (VII. 4. 32) says of this stay in Baktria: hic regi stativa habenti nuntiat ex Graecia Peloponnesiorum Laconumque defectio: nondum enim victi erant quum proficiscerentur tumultus ejus principia nuntiaturi. The messengers must have been dispatched about June 330 and have taken ten months to reach Alexander. The notice would be of immense value if Kleitarchos were not the source.

15. Curtius (VII. 5. 1) describes a march through a terrifying desert, certainly exaggerating and anticipating on the near side of the Oxos what is true of part of the far side. Strabo (XI, p. 510) says that the river of Baktria reaches the Oxos: ἦν [πόλιν] διαρρέει ὁμώνυμος ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων εἰς τὸν Ὠξόν. The distance from Balkh to Kelefit is easily ten miles.

16. Arr. III. 29. For the whereabouts of Nautaka τῆς Σογδιάνης χώρας we have no indications other than Bessos's flight and the Macedonian encampment in winter 328–27 (Arr. IV. 18. 1). Because Bessos fled westward, toward Bukhara, Nautaka is more likely to have lain in the canton of Nakshab (or Karshi), Tamerlane's winter residence, than farther east in Kesh (or Shakhrisabz). The way there from Balkh would cross the Oxos at Kelefit and avoid the significant mountains that separate Hisor from the Karshi area, particularly the dangerous pass of the Iron Gate. The entire region between Oxos and Sogd has been made known only since 1875 by the expeditions of Fedtschenko and Majev and the English explorations launched by Major Montgommery. I refer the reader to *Bulletin*

géogr., 1876 (Dec.), p. 572 ff., and to R. Kiepert, *Globus*, 1, 1877; both offer helpful small maps. Majev's reports, especially, add greatly to the value of Chereffeddin's information.

17. If Nautaka is present-day Karshi on the river Kashka, it lay about thirty miles from the Oxos crossing at Keleft. From Nautaka, then, Bessos fled northwestward toward Bukhara, twenty miles away. He was handed over at one of the hamlets along the way, perhaps at Qorovul tepa (Karaul-Tube), five miles short of Bukhara. This will make Ptolemy's "ten marches in four days" intelligible.

18. οὕτως αἰκισθεὶς ἀποπέμπεται εἰς Βάκτρα ἀποθανούμενος (Arr. III. 30. 5). Thus does Arrian close a passage taken from Ptolemy. According to Curtius (VII. 5. 40), Bessos was delivered to Oxathres, brother of the murdered king; Diodoros (XVII. 83) says, τῷ ἀδελφῷ τοῦ Δαρείου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συγγενέσι—in perfect compliance with the *lex gentilitia*; but in Arrian, Oxathres is Abulites's son and Alexander's satrap in Susa, and Dareios's brother is called Oxyartes (VII. 4. 5) and must be distinguished from the Baktrian Oxyartes.

19. The identification of Marakanda with modern Samarkand is not based on similarity of name alone, deemed insufficient by Spiegel (II, p. 546). Throughout the East the city is said to have been founded by Alexander (Baber, *Mem.*, p. 48).

20. συνελθεῖν τοὺς ὑπάρχους τῆς χώρας ἐκείνης εἰς Ζαρίασπα τὴν μεγίστην πόλιν . . . ὥς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ οὐδενὶ τοῦ συλλόγου γενομένου (Arr. IV. 1. 5). Xenophon explains the word *σύλλογος* as the annual *ἐξέτασις τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷς ὀπλίσθαι προστέτακται*, excluding those *ἐν ταῖς ἀκροπόλεσι* (*Oec.* IV. 6; *Cyrop.* VI. 2. 11). Also from Xenophon (*Hellen.* I. 4. 3 and *Anab.* I. 1. 2), we know that the *σύλλογος* of the troops of Asia Minor was held at Kastolos. We know from Arrian that the Medes and the Persians held their *σύλλογος* at Ecbatana: Bessos was to be transported there *ὥς ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ Μήδων τε καὶ Περσῶν ξυλλόγῳ ἀποθανούμενος* (IV. 7. 3). What the Greeks understood by the word "hyparch" cannot be defined precisely. It seems to have denoted some kind of personal *ἀρχή*. In Xenophon, Jason of Pherai calls the Molossian king Alketas his hyparch (*Hellen.* VI. 1. 7), and Cyrus puts to death a Persian in charge of the dye works of royal purple *καὶ ἕτερόν τινα τῶν ὑπάρχων δύναστην* (unglossed) (*Anab.* I. 2. 20). But Arrian (IV. 22. 4 and V. 29.

4) uses the word for a commanding officer of the second rank and calls Mazaios, first, satrap of Babylon (III. 16. 4), then, hyparch of Babylon (IV. 18. 3).

21. Arrian says of this castle: αὐτός τε Χοριήνης ξυμπεφύγει καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑπάρχων οὐκ ὀλίγοι (IV. 21. 1); and again, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χωρίον ἐκεῖνο ἐπιτρέπει Χοριήνη καὶ ὑπαρχον εἶναι ὁσωνπερ καὶ πρόσθεν ἔδωκε (IV. 21. 9).

22. Curtius says of these local lords: satrapes erat Sysimithres (VIII. 2. 19), and again: imperium Sysimithri restituit spe majoris etiam provinciae facta si cum fide amicitiam ejus coluisset (VIII. 2. 32); of Oxyartes: in regionem cui Oxyartes satrapes nobilis praeerat (VIII. 4. 21). In both instances *satrapes* must be a rendering of ὑπαρχος.

23. Arr. III. 30; Curt. VII. 6. The area in question is none other than the alpine canton of Osrushnah, Ptolemy's Montes Oxii. This can be deduced from the direction taken by the roads in the area, as I represented them in the earlier edition, following Chereffeddin's indications. These roads are indicated even more clearly now by Kiepert, who used the recent Russian reports for his "Übersichtskarte der nach China und Buchara führenden Strassen" (1873). Alexander took the shortest route: It leads from Samarkand directly northward for twelve miles toward Jizzax, then up the valley of a small river to the "White Pass" Ak-Kutel (Bitti Codak in Cherffeddin), where it enters the countryside of Osrushnah. From there it leads to the river of Jam, ten miles from Jizzax, over Sebat and Uroteppa, through the mountains of Masikha (? Memaceni at Curt. VII. 6. 19), and over the Aksu to Khujand, the most important point on the Jaxartes line (ten miles from Jam). Cf. Fraser, *Append.*, and Ebn Haukal (cited by Abulfeda in *Geogr. min.*, III, p. 65), who, however, replaces Sebat, which lies between Jam and Uroteppa, by Zomin, which lies farther west. As late as the time of Ahmed Alcateb (Abulfeda, p. 69), some four hundred fortresses still stood in the countryside of Osrushnah.

24. Strabo (XI, p. 440) says: τὰ Κύρα ἔσχατον Κύρου κτίσμα ἐπὶ τῷ ἱλαξάρτῃ κείμενον. The description is not entirely correct, for Arrian says explicitly that this Κυρούπολις did not lie on the Jaxartes; rather, it was traversed by a stream that was dry in summer. That alone indicates that the town lay at the foot of the mountains and on the edge of the desert. This is not true of the river Aksu on which Uroteppa lies; its stream soon reaches

a larger stream. But to the west of the mountains of Uroteppa, the river of Zomin flows down from the White Mountains toward Jam, where it dries out. Ebn Haukal says that the city Zomin lies below the mountains of Os-rushnah and faces the desert. This, I believe, is Kyropolis or Kyreshata, in Kiepert's opinion not a foundation by Cyrus but rather a city of the Kuru, the same Kuru who appear with the Pandu in the Indian epic. The name of the Pandu also occurs in this area of the Jaxartes (Plin. VI. 18, par. 49), and Kurukshatra is the name of the Indian city near the great battleground of the Indian Kuru and Pandu. It is tempting to associate here the similarly named stronghold Kuruat, six miles from Khujand (Fraser, *Append.*), but distance and the character of the landscape present significant obstacles.

25. Only Khujand has a military importance appropriate to Alexander's project. It was at all times the key to the Ferghana and to Maveralnahr, the point of invasion from east and west, and a principal station on the great road between Samarkand and Kashgar. Countless proofs are to be found in the travels of Ghengis Khan, Tamerlane, and Baber and in the accounts of eastern geographers. Sultan Baber says that the city is very old and that its citadel stands on a rocky promontory within gunshot of the river, which turns northward below the citadel and rolls on through the sand. Pliny (VI. 16) calls this spot Alexandria, *in ultimis Sogdianorum finibus*, and Ptolemy cites the very bend in the Jaxartes as the frontier of Sogdiana.

26. παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Σκυθῶν (Arr. IV. 1. 1). For information on the Scyths and on the ethnographic implications of the three names by which the Syr Darya was called (Jaxartes, Tanais, Silis: Plin. VI. 16), I refer the reader to C. Ritter (VII. 480 and *passim*) and to Klaproth (*Nouv. Journ. Asiat.*, 1, p. 50 ff.).

27. Arr. IV. 1. 2. If Curtius were more reliable, what he says here (VII. 6. 12), would be very informative: Berdam [*Penidam*: ed. Mützell] quendam misit ex amicis qui denunciaret his, ne Tanaim amnem [regionis] injussu regis transirent. Alexander will have known of Zopyrion's fate and of the Spartan rising, if these bulletins reached him in Baktra. He had reason to fear that Zopyrion's failed attack on the Borysthenes would rouse the Scyths of the Don to invade the Danube country. This Scythian embassy certainly had not come such a distance, but rather from the lower Volga at the utmost.

28. ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀποστάσεως, καὶ τῶν Σογδιανῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπαρθέντες πρὸς τῶν ξυλλαβόντων Βῆσσον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν Βακτριανῶν ἔστιν οὓς σφισιν αὐτοὶ ξυναπέστωσαν (Arr. IV. 1. 5).

29. ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ οὐδενὶ τοῦ ξυλλόγου γιγνομένου (Arr. IV. 1. 5); vul-gaverant famam Bactrianos equites a rege omnes ut occiderentur accersi (Curt. VII. 6. 15).

30. Arr. IV. 3. Curtius (VII. 6. 17) accords with neither Ptolemy nor Aristoboulos. The murder of fifty Macedonian riders that he recounts has an aura of invention; in any event, Alexander's troops would have proceeded more cautiously at such a dangerous moment. Far more credible is his notice that Cyrus's city and the other frontier forts were destroyed, for Alexander's new Alexandria changed the system of defenses in the area, said to trace back to Cyrus and Semiramis (Justin. XII. 5 and Curt. VII. 6. 17).

31. ἐδίωξεν ἵππων πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατον σταδίους ὑπὸ διαρρόας ἐνοχλούμενος ([Plut.,] *De fort. Alex.* II. 9).

32. Curtius's account (VII. 7. 6 ff.) is quite different. The famous speech of the Scythian ambassadors hardly fits the historical context. Curtius (VII. 8. 11) introduces it very oddly: sic quae locutos esse apud regem memoriae proditum est, abhorrent forsitan moribus nostris . . . sed ut possit oratio eorum sperni, tamen fides nostra non debet; quare utcunque sunt tradita incorrupta perferemus. Elsewhere (VI. 11. 12) he says: Rex Cratero accersito et sermone habito cujus summa non edita est. Even the speeches, it seems, are not his composition.

33. Arr. IV. 5.

34. Only Curtius (VII. 9. 18) describes the impression made by these events: itaque Sacae misere legatos. Perhaps these are the Σάκαι Σκυθικὸν τοῦτο γένος τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐποικούντων Σκυθῶν οὐχ ὑπήκοοι who followed Bessos to Gaugamela κατὰ συμμαχίαν τὴν Δαρείου (Arr. III. 8. 3).

35. haud oppidanis consilium defectionis adprobantibus; sequi tamen videbantur quia prohibere non poterant (Curt. VII. 6. 24). Immediately thereafter we read: incolae novae urbi dati captivi, quos reddito pretio dominis liberavit, quorum posteri nunc quoque non apud eos tam longa aetate propter memoriam Alexandri exoleverunt. In Arrian, too, the repeated risings in Baktria and Sogdiana seem to have been the work of a handful of οἱ νεωτερίζειν ἐθέλοντες (IV. 18. 4, cf. IV. 1. 5), such as

Chorienes καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑπάρχων οὐκ ὀλίγοι (IV. 21. 1). Then as now, apparently, in the khanat of Bukhara the greater part of the population, peacefully engaged in agriculture and trade, lived under heavy oppression. The Tadjiks of Bukhara today, hardworking, cultivated, unwarlike, recount that they have inhabited the land since Iskander's time, that never has one of their own been prince, and that obedience is all they know (Meiendorf, p. 194).

36. The relevant passage in Arrian, ἐς τὰ βασίλεια τῆς Σογδιανῆς (IV. 5. 3), is generally considered corrupt. It is clear from subsequent events (Arr. IV. 5. 4) that Spitamenes withdrew toward the desert. Perhaps a second king's castle lay in this direction.

37. We see from Arrian (IV. 5. 7) that Karanos was hipparch of the 800 mercenary riders and that Andromachos was his superior officer, probably as strategos and perhaps accompanied by the 66 Macedonian cavalrymen (IV. 5. 5). Also according to Arrian (III. 28. 2), Karanos was τῶν ἐταίρων and perhaps the same Κοίρανος who led the allied riders at Gaugamela, where Andromachos Hieron's son led the mercenary riders. Menedemos, the only one Curtius mentions, probably led the infantry.

38. My account follows Ptolemy, where certain details are supplied by Aristoboulos. Curtius's account (VII. 7. 30) is at variance on essential points: Spitamenes and Katanes are first charged with suppressing the Sogdian insurrection (VII. 6. 14); the wood beside the river (ἐν παραδείσῳ) where Aristoboulos says Spitamenes laid an ambush becomes a *silvestre iter et saltus*, and these Scyths are called Dahae.

39. A distance of 1500 stades corresponds to Abulfeda's notice that Samarkand is seven days' journey from Khujand (*Geogr. min.*, III, p. 32, ed. Hudson) and even more precisely to the route indicated by Fraser, mentioned previously.

40. Arrian (IV. 6. 4) does not say where he fled; Curtius (VII. 9. 20) says: Bactra perfugerat. Clearly, this cannot be the usual Baktra on the way to India. If we consider the importance and the great beauty of the valley of the lower Sogd, where the Oxos crossing at Charjui and the road to Merv are the nearest connection to Iran, and consider that in Alexander's time no other place below Samarkand was noted for the "paradises" of Bukhara, then it seems reasonable to place this king's castle approximately there. The Tribactra of Cl. Ptolemy stands quite precisely in the

same area, a few miles northeast of the Sea of Oxiana, which is none other than the Karakul, and the points of orientation that Cl. Ptolemy cites for his Tribactra correspond to those cited by Abulfeda for Bukhara. From Bukhara, Spitamenes probably fled westward over the south arm of the Sogd (the Zarafshon), a few miles distant, for here begins the steppe in which the north arm (Wafhend) disappears.

41. ὥς Ἀλέξανδρος ἀποστάντας τοὺς Σογδιανούς κατεπολέμησε καὶ κατέσφαξεν αὐτῶν πλείους τῶν δώδεκα μυριάδων (Diod., *Epit.* XVII). In our text of Diodoros, book VII, a large lacuna begins after chapter 83, at the capture of Bessos, and extends over the next two years. Of this retribution Curtius (VII. 9. 22) says simply: *ut omnes qui defecerant pariter belli clade premerentur, copias dividet urique agros et interfici puberes jubet.*

42. Only Curtius (VII. 10. 10) mentions Peukolaos and his 3000 men.

43. ὥς Βακτριανούς ἐκόλασεν (Diod., *Epit.* XVII), a notice that may not even be reliable.

44. Strabo (XI, p. 514), following Eratosthenes, gives the route and the distances from Alexandria in Areia over Baktra to the Jaxartes and says there: εἴτ' εἰς Βάκτραν τὴν πόλιν ἣ καὶ Ζαρίασπα καλεῖται; then (p. 516) he names among the Baktrian cities: τὰ Βάκτρα ἥνπερ καὶ Ζαρίασπαν καλοῦσιν ἣν διαρρέει ὁμώνυμος ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων εἰς τὸν Ὠξον. Arrian, following Lagid Ptolemy, reports (III. 30. 5) that Bessos was taken away *ἐς Βάκτρα ἀποθανούμενος* and (IV. 7. 3) that he was brought before the assembled grandees at Zariaspa; this could be read to mean that Arrian is calling one and the same city by two names. But his account (IV. 16. 6) of the surprise attack at Zariaspa leaves no doubt that he, at least, uses these two names for two different cities, for αὐτοῦ ἐν Βάκτροις (IV. 16. 1) four strategoi remain with their phalanges, whereas in Zariaspa only the sick remain, with eighty riders for their protection. Ptolemy the geographer distinguishes a river Zariaspes from the Dargidos at Baktra and places the two cities under different latitudes. I still believe that Zariaspa should be placed somewhere in the vicinity of Andkhvoy (Andkhui), about fifteen miles west of Baktra. Andkhvoy is an ancient city, and General Ferrier, passing nearby in 1845, heard that it still numbered 15,000 inhabitants. It too may have once been called Baktra, just as present-day cities are called Balkh ab Fayin, Khan Balkh, Balkh ab Bala; cf. Tribactra in Ptolemy. Perhaps the city was called Βάκτρα ἢ καὶ Ζαρίασπα

to distinguish it from Baktra upon Dargidos. Polybios knows both names: Euthydemos, king of Baktria, having sent his main force into Tapuria, stands with 10,000 cavalry on the banks of the Areios, where he is attacked by Antiochos III and withdraws *εἰς πόλιν Ζαρίασπα τῆς Βακτριανῆς* (X. 49); after negotiations with Euthydemos, Antiochos marches *ὑπερβαλὼν τὸν Καύκασον . . . εἰς τὴν Ἰνδικήν* (XI. 34). Finally, in a series of cities taken (*καταλήψεις*)—Tarentum, Sardeis, Gaza, Carthage—he also names Βάκτρα, doubtless the one Antiochos took on that campaign (XXIX. 12. 8). For Polybios, therefore, Zariaspa and Baktra are two cities.

45. *ξύλλογον ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυναγαγών* (Arr. IV. 7. 3). Thus they had been convened at Zariaspa for another purpose, just as the assembly at Ecbatana where Bessos was to be executed (*ὥς ἐκεῖ ἐν Μήδων τε καὶ Πέρσων ξυλλόγῳ ἀποθανούμενον*) was not called together for that specific purpose. Arrian's expression, *κατηγορήσας τὴν Δαρείου προδοσίαν*, implies that the assembly pronounced a judgment. The punishment that the king ordered is the same as the one mentioned repeatedly in the inscription of Bisotun.

46. Arr. IV. 7, cf. Curt. VII. 5 and 10; Justin. XII. 5; Diod. XVII. 83; Plut., *Alex.* 43, etc.

47. Where ancient Chorasmia lay is indicated by the present-day region of that name. Arr. IV. 15; Curt. VIII. 1. 8. Pharasmanes's proposal, as reported by Arrian, and Alexander's reply that he did not want to enter Pontic country for now could be taken to confirm an assumption that Alexander conflated the European Tanais with the Jaxartes. For it is far from clear how he could use the help of the Chorasmians on the Aral Sea for a campaign on the Pontos or how Pharasmanes could claim to be a neighbor of the Kolchians. A conflation is more likely to be traceable to exaggerating Macedonians than to Alexander himself. The trusted aides who accompanied the European Scyths home must have returned with new information about the Aral Sea and the Caspian. It is possible that Pharasmanes had a seafaring connection with the Kur and Araxes regions opposite, which are ancient, as we know from old sources and recent research. It is notable that Arrian has Pharasmanes speak of the Amazons (*ἔφασκε*) without the usual formula, *εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ λέγουσιν*: implicitly, he found the story thus in Ptolemy or Aristoboulos.

48. That Alexander still adhered to this notion is demonstrated less

by the words that Arrian puts in his mouth (V. 26. 1) than by his sending Herakleides to the Caspian to build a fleet and explore *ποία τινὶ ξυμβάλλει θαλάσση*, etc. (VII. 16. 1).

49. ὅτι πολλοὺς τῶν Σογδιανῶν ἐς τὰ ἐρύματα ξυμπεφευγέναι οὐδὲ ἐθέλιν κατακούειν τοῦ σατράπου ὅστις αὐτοῖς ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐπετέτακτο (Arr. IV. 15. 7). It is very curious that Arrian cannot name the satrap.

50. Arr. IV. 7. 2. Arrian gives no numbers. Curtius (VII. 10. 11) reckons in the first column, led, he says, by Alexandros (he means Asandros), 3000 infantry and 500 riders; in the second, 3000 infantry and 1000 riders; in the third, 3000 infantry and 1000 riders; he also mentions 7400 Greek infantry and 600 mounted Greeks that Antipater had sent. The name Melamnidas in Arrian is probably Menidas, which Curtius gives. To be noted is Πτολεμαῖος ὁ τῶν Θρακῶν στρατηγός in Arrian. Sitalkes, earlier captain of the Thracian infantry, had stayed behind in Ecbatana; this Ptolemy, with Epokillos (Arr. III. 19. 6; IV. 7. 2), had accompanied a transport of money and discharged troops to the sea and across to Euboia (spring 330). Thus the march on to Macedonia and from there back to Zariaspa had taken about a year. As the crow flies, the distance from the Hellespont to Issos and from Issos over Baghdad to Balkh is about 400 miles.

51. αὐτοῦ ἐν Βάκτροις ὑπολειπόμενος . . . τήν τε χώραν ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν (Arr. IV. 16. 1). Baktra is the city, not the land, which Arrian calls Βακτριανή (IV. 16. 4). Why αὐτοῦ cannot designate Baktra and Zariaspa considered one and the same is discussed earlier.

52. Strabo (XI, p. 517) says that Alexander built eight cities in Sogdiana and Baktriana; Justin (XII. 5) says twelve. The six cities cheek-by-jowl that Curtius (VII. 10. 15) says he founded in Margiana (var. Margania) could be placed unhesitatingly at Merv Shahijan, lower Merv, if Arrian could be thought simply to have forgotten this expedition southward from Zariaspa, so distracted was he by the long episode that he relates there (IV. 7. 3-15. 7). The relevant passage in Curtius (VII. 10. 13-16) is so tangled that nothing can be made of it. When we consider the importance of the fertile Margiana on the edge of the desert (and what forces rose there against Dareios, as recorded in the inscription of Bisotun), it seems inconceivable that Alexander did not found a city there to control the area. The

ancient world knew of such an Alexandria, which was destroyed by barbarians and refounded by Antiochos I (Plin. VI. 16). Of course, Alexander did not have to be present personally to found such a city.

53. σεμνοὶ δ' ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἤμενοι κατὰ πτόλιν φρονούσι δήμου μείζον, ὄντες οὐδένες (Eurip., *Androm.*, 687).

54. Arrian's description (IV. 16. 6), ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλικῆς θεραπείας τῆς ἐν Ζαριάσποις τεταγμένος, seems to make him simply chief of hospital services.

55. Arrian does not say where Krateros was standing; in Sogdian matters in general, he leaves many things unclear. Perhaps Krateros had command of the four regiments that remained ἐν Βάκτροις (IV. 16. 1). That would explain his availability for pursuit; οἱ ἀμφὶ Κράτερον come into the next winter camp (328-27) at Nautaka, north of the Oxos.

56. καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι μετὰ Ἀμύντου ἐτάχθησαν (Arr. IV. 17. 3). This Amyntas, Nikolaos's son, has not appeared before in Arrian; he might be the same as another just mentioned: τοῦ σατράπου ὅστις αὐτοῖς ἐπετέτακτο (IV. 15. 7). However, Koinos, who succeeds this Amyntas, is not called satrap. Perhaps Amyntas was appointed to replace Peukolaos, whose military command had been less than brilliant.

57. in regionem Bactrianam misit commeatum in hiemen paraturum (Curt. VIII. 2. 13).

58. Only Curtius (VIII. 2. 14) mentions this campaign. His saying merely, *Scythia confinis est regio*, allows no exact location, which one would otherwise be inclined to place closer to Baktria, perhaps in the mountains northeast of Kesh.

59. On this expedition, too, Arrian is silent. Curtius (VIII. 2. 14; cf. Strab. XI, p. 517) relates details about it that Arrian attributes to other occasions (IV. 21). The name of the area where the castle stands is uncertain in the Curtius manuscripts: Nausi, Nauram, Nauta. "Nautaca" is the form that has arrived in print. The summary to supply the lacuna in Diodoros (XVII. 83) reads: στρατεία τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς τοὺς καλουμένους Ναύτακας καὶ φθορὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς χιόνος. I once assumed—rashly, I now believe—that this was the name in Curtius for the Naura mountains and the little town of the same name, mentioned by the Arab authors (*Geogr. min.*, III, p. 31, ed. Hudson).

60. ἐς Βαγὰς χωρίον τῆς Σογδιανῆς ὄχυρόν ἐν μεθορίῳ τῆς τε Σογδιανῶν γῆς καὶ τῆς Μασσαγετῶν (Arr. IV. 17. 4).

61. Curtius's version of these events is more inventive: it is Spitamenes's wife who cuts off his head and brings it personally to Alexander.

62. τὴν στρατιάν τὴν ἐκ Μαδεδονίας αὐτῷ ἀνάξοντας (Arr. IV. 18. 3). The definite article implies that these were regular replacements.

63. ἄμα τῷ ἡρι ἀποφαινομένῳ (Arr. IV. 18. 4), thus about the beginning of March.

64. Curtius (VII. 11. 1) says the stronghold belonged to Sogdian Arimazes, Polyaeus (IV. 3. 29) that it belonged to Ariomazes and stood in Sogdian country. Strabo (XI, p. 517) is probably describing the same one when he says: καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ Σογδιάνῃ καὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὀξοῦ, οἱ δὲ Ἀριαμάζου φασί. "Ὀξοῦ" may be an attempt to correct Ὀξου, a corruption of Ὀξινάρτου. No other indications of place are to be found in Arrian. Quite certainly, the fort was not situated between Balkh and Merv, as has been asserted. Our sole indications are that Strabo puts Sisimithres's fort in Baktrian country and Curtius puts Arimazes's fort in Sogdian country. If we assume that the frontier between Sogdiana and Baktria is formed by the westward and southward spurs of the snow-covered peaks of Hisor tizmasi (Hazreti Sultan) and Kalai Shiraya, where the streams run westward to the river of Karshi and southward to the Oxos—a strong natural frontier indeed—we find in the regions east and west of the Iron Gate a multitude of possible sites for these ancient mountain fastnesses, as Majev's reports now indicate: on the Baktrian side, in particular, Derbent and Boysun.

65. In an earlier essay, "Alexanders Züge in Turan," (*Rhein. Mus.*, 1833), I attempted to show that Paraitakene could be the region Vakhsh and that Chorienes's rock might possibly be the "fastness," that is, Hisor. Majev's expedition has produced more precise information about this Hisor, also called Happy Hisor (Hisor Shadman) or Upper Hisor (Hisor Bala) to distinguish it from Lower Hisor (Hisor Payan), another name for Regar, to the west. The extracts published by R. Kiepert describe the mountain cascades, cliffside cirques, and crevasses that mark the adjacent area, which extends to the Vakhsh and to the steps hewn into rock at the rapids, to lead to the "bridge of rock," Puli Sengi.

66. καὶ ὕπαρχον εἶναι ὅσων περ καὶ πρόσθεν (Arr. IV. 21. 9), which tells us the meaning of καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑπάρχων οὐκ ὀλίγοι (IV. 21. 1). If Alexander went from Chorienes's rock to Baktra, this would seem to indicate

that the rock did not lie east of Hisor and that Alexander did not descend along the river of Hisor (for then he would have set out for India from Kholm), but rather that he came down along the valley of the Surkhon and crossed the Oxos at the “old fortress Termiz,” as Cherffeddin calls it, toward Balkh (ἐς Βάκτρα: Arr. IV. 22. 1). That is where Krateros’s column joined him (IV. 22. 2); the army starts ἐκ Βάκτρων for India (IV. 22. 3). Nota bene: At Alexander’s entry into Baktrian country and at the conclusion of these campaigns, Arrian names only τὰ Βάκτρα and elsewhere (IV. 1. 5; 7. 1; 16. 6) only Ζαρίασπα.

67. Arr. IV. 22. 1. We do not know how far Alexander’s troops penetrated into the interior of the land. Marco Polo, Baber, and others report that the princes of Badakhshan and Darvaza boasted of their descent from Sekander Filkûs (Alexander Philip’s son). The curious tramper Wolff heard the same boast by the princes of Little Kashgar (*Asiat. Journ.*, 1833, May, app., p. 15).

68. The passage in Dexippos reads: τὴν δὲ Σογδιανῶν βασιλείαν Ὀρώπιος εἶχεν οὐ πάτριον ἔχων ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ δόντος αὐτοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου · ἐπεὶ δὲ τύχη τις αὐτῷ συνέπεσεν ἐπαναστάσεως αἰτίαν φεύγοντι παραλυθῆναι τῆς ἀρχῆς, etc. For details, see *Hermes*, 11, p. 463.

69. After describing the bountiful provisions Chorienes gave the army from the stores of his stronghold, Arrian continues: ἐνθεν ἐν τιμῇ μᾶλλον τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἦν ὥς οὐ πρὸς βίαν μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ γνώμην ἐνδοῦς τὴν πέτραν (IV. 21. 10).

70. imperium Sisimithri restituit spe majoris etiam provinciae facta si cum fide amicitiam ejus coluisset (Curt. VIII. 2. 32).

71. Diodoros counts to ἀπόστασις τρίτη Σογδιάνων (*Epit.* XVII). Curtius’s *defectio altera* (VIII. 2. 18) shows how much more freely his Greek model used Kleitarchos than did Diodoros.

72. According to Curtius at least (VIII. 4. 21), the marriage took place before Alexander’s return to Baktra. “Cohortanus” is a corruption of “Oxyartes”; it cannot be defended by appealing to Wesseling’s conjectural ἐν Χορτάνου for ἐν τίνι χώρῳ or χρόνῳ, as the manuscripts for Plutarch (*Alex.* 47) seem to read—an observation already made by Zumpt. When thirty daughters of noble families were brought before a state banquet, none more beautiful than Roxane, Curtius writes, Alexander, smitten, responded: ita effusus est ut diceret, ad stabiliendum regnum pertinere

Persas et Makedones connubio jungi, hoc uno modo et pudorem victis et superbiam victoribus detrahi posse (VIII. 4. 25). The Diodoros summary is less brilliant but probably closer to the facts of Kleitarchos's representation: ὥς Ἀλέξανδρος . . . ἔγημεν αὐτὴν καὶ τῶν φίλων πολλοὺς ἔπεισε γῆμαι τὰς τῶν ἐπισήμων βαρβάρων θυγατέρας.

73. Callisth., fr. 36. The offer by Thasos to Agesilaos is reported by Plutarch (*Apophth. Lacon.*: Agesil. 25).

74. Alexander, enraged at Hephaistion, who had quarreled with Krateros, is supposed to have said: "The moment you are deprived of Alexander, you are nothing" (Plut., *Alex.* 47).

75. This is Plutarch's account (*Alex.* 54); his authority is Hermippos, who claimed that Stroiobos, Kallisthenes's secretary, had reported the story to Aristotle. According to Plutarch, Aristotle said that Kallisthenes was a master of oratory but did not have good sense: ὅτι λόγῳ μὲν ἦν δύνάτος καὶ μέγας, νοῦν δ' οὐκ ἔχει.

76. Thus the account of Chares of Mytilene, the king's εἰσαγγελεύς, that is to say, roughly, grand chamberlain. The sources do not permit us to reconstruct what really happened. The most vivid and least credible account is by Curtius (VIII. 5), who has Alexander hide behind a tapestry to listen to Kleon (not Anaxarchos) in conversation with Kallisthenes.

77. These notices are taken partly from Arrian (IV. 12), partly from Plutarch. Cf. Müller, *Script. de rebus Alex.*, p. 2 ff. One measure of the confusion and the falsification in the tradition of this story is that Lysimachos, here an adversary of Kallisthenes, is said by Justin (XV. 3) to have been so loyal an adherent that Alexander had him thrown to the lions—a tale that Curtius treats as it deserves (VIII. 1. 17).

78. haec cohors velut seminarium ducum praefectorumque apud Macedones fuit, hinc habuere posteri reges, etc. (Curt. VIII. 6. 5).

79. Arr. IV. 18. 3. Curtius (VIII. 7. 2) represents him as present in camp, for it is virtually certain that Hermolaos's father was none other than the sometime captain of the squadron from Amphipolis and now one of the hipparchs of the cavalry.

80. Φιλώταν τοῦ Κάρσιδος τοῦ Θρακός (Arr. IV. 13. 4). Did he belong to the princely house of Thrace? Curtius (VIII. 6. 7) gives only the name Philotas. It may be this Philotas who is meant, not Parmenion's son, when

Arrian notes: Some reported of Kallisthenes that he had reminded Philotas of the honor in which tyrannicides were held in Athens (IV. 10. 4).

81. According to Curtius (VIII. 6. 20), Epimenes tells his brother Eurylochos, who is supposed to tell the king. He leaves out Charikles Menandros's son. Kleitarchos probably mentioned him, for Plutarch (*Alex.* 57) relates that Menandros, one of the companions, not wanting to remain at his appointed post (ἄρχοντα φρουρίου καταστήσας), was cut down by the king. But Plutarch does not say that he has the story from Kleitarchos.

82. The king's letter to Krateros, Attalos, and Alketas, who were away on the campaign into Paraitakene (Arr. IV. 22. 1), reads: τοὺς παῖδας βασανιζομένους ὁμολογεῖν ὡς αὐτοὶ ταῦτα πράξειαν, ἄλλος δ' οὐδεὶς συνειδείη. But Aristobulos and Ptolemy (Plut., *Alex.* 55) attest that the pages claimed to have been encouraged (ἐπάραι) by Kallisthenes. According to Strabo (XI, p. 517), Kallisthenes was arrested in Kariatai in Baktria.

83. The defense, which Arrian (IV. 14. 2) says was pronounced by Hermolaos, "after certain others," appears in Curtius and therefore seems to come from Kleitarchos.

Book Three, Chapter 3

1. This is the conclusion drawn by C. Ritter ("Über Alexanders Zug am Kaukasos," *Abhandl. der Berl. Akad.*, 1829) from the name Choaspes and others of these regions.

2. Thus Diodoros at the beginning of his second book, whose content, according to Jacoby (*Rhein. Mus.*, N. F. 30, p. 555 ff.) is not drawn from Ktesias but rather excerpted from Kleitarchos.

3. Herod. III. 94. 105 and IV. 144. Spiegel, I, p. 221. It is notable that the scholiast of Scylax, *Peripl.* explicitly states: τὸ μήτε Ἀλέξανδρον εἶδέναι τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλέα μήτε τινὰ τῶν ὀλίγων ἔμπροσθεν ἐκείνου χρόνου (C. Müller, *Geogr. min.*, XXXIII).

4. Diod. XVII. 86. In Arrian (IV. 22. 6), Alexander's instructions to this prince are implicitly the result of prior negotiation.

5. Arr. IV. 30. 4. Arrian's formulation, ἡὐτομολῇκει ἐς Βάκτρα παρὰ Βῆσσον, implies that the realm of Sisikottos lay in the part of India, north of the Kopphen, that belonged to the Baktrian satrapy. Curtius's source must have been referring to him when Bessos promises the conspirators, *venturos . . . et Indos* (VII. 4. 6).

6. Implied by *καταλέξαι* in Arrian (I. 24. 2): ἡ στρατιὰ καταλεχθεῖσα (I. 29. 4).

7. Arrian's summary fashion of reporting reinforcements added to the army after 333 defeats any attempt to calculate their numbers. Kleitarchos's figures as found in Diodoros and Curtius are clearer but unreliable: In Susa, the army received 13,500 infantry and 2100 riders; in Media, 5000 infantry and 1000 riders; in Drangiana, 5600 infantry and 930 riders; in Baktria, 17,000 infantry and 2600 riders, for a grand total of 41,100 infantry and 6630 riders.

8. Arrian gives these figures (IV. 22. 3).

9. Arrian mentions riders from Arachosia and the Paropamisos (V. 11. 3), then Baktrian, Sogdian, and Scythian riders and Dahaeon horse archers (V. 12. 2). Curtius's figure of 30,000 (VIII. 5. 1) is probably a confusion caused by the levy of boys recruited to the army in 324 (Arr. VII. 6. 3).

10. Arr., *Ind.* 18.

11. ἤδη γὰρ καὶ δώδεκα μυριάδες αὐτῷ μάχιμοι εἶποντο σὺν οἷς ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τε αὐτὸς ἀνήγαγε καὶ αἷθις οἱ ἐπὶ συλλογὴν αὐτῷ στρατιῆς

πεμφθέντες ἦκον ἔχοντες, παντοῖα ἔθνεα βαρβαρικά ἅμα οἱ ἄγοντα καὶ πᾶσαν ἰδέην ὥπλισμένα (Arr., *Ind.* 19). Curtius (VIII. 5. 4) also gives 120,000 at the opening of the Indian campaign. Plutarch (*Alex.* 64) gives 120,000 infantry and 15,000 riders at the outset of the Indus voyage.

12. In the first operations of the campaign Arrian (IV. 22 ff.) mentions ten phalanges by name: Gorgias, Kleitos, Meleagros, Koinos, Attalos, Balakros, Philip, Philotas, Polyperchon, and Alketas. Half the cavalry (οἱ ἡμισεῖς) was under Hephaistion and Perdikkas, the other half with Alexander (IV. 23. 1); then we learn that the king had with him: τῶν ἱππέων τὸ ἄγημα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐταίρων ἐς τέσσαρας μάλιστα ἱππαρχίας (IV. 24. 1). Therefore the cavalry must have been composed of eight hipparchies plus the agema.

13. Arrian (IV. 22) says, "in ten days"; Strabo (XVII, p. 697) says, "by other, shorter ways." We do not know whether this was by way of the pass of Kipchak or of Bazarak or of another.

14. This Nikanor was neither Nikanor of Stageira, who announced the recall of exiles at the Olympian games of 324 (Harpocrat., s.v.; Dinarch. I, par. 81) nor Parmenion's relative, but probably father of the Balakros who was governor in Kilikia at the time.

15. That the river Kabul was designated the frontier of the satrapy (ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸν Κωφῆν ποταμόν: Arr. IV. 22. 5) implies that the land south of the river was attached to the satrapy "this side of the Indus" or, more likely, to Arachosia.

16. In the appendix on Alexander's foundations, I observed that Nikaia was not the old provincial capital Kabura (or Ortospaña). Lassen (II, p. 125) agrees. If Alexander ever saw Kabura (Kabul), it must have been on the march from Arachosia to the Paropamisos at the beginning of 329. If Bagram were not situated too close to Alexandria, one would place Nikaia there.

17. Of the four routes from Kabul to the Indus (see Baber, p. 140), only that of Lamghanat leads along the Kabul river to its confluence with the Indus, whether one proceeds by the Khyber pass on the south bank (Elphinstone, *Kabul*, II, p. 697, transl. Rühls) or by the far more difficult Karrapa pass on the north bank (Elphinstone, II, p. 51). Strabo (XV, p. 697) says that Alexander had learned that the area to the north and in the mountains was productive and well populated, whereas the area to the

south, where not arid, was burning hot and more suited to beasts than to man. For these reasons and to reach the streams closer to their source, where they were easier to cross, he went northward.

18. τῶν πεζεταίρων καλουμένων τὰς τάξεις (Arr. IV. 23. 1). This formulation should not be taken to mean that the regiments Meleagros, Kleitos, and Gorgias were not *πεζέταιροι*. The number of foot companions at this time is unknown.

19. Arrian (IV. 23. 2) says “Choes” (Χόης); Strabo (XV, p. 697) and Aristotle (*Meteor.* I. 350a. 24) say “Choaspes.”

20. On the same *Açvaka*, in more precise translation, Ἰππάσιοι, and adapted phonetically, Ἀσσακῆνοι, see Lassen, II, p. 129. Arrian (IV. 23. 1) uses these names for distinct tribes—ἐς τὴν Ἀσπασίων καὶ Γουραίων χώραν καὶ Ἀσσακῆνων—a practice in which I follow him.

21. Arrian (IV. 23) says πόλις ὠκισμένη and does not name the city.

22. This is the road by which an agent of Major Montgommery went from Jalalabad up the valley of Chitral and along the southern rim of the Pamir plateau to Yarkand in 1861.

23. On the situation of Andaka and Arigaion and on the Guraios (Panjkora), which joins the Suastos (Swat), see Lassen, II, p. 131 and Cunningham, *Anc. Geogr.*, I, p. 82.

24. Arrian (IV. 24. 1) writes: ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Εὐάσπλα; ms. A of C. Müller (Colbertinus) reads: τὸν Εὐασπόλεως, ms. B reads: Εὐασπόλεως. If there was no name of a city here, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, with no name to follow, indicates a lacuna. Lassen (II, p. 130) identifies the Euaspla as the eastern tributary that flows into the Konar at Guyur.

25. Lassen (II, p. 131) has demonstrated that the city called Gorydala, or Gorys in a corrupted passage of Strabo (XV, p. 697), lay, not in the high mountains, as I once assumed, but rather near the confluence of Guraios and Kopphen. Ritter places Arigaion at Bajor, on the river of that name; I believe it lay on the Gaurios (Panjkora), and Lassen (II, p. 213) agrees.

26. Arr. IV. 25. To this day, the fields there are worked with oxen (Lassen, II, p. 131).

27. Arr. V. 1 ff.; *Ind.* 2; Curt. VIII. 10. 13; Justin. XII. 7; Strab. XV, p. 687. After the well-known work of Colonel Tod, Bohlen, Ritter, et al. (cf. Lassen, I, p. 518; II, p. 135), I find it unnecessary to say more about

these tales than is appropriate to the sequence of events here. That Alexander was glad to see such beliefs spread among his men was no mere vanity of competing with the triumphs of Dionysos. The populations of the entire area have shifted subsequently and ethnographic boundaries can no longer be reconstructed. Perhaps the Nysai, who Arrian says were not Indic (*Ind.* 2), can be traced to the indigenous Kafirs. In any event, everything that the British mission in Kabul could discover about this people (Elphinstone, II, p. 321) chimes with Curtius's and Arrian's (V. 1) descriptions. Even today these tribes lead a Dionysiac life. Their pipes and tambourines, their banquets and torchlight processions, their European climate and European landscape could indeed create the impression among Alexander's staff that the legend of Dionysos was plausible and applicable in these regions. The memory of Alexander among these peoples, from whose Macedonians they claim descent, is, if not accurate, at least remarkable.

28. Arr. IV. 26. 27. Massaga can no longer be located precisely. Cunningham (*Geogr.*, I, p. 82) places it at Mingaora or Minglora on the Swat. About Daedala and Acadira, which Curtius mentions between Nysa and Massaga, nothing can be said except that Curtius is in error when he has the army cross the Choaspes between these two and Massaga.

29. The source for Curtius (VIII. 10. 22) and Justin (XII. 7) lets this attack end in a love affair between Alexander and the queen mother, *nuper Assacano cujus regnum fuerat defuncto*. He taxes his reader's willingness to suspend disbelief when he reports that the charms of the lady vanquished the victor and that she bore him a son whom she called Alexandros. The queen is mentioned after the lacuna in Diodoros, where she admires Alexander's magnanimity (XVII. 83–84). After a smaller lacuna comes an account in which one recognizes the battle of Massaga as recounted by Arrian (XVII. 84). The claim that Alexander's portable tower threw the Indians into a panic is the more preposterous since these authors themselves report far more astonishing things as native to India.

30. The situation of these two cities can be gathered from their direction: Ora lay toward Abisares's territory in Kashmir, and Bazira not far from Aornos and the mouth of the Kophen.

31. Absares's legations to Alexander show him to be prince of Kashmir; furthermore, his alliances against Alexander, with Poros on the one hand

and with the tribes west of the Indus on the other, were possible only from Kashmir; finally, Wilson has shown that the ancient annals of Kashmir call the southern part of the country Abhisâram (Lassen, *Penta potam.*, p. 18; *Ind. Alterth.*, II, p. 138). Abisares did not come personally to the aid of Ora; he prompted the mountain Indians nearby to move out.

32. Πευκελαῶτις (Arr. IV. 28. 6) is Pushkalavati on the Swat below its junction with the Guraios (Panjkora) and about two hours above the junction with the Kophen. The river is called Astes (Arr. IV. 22. 8), probably after the Ἀστακῆνοι (Arr., *Ind.* I. 1).

33. Cunningham places Embolima at Ambar-Ohind.

34. Nothing specific is known about the whereabouts of these two places. The Macedonians called the fort they had taken Orabatis; in conjunction with a situation probably on the south side of the Kophen, the name would seem to indicate the passes over which the road runs shortly before it reaches the Indus (see Elphinstone, I, p. 117). I cannot place Astes's stronghold precisely, unless it is the mountain fastness Timrud or rather Jamrud (Baber, p. 127), northeast of Peshawar at the eastern entrance to the Khyber pass (see Forster, II, p. 53).

35. These are: Akuphis in Nysa; Sangaios south of the Kophen; Kophaïos and Assagetes, hyparch of the Assakenoi, whom Arrian mentions (IV. 28. 6), and all who came to Nikaia; Taxiles too seems to have received some territory to the west of the Indus. All these princes were bound by military fealty. As satrap of the Indian satrapy Arrian names the same Nikanor who had been appointed strategos on the Paropamisos. This may be an error; later, in any event, only Philip is named. His calling the satrap of the Assakenoi (V. 20. 10) Σισίλου, as one ms. renders it, or Σισίκου, as another has it, seems also to be an error. Σισικόττου in the editions is a conjecture based on IV. 30. 4.

36. Cunningham recognized in 1848 that this Aornos is the fort Rani-Gat (King's Rock), an identification that he later established (*Anc. Geogr.*, I, p. 59; *Survey*, II, p. 107). He describes the knob as two English miles long and one-half mile wide and its height as 1200 feet above the plain. He considers the name Aornos to be a Greek rendering of the local name Varni (Οὔαρνοι), which is the origin also of Baktrian Aornos. Strabo (XV, p. 688) places the fort on a πέτρα ἧς τὰς ρίζας ὁ Ἰνδὸς ὑπορρέει πλῆσιον τῶν πηγῶν. Curtius (VIII. 11. 7) says: radices ejus Indus amnis subit;

Diodoros (XVII. 85) specifies: καὶ τὸ μὲν πρὸς μεσημβρίαν μέρος αὐτῆς προσέκλυζεν ὁ Ἰνδός. Strabo therefore has drawn on Kleitarchos.

37. Here, said the Macedonians, the conquests of Herakles came to an end. Even Arrian (IV. 30. 4) says: ἡ πέτρα ἢ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἄπορος γενομένη; he comments on the legend at V. 3. The authors in the Kleitarchan tradition (to which the passage at Diod. I. 19 also belongs) maintain that Alexander's sole ambition was to exceed Herakles. He had long since exceeded Herakles, and by some distance.

38. The table of mount Rani-Gat has a surface 1200 feet long and 800 feet wide. To north, west, and south, the edge slopes a bit toward the middle, and the center rises to form a mound 500 feet long and 400 feet wide, on which lie the ruins of an ancient fort. To north and west, the incline between the edge and the fort is about 200 feet wide and 100 to 150 feet deep and resembles a moat; it is less wide and deep toward the south side, where the road comes up. The east side, which is connected by a flat ridge to a distant mountain chain, rises steeply to the fort.

39. This becomes ἰσόπεδον in Arrian (IV. 30. 1). It is odd to learn (IV. 29. 7) that *μηχαναί* are at hand to throw missiles at the walls.

40. Arr. IV. 30. Divergent notices in Diodoros and Curtius refute one another. This may be the relevant undertaking for Chares's remark (fr. 11, ap. Athen., III, p. 127 c) that Alexander, besieging Petra in India, gave orders that snow be saved. Cunningham (*Survey*, V, 1875, p. 55) adds details on Rani-Gat: that from the summit one can see Hashtnagar on the Swat to the west and that Dr. Bellew, who visited the fort repeatedly, drew attention to the precision with which the massive stone and timber pieces had been hewn and mortised: "There are the same pointed arches and underground passages, the same sort of quadrilaterals with chambers, the statuary and sculptures also represent the same figures and scenes in the same material, but the general aspect of these ruins is very different from that of others, the neatness and accuracy of the architecture is wonderful." Thus does Aornos distinguish itself from the other fortresses of the region Yusufzal; Cunningham mentions Jamal-Garhi and Sahri-Balol, where acanthus capitals and the profiles of the pedestals clearly show Hellenic influence.

41. Curtius calls this prince Eryx, in Diodoros he is Aphrikes; the story itself tells us that in either case this is Arrian's "brother of Assakenos."

42. According to Court (*Journ. of the As. Soc. of B.*, 8, p. 309), Dyrta is probably Dir on a tributary of the Tal. Cf. Lassen, II, p. 141.

43. I omit Curtius's notice of sixteen days to the Indus (VIII. 12. 4), because it merely confuses matters. In no event can we use his sixteen days to determine how far Embolima and Aornos lay from the mouth of the Kophen, as has been attempted. The bridge over the Indus, which Arrian (V. 7) suspects was a pontoon bridge, was probably laid between Embolima and the mouth of the Kophen.

44. διατριψάντων κατὰ τὴν ὀρεινὴν ἔν τε τῇ Ἰππασίων καὶ Ἀσσακανοῦ [*vulg.* Μουσικανοῦ] γῇ τὸν χειμῶνα, τοῦ δὲ ἔαρος ἀρχομένου καταβεβηκότων, etc. (Aristobul., fr. 29).

45. Aristobul., fr. 34 a; Arr. VII. 3.

46. I shall not repeat my earlier note on Taxila (Takshaçila), as Cunningham (*Geogr.*, I, p. 104 and *Survey*, II, p. 111 ff.) has now shown persuasively that it was situated where ruins now lie on a field between Shah-Deri and the river Haro. Curtius calls the prince Omphis, Diodoros calls him Mophis. (Tod, *Radjastan*, II, p. 228, conjectures that Ophis, or snake, is a Greek translation of Tak.) They add some minor details: He had advised his father to combine with Alexander, and when his father died, he assumed the princely title of Taxila only with Alexander's permission. Arrian (V. 8. 2, etc.) describes the prince as ὑπαρχος τῆς πόλεως.

47. Curtius (VIII. 12. 17), Plutarch (*Alex.* 59), and Strabo (XV, p. 698) write that Alexander sent Taxiles more than 1000 talents, among other things, that Alexander's strategoi grumbled at the gift, and that Meleagros observed that the king had to come all the way to India to find someone worthy of such bounty. Curtius would have it that only the painful memory of Kleitos restrained the king from another such act of retribution.

48. Arrian (V. 8. 3) calls him νομάρχης, a title that he gives Indian princes who furnished contingents of 5000 troops (V. 11. 3).

49. My account reconciles the various notices on Philip's satrapy. Arrian (IV. 2. 5), adopting Alexander's position on the Hydaspes, calls Philip satrap of the far side of the Indus, that is to say, of the land toward Baktria; in a subsequent passage (IV. 14. 6), the land of the Malloi is added to his province. Arrian writes too generally at *Ind.* 18 to permit a conclusion about the extent of the satrapy of Upper India. This

Philip, Machatas's son, was of the princely house of Elymiotis, brother of Harpalos, and nephew of the older Harpalos, whose son Kalas was satrap of Little Phrygia. The succession of families in this princely house places this Philip's birth about 385.

50. Only Polyaeos (IV. 3. 26) says that Alexander had elephants in his army. Curtius recounts, at variance with what he says elsewhere (VI. 6. 36), that on this march the Indian prince Gamaxus and Barsaentes, ex-satrap of Arachosia, who had fled to him, were brought before Alexander in chains and that Alexander gave this prince's thirty elephants to Prince Taxiles. Arrian (III. 25. 14) reports that Barsaentes fled to India—ἐς Ἰνδοὺς τοὺς ἐπὶ τᾷδε τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ—was handed over by the Indians, and was executed for his part in the murder of Dareios. From the way he tells the story, one gathers that Barsaentes was executed in the winter 330–29.

51. Polyaeos. IV. 3. 21. The defile may be that described by Elphinstone (I, p. 129) and the same gorge of Hambatu traversed by Baber, in whose *Memoirs* (p. 255) one generally recognizes the road that Alexander took.

52. Curt. VIII. 13. 8. The river was not yet in full flood, which it reaches in August. Macartney found it 3000 paces wide as early as July. See Elphinstone, I, p. 551.

53. Arrian's remark in passing (V. 20. 5) that Abisares had intended to join Poros before the battle (αὐτὸς σὺν Πώρῳ τάττεσθαι) is noted in the run-up to the battle by both Diodoros and Curtius, in each instance in a different aspect. Diodoros (XV. 87) writes that Alexander decided on battle when he heard that Embisares was coming to join Poros and was only 400 stades out; Curtius (VIII. 14. 1) writes that Poros, having learned that troops had crossed the river: primo humani ingenii vitio spei suae indulgens Abisaren belli socium (et ita convenerat) adventare credebatur. Here, too, the authors seem to be drawing on different sources; in Curtius we see a reworked version of Kleitarchos.

54. For the location, see Elphinstone, I, p. 132. In Cunningham's sketch of the area (*Geogr.*, I, p. 158), the bend in the river is less abrupt. There also the hills extend to the left bank of the river and run northeastward, but at a height of no more than 500 feet above the stream. In Tamerlane's time the fortress Chehad-Eddin stood on the wooded isle Jamad (cf. Chereffeddin, IV. 10, p. 49). Baber (*Mem.*, p. 257) describes the stream

that runs down north of the mountains and south of the city Behreh. According to Pseudo-Plutarch (*De fluv.*, 1), the Macedonians seem to have called these hills the Elephant Mountains. Let us recall Plutarch's story of the nest of snakes and the sacrifices, which, related to the Ophite cult of Kashmir, may have ethnographic significance.

55. A lacuna here in Arrian's text (V. 11. 4) begins with the words ἡ δὲ ἄλλη στρατιά C. Müller's critical commentary does not indicate whether *μενέτω* or *εὐπόρος* is to be found in a manuscript or is conjecture. Other things are missing. Three of the phalanges operating during the previous autumn (Balakros, Philip, and Philotas) have disappeared from the text. In no event can so many of the most important troops have been dispersed to garrisons. The Philip whom Arrian mentions with his regiment (IV. 24. 10) may be Machatas's son and, as satrap, may have remained with his regiment on the Indus, but the regiments Philotas and Balakros are still unaccounted for, and Arrian (IV. 24. 10) shows that any doubt whether Balakros had a regiment is baseless. The phalanges of Gorgias, Attalos, and Meleagros, at least, must have been mentioned in the lacuna, to the effect that these three, with the mercenary infantry and riders, were used to maintain contact between Alexander and Krateros when Alexander moved out, with orders to support Alexander's operations or Krateros's, as circumstances required.

56. Arrian's text says that these three phalanx commanders were stationed here with the mercenary infantry and riders; the context tells us that their three phalanges moved out first.

57. This is an inference from a subsequent notice (Arr. V. 14. 1) that the infantry battle line was composed of almost 6000 men and from Arrian's mentioning the shieldbearers in the crossing, but not the two phalanges (V. 13. 1). Nor does Arrian mention Hephaistion among the ranking officers who crossed with Alexander. Hephaistion therefore seems to have remained behind in command of the two phalanges. Curtius (VIII. 14. 15) has him cross the Hydaspes, but this proves nothing.

58. These must be the βασιλικοὶ παῖδες, since the ἄγῃμα and the other shieldbearers are mentioned as led up beside them (Arr. V. 13. 4).

59. My account follows Ptolemy, whose notice the prudent, circumspect tactician Arrian accepts as correct (cf. Plut., *Alex.* 68). Aristoboulos recounts that the prince began pelting the Macedonians while they

were still crossing the last ford but did not dare attack them immediately; others describe lively combat right away. These notices are demonstrably false, since the prince would have needed four hours to reach the ford from his father's camp. If Alexander began crossing about four o'clock in the morning, the cavalry engagement must have begun about ten or eleven o'clock. Aristoboulos says that the corps detached under the prince numbered 1000 horse and 60 chariots; Plutarch says that Alexander mentioned just such a number in his letters. My numbers are according to Ptolemy and confirmed by Arrian in judicious argument.

60. Arrian's explicit notice of the distances (a plethron: V. 15. 5) must of course take precedence over Curtius, Diodoros, and Polyaeos, who all speak of fifty feet. Curtius describes how the war chariots were manned—I do not know with what degree of accuracy.

61. Κοῖνον δὲ πέμπει ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ δέξιον, etc. (Arr. V. 16. 3), that is to say, as Köchly and Rüstow (p. 302) establish, Alexander's right wing (cf. Arr. V. 17. 1). Plutarch (*Alex.* 60), using a letter by Alexander, reaches the opposite conclusion: αὐτὸς μὲν ἐνσεῖσαι κατὰ θάτερον κέρας, Κοῖνον δὲ τῷ δεξιῷ προσβαλεῖν κελεύσαι. Curtius (VIII. 14. 15) frames Alexander's instructions to Koinos accordingly: cum ego . . . in laevum cornu inpetum fecero . . . ipse dextrum move et turbatis signum infer; but then he writes: Coenus ingenti vi in laevum invehitur (VIII. 14. 17).

62. Arrian makes no further mention of the war chariots at the tip of the Indians' left wing.

63. οἱ Ἰνδοὶ τοὺς ἱππέας πάντοθεν ξυναλίσσαντες παρίππευον Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀντιπαρεξάγοντες τῇ ἐλάσει (Arr. V. 17. 1). He doubtless means only the riders of the left wing, because those on the right were too far away to arrive so quickly.

64. According to Arrian (V. 18. 2), the number of Macedonian dead was ca. 80 infantry, 20 Macedonian riders, 10 Dahaeans, and 200 other riders—no understatement, when we consider that combat so fierce probably produced ten times as many men "crushed," and therefore ca. 3000–4000 dead and wounded for every 10,000–12,000 combatants. Diodoros says that more than 700 infantry and 280 riders fell. Diodoros, Curtius, and Polyaeos all liken the Indian battle line to city walls with watchtowers, betraying a common source that has never proved revealing in military matters, so that Arrian's description is the more valuable. Like all the

ancient authors who were versed in military matters, he describes only the decisive troop movements, and even these descriptions may be too spare. He says nothing of the two phalanges left at the ford to cover the right bank and the road down from Kashmir. Only his casualty list, which mentions not only the mounted companions and the Dahae but also *τῶν τε ἄλλων ἱππέων ὡς διακόσιοι*, tells us that the Baktrian, Sogdian, and Scythian riders (V. 12. 2) also crossed the river and took part in the battle. (They cannot have belonged to Krateros's corps, since no losses are given for his hipparchy.) Arrian describes the progress of the battle itself with great precision. Alexander knew that he could count on his shieldbearers. Here, as at Gaugamela, the strength of morale in this corps enabled him to risk everything to gain everything. Disciplined to the high level of the Macedonian military order, these troops could emerge from the most confused hand-to-hand combat and regroup in a closed phalanx. To this maneuver, executed with the greatest precision and supported by the cavalry, the Indians knew no reply, and it decided the outcome of the battle on the Hydaspes.

65. Curt. VIII. 14. 33. The episode does not appear in Arrian.

66. The chronology of the battle requires a comment. Arrian explicitly attests that it was fought in the month Munychion of the Athenian archon Hegemon (Ol. 113.2), whose year in office Ideler reckons to be 28 June 327 to 16 July 326, placing the battle between 19 April and 19 May 326. Opposing argument has cited Arrian himself, where he notes (V. 9. 6) that Alexander was standing on the Hydaspes at the time of year *ἢ μετὰ τροπᾶς μάλιστα ἐν θέρει τρέπεται ὁ ἥλιος*, to draw the inference that the battle was fought after the summer solstice. The argument supports itself by reading, instead of Munychion, Metageitnion of archon Hegemon, to produce August 327, a moment when Alexander was still in the Choaspes basin. What has escaped notice is that Arrian's "approximately" is not to be taken literally here: the purpose of his observation is to establish that the season of the tropical rains and flooding rivers has arrived. This point is supported by Nearchos's notice (Strab. XV, p. 691) that at the solstice, the Macedonians were encamped on the Akesines. No less ineptly, Grote proposes the Metageitnion of the succeeding archon, Chremes, which would place the battle in August 326. By virtue of this particular error, the chronology of the entire period 327–23 is riddled with errors.

67. On the widely distributed name “Gandari,” see Wilson, addenda to *History of Cashmere* (*Asiat. Researches*, 15, p. 105). Cf. Lassen, II, p. 155.

68. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 60), Poros was obliged to assume the title “satrap.” Arrian’s silence on the matter and the system of dependent states described here cast doubt on that assertion.

69. Strabo (XV, p. 698), Curtius (IX. 1. 6), and Diodoros (XVII. 89) place these cities on opposite sides of the river. Arrian (*Peripl.*, p. 25, ed. Hudson) and the scholiast of Aristophanes (*Nub.* 23) give Bukephala the name Alexandria.

70. It is not clear whether οἱ παρ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐκπεμφθέντες πρέσβεις πρὸς Ἀβισάρην (Arr. V. 29. 4) were dispatched to the prince at this time or only later.

71. Arr. V. 20. 6. In describing the Glausans’ territory, I have followed Lassen (*Penta potam.*, p. 26). The Bhimbar pass leads through it.

72. Strab. XV, p. 698; Diod. XVII. 89. Burnes and Gerard (*Asiat. Journ.*, Dec. 1832, p. 364) mention the fine ship’s timber in this area, particularly cedar, as described by Diodoros (XVII. 89).

73. Alexander, finding that the native name of the river, Kshandrabhaga, went into Greek phonetically as Sandrophagos (“maneater” or indeed “Alexander-eater”), averted the omen by renaming it Akesines (healer). Cf. A. W. v. Schlegel, *Ind. Biblioth.*, II, p. 297. Ptolemy’s description of the steep banks and rocky riverbed at the spot where Alexander crossed tells us that this place cannot have lain on the great road from Attock to Lahore, which Alexander did not control in any event, and therefore was not at Wazirabad. The breadth of the river at flood implies that the army crossed, not high in the mountain regions, but rather somewhere near the point where the river emerges from the mountains, which is to say, between Bhimbar and Jammu. Strabo says very clearly (XV, p. 691) that Alexander went from the Indus southward toward the Hydaspes and from there eastward, through a countryside more mountainous than flat. Strabo puts the time of Alexander’s encampment on the Akesines at the summer solstice, end of June.

74. Diodoros (XVII. 91) says that this Poros fled from his own realm into the Gandarite, which plainly contradicts Strabo (XV, p. 699), unless one accepts the reading Γαγγαριδῶν for the text of Diodoros.

75. At Wazirabad at the end of July, Macartney found the river 4000 paces wide (Elphinstone, II, p. 554).

76. Helladius (*Chrestom.*, ap. Phot. 530 a 35) says that Poros's father was a barber; Diodoros and Curtius say the same of Xandrames, king of the Prasians. According to Pseudo-Plutarch (*De fluv.*, 1), Poros came from Gegasios; Lassen presents these matters in context. Dunker (III, p. 306), following Lassen (I. p. xx, n. 4, and II, p. 161), identifies Gegasios as Jajati.

77. Details on the names and settlements of the Khattia and their city Çakala can be found in Lassen (II, p. 158 and I, p. 801). Cunningham (*Geogr.*, I, p. 179) places Sangala much farther south, erroneously in my view; the pond (λίμνη οὐ μακρὰν τοῦ τείχους: Arr. V. 23. 4) and hill that situate Sangala (*Geogr.*, I, p. 179) are very similar in the landscape where he would place Pimprama (*Survey*, II, p. 200).

78. They are called Adraistes or Adrestes in Diodoros, Justin, and Orosius; Arrian calls their capital Pimprama; Lassen conjectures that their name is comparable to Indic Arashtira, or Aratta in Prakrit. It might be more precise to read "Arratakanes" for the Attakanes, whom Arrian notes at the springs of the Neudros between the Akesines and the Hydraotes; that would place Saccala, the Arratan city of the Mahabharata, here. Cf. Wilson, *Asiat. Researches*, 15, p. 107.

79. Arr. V. 23. 24; Polyæn. IV. 3. 30.

80. Açvapati ("master of steeds": Weber, *Vorlesungen*, p. 147) is the title of the princes of Kekaja on the upper Iravati and Bipaça (Lassen, II, p. 161).

81. Arrian makes no mention of Prince Sopeithes at this point. My account is based on Diodoros (XVII. 92) and Curtius (IX. 1. 24), who place the realm of this prince beyond the Hydraotes. Strabo (XV, p. 699) says: "Kathaia, land of a certain nomarch Sopeithes, is placed by some in this mesopotamia [between Hydaspes and Akesines] and by others beyond the Akesines and the Hydraotes, adjacent to the principality of the younger Poros, whose land they call Gandaris." And again: "Sopeithes's land is said to have a mine of crystal salt, enough to furnish all India, and not far away, in different mountains, fine gold and silver mines, as told by Gorgos the prospector." These are the crystal salt deposits of Mondi between the Beyah, or Beas, and the Satadru, in the first ranges of the Himalaya (Ritter, p. 1075; Lassen, I, p. 300). Gold is known to be present in quantity at the headwaters of Indus, Satadru, and Beas (Hyphasis), some in veins that are mined, some in grains that the spotted jerboa (cf. Megasthenes and Nearchos in Arr. *Ind.* 15), called "ant" by the Greeks (cf. Ritter, p. 660), excavated as it burrowed. All these indications place Sopeithes's princi-

pality between the Mondri mountains in the east and the mountains of the Retung pass in the north, where the Hyphasis and the Akesines, which border the lands of Abisares and Sopeithes, rise not far from one another.

82. Diodoros says "Phegeus," Curtius says "Phegelas." Is the name related to the river of the principality, the Beas? Lassen (II, p. 162) thinks not.

83. Strab. XV, p. 702. Did Strabo, too, use forged letters? He says of this letter: πολλά τε ἄλλα παράδοξα φράζουσα καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσα οὐδενί. In Pseudo-Kallisthenes we find the report of Palladios, who claims to have come to the land of the Indus in the company of Bishop Moses of Axum. The bishop, says he, pushed ahead to the Ganges and returned to report having seen a stone stele inscribed: Ἀλέξανδρος βασιλεὺς ἔφθασα μέχρι τούτου τοῦ τόπου (Ps.-Callisth. III. 7. 20). Details can be found in Zacher, *Pseudo-Kallisthenes*, pp. 107 and 146. I observe, for the record, that Suidas (s.v. *Βραχμᾶνες*) gives the inscription as: ἐγὼ μέγας Ἀλέξανδρος ἔφθασα μέχρι τούτου. The remaining content is equally an extract of Palladios's report.

84. Arr. V. 25 ff.

85. ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν τάξεων (Arr. V. 25. 2). The formula of address, ὦ ἄνδρες Μακεδόνες τε καὶ ξύμμαχοι, and the expression (28. 3), ὑπομένοντα εἰ δὴ τις τροπὴ ταῖς γνώμαις τῶν Μακεδόνων τε καὶ ξυμμάχων, etc., indicate which troops were resisting. It should be easy to demonstrate that Alexander's address, at least, is not taken from Ptolemy but rather composed by Arrian. But the facts of the episode are probably from Ptolemy, as Arrian himself indicates (V. 28. 4).

86. δίκαιος δέ εἰμι καθ' ἡλικίαν (Arr. V. 27. 3). In autumn 334, he and Meleagros had gone to Macedonia with the bridegrooms on furlough, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν νεογάμων ἦσαν.

87. Arr. V. 28. 4, after Ptolemy and Strabo.

88. Curt. IX. 2; Diod. XVII. 94.

89. περαιτέρω γὰρ προελθεῖν ἐκωλύθη, τοῦτο μὲν μαντείοις τισὶ προσέχων, τοῦτο δ' ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀπηγορευκυίας ἤδη πρὸς τοὺς πόνους ἀναγκασθεῖς, μάλιστα δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑδάτων ἔκαμνον συνεχῶς ὕμνοι (Strab. XV, p. 697).

90. Tamerlane, passing through this area about thirty days later in the season (in Safar), saw his horses die in numbers (Chereffeddin, IV. 13, p. 59).

Book Three, Chapter 4

1. διελὼν κατὰ τάξεις τὴν στρατιὰν δώδεκα βώμους κατασκευάζειν (Arr. V. 29. 1). This does not mean, as I once believed, the τάξεις of the phalanges, although the king had with him here, as we know from Arrian (V. 20. 3), τῶν πεζῶν ἀπὸ φάλαγγος ἑκάστης ἐπιλέκτους. It cannot be shown that he had more than ten phalanges at the time. We do not know whether the number of altars refers to the twelve gods, as Diodoros says (XVII. 95), or to something else. References to the finishing and furnishing of the altars and to huge vessels left there at the king's orders so that posterity would believe that the Macedonians were a race of giants are cited in the commentary to Curtius IX. 3. 19. The inscription on the altars has been said to have read: "To my father Ammon and my brother Herakles and Athena the Provident and Olympian Zeus and the Kabeiroi of Samothrace and Helios of India and my brother Apollo." All this nonsense is repeated by Philostratos (*Vit. Apollon.* 11. 15), who adds that a bronze column standing among the altars was inscribed: "Here Alexander stopped." In Suidas (s.v. *Βραχυᾶνες*), the inscription is recorded as: "I, King Alexander, reached this point."

2. The place where these twelve altars stood is unknown. Curtius (IX. 2. 2) says that a traveler there would move through the desert on the far side of the river for eleven days to reach the Ganges. From this description one could conjecture that the spot lay below the confluence of Vitasta and Çatadru, because that particular duab, which the emperor Akbar called Beyt-Jalindher (Ayeen Akbery, II, p. 108), is intensely cultivated and the combined stream is called Bhis or Beas—Hyphasis, evidently—as the combined five rivers are called where they meet the Indus (Elphinstone, II, p. 559). Lassen (II, p. 164), however, doubts the accuracy of Elphinstone's notice. Pliny (VI. 17), drawing on Megasthenes, says that the army got no farther than the Vitasta and erected the twelve altars on its far bank: ad Hypasin . . . qui fuit Alexandri itinerum terminus exsuperato tamen amne arisque in adversa ripa dicatis . . . Reliqua Seleuco Nicatori peragrata sunt ad Hesudrum 168 milia (cf. *Asiat. Journ.*, 5, 1818, p. 216 ff.). If the figure were not conspicuously corrupt, it could be used for more exact inferences.

3. This Alexandria on the Akesines, on the great road that Pliny seems to indicate, would correspond approxiately to present-day Wazirabad.

4. According to Lassen (II, p. 165), the native name of this prince was Uraça, or rather, this was the name of his capital, six days' journey from the capital of Kashmir.

5. This form of trierarchy, mentioned by Arrian (*Ind.* 18), is confirmed by Plutarch (*Eumen.* 2) and Pliny (XIX. 1). The obligatory expenditure cannot have been 300 talents by each trierarch, as Plutarch would have us believe, but it was probably higher than in Athens, where a trierarch did not have to assume the cost of building his ship.

6. ὀκτακόσιαι (Arr., *Ind.* 19.7). The reconstruction χιλίαι καὶ ὀκτακόσιαι is pure conjecture. But elsewhere (VI. 2. 4) Arrian says: οὐ πολὺ ἀποδεόντων τῶν δισχιλίων. Nonetheless, Diodoros (XVII. 95) and Curtius (IX. 13. 22), whose figures usually exceed Arrian's, both say one thousand. Diodoros specifies: διακοσίων μὲν ἀφράκτων, ὀκτακοσίων δὲ ὑπερετικῶν, as if there had been no κατάφρακται. The eighty τριακόντοροι were probably not such triakonters as Ptolemy II built (Athen., p. 203 d), but smaller war ships (Böckh, *Seeurkunden*, p. 74), as seems to be indicated by Arrian (VI. 5. 2), where the μακραὶ νῆες of the fleet are δίκροτοι.

7. Diodoros's figures are: more than 30,000 infantry and nearly 6000 riders, both Hellenic allies and mercenaries; 25,000 superb panoplies for infantry; and 100 talents' worth of medicament (XVII. 95). Curtius says: 7000 infantry sent by Harpalos and 5000 Thracian riders, both under Memnon's command, and 25,000 sets of armor trimmed with gold and silver (IX. 3. 21).

8. "A few days before the setting of the Pleiades" (Strab. XV, p. 691), that is, before 13 November, according to Kallipos, Alexander's contemporary. See Ideler, *Über das Todesjahr Alexanders*, p. 275.

9. This total figure (Arr., *Ind.* 19) would indicate that the Agrianians and archers together numbered no more than 2000 men, unless Arrian erroneously added the Agrianians at VI. 2. 2 and omitted them at *Ind.* 19.

10. Arrian (VI. 2) names the βασιλία Σωπείθου as the destination of Hephaistion's march, of which he made no mention at the apt moment, the march through Hyphasis country. Does he mean of Spitakes?

11. ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μεγαλοπρεπῶς (Arr. VI. 2. 1). Curtius (IX. 13. 20) is more pointed.

12. Arr. VI. 3. 5; Pliny (XIX. 1) particularly describes the splendor of the many-colored sails.

13. Pliny (VI. 17) says that Alexander made 600 stades per day; Curtius (IX. 3. 24) says 40; neither can be right. The fleet reached the mouth of the Akesines in 8 days, a distance of 5 or 6 days by land (see Vincent, p. 110) and 24 miles by water (according to Macartney's map); the actual surface distance on the river may have been 40 miles. Assuredly, Curtius did not write *quadringinta* instead of *quadragenta*, as Freinsheim proposes.

14. ἤδη γὰρ καὶ δώδεκα μυριάδες αὐτῷ μάχιμοι εἶποντο σὺν οἷς ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τε αὐτὸς ἀνήγαγε καὶ αὐθις οἱ ἐπὶ συλλογὴν αὐτῷ στρατιῆς πεμφθέντες ἦκον ἔχοντες, παντοῖα ἔθνεα βαρβαρικὰ ἅμα οἱ ἄγοντι καὶ πᾶσαν ἰδέην ὥπλισμένα (Arr., *Ind.* 19. 5).

15. More recent reports confirm this description: see Vincent, p. 112. Chereffeddin (IV. 10. 52) says of this spot: "les vagues qui se forment en ce lieu le font paraître une mer agitée."

16. Curt. IX. 4. 10; Diod. XVII. 96.

17. On the Xudraka and the Malava, see Lassen, II, p. 171 and Cunningham, *Geogr.*, I, p. 215 ff.

18. Σίβαι is the orthography in Arrian (*Ind.* 5), Strabo (XV, p. 253), and Stephanos of Byzantium (s.v.); the less accepted Σίβοι appears in Diodoros; Curtius writes *Sobii*. Bohlen (*Das alte Indien*, p. 208) took them for Siva worshippers, which Lassen (I, p. 644) disproves. Arrian says little about this tribe in the *Anabasis*, because he would consider their descent from Herakles a tale and would be the last to give political importance to a claim of kinship with Herakleid Alexander, as Diodoros does. But he mentions this excursion in its proper place (VI. 5. 9), which indicates that the tribe lived in the duab between Akesines and Indus.

19. As indicated by Curtius and Diodoros.

20. Arr. VI. 11. 7.

21. The name Agalassa does not occur in Arrian. In Curtius (IX. 4. 5), who follows Diodoros here nearly word for word, it is obscured by the false reading *alia gens*. For all their confusion, these two accounts can be reconciled with Arrian. Curtius's "superato amne" is the Akesines, which Alexander had to cross to go from the camp to which he had returned after his Sibian expedition into Mallian country east of the river. On the Malloi, see Tod, *Rajasthan*, II, pp. 292 and 443. Agalassa, eight miles from the station below the mouth of the Hydaspes, coincides with the setting of Pindi Shaikh Moosa, one and one-half miles from the Hydraotes.

22. This could be Murree, not far from the river.

23. The whereabouts of this city is very unclear. I no longer dare to repeat my earlier conjectures. Masson (*Narration*, I, p. 402) would put the Mallian city at Kot Kamalia; Cunningham proposes Multan. He demonstrates that the Hydraotes, or Ravi, has changed its course and that it once met the Akesines a few miles below Multan. He also gives a plan of the city Multan showing the citadel and its site on what was once an island in the Ravi (*Survey*, V, plate 36).

24. Arrian (VI. 11) examined critically accounts that deviate from the presentation offered here (which follows Ptolemy) and their errors are no longer to be doubted. He takes particular exception to the version that places the incident in Oxydrakan country, conveyed by Curtius (IX. 4. 26), Lucian (*Dial. mort.* XIV. 14), Appian (*Bell. civil.* II. 102), Pausanias (I. 6), and others (ap. Freinsheim ad Curt. IX). He notes variance also in the names of those present with the king in the citadel. Plutarch (*Alex.* 63) names Peukestas and Limnaios; Curtius (IX. 5. 15) names Timaios and the three bodyguards Peukestas, Aristonus, and Leonnatos; Timagenes and Kleitarchos (according to Curtius) and, after these two, Pausanias and Stephanos of Byzantium (s.v. *Ὀξύδρακαί*) add Lagid Ptolemy, who was at least ten miles away at this moment. In ancient times Peukestas was generally accepted as Alexander's savior (*Alexandri Magni servator*: Plin. XXXIV. 8). Many authors mention a cudgel blow to the neck in addition to the chest wound. The arrow was drawn from the wound either by Perdikkas or by Asklepiad Kritobulos of Kos ("Kritodemos" in Arrian), King Philip's celebrated physician, who had removed the arrow Philip took in the eye at Methone (Plin. VII. 37). Plutarch (*De fort. Alex.* 11) has a somewhat different version of the drawing of the arrow: Alexander's attendants were unable to pull the arrow from the sternum, and they dared not saw off the shaft for fear of shattering the bone. Seeing the dismay of those around him, Alexander tried to use his dagger to cut the shaft away from his cuirass, but his hand faltered. He therefore ordered his attendants to proceed boldly, scolding them for weeping and wailing, calling them traitors for denying him their help, etc.

25. Arrian (IV. 14. 5) speaks of the Hyphasis, not of the Hesudrus (Çatadru).

26. Arr. VI. 15. The respective territories of the Oxydrakans, the Xatharas, and the Ambastha are the more difficult to identify because Diodoros

and Curtius confound everything, and even in Arrian's *Indike* the indications for the various river mouths prove false. We can be sure of this much: The very extensive territory of the Oxydrakans began not far south of the mouth of the Hydraotes, on the Mallian frontier, and extended beyond present-day Multan to the confluence of Hyphasis and Akesines. Persuaded by Lassen (II, p. 173), I have abandoned my conjecture that the Xathras are Diodoros's Σόδρας (XVII. 102) and that their name can be construed as Kshatras, which can be interpreted in turn as a mixture of Kshatrijas (warrior caste) and Sudras. The Xathras must have lived in wooded territory along a river, because they seem to have been shipbuilders. Nothing tells us who the Ambastha were ("Sambastai" in Diodoros) or where they lived.

27. It is fairly certain that this is Stephanos's fifth Alexandria, ἐν τῇ Ὀπιανῇ κατὰ τὴν Ἰνδικήν. Of the land of the Ὀπίαι, Hekataios says: ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων ἐριμὴ (fr. 175 ap. Steph. Byz., s.v.). Vincent (p. 136) describes in detail how favorable to commerce was the situation of this countryside. That the tribe is never mentioned again is unremarkable: our information from the time of the Baktrian and Indo-Scythian empires is so sparse that we cannot conclude that what is no longer mentioned no longer existed.

28. Vincent (p. 119 ff.) and Pottinger (p. 382) would place this city at present-day Sukkur—mistakenly, I believe. This τῶν Σόγδων τὸ βασίλειον (Arr. VI. 15. 4) must have stood farther upstream, perhaps about midway in the distance of approximately thirty miles that lies between Sukkur (Bhakkar) and the mouth of the Hyphasis, roughly where the way from India to the Bolan passes crosses the river: as Cunningham (p. 255) describes, between Fazilpur on the left bank and Kashmor on the right. This must be the Alexandria that Stephanos of Byzantium lists in sixteenth place and describes as ἐν τῇ Σογδιάνῃ. The additional note, παρὰ Παροπαμισάδαις, has found its way here from elsewhere, for Alexandria sub ipso Caucaso does not appear on Stephanos's list. Diodoros mentions the 10,000 troops left here. The name of the satrap, apparently, is Peithon, not Python. He was Agenor's son, not to be confused with Peithon Krateuas's son, who was from Eordaia, or with Python of Katanai or Byzantium, said to have composed the satyr play *Agen*. Arrian says, "Peithon and Oxyartes." But see below. Tod (I, p. 92) believes the Sogdi were the Sodas, who belonged to the Pramares.

29. Arrian (VI. 16. 4) calls the prince Sambos; "Sabos" is the form in Curtius (IX. 8. 17), Diodoros (XVII. 102), and Strabo (XV, p. 701); "Sab-bas" in Plutarch (*Alex.* 64); in Justin (XII. 10) he is Ambigerus (var. *Ambi regis*) and in Orosius (I. 19) "Ambira rex." Lassen believes the original name was Çambhu.

30. Vincent (p. 130 ff.) would place the principality of these mountain Indians near Sibi, nearly forty miles northwest of Sukkur or Alexandria. Only a similarity of name speaks for this surmise; against it are distance, a non-Indic population in Siwistan, and Strabo's clear statement that their land bordered Pattalene. Thus Pottinger (transl., p. 539) is probably correct to think that Sambos's mountainous territory lay in the Jungar mountains south of the Indus arm at Larkana and that the capital was Sehwan on the Indus. Colonel Tod (II, p. 220) characteristically traces the prince's name to the dynasty Sind-Sama.

31. Arr. VI. 15. The name of Prince Musikanos is also the name of his land. We recognize Mushika with its residence in the ruins of Alor, which Wood (p. 49) describes, calling the city Arore. When the army moved out of Sogdian Alexandria, Krateros had crossed to the right bank of the Indus (Arr. VI. 15. 5). In the passage cited, *διὰ τῆς Ἀραχώτων καὶ Δράγγων γῆς ἐκπέμπει* seems to be a fragment on the purpose of his mission (thus *ἤδη ἔστελλε*: Arr. VI. 17. 3). As the Musikanos incident developed, Krateros was probably instructed to stop, perhaps between Sukkur and Shikarpur, about four miles from Bhakkar.

32. Arrian says "Oxykanos"; Strabo, Diodoros, and Curtius say "Porti-kanos"; more correct, according to Lassen (II, p. 178), would be "Prâthaka," derived from the name of the tribe or the land, Prashta (hill country). Arrian's account implies that this march took the king away from the river, therefore westward. Thus Cunningham (*Geogr.*, I, p. 260) seems to be correct in placing the city of the Prashta at Mahorta, where Masson (*Travels*, I, p. 461) found an important ancient fortress.

33. This is the name in Arrian; Strabo writes "Sindonalia" or "Sindonia." Tod (I, p. 218) proposes that the Indo-Scythian city Minagara is Saminagara, Sambos's residence (*nagara*). Its placement near present-day Sehwan, indicated previously, is further established now by Lassen (II, p. 179) and Cunningham (II, p. 264).

34. Octoginta milia Indorum in illa regione caesa, Clitarchus est auctor (Curt. IX. 8. 15). His immediately preceding account, how the Macedonians stood suddenly in the market square of this city, having tunneled their way in, is no less worthy of Kleitarchos, from whom Diodoros (XVII. 102) takes the figure 80,000 without attribution. According to Plutarch (*Alex.*, 64), it was Sabbas's Brahmans who replied to King Alexander in the famous sophisms, of no philosophical importance, as well-schooled Arrian correctly observes (τῆς σοφίας, εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστίν: VI. 16. 5), and celebrated by the ancients for their deep wisdom nonetheless. They exhibit the casuistic distinctions and learning more apparent than real into which Hindu teaching degenerates when it loses its mythic and mystical qualities.

35. Among these was the Brahman city Harmatalia (Diod. XVI. 103; Curt. IX. 8. 18), where Lagid Ptolemy was wounded. The marvelous tale of his dream while lying on the king's couch seems to be Kleitarchos's invention. Arrian, who had Ptolemy's memoirs before him, knows nothing of it.

36. ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδόν τε ἐπανῆκε καὶ τὸν στόλον (Arr. VI. 17. 1). Thus they were headed upstream, where army and fleet had stopped. The fleet had certainly sailed southward beyond Alor and the army, under Hephaestion perhaps, had moved with it, while Krateros had stopped near Sukkur and was awaiting further orders.

37. Only Curtius (IX. 8. 28) names Moeris (var. Meris), and the name cannot be verified. Lassen, however, uses the name as point of departure for a series of appealing combinations. He assumes that Moeris is an error of Soeris, that Soeris is a dynastic name of the Saurja, that this is Stephanos's reference (s.v. *Ἀλεξάνδρεια*) when he describes his fourteenth Alexandria as ἐν Σωριανοῖς, Ἰνδικῶ ἔθνει, and that this Alexandria is the city Pattala, which Arrian notes as being restored (VI. 17. 6 and 18. 2).

38. Curt. IX. 7. 1. He concludes: bis liberatus [Biton], cum caeteris qui colonias a rege attributas reliquerant, revertit in patriam. Diodoros (XVII. 99) says that the insurrection reached Sogdiana. He also says that these Greeks, heading home after Alexander's death, were overcome and cut down by Peithon. Dexippos (ap. Phot., cod. 82, fr. 1, ed. Müller), working from good sources, reports matters relevant apparently to the same insurrection, as I have noted in *Hermes*, 11, p. 462.

39. Arr. VI. 15; Curt. IX. 8. 9. Arrian says that Peithon and Oxyartes received the satrapy of the lower Indus. This seems unlikely, because the Paropamisad satrapy and the Indus satrapy had no common frontier; rather, they were separated by the satrapy of Upper India and Arachosia.

40. Arr. VI. 27. 3. Curtius (IX. 10. 20) writes: Orcinen [Ocinen] et Tariaspen [Zariaspen] nobiles Persas. Arrian names only Ordanes, whom Krateros seized on his march through Arachosia, Drangiana, Ariaspan country, and Choarene, in that sequence. It seems not excessively bold to posit that Curtius has made the name of one of the oppressed peoples into the name of a second renegade, Ariaspes.

41. Arrian (VI. 17. 3) names Antigenes here as leader of a τάξις. In the battle on the Hydaspes, fought by shieldbearers and light infantry, he led τῶν πεζῶν τὴν φάλαγγα, as did Seleukos and Tauron. If he is named correctly here, we have an example of promotion through the ranks.

42. Strabo (XV, p. 721) says that Krateros, “setting out from the Hydaspes, marched through Arachosia and Drangiana.” Can that mean that he went up the Indus and then the Akesines to reach the Hydaspes, where he began his march westward? Not only would that have been a pointless and exhausting detour, but also it would have taken him through Taxiles’s realm, through the Indian satrapy, and the Paropamisos before he could reach Arachosia. Strabo himself straightens out the problem (p. 725) when he names Choarene as the southeastern tip of the Parthian empire, bordering India, and says that Krateros marched through it. More plausible yet is the route from Sukkur and Shikarpur through the Bolan passes, then across the mountains of Arachosia to Kandahar—a route so important that it could not be left uninvested. Pottinger (transl., p. 386) explains why Krateros cannot have marched over Kalat in Baluchistan.

43. Diodoros (XVII. 105) says that Alexander gave this order in the heat of emergency, when he ran out of supplies in the Gedrosian desert and that it was promptly obeyed. The true state of affairs is easily discovered in this nonsensical notice; it is self-evident and repeatedly confirmed in Arrian’s *Indike*.

44. τὰς τε ἐκτετελισμένας ἤδη πόλεις ξυνοικίσαι (Arr. VI. 17. 5). These are the places in Musikanos’s land mentioned at VI. 17. 1.

45. Arrian describes the site of Pattala as “where the Indus forks to form a delta.” If the river had remained as it was in ancient times, this

might be the fork at Thatta or the fork at Hyderabad. Vincent favors Thatta, a conjecture wholly unsupported by Arrian's description. In Indian tradition, the most ancient site of a fork is above Hyderabad, at Brahmanabad. Lassen (II, p. 182) gives further detail. Strabo (XV, p. 759) places the arrival at Pattala at the morning rising of the Dog Star, when the river was at its height.

46. Arr. VI. 18. 4. The *ἡμιόλῃαι*, so-called probably because they had one and one-half rows of rowers, were the usual pirate ships, therefore particularly fast; the *κέρκουροι* are thought to have come from Cyprus and seem to have been a smaller seafaring craft.

47. Arrian's intelligent narrative (VI. 18) is not at variance with the declamation in Curtius. It is no longer possible to find the stations of this voyage.

48. "Killuta," "Skillutis," "Psiltukis" are versions in the various authors. The Indus delta is subject to great change and many of these localities can no longer be identified. The eastern bank of the Indus juts out into the sea, and one of three islands formed by broad arms of the river must be meant here, probably the second. The stations at the beginning of Nearchos's voyage, too, are greatly changed, so that we can discover little about them.

49. The most recent reports and maps of the mouth of the Indus indicate no true sea formed by an arm of the river, except the Sindri Sea, formed in our own century by the old, now very feeble eastern branch of the Indus (Purana). From the eastern mouth, Alexander moved westward in three marches. Thus at the time there lay along this distance of ten to fifteen miles none of the six other mouths of the Indus present today, so that hardly one mile and one-half separates the mouth of the Rin (Kori mouth) from the next, and no more than ten miles lie between this mouth and the great principal mouth, much of that distance composed of river islands. In the so-called *Periplus*, Arrian says (ch. 40, p. 24, ed. Hudson) that many traces of Alexander's army were to be found around the gulf of Barake (Katschha, or Kachchh; Κάσθι κόλπος in Ptolemy) and the region of Minagara. According to MacMurdo (*Bombay Transact.*, 2, p. 236) and Tod (II, p. 290 ff.), east of the Purana arm of the river lies moorland, where many streams flow down from the east in the season of the southwest monsoon, creating a great sea called the Aranya or, abbreviat-

ed, the Rin, which drains by a broad outlet into the gulf of Kachchh. This may be the area Alexander visited. Strabo, citing Nearchos, gives the base of the Indus delta a length of 1800 stades (45 miles), impressively close to the measurement on modern maps of the distance from the great mouth of the Indus to the mouth of the marshes. Arrian's *Periplus* describes the gulf of Barake as dangerous, its entrance full of sandbars, and adds that the spit of land that borders it on the south turns first east, then west. Arrian's Εἰρῖνος seems to be a Greek rendering of Aranya; this may be the sea where Alexander sailed (Tod, *Rajasthan*, II, p. 295).

50. Arr., *Ind.* 20.

51. The chronology has been fixed as follows: Alexander arrived in Pattala about the time that Sirius rises (ἐπιτολή), end of July (Strab. XV, p. 691). Plutarch counts 7 months for the journey here from Nikaia; Strabo counts 10, probably taking the ocean as his terminus, because the march from Nikaia to Pattala in fact took 9 months (early November 326 to late July 325). Nearchos set sail on 22 September (see below); about 80 days later he met Alexander again in Karmania (16 December). Alexander marched from the frontier of the Oreites to Pura in 2 months. From the Indus to the Oreites is a distance of about 40 miles, which probably required at least 20 days, given the many delays. The distance from Pura to his reunion with Nearchos is somewhat shorter; from the Indus to the meeting in Karmania we should set something more than 3 months. Therefore Alexander probably moved out of Pattala toward the end of August.

Book Four, Chapter 1

1. Dustibe-Dulut, according to Pottinger, on whose account my own is based.

2. This is the meaning of the name of the province, Lussa, in Judgali. The passes, or *lukhs*, are as follows: northward, the mountain road (Kohanwan: see Pottinger's diary, 1 February); eastward to India, the pass toward Hyderabad and Karachi; westward, the pass of Hinglaj (Hingol, which appears as a telegraph station on the map that H. Kiepert prepared from Goldsmid's information and published in *Zeitschr. d. Gesell. f. Erdkunde*, 5, 1870, 3), which leads toward the sea; and the pass of Bela on the road to Kech. See Pottinger, p. 431, transl.

3. According to Curtius, in 330 the king appointed Aspastes satrap of Karmania; according to Arrian (IV. 27.1), Sibyrtios was appointed shortly before the march out of India.

4. This is taken from Curtius (IX. 10. 5), who is otherwise useless for the geography of the area, as is Diodoros. The distance from Pattala to the pass at Hyderabad is about sixteen miles and from there to the Arbios (modern Porali) about twelve miles.

5. Lassen (II. p. 189) shows that Arba is the indigenous name.

6. Strab. XV, p. 723; Cic., *De divin.* II. 66; and others. Diodoros (XVII. 103) and Curtius (IX. 8. 20) place Ptolemy's wounding in the Indus delta.

7. Vincent, and with him, van der Chys, believe that Rambakia is present-day Ramyur, which does not appear on either Pottinger's map or the map of the telegraph stations. Diodoros reports that Alexander, wishing to found a city, discovered a secure (*ἀκλυστον*) harbor and well-situated countryside for a new Alexandria. Curtius adds that the city was settled with Arachosians, perhaps from the army. Nearchos's log says nothing of this new city. The "harbor of women," which he also calls *ἀκλυστον*, lies east of the Arbios. The commentators to Diodoros, Curtius, and Stephanos have established that Stephanos's fourth Alexandria, *πόλις Νεαρτῶν ἔθνους ἰχθυοφάγων*, which Diodoros spells *Νεωρειτῶν* and which is in fact Alexandria *Ἰνδρεϊτῶν*, and Arrian's colony in Rambakia are one and the same. See Lassen (II, p. 188) on the subject of a second city in the area, founded by Nearchos. There is no indication how far the land of the Oreites extended northward, but the mountain chain surely formed a frontier to the west and to the north.

8. This order to Apollophanes is implicit in Arrian (VI. 27. 1). The provisioning of the army was possible because the productive valleys Kolwan and Kech, which extend for perhaps forty miles, lie at a distance of ten or fifteen miles from the coast and could be reached from Oreite country by the pass at Bela. The Kech valley is irrigated by the abundant Khori-Dasht (see Lt. Ross, "Notes on Mekran," *Transact. of the Bombay Geogr. Soc.*, 18, 1868, p. 36 ff.), which reaches the sea in the bay of Gwatar, clearly the harbor Kophas, where Nearchos found "much and pure water" (Arr., *Ind.* 27. 6).

9. On this plant, see *Asiat. Researches*, 4, pp. 97 and 433.

10. Lt. Ross reached the Khori-Dasht in September and found only isolated puddles. But he was told that the hard rains of winter created freshets so sudden and so swift that those settled near the river often had no time to flee and many lost their lives.

11. Descriptions of the march through the desert have been thought exaggerated. Recent reports, notably Pottinger's, prove the contrary, which Nearchos's name alone would guarantee: excerpts from his memoirs by Arrian and Strabo are substantially in agreement. The April entries of Pottinger's diary should be compared with Strabo (XV, p. 722) and with Arrian (VI. 23). The route of the march cannot be reconstructed in detail, of course, but it seems never to have gone north of the line of cliffs ten or fifteen miles distant from, and parallel to, the coast. Nor can anything definite be said about the whereabouts of Pura. Present-day Bampur, nearly thirty miles inland, has in its favor only its situation in the productive part of Gedrosia and on the way from the coast into upper Karmania (cf. Vincent, p. 303). Alexander's route may have been approximately that of Captain Grant, who went from Bampur and Gah to the coast. Here where the more hospitable coast of Karmania begins, Alexander could afford to give up looking for his fleet and move inland.

12. These sixty days seem to be in contradiction with the immense daily marches of 400, even 600 stades that Alexander is supposed to have made. The distance straight from the Oreite frontier to Bampur is almost 100 miles; wandering off the track and the trip down to the coast and back inland may have made the distance half again as long. This would yield an average of two and one-half miles per day, which is ample in such terrain.

13. ὥστε τῆς μάχης δυνάμει μὴδὲ τὸ τέταρτον ἐκ τῆς Ἰνδικῆς ἀπαγαγεῖν (Plut., *Alex.* 66). Plutarch may have found this calculation of

one-quarter in his source. He adds, on his own authority, that the king nonetheless brought 120,000 infantry and 15,000 riders out of India.

14. Arr. VI. 22. 1. Apollophanes meanwhile had died in battle against the Oreites (see below).

15. τῆς χώρας ὁ ὑπάρχος (Arr., *Ind.* 34. 1).

16. This is Strabo's report (XV, p. 721), following Nearchos. No such excerpt appears in Arrian, who reports that the fleet sailed when the summer etesians had fallen. This is true, but the winter etesians had not yet set in and Nearchos would have waited for them, had it been possible. I shall discuss this important point in an appendix on chronology.

17. After Vincent's excellent inquiries, I will not venture to add details on this voyage; any such attempt would require careful study of the latest geographical reports and more extended discussion than is possible here.

18. Thus Nearchos in Arrian's *Indike*. The time of this reunion can be fixed by Nearchos's voyage. He sailed on 21 September and, in Vincent's calculation, landed on the Anamis on the eightieth day, 9 December. He may have reached the king between 15 and 20 December. It is more difficult, and in fact impossible, to place Alexander's camp. Diodoros relates (XVII. 106) that Alexander stood with his army in Salmos on the coast and that they had all gathered in the theater when Nearchos, having just landed with the fleet, appeared to tell them of his voyage. Assuming that at least the name Salmos is correct in this silly story, Vincent (p. 306) proposes that the name Sal-moun corresponds to a local name, Maaun. The hypothesis seems too bold. The one datum that we have is that Alexander's camp lay five days' journey, which is to say fifteen or twenty miles, from Nearchos's mooring on the Anamis, or Ibrahim river. Kerman therefore is excluded, as is Jumali and any other point on Pottinger's journey. If the orography of Karmania were not so wholly obscure, we could at least place the Alexandria that the king built here with some confidence. It may have been here that he met Nearchos again. Could Jiroft mark the spot?

19. We have no information about Krateros's march. We may assume that he followed the course of the Hindmend (Helmand) river and passed over Lashkar and Nikh, then marched through the desert to Kerman, traveling approximately the route that Khanikoff describes (*Recueil de la Soc. de Géogr.*, 7, 1865, 2, p. 404 ff.).

20. Arr. VI. 27. Curtius (X. 1. 1) gives the figure 5000.

21. The celebration described here (Arr. VII. 28; *Ind.* 37) has given rise to a revolting exaggeration: The king paraded through Karmania seven days in a row in an unbridled bacchanale. Carried on an immense car drawn by eight fine horses, he sat at a golden table feasting with his friends day and night. His other companions followed on countless other wagons decked out with purple carpets and garlands of flowers, also feasting and carousing. Barrels of wine and laden tables stood at the roadside for the rest of the army, which followed, staggering and stumbling from one wine barrel to the next. Loud music, bawdy songs, easy girls, phallic images—in short, every imaginable form of debauchery and depravity had converged here. Thus Plutarch and Curtius and any number of allusions in the Greek and Roman authors. Arrian's words are sufficient commentary: "Certain authors recount something I find improbable: that Alexander rode through Karmania to the sound of flutes, seated with his friends at a table mounted on a platform fashioned of two cars fastened together. The army followed, garlanded and making merry, for it found food and all that pleasure requires brought to the roadside by the Karmanians. And the king did all this in imitation of Dionysos, who is said to have ridden through most of Asia thus decked out when he returned from conquering the Indians . . . But these things are reported neither by Ptolemy son of Lagos nor by Aristoboulos son of Aristoboulos nor by any other author worthy to be believed." That the festivals in Karmania were celebrated with all possible magnificence goes without saying.

22. Hephaistion's route cannot have led directly to the coast, for in that case Nearchos would not have been attacked by mountain tribes as he returned to the Anamis (Arr., *Ind.* 36). Vincent, however, seems to keep him too long in the interior of the province. He probably followed the route of Don Garcias de Silva Figueroa (*Ambassade*, p. 65 ff., transl. Wicquefort) to Lar and proceeded from there to the coast.

23. Alexander seems to have gone from Jiroft to Fasa by the route Edrisi describes.

24. Arr. VI. 27. 1. Thus the satrapy was briefly without administration (Arr., *Ind.* 36. 8).

25. *nuper interierat morbo* (Curt. X. 10. 20).

26. Arr. VI. 27; V. 6. 2.

27. Arr. VI. 27. 3. These men are Sitalkes captain of the Odrysian javelin throwers, Kleandros captain of the veteran mercenaries, and, it seems, Herakon captain of the mounted mercenaries, in place of Menidas, who may have died (Arr. III. 26). Curtius (XI) also names Agathon captain of the Thracian riders and says that they brought 5000 infantry and 1000 riders.

28. We owe this important notice to Diodoros: ἀπομίσθους ποιῆσαι τοὺς μισθοφόρους (XVII. 111). The additional remark, “as many as had not been recruited in the king’s name,” points to the intention of the order.

29. Arr. VI. 29. 2. Curtius (X. 1. 22) calls him Orsines and names him among the captains at the battle of Gaugamela, specifying that Ariobarzanes and Orontobatis led the Persians, Mardaites, and Sogdians and had command of the individual tribes and that Orsines had supreme command (IV. 12. 8). He was, says Curtius, an Achaimenid and excessively rich (X. 1. 22). Arrian makes no mention of him at the time.

30. Arr. VI. 29; Strab. XV, p. 730. Both follow Aristoboulos, who concluded from the state of the tomb that grave robbers had broken in (προνομευτῶν ἔργον ἦν) and the satrap was not guilty. Plutarch (*Alex.* 69) tells us that the guilty party was Polymachos of Pella, a very well-born Macedonian, who was put to death. Perhaps *προνομευτῶν* should be taken in a narrow sense, “foragers”; Polymachos may have been out foraging with his troops.

31. Thus Arrian (VI. 30). According to Curtius (X. 1. 21), Orsines’s death had been contrived by the eunuch Bagoas, Alexander’s favorite. The satrap is represented as not merely not guilty but indeed as particularly devoted to the king. Concerning Alexander’s fondness for the eunuch, Dikaiarch tells a rather salty story in his book, “On the Sacrifice in Iliion” (Athen. XVII, p. 603 b), which Plutarch (*Alex.* 67) repeats.

32. Arr. VI. 29. 3. Curtius (X. 1. 39) seems to use the name Phradates for the same man, but I note that Autophradates, the sometime satrap of the Tapurians, is also called Phradates in Curtius.

33. Arr. VII. 4; VI. 27. 12.

34. Arr. III. 6; Plut., *Alex.* 10 and 35.

35. Theopomp., fr. 277, 278. On the title of the tract, now *ἡ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολή*, now *πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συμβουλαί*, see C. Mül-

ler, *Fragm. Hist. Graec.*, I, p. lxxiii. The Theokritos accused in fr. 276 (ap. Athen. IV, p. 230 f.) is the rhetor from Chios whom Strabo (XIV, p. 645; cf. Suidas, s.v. *Θεόκριτος*) mentions as a political foe of Theopompos and who turned the verse on “empurpled death” so bitterly against Alexander (Plut., *De educ. puer.* 16; cf. Ilgen, *Scol. Graec.*, p. 162). Even Aristotle was not spared: see the epigram in Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* XV, p. 793 a.

36. This is Plutarch’s reference when he notes that Ephialtes and Kissos, who brought the first news of Harpalos’s flight, were seized for false report (Plut., *Alex.* 41).

37. Plut., *Phoc.* 22.

38. Athen. IV, p. 230 f.; Curt. X. 2. Events in Athens date Harpalos’s flight securely enough to this moment (end of 325 or beginning of 324).

39. Chares’s account (fr. 16, ap. Athen. XII, p. 538 and, following him, Aelian. VIII. 7) may be combined with Phylarch’s description (fr. 42), which follows immediately, because both relate to the same construction.

40. Aristoboulos (ap. Arr. VII. 4) says that Alexander married not only Dareios’s daughter but also King Ochus’s daughter Parysatis; the notice is unconfirmed. Barsine, Artabazos’s daughter and Mentor’s widow, whom he found again at Damaskos and who accompanied him later, was never his wife; about 323, she was living at Pergamon with her small son (Justin. XIII. 2. 7). Roxane alone was Alexander’s peer and his lawful wife, and they lived together the following year at least. Arrian calls Dareios’s daughter Barsine or, in the manuscript that Photios excerpted (p. 68 b 7), Arsinoe, whereas all other authors call her Stateira (Diod. XVII. 107; Plut., *Alex.* 70; Curt. IV. 5. 1; Justin. XII. 10; Memnon ap. Phot., p. 224 a 50), which was also her mother’s name, according to Plutarch (*Alex.* 30) and Phylarchos (ap. Athen. XIII, p. 609 b). Perhaps the princess changed her Persian name when she married, as did other Asiatic women, and took a Hellenic name. Queen Olympias had once been called Myrtale (Justin. IX. 7. 13). “Amastrine” in Arrian is “Amestris” in Diodoros (XIX. 109) and “Amastris” in Strabo (XII, p. 544) and on the coins of the city named for her. Artabazos’s daughters are: Barsine (Pharsine ap. Syncell., p. 504), Artakama or Apama (Apamea), and Artonis, also called Barsine.

41. Perhaps another trait to show the state of this army: these dauntless warriors will not have delayed until now to seek and find Asiatic women; a train of women and children doubtless shared their camp life.

42. Athenaios (XVI, p. 575 e) says that the satyr play *Agen* was presented “at the Dionysia celebrated on the Hydaspes, when Harpalos had put to sea and consummated his defection.” This can only have been the year 326, either in April or perhaps March, or on the return from the Hyphasis in October—but just at that moment fresh troops arrived, sent by Harpalos. Athenaios wrote “Hydaspes” for Choaspes, the river of Susa, which is where the play was performed. The play has been attributed to Python of Byzantium or of Katana and to Alexander himself. Python of Byzantium is reliably the orator closely associated with Philip, who sent him on important missions (see A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes*, II, p. 351). Athenaios’s account (XII, p. 550) makes him seem clever enough to have written a satyr play. Two fragments of *Agen* survive (Nauck, *Trag. frag.*, p. 630):

Where this reed grows there stands
A rounded front on the left of the great road,
The splendid shrine that Pallides built for a courtesan,
And, having built, thought to take flight.
Barbarian magi, coming that way,
Found him lying there in pitiable state
And promised to summon for his consolation
The spirit of Pythionike.

One player asks:

I would like to hear from you,
Since I now live far away,
How things are in Attika these days,
How the people are and what they’re doing.

Another player answers (Athens was in famine in 326–25):

As long as they cried, “We lead a slave’s life,”
They had plenty for dinner. Now they eat
Only fennel and peas, and they have no bread.

The first player:

But I hear Harpalos sent them
Wheat flour by the bushel—far more
Than *Agen*—and was made a citizen for his pains.

The second player:

That was Glykera’s flour—Attika’s perdition,
Not the lady’s salvation.

The name Pallides for Harpalos is as crassly allusive as is the rounded front (ἀέτωμα λορδόν) of Pythionike's monument; the text itself makes the allusions clear enough.

43. This is Arrian's figure (VII. 5); Plutarch (*Alex.* 70) says 970 talents. Curtius (X. 2. 10) and Diodoros (XVII. 109) do not actually write of a cancellation of debts in Susa; rather, where they intend gifts made in Opis to veterans who did not return home, they introduce a confusion with events in Susa.

44. Plut., *Alex.* 70. Pseudo-Plutarch (*De fort. Alex.* 2) says that this was Tarras, in whom one suspects Atharrias, a familiar stock figure in the chronicles that Curtius follows.

45. Arr. VII. 5, cf. VI. 28.

46. My account follows Arrian (VII. 3), Strabo (XV, p. 717 ff.), Aelian (*Var. Hist.* II. 41), and Plutarch (*Alex.* 69); mentioned also by Philo (1691, p. 879, ed. Francfort), Lucian (*De mort. Peregr.* 25 and 39), and Cicero (*Tuscul.* II. 22, *De divin.* I. 23, etc.). Arrian says nothing of a wild drinking match in memory of Kalanos. Our authors differ on the setting of these observances. Strabo (fr. 37) seems to put events in Pasargadai, which is impossible, since Nearchos was present. Aelian says that the funeral pyre was erected in the prettiest suburb of Babylon, equally impossible, since Alexander arrived in Babylon fully one year later. Kalanos, says Arrian, fell sick in the land of Persis; Strabo says, more specifically, in Pasargadai; Plutarch says that shortly thereafter he asked for a funeral pyre. Only in Susa were the elephants present, brought by Hephaistion, and Nearchos with his crew, and only there can the funeral have been celebrated; this seems also to be Arrian's opinion. He recounts first Kalanos's death, then Atropates's return to Media, and finally the weddings, without preserving a strict chronology: Atropates probably stayed in Susa to see his daughter, and the other princesses, married.

47. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς φανῆναι τὸ θέαμα ἐπὶ φίλῳ ἀνδρὶ γιγνόμενον (Arr. VII. 3. 5).

48. According to Curtius (V. 2. 8), Alexander retained for the moment 13,000 infantry and 2000 riders, *senioribus militum in patriam remissis*; according to Diodoros (XVII. 109), who follows the same source, the veterans released numbered 10,000. But the figures are not reliable.

49. Arr. VII. 6. Cf. Plut., *Alex.* 71 and Diod. XVII. 108. These authors introduce here events that took place in Susa later. Other scholars have already noted that Arrian (VII. 6. 8) mistakenly calls these troops “epigones,” a term properly applied to the children of Macedonian soldiers and Asiatic women, whom the king undertook to give a military education. Similarly, in the Lagid army one hundred years later (Polyb. V. 65), the epigones were, not “warriors armed in Macedonian fashion,” but rather the descendants of the Galatians whom Ptolemy Philadelphos had called into the land (Schol. ad Callimach., *In Del.*, p. 165). Arrian (VII. 11. 3) calls these new cohorts Persians and says (VII. 6. 3) that they were brought to the army by the satraps of the new cities and the conquered countries. Diodoros (XVII. 108) and Justin (XII. 12) also say “Persians.” Clearly, they were not just Persians but rather recruits from the various satrapies and from a levy of 6000 βασιλῆιοι παῖδες that Alexander had ordered raised and trained in Egypt.

50. The number is striking, because there were eight hipparchies, besides the agema, about the time of the battle of the Hydaspes. Did the march through the desert cause such losses that remaining numbers were sufficient for no more than four hipparchies? This is probably the context for Arrian’s remark (VII. 29. 4) that Alexander inserted into Macedonian regiments the ancient Persian melophores, the 10,000 “immortals who carried lances bearing gold and silver pomegranates” (Herod. VII. 40. 83; Arr. III. 11. 5) and took the ὁμότιμοι (whom Arrian, II. 11. 8, calls ἔντιμοι), the tablemates and kinsmen of the Great King, into the agema.

51. On the orthography of these names it is well to compare the commentators to Arr. VII. 6. 5. Hystaspes may be the relative of Dareios whom Curtius mentions (VI. 2. 7).

Book Four, Chapter 2

1. The Eulaios, as Spiegel (II, p. 625) concludes from comparing versions of its later name (Alai in the *Avesta*, Avrai in the *Bundehesh*), is the Khorram, the river of Shushtar. Six miles below this city, it joins the Dezful, a river of equal size. Loftus (*Travels*, p. 342) notes that the Dezful passes within one and one-half miles of the ruins of Susa. Nearchos had brought the fleet up the Pasitigris, the combined Khorram and Dezful, καὶ πρὸς τῇ σχεδίῃ ὁρμίζονται, ἐφ' ἣ τὸ στράτευμα διαβιβάσειν ἔμελλεν Ἀλέξανδρος ἐς Σοῦσα (Arr., *Ind.* 42. 7).

2. Plin. VI. 26; cf. Mannert, p. 421. The city was built on a mound ten stades from the sea and settled in part by citizens of the sometime royal city Durine.

3. Arr. VII. 7. On these constructions in the Tigris, see Strabo (XVI, p. 740). The ancients called river dams “cataracts.” The emperor Julian’s campaign in these parts is instructive on the subject: He had to *avellere cataractas* (Ammian. Marcell. XXIV. 6) to reach the King’s Canal (Nahr-malha in Ammianus and in modern times).

4. Felix Jones has fixed the site of Opis at Tall Manjur on the west side of the Tigris today (see Kiepert’s note in my appendix on Alexander’s foundations). The date of Alexander’s arrival there cannot be given more precisely. According to Tavernier, the journey by water from Basra to Baghdad takes about sixty days, according to Hackluyt, forty-seven (see Vincent, p. 462). From Susa downstream to the sea, about thirty miles, might take four days. To these must be added the distance along the coast from the mouth of the Eulaios to the mouth of the Tigris, the delay while the weirs were being destroyed, then the distance from Baghdad to Opis. Finally, allowance must be made for the high water at this time of year and the difficulty of moving against that current. An estimate of two or three months does not seem excessive for the journey from Susa to Opis.

5. No one tells us what the army did during these three unhappy days. Only Diodoros (XVII. 109) says vaguely: ἐπὶ πόλῳ τῆς διαφορᾶς αὐξανομένης. Evidently, the mutiny extended to all Macedonian troops except some of the shieldbearers and even to most of the officers outside Alexander’s immediate staff (Arr. VII. 11. 3).

6. Here Arrian uses the expression “silvershields” for the first time: καὶ ἀργυρασπίδων τάξις περσική (VII. 11. 3). Even if the sense of

τάξις for the shieldbearers here is different from its sense at the outset of the campaign, the shieldbearers must have carried silver shields earlier. As early as Gaugamela, Diodoros (XVII. 56) speaks of τὸ τῶν ἀργυρασπίδων πεζῶν τάγμα, and Curtius (IV. 13. 27) makes clear that the entire corps of shieldbearers is meant, though only later (VIII. 5. 4) does he say explicitly *scutis argenteas laminas addidit*.

7. Arrian says nothing of this order, but it is indicated clearly enough by what the mutineers then proceeded to do. Therefore I have followed Polyaeos here (IV. 3. 7).

8. Arrian (VII. 11. 5) says, σπουδῇ ἐξέρχεται. Plutarch (*Alex.* 71) says that Alexander let the troops implore him for two days and two nights. He is surely following Kleitarchos, who sets no great store by the reality of events.

9. Arrian (VII. 12. 1) gives the number of veterans returning home as τοὺς μυρίους. Diodoros (XVII. 4), following Hieronymos, gives the same number: ὄντων μυρίων. Therefore ὄντας ὑπὲρ τρισμυρίους (Diod. XVIII. 12) should be emended to read ὑπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους. Diodoros (XVIII. 16) gives 6000 infantry, who had marched out with Alexander in 334, and 4000 τῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ προσειλημένων (i.e., drawn from the garrisons), 1500 riders, and 1000 Persian archers and slingers.

10. Arrian (VII. 12. 4) names only Krateros and Polyperchon. The other names are from Justin (XII. 12. 8). Antigenes, who later led the silver-shields, is doubtful and Amadas is otherwise unknown.

11. Μακεδονίας τε καὶ Θράκης καὶ Θετταλῶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας (Arr. VII. 12. 4); *jussus praeesse Macedonibus in Antipatri locum* (Justin. XII. 12. 9).

12. Ἀντίπατρον δὲ διαδόχους τοῖς ἀποπεμπομένοις ἄγειν Μακεδόνες τῶν ἀκμαζόντων ἐκέλευσεν (Arr. VII. 12. 4); *Antipatrum cum supplemento tironum in locum ejus evocat* (Justin. XII. 12. 9). I noted earlier my conjecture that certain regiments remained in Macedonia to constitute the militias of the various regions and that freshly recruited replacements were sent directly from the cantons to be integrated into the regiments of the field army. But it remains unclear whether entire regiments were sent from Macedonia after 330 to make up the nearly doubled number of phalanges that the army had in India or whether these regiments came to Asia only now, under Antipater, to replace the mobilized phalanges returning home as released veterans.

13. Hypereides (*Pro Euxenipp.*, par. 36) mentions a letter in which she wrote of the shrine in Dodona ὡς ἡ χώρα εἶη ἡ Μολοττία αὐτῆς.

14. Plutarch (*Alex.* 68) recounts events as if the two queens had formally divided their rule: στασιάσασαι διείλοντο τὴν ἄρχην. Alexander is supposed to have remarked that his mother had proceeded more advisedly than his sister, since the Macedonians would never let themselves be ruled by a woman.

15. ἔξωθεν Ἀντίπατρος λευκοπάροφός ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἔνδον ὀλοπύρφορος (Plut., *Apophth. reg.* : *Alex.* 17). The antithesis implies that a white border was specific to the cloak of an ordinary Macedonian cavalryman; we have no other evidence for such a border.

16. Alexander urged Antipater to surround himself with a personal guard that would protect him from ambush by his enemies (Plut., *Alex.* 39).

17. Arr. VII. 12. 6.

18. Justin (XII. 14) says: "Antipater had recently imposed terrible penalties on the leaders of conquered nations—in *praefectos devictarum nationum*—and therefore assumed that the king was calling him to Asia to punish him." It is possible that Antipater, having defeated Agis, treated the Thracian tribes harshly. Plutarch (*Alex.* 74) says that Kassandros came to Alexander in spring 323 to defend his father against the many complaints of him that were coming in. In an appendix to the first edition of the volume on the successors, I examine the story that Alexander was poisoned on this occasion.

19. Plutarch (*Phoc.* 18) recounts that Phokion's refusal of a gift of one hundred talents—φίλους μὴ νομίζειν τοὺς μηδὲν αὐτοῦ δεομένους—provoked Alexander's wrath. To mollify him, Phokion asked another form of favor: release of four prisoners held in Sardeis, whom Plutarch names as Echekrates the Sophist, Athenodoros of Imbros, who had been prominent in Thracian affairs about 358, and the two Rhodians Sparton and Demaratos. This last name, at least, is corrupt; are these two men perhaps Δαμάτριος and Στρατών, whose names appear on contemporary Rhodian coins? Alexander had the prisoners released immediately, a sign that they were being held for political reasons. We do not know what these reasons were.

20. Aeschin., *In Ctesiph.*, par. 162; Hyperid., *In Demosth.* IX. 17.

21. Plut., *Apophth. reg.* (*Alex.* 15); *Alex.* 27.

22. How the matter was proposed—specifically, whether the propos-

al was addressed to persons whose loyalty was established—is unknown. The actual wording of the demand is also unknown. The closest approximation may be preserved in Timaios's praise of the position taken by Demosthenes and others: διότι ταῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου τιμαῖς ταῖς ἰσοθέοις ἀντέλεγον (Polyb. XII. 12 a).

23. The riposte is reported by Aelian (*Var. Hist.* II. 19) and even more pointedly by Plutarch: συγχοροῦμεν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἔαν θέλῃ θεὸς καλεῖσθαι (*Apophth. Lacon.*: Damidas, or, after Schäfer's conjecture, Εὐδαμίδας).

24. Demades was later fined ten talents (Athen. VI. 251 a) or one hundred talents (Aelian., *Var. Hist.* V. 12) for the proposal (ὅτι θεὸν εἰσηγήσατο Ἀλέξανδρον).

25. Plut., *Princ. pol.*, p. 804.

26. Would this be the context for Pausanias's statement (I. 25. 3 and VIII. 52. 5) that Leosthenes sailed from Asia back to Europe with the Greeks who had taken service under Dareios and the satraps and whom Alexander had wanted to settle in Asia—nearly 50,000 (?) men? They had chosen Leosthenes to lead them (Diod. XVII. 111), and later, at the beginning of the Lamian war, Leosthenes found it necessary to muster no more than 8000 mercenaries—a reduction in numbers that may be traceable to a return earlier by many of those who had been exiled. Hypereides was in contact with Leosthenes, as he had been with Chares, who died about this time. We know this from a passage in the biography of Hypereides: συνεβούλευσεν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ Ταϊνάρῳ ξενικὸν μὴ διαλύσαι οὐ Χάρης ἡγεῖτο, εὐνόως πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν διακείμενος (Plut., *Vit. X Oratt.*).

27. The number of this Olympiad is much in controversy, since it is of great importance to the problem of dating Alexander's death. Ideler's argument (*Abhandl. der Berl. Akad.*, 1820, p. 280) is supported by the absence of the Athenians from the 113th Olympiad in 328 as penalty for a fraud committed by an Attic citizen at the 112th in 332 (Pausan. V. 21. 5; Schäfer, III, p. 268). On the other hand, Hypereides, speaking against Demosthenes (XV. 8, ed. Blass), is beyond doubt.

28. This is the text of the decree according to Diodoros (XVIII. 8). It is confirmed to some extent by the king's letter addressed to Athens: ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὑμῖν ἐλευθέραν πόλιν ἔδωκα καὶ ἔνδοξον, etc. (Plut., *Alex.* 28). Its official classification seems to have been *διάγραμμα*, as it is called in the inscription of Iasos: κατὰ τὸ διάγραμμα τοῦ βασιλέως (C. I. Gr., no.

2671, v. 45) and in the inscription of Eresos: κατὰ τὰν διαγραφὰν τῷ βασιλέως Ἀλεξάνδρῳ (Sauppe, *Comment. de duabus inscr. Lesb.*, II, v. 25). Hypereides uses the term ἐπιτάγματα.

29. Diod. XVII. 109 and XVIII. 8; Curt. X. 2; Justin XIII. 5; Dinarch., *In Demosth.*, par. 81 and par. 103. Diodoros describes the exiles barred from returning as πλὴν τῶν ἐναγῶν and as πλὴν τῶν ἱεροσύλων καὶ φονέων. Curtius says: exsules praeter eos qui civile sanguine aspersi erant. Justin's formulation is : praeter caedis damnatos. Becker's attempt to find in an oration attributed to Demosthenes, *De foed. Alex.*, allusions to Alexander's order must fail on the dating of the oration, which is between 333 and 330 (*Demosthenes als Redner u. Staatsman*, p. 265; see previous cite, book II, ch. 2).

30. The expulsion is treated in detail by C. Curtius (*Inschriften u. Studien zur Geschichte von Samos*, 1877, p. 21 ff.), where the returning Samians' decree thanking Gorgos and Minnion of Iasos can be found.

31. My earlier conjecture that these events are related is now confirmed by papyrus fragments of the orations of Hypereides. See v. Duhn, "Zur Geschichte des harpalischen Processes," *Fleckeisens Jahrbücher*, 1871, p. 33 ff.

32. Plut., *Demosth.* 25. πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα [not Ὀλυμπιάδα, as v. Duhn would correct ἐλπίδα] προσέπεσεν ὥστε μηδένα προαισθῆσθαι (Hyperid., *In Demosth.* IV. 1, ed. Blass).

33. Diodoros (XVII. 108) says that the demand came from Antipater and Olympias; Photios, Plutarch (*Vit. X Oratt.*: "Demosthenes") and others name only Antipater. Pausanias (II. 33) says the demand was made by Philoxenos, and Philoxenos alone is mentioned in Hypereides's oration against Demosthenes (οἱ παρὰ Φιλοξένου: I. 14. 21).

34. Curt. X. 2. 2; Justin. XIII. 5; and especially Gorgios's toast, which Athenaios (XII, p. 538 a) takes from Ehippos: "For the son of Ammon, a wreath of three thousand gold staters and, for his siege of Athens, ten thousand suits of armor and as many catapults, and all the other artillery used in war."

35. καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινούς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων (Hyperid., *In Demosth.* XV).

36. According to Aelian (*Var. Hist.* II. 12), Demades's proposal was that Alexander be added as thirteenth in the number of the Olympians. Hypereides's report of Demosthenes's rejoinder (*In Demosth.* XXV, ed. Blass) is badly mutilated. With Blass's emendations: συγχωρεῖν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ

τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος εἶναι εἰ βούλοιτο καὶ ἀφικόμενον
(*Hermes*, 10, p. 33). Sauppe had proposed: . . . Ποσειδῶνος εἶναι υἱῶ, εἰ
βούλοιτο καὶ ἅ φίλον εἶη αὐτῶ ἀπενέγκασθαι

37. Diod. XVII. 108; Arr., *De rebus succ.*, par. 16, ap. Müller, *Fragm.*, p. 242; Pausan. II. 34. 4. A few years later, Athens issued a decree in his honor: C. I. A. II, no. 231.

38. These lists were already in Athens when the case was pleaded before a jury, and Deinarchos's words (*In Demosth.*, par. 68) do not prove otherwise. The slave whose testimony Philoxenos conveyed must have been interrogated under torture in Athens to render his witness admissible before an Attic court of law.

39. Athen. XV. 592 c. The notice is suspect, not because its allegation is taken from the forged oration *περὶ χρυσίου*, or however it is called (Schäfer, III, p. 128), but rather because the motif of bringing in the children, without their mother, for the reasons indicated here belongs to the idiom of an accuser, or even of tittle-tattle perpetuated by the tradition. Deinarchos, speaking against Demosthenes (par. 94), says he tried to derail the proceeding by means of an *εἰσαγγελία* to the effect that Kallimedon was gathering exiles in Megara for an attempt upon the state. Schäfer (III, p. 295), with his usual care, has assembled further material on these trials.

40. At least according to the second of the letters attributed to Demosthenes, right at the beginning.

41. Demades was indeed condemned in the Harpalian trials (Dinarch., *In Aristogit.*, par. 14). Speaking against Demosthenes (par. 104), Deinarchos says that Demades admitted taking money and claimed he would do so again, but did not dare appear before the court (*αὐτοῖς δεῖξαι τὸ πρόσωπον*) nor defend himself against the indictment of the areopagos, which said that he had received 6000 staters (twenty talents). Even if he was rich enough to carry on his person funds sufficient to pay a fine of 1000 drachmas for each of one hundred foreign dancers whom he unlawfully brought onto the stage, the five- or ten-fold fine imposed for bribes taken would have ruined him. If a fine had been imposed and he had failed to pay, he would have fled or been imprisoned. Instead, six months later, news of Alexander's death found him on the speaker's platform (Plut., *Phoc.* 22). Perhaps his punishment had been remitted by the dem-

os, as had been that of Laches, son of Melanopos (Demosth., *Epist.* III, p. 642), in consideration of Alexander and his eventual intervention. After Alexander's death, Demades's star sank. He was condemned for three, or even seven, offenses (Diod. XVIII. 18; Plut., *Phoc.* 26) and declared ἄτιμος when he could not pay. Proposing deification of Alexander will have figured prominently among his transgressions. A ten-talent fine, as noted by Athenaios, would have given him no trouble; one hundred talents, in Aelian, comes closer to the truth.

42. Lykurgos died before the Harpalian trials (Plut., *Vit. X Oratt.*: "Hyperides"). Cf. Böckh, *Staatshaushaltung*, II, p. 244. It was not the impulsive, doctrinaire Hyperides who now came to the fore, but rather young Pytheas (who soon revealed Macedonian sympathies), Stratokles, Mnesaichmos, Prokles—people of the worst sort.

43. We have no indication that Alexander relented in the matter of exiles, and although Arrian may note that Alexander returned the statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton in these days (VII. 19. 2), he recorded earlier (III. 16. 7) that the statues were returned by order from Susa (in 331).

44. τοιαύτην τάξιν, ἣν ῥαδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν (Aristot., *Pol.* IV. 1. 4 and 11.1).

45. κατασπείρας τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνικοῖς τέλεσιν [read: not γένεσιν or ἔθουσιν, but rather πόλεσιν] . . . οὐ γὰρ ληστρικῶς τὴν Ἀσίαν καταδραμὼν οὐδὲ ὥσπερ ἄρπαγμα καὶ λάφυρον εὐτυχίας ἀνελπίστου ἀπαράξαι καὶ ἀνασύρασθαι διανοηθεῖς, etc. ([Plut.,] *De fort. Alex.* I. 5 and 8).

46. To be noted here is Eratosthenes's well-taken comment on Aristotle's advice, τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήσιν ὡς φίλοις χρῆσθαι, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις ὡς πολεμίοις. Eratosthenes comments: βελτίον εἶναι ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διαιρεῖν ταῦτα, and adds that this is exactly what Alexander did (ap. Strab. I, p. 66).

47. C. I. Gr. II, no. 2166.

48. According to the great inscription discovered by Conze and interpreted by Sauppe (*Comment. de duabus inscr. Lesb.*). The relevant passage reads: αἱ μὲν κατὰ τῶν φυγάδων κρίσεις αἱ κριθεῖσαι ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου κύριοι ἔστωσαν καὶ ὧν κατέγνω φύγην, φευγέτωσαν μὲν, ἀγώγιμοι δὲ μὴ ἔστωσαν.

49. C. I. Gr. II, no. 2671.

50. C. I. Gr. II, no. 3137, an inscription of great importance for the whole question of colonization.

51. The inscription found by Schliemann at Hissarlik (*Trojanische Alterthümer*, p. 203) offers our first information on the royal domain, βασιλικὴ χώρα, and on the βασιλικοὶ λαοὶ who lived there.

52. Plut., *Phoc.* 18.

53. ὅσοι σατράπαι ἢ ὑπαρχοὶ ἢ νομάρχαι ἀπολείποντο (Arr. VI. 27. 4). A passage in Herodotos (V. 102) may cast light on the term “nomarch.” The Ionian attack on Sardeis brings in: οἱ Πέρσαι οἱ ἐντὸς Ἄλυσος ποταμοῦ νομοὺς ἔχοντες. The absence of an article argues against taking νομοί here as satrapies, which is Herodotos’s common usage.

54. ἡμιόδιος Ἀλεξάνδρου γενόμενος περὶ Βαβυλῶνος ([Aristot.,] *Oec.* II. 35). This may be an office, or the passage may be corrupted and mean something else altogether.

55. Plutarch (*Alex.* 42) notes instructions from Alexander to the megabyxos of the Artemis temple at Ephesos.

56. τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμη καὶ χημάτων περιουσίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι (Thucyd. II. 13. 2); αὐτουργοὶ τε γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς (I. 141. 3).

57. Diodoros (XVII. 66) gives the sum differently: “of unminted gold and silver more than 40,000 talents and 9000 talents χρύσου χαρακτῆρα δαρεικὸν ἔχοντα.” In the θησαυροὶ of Persepolis 120,000 ταλάντων εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον ἀγομένου τοῦ χρυσοῦ were found (XVII. 71).

58. Plutarch (*Alex.* 36) says that 5000 talents of royal purple gathered over the course of 120 years were found stored in Susa, still bright and beautiful.

59. We may recall that Lykurgos’s accounts say that in Athens gold could be bought with silver at a ratio of 1:11.47. The ratio in Philip’s time had been 1:12.51, and at Alexander’s outset, 1:12.30.

60. Athens, for example, had long been challenged by Byzantium (Demosth., *De pace*, par. 25) and by Rhodes (Lycurg., *In Leocrat.*, par. 18) as an entrepôt for grain; it was now losing to Rhodes in Kleomenes’s great speculations on the price of grain in Egypt ([Demosth.,] *In Dionysodor.*, par. 7–10). From the notice, Κλεομένους τοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἀιγύπτῳ ἄρξαντος, A. Schäfer has rightly concluded that the oration was written about 322–21.

61. At Alexander’s death, says Justin: erant in thesauris quinquaginta millia talentum, et in annuo vectigali tributo tricena millia (XIII. 1).

62. Pseudo-Aristotle (*Oec.* II. 39) says that Antimenes the Rhodian ordered the satraps through whose territories the troops marched *τούς θησαυρούς τοὺς παρὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἀναπληροῦν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν τῆς χώρας* and then sold the troops what they needed from these stores. The compelled voluntary contributions that Philoxenos invented (*Oec.* II. 32) belong to the same system.

63. O. Müller, *Orchomenos*, p. 57.

64. [Plut.,] *De fort. Alex.* II. 13.

65. I have deliberately refrained from discussing Alexander's monetary system, the common currency that he introduced in his empire, the impressive number of types, etc. The information expertly assembled by L. Müller (*Numismatique d'Alexandre le Grand*, 1855) has opened new aspects that will be important to historical inquiry, even if they do not all stand up to examination.

66. οὐ γὰρ ληστροικῶς τὴν Ἀσίαν καταδραμὼν οὐδὲ ὥσπερ ἄρπαγμα καὶ λάφυρον εὐτυχίας ἀνελπίστου σπαράξαι καὶ ἀνασύρασθαι διανοηθεὶς . . . ἀλλ' ἐνὸς ὑπήκοα λόγου τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ μιᾶς πολιτείας, ἓνα δῆμον ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας ἀποφῆναι βουλόμενος, οὕτως, etc. ([Plut.,] *De fort. Alex.* I. 8).

67. ὥσπερ ἐν κρατῇ φιλότητος μίξας τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰ ἥθη . . . πατρίδα μὲν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἡγεῖσθαι προσέταξεν πάντας, etc. ([Plut.,] *De fort. Alex.* I. 6).

68. Non levem et Alexandri Magni temporibus auctoritatem addidit professioni secundus Osthane comitatu ejus exornatus planeque, quod nemo dubitet, orbem terrarum peragravit, etc. (Plin., *Hist. Nat.* XXX. 2; par. 11, ed. Detlefsen).

69. To what has already been said about the Ammonion may be added Plutarch's remark (*Alex.* 27): λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ψάμμωνος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ φιλοσόφου διακούσας ἀποδέξασθαι μάλιστα τῶν λεχθέντων ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι βασιλεύονται ὑπὸ θεοῦ · τὸ γὰρ ἄρχον ἐν ἐκάστῳ καὶ κρατοῦν θεῖόν ἐστιν, etc.

Book Four, Chapter 3

1. “Tant de campagnes laborieuses, qui avaient usé mon tempérament, et mon âge avancé, qui commençait à me faire ressentir les infirmités qui en sont la suite nécessaire, me faisaient entrevoir comme prochaine la fin de ma carrière” (*Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand*, VI, p. 2).

2. Isidor. Charac., in *Geogr. minor.*, p. 248, ed. Müller. Masson (*Journal of the Asiat. Soc.*, 12, 1850, p. 97) has traced this march more precisely, and Mordtmann (*Berichte der Münch. Akad.*, 4, 1876, p. 360 ff.) comments on it. Diodoros (XVII. 110), who describes the journey in detail, entirely omits the march from Susa to Opis and writes as if Alexander went from Susa directly toward Media. The lacuna in Arrian (before VII. 13) falls here.

3. The western entrance to the passes of Bisotun (or, as Mordtmann believes more correct, Behistun), rich in sculpture and inscriptions, is still called Tagh-e-Bostan, Arch of the Garden. Diodoros (II. 13) relates that Semiramis had a garden laid out, twelve stades around, near the mountain Bagistanos and erected statuary on the mountainside.

4. According to Mordtmann (p. 369 ff.), the Nysaen Fields lie farther west, between Isidor’s Χαλωνίτις and Κάρινα, that is, between Sarpol and Kerend today. Mordtmann is surely right to conclude that Niçaya, where Dareios I defeated Gaumata, is the same Nysaen plain. Less certain is that Çiktauvis in the Bisotun inscription, the “falcon castle” near the village Zij-Pai-Tak, is the site of the battle.

5. Arr. VII. 13. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristoboulos mentions this tale. The exaggerations can be traced to Kleitarchos (Strab. IX, p. 420; cf. Plut., *Alex.* 41). Enlightened ages have long looked for historical confirmation of the Amazon myth, and one could imagine that the Median satrap, much prevailed upon, found something Amazon-like in his satrapy to present to the king. For among the nomadic tribes in the mountains, women are more free, more bold, and more vigorous than elsewhere in Asia: they have an active part in all the exploits and dangers that are the lot of the horde. Malcolm (II, p. 446, transl.) gives an eyewitness account of the skill and daring of a Kurdish girl putting a fine horse through its paces. Plutarch names authority for and against the Amazon story. Onesikritos, one of the worst liars, once read the relevant passage from the fourth book of his memoirs to King Lysimachos, who exclaimed: “Where was I at the time!”

6. Plut., *Eumen.* 2. How much of this story is from Duris and therefore unreliable is a question to which we have no answer. The sum mentioned makes it highly suspect, especially when we consider that thirty-three trierarchs were called upon at the time. That the king's funds were so depleted (χρήματα οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῷ βασιλείῳ) in the midst of his immense successes in India is also very odd.

7. Plut., *Alex.* 39.

8. This can be pieced together from Plutarch (*Eumen.* 2) and the first two lines following the lacuna in Arrian (VII. 13).

9. The chronology is taken from Diodoros (XVII. 110), who counts some fifty days for the march from Opis to Ecbatana.

10. I have no doubt that this is the context for Polybios's notice (X. 4. 3) that Media was given many Greek cities established by order of King Alexander.

11. As far as I know, we are not told exactly when Macedonian custom celebrated the Dionysia.

12. Polyb. X. 17.

13. This may be the same prospector Gorgos whom Strabo mentions (XV, p. 700). He is probably the Iasian who interceded with Alexander in behalf of the Samians who had been driven out by Attic cleruchs, remembered in detail in an inscription in C. Curtius (*Urkunden zur Geschichte von Samos*, p. 40). He is identified there as Theodotos's son, which defeats the attempt to identify him with the founder of Ambrakia: Γόργου τοῦ Κυψέλου κτίσμα, as Meinecke writes for Τόλγου in Strabo (VII, p. 325).

14. Ehipp., fr. 3, where the satrap is called Satrabates.

15. Arr. VII. 14 and Plut., *Alex.* 72. Plutarch's notice does not belie its source.

16. Diod. XVII. 110 and 114. Arrian (VII. 14), intelligent and dignified as always, writes:

All sorts of things have been written about Alexander's grief, but all agree that it was very great. His deeds are reported variously, according to the author's love or envy of Hephaistion or of Alexander himself. Of those who exaggerate, some, it seems to me, want to exalt the king by describing his excessive grief, expressed in words and deeds, over the corpse of the man whom he loved above all others; others, by contrast, want to diminish him, as if in his sorrow he had shown himself worthy neither of himself nor of the majesty of the

kingdom. Some say that he lay on the corpse all day long, writhing with grief, and that his friends had to use force to pull him away; others that he had the physician “crucified for administering the wrong medicine” (thus Plutarch), because he did not want to see that Hephaistion had died of drinking too much wine. That Alexander cut off his hair seems probable, particularly after Achilles’s gesture over the grave of Patroklos; that Alexander himself drove the hearse seems improbable. Others say that he ordered the shrine of Asklepios at Ecbatana destroyed; that would have been barbaric and less like Alexander than like Xerxes. I find more probable the story that many embassies from Hellas came to him on the way to Babylon, among them one from Epidauros, where the great shrine of Asklepios stands. He granted what the Epidaurians asked and added an offering for their god, saying: “Even though the god was not kind to me when he did not save the friend whom I loved with all my heart, I will do him honor.” Most of the authors write that Alexander ordered that Hephaistion be honored as one of the heroes. Others add that he sent to the Ammonion to ask its permission to sacrifice to Hephaistion as to a god and that permission was denied.

This is Arrian’s account. Plutarch, following authorities whom one can divine from Arrian’s comments, writes:

Alexander nearly lost his mind for grief. He had the manes and tails of the horses and mules shorn and the battlements broken from the walls of the cities of the land. To distract himself, he set out on a manhunt against the Kossaians, exterminated the entire tribe, and called it a funeral celebration for Hephaistion. (*Pelop.* 34)

No less idiotic is the story of the Samian Agathokles that Lucian recounts in his treatise on mistrusting calumnies.

17. σφάς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὄπλα Ἑφαιστίωνι ἀνέθεσαν ἀποθανόντι (Arr. VII. 14. 9). The formulation is unclear, to say the least. Diodoros (XVII. 115) says nothing of the kind: κατεσκεύαζεν εἰδῶλα δι’ ἐλέφαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν θαυμαζομένων παρ’ ἀνθρώποις.

18. Arr. VII. 15; Diod. XVII. 112 and XIX. 20; Plut., *Alex.* 72; Strab. XVI, p. 744; Polyæn. IV. 3. 31. Only the Greek authors, as already noted, believed them a people distinct from the Uxians, who go by the same name. Alexander must have subjugated tribes settled on the upper tributaries of the Kerka and the river of Dezful.

19. Arr. VII. 15. 5. Arrian does not say here that Hellenes were present among these envoys, but their presence can be gathered from what he says earlier (VII. 14. 6). Diodoros explicitly names Hellenes.

20. Livy (VIII. 17) mentions this alliance.

21. Strab. V, p. 232. While the story of an embassy sent from Rome may have been embroidered in the late histories of Alexander written by Aristos and Asklepiades (Arr. VII. 15. 5), Kleitarchos mentions one (fr. 23), according to Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* III. 9), and that mention renders it credible. For Kleitarchos wrote at a time when the Romans were of no great importance to the Greeks. Aristotole's only known mention of them is a fragment preserved by Plutarch (*Camill.* 22) for the purpose of correcting it. Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* III. 9) says: Theophrastus . . . primus exter-norum aliqua de Romanis diligentius scripsit, nam Theopompus, ante quem nemo mentionem habuit, urbem duntaxat a Gallis captam dicit, Clitarchus ab eo proximus legationem tantum ad Alexandrum missam. Livy's saying (IX. 18), Alexandrum ne fama quidem illis notum fuisse arbitror, proves just as little as the other Roman annalists' silence concerning an embassy (οὐτε τις Ρωμαίων ὑπὲρ τῆς πρεσβείας ταύτης μνήμην ἐποίησάτο τινα: Arr. VII. 15. 6). And in any event, Livy's notice (VIII. 14), interdictum mari Antianti populo est, said of a treaty dating from 338, surely does not prove that the name of the Antiata pirates then vanished from the seas.

22. According to the decree issued at Kephisophon's request (Böckh, *Seeurkunden*, XIV a, and commentary, p. 457 ff.), the expedition was to sail before 10 Munychion, Ol. 113.4 (May 324), under the command of Miltiades the Lakkiad. The very attempt to found a colony could have given rise to an Etruscan mission delivering a protest.

23. Frontinus reports (I. 2. 3) that the Carthaginians sent, cum animadvertissent Alexandri ita magnas opes ut Africae quoque immineret, unum ex civibus, virum acrem, nomine Hamilcarem Rodinum (?), who worked his way into the king's favor by styling himself an exile, qua potius consilia ejus nota suis civibus fecit. Justin's detailed account (XXI. 6. 1) shows that the story of this gambit derives from Trogus Pompeius.

24. The surmise that Herakleides's mission may have extended to a campaign against the Scyths is favored not only by simple probability but also by Arrian's mention (VII. 1. 3) of a rumor to this effect.

25. Arrian (VII. 16. 13) says: "Alexander would rather have died before Hephaistion than survive him, just as Achilles would rather have died before Patroklos than become the avenger of his death."

26. Arr. VII. 16. 5. According to Plutarch and Diodoros, the Chaldaeans, fearing to speak with Alexander directly, delivered their warning by Nearchos's intercession. He therefore had already arrived with the fleet.

27. This is Diodoros's version (XVII. 112). Plutarch says that the king paid the Chaldaeans' warning no heed, but that as he approached the city walls, he saw a flock of ravens attacking one another and many fell dead at his feet. Justin puts the incident at Borsippa, but the holy city of Borsippa stood on the west bank of the Euphrates.

28. Plut., *Alex.* 74. Arrian (VII. 19) mentions an Artemis Kelkaia (cf. C. I. Gr. II, p. 47, no. 1947) and the images of the heroes Harmodios and Aristogeiton, but these he had mentioned earlier as returned (III. 16. 7). The earlier mention is absolute; here he says *λέγεται*.

29. Thus does Arrian (VII. 27) evaluate these rumors and subsequent events. Plutarch (*Alex.* 27) gives a complete account, Diodoros (XVII. 118) certain details.

30. Arr. VII. 17. 4; Strab. XVI, p. 738.

31. Arrian is surely wrong on the distance of this island from the mouth of the Euphrates, in just the way that Mannert describes; Strabo (XVI, p. 765) is perfectly clear.

32. According to Strabo (XVI, p. 766), Tylos or Tyros lay one day's voyage from the promontory Maketa, ten from Teredon (Diridotis) and the mouth of the Euphrates. But no island rises there that could be called large.

33. Mannert recognized this promontory as Ptolemy's Korondanum, present-day Kuriat, or Ras Akanis. Onesikritos seems to be mistaken when he takes it for the same finger of land (Maketa) that the Macedonians saw in the west on the voyage out of India (Arr., *Ind.* 23).

34. Strabo mentions the construction of this canal, but he does not name it. Edrisi seems to describe it when he writes (p. 304): "Below the castle Ebn Hobaira, the Euphrates flows over the countryside of Kufa and this overflow is caught in a sea." This sea of Kumyah was still extant at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and Rennel's map of Babylonia shows it clearly.

35. This city, called Alexandria, probably stood on the site of present-day Al Mussayyib (Hira). Mignan, traveling from Baghdad to the ruins of

Babylon, found ruins called Iskandariyah lying beside a canal; the ancient authors know nothing of an Alexandria there.

36. This is Aristoboulos's report in Arrian (VII. 22). Other authors say the sailor was executed, yet others that Seleukos salvaged the diadem and bound it around his head so that he could swim more freely, creating an omen of the power he was destined to attain.

37. Menandros is the satrap whom Alexander appointed over Lydia on his return to Tyre (331). The inscription dated to his name (C. I. Gr. II, no. 3561) has now appeared corrected and more complete (*Bullet. de corresp. hellén.*, 1, 1877, p. 54). It begins: Θεὸς · τύχη ἀγαθῇ · Βασιλεύοντος Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔτει ἑνδεκάτῳ, Μενάνδρου σατραπεύοντος, ἐπὶ πρυτάνιου Ἰσαγόρου, etc. The subject is an unplanted field (γῆν ψιλὴν ἀγρόν) adjacent to a planted field, which Krateuas transfers to Aristomenes. Alexander's eleventh year ended in autumn 325; a bit more than a year later the satrap will have started for Babylon with his troops.

38. From Nautaka in spring 327, Alexander sent Menidas, with Epokillos and Sopolis, ἐς Μακεδονίαν, τὴν στρατιάν τὴν ἐκ Μακεδονίας αὐτῷ ἀνάξοντας (Arr. IV. 18. 3). From Arrian's expression (VII. 23. 1), καὶ Μενίδας τοὺς ἱππέας ἄγων τοὺς αὐτῷ ξυνταχθέντας, we may assume that he has returned only now to the mobilized army.

39. Böckh's discussion of the *δεκαστάτηρος* and the wage scale of the Macedonian army (*Staatshaushaltung*, I, p. 380) is premised on the doubtful assumption that the tetradrachm was already called "stater" in Alexander's time. The sole notice (albeit from the Kleitarchan tradition) that leads further (Diod. XVII. 64 and Curt. V. 1. 45) can be interpreted to mean that the bonus payments listed there—Macedonian rider: 600 drachmas; allied rider: 500 drachmas; Macedonian soldier: 200 drachmas; mercenary (infantry): two months' wages—are a series in which the first three classes also receive the two months' wages explicitly stated for the fourth. If we take the ratio of gold to silver as 1:12, we arrive at 12½ st., 10½ st., 4 st., and 3½ st. If we assume that these figures are wages and reckon an equal sum for provisions, we arrive at 25, 21, 8, and 7 staters. A dimoirit would have received 16 staters each month and the dekastateros would have received 2 staters more than the common phalangite.

40. Arrian's notices (VII. 23. 3) on this new order, although brief, are those of an expert. Many questions remain unanswered. The figure

26,664 does not count Kossaians and Tapurians. If the basic formation of the Macedonian infantry was a *lochos* of 500 men (31 on the front), as it seems, and if 4 *lochoi* constitute a *taxis*, the intervals through which the middle ranks ran forward are self-evident. But this assumption leaves us without an equivalent for what the Roman formation in *maniples* allows during deployment *en échelon*. The entire question deserves to be examined by specialists.

41. We may assume that Alexander was acquainted with the Roman legion. Since the time of Spartan Archidamos and Molossian Alexander, military matters in Italy were of sufficient interest to the Hellenic world to have been studied there.

42. This much can be gathered from Diodoros (XVIII. 4).

43. Arr. VII. 24, following Aristoboulos; Diod. XVII. 116; Plut., *Alex.* 74 (with certain variants). The episode occurred a few days before the sacrifices and festivals that fell this year in Daisios, according to the *Ephemerides*. In an appendix, I will attempt to show that the Greek month runs between May and June.

44. Arr. VII. 23. 5.

45. Thus Arrian (VII. 23. 8). Diodoros (XVII. 115) says that the Ammonion permitted divine honors and prescribed that Hephaistion be invoked as *πάρεδρος* (emended after Lucian, *De calumn. non cred.* 17). Arrian's version is supported when Kleomenes of Egypt builds a heroon for Hephaistion in Alexandria and another on Pharos. Kleomenes, who had reason to fear Alexander's displeasure at oppression in Egypt, then wrote him of these honors and of others he had arranged. He received a letter of thanks, where we read, among other things: "When I hear that you keep the shrines in Egypt so diligently and provide a heroon for Hephaistion, I am inclined to overlook your earlier misdeeds and to forgive your future transgressions." Even Arrian takes exception to this concession. He would be justified if Alexander's sole consideration had been his satisfaction with the honors done Hephaistion. Kleomenes, in any event, was an excellent financier and a very useful high administrative officer. His satrapy was of the greatest importance for the field campaign that was about to open and, having been born in Egypt, he knew the land like none other. Circumstances may have made it impossible to call him to account from a distance; perhaps there was even a risk that he would flee, taking with

him the great treasures he had gathered. Beyond these superficial considerations, more obscure and more peculiar circumstances may have called for an answer such as the king framed. Given everything we know about Alexander, we have reason not to look right away for small motives.

46. Diodoros's description of the funeral pyre (XVII. 115) is not technical enough to permit a sketch of any clarity; the acclaimed drawings by Quatremère de Quincy are all one could wish except in conformity with the spirit of Hellenic architecture.

47. Plut., *Alex.* 75; Athen. X, p. 432; Arr. VII. 24. I shall no more than mention the silly speculation that Alexander died of a poison prescribed by Aristotle, carried by Kassandros, and administered at Medios's banquet.

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Johann Gustav Droysen

HISTORY OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

Translated from the German by Flora Kimmich

Preface by G. W. Bowersock

Foreword by A. B. Bosworth

Flora Kimmich has translated J. G. Droysen's classic *History of Alexander the Great* into English for the first time. Through her masterly rendering she brings this foundational work of modern historiography of the ancient world to a new audience. Based entirely on ancient sources, this is an exhaustive, beautifully narrated account of Alexander from the origins of the ancient Macedonian kingdom to Alexander's death in Babylon in 323 B.C.

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